Nicole C. Evans is completing her doctorate in international relations at the University of Oxford, St. Antony's College. She is the 2003-2004 retained lecturer in international relations at the university's Wadham College.DESPITE THE END OF THE COLD WAR, many assumptions continue to be made about the supposed inherently aggressive nature of Soviet and Russian strategic nuclear thought. Contained within these assumptions are arguments about the continuity, or lack thereof, between Soviet and Russian defence policies. These assumptions can cloud contemporary analysis of Russian defence policies and contribute to the continuation of dangerous misunderstandings between states. If the orientation and intent of a state's nuclear policy are misinterpreted, the likelihood of an inappropriate response increases dramatically, and with it a spurring of the security dilemma.Contrary to these assumptions, this article argues that there was a defensive orientation in Soviet and Russian strategic nuclear thought from the 1960s until 2002. This is demonstrated by analyzing a neglected but key aspect of Soviet and Russian strategic nuclear thought on the use of nuclear weapons: no-first-use (NFU). I argue that the Soviet Union and Russia took NFU very seriously, which is a good indicator of a defensive orientation in their strategic nuclear policy. The policy of NFU was symbiotic with the Soviet and Russian post-1969 doctrine of launch-upon-attack, since launch-upon-attack called for a retaliatory reaction to an enemy attack. NFU and moves to restrict the use of nuclear weapons were seen by the Soviet Union and Russia as defensive gestures that would restrict the ability and desire of adhering parties to initiate nuclear action.(1)The motivating factors for Soviet and Russian NFU policies varied across different periods and opinion groupings. In the 1960s, civilian analysts and the political leadership focused on the link between NFU, on the one hand, and disarmament and proliferation on the other. Beginning in the 1970s, and carrying through until the demise of the Soviet Union, the emphasis was on the risks of nuclear war and the crucial role for NFU in halting such dangers. As the military establishment became increasingly involved in NFU debates, the consistently negative American responses to Soviet NFU initiatives were seen as evidence of aggressive American intentions. In the post-Soviet period, the dire situation of the Russian armed forces and the ensuing military insecurities led to a shift away from pure NFU to a stance that saw the use of nuclear weapons as a necessary defensive response mechanism. While many of the Soviet NFU gestures were political, the long-lived and cumulative energies put into promoting NFU indicate a positive climate of Soviet opinion regarding NFU.The Soviet and Russian defensive orientation was at times accompanied by a seemingly contradictory offensive military posture and means. However, in contrast to the majority of the Cold War literature, the two stances are not mutually exclusive. The overall Soviet and Russian defensive orientation can be seen as leaning backwards and stepping away, as opposed to leaning forward and poised to pounce. This defensive orientation leaned away from precipitating conflict and worked to sustain stability and peace--however precarious. This was at times contrasted by an offensive military posture. A military posture is the position that would be assumed once the Soviet Union or Russia had been attacked. Once the Rubicon was crossed, Soviet and Russian forces were prepared to engage in what is termed offensive defence. Thus the Soviet Union and Russia could be defensive in orientation but offensive in military posture.The analysis is divided into three periods. It begins in the 1960s, moves into the Brezhnev-Gorbachev period from the 1970s until the extinction of the Soviet state and concludes with the post-Soviet period, ending in 2002 with the American withdrawal from the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. …