War Leader Research Articles

Doing Justice to the Cold War: A Review Essay

January/February 2008 · Historically Speaking 19 Doing Justice to the Cold War: A Review Essay William Stueck ^^ uring the summer of 1986 a group ^H of U.S. scholars selected to partici- ^^ pate in a conference on the Cold War in Beijing traveled to Washington for a briefing . There they learned that die origins of the Korean War were off limits for discussion. Jonathan Pollack, the scholar assigned to write the paper on the war, was not to mention that the fighting had started widi a North Korean military offensive across the 38th parallel. Two years later, at a conference of American and Soviet scholars at Ohio University, the two groups sparred over who had initiated the fighting on June 25, 1950 that began the Korean War. The senior members of the Soviet delegation insisted that it had been South Korea whereas the Americans were adamant that North Korea had been the initiator. Suddenly a young Soviet historian broke in: "I think we should all agree that North Korea attacked South Korea and move on to more important issues." For a moment the conferees fell into stunned silence.' How times have changed since the 1980s! The Cold War has ended, North Korea no longer can dictate what is said by scholars in China about the outbreak of the Korean War, and large bodies of documentation from the former communist nations have become available, thus settling once and for all such issues as who started the shooting in Korea in June 1950. Many mysteries remain, of course, as do many disagreements on interpretation. But no one can reasonably deny that over the last generation Cold War scholarship has been enormously enriched. The five books reviewed here represent some of the most ambitious work published by senior scholars over the last three years. The complaint has been made that, too often, historians treat World War II as the gateway into the Cold War rather than a distinct and important entity unto itself.2 Stalin's Wars clearly avoids such a complaint , as Geoffrey Roberts devotes the bulk of his space to the notion that the Soviet dictator was "a very effective and highly successful war leader" between 1941 and 1945, especially as the conflict progressed . Since this review focuses on the Cold War, I will limit my comments on this book to Roberts's second and third arguments, namely that Stalin "worked hard to make the Grand Alliance a success and wanted to see it continue after the war" and that his "domestic regime [in his last years] was very different from the Soviet system of the prewar years." Roberts makes a strong case that Stalin sought to perpetuate the Grand Alliance after the war. He did so, Roberts asserts, because he needed peace to rebuild his country, because U.S. loans could help in this process, and because he believed that the Americans and the British would accept his primarily defensive goals beyond his borders. Thus he showed considerable flexibility in negotiations and often retreated when faced with U.S. resistance. With the unveiling of the Marshall Plan in mid1947 , however, after the Americans and the British had persistendy revealed insensitivity to his legitimate security concerns and an unwillingness to grant him the gains that superior Soviet contributions to the war effort entided him, he determined that his only choice was to rally his country and die international communist movement to staunch resistance. Even then, from 1949 to his death in 1953 he pursued a measure of détente with the West and, with the exception of Korea, adopted a course of "restraint " that not only sought to maintain peace but looked to a resolution of the critical German question . Roberts does not claim that the United States alone was responsible for the breakdown of the Grand Alliance. Yet he does argue that the United States failed to see "that beyond the alleged communist threat was an opportunity to arrive at a postwar settlement that could have averted the cold war and avoided the ideological warfare that obscured the paradoxical truth that Stalin was the dictator who defeated Hitier and helped to save the world for democracy." Most Cold War historians...

Battles & Leaders of the Civil War by Peter Cozzens, Editor

Battles & Leaders of the Civil War by Peter Cozzens, Editor

DENNIS TEDLOCK (translator and interpreter), Rabinal Achi: A Mayan drama of war and sacrifice

Dennis Tedlock (translator and interpreter), Rabinal Achi: A Mayan drama of war and sacrifice. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. vii, 361. Hb $35.00The Rabinal Achi, a colonial text of the K'iche'-speaking Maya of Rabinal, Guatemala, is an unusual document for a number of reasons. For one, it is a lengthy text of a Maya dance drama concerning historical events before the Spanish conquest. The content is almost entirely pre-Hispanic and concerns such themes as courtly elite behavior and the arraignment and execution of a prisoner, the rebellious K'iche' war leader Cawek of the Forest People. For the colonial period, there is no Maya dramatic text of comparable length and complexity. However, as a dance drama, the Rabinal Achi is as much a performance as it is a text. Although early colonial forms must have existed, the earliest known version dates to 1850, the manuscript recorded by Charles Etienne Brasseur de Bourbourg. Brasseur came to Rabinal in 1855, soon after he acquired the famed K'iche' epic Popol Vuh. While temporarily serving as the parish priest in Rabinal, Brasseur learned of the Rabinal Achi drama. Although he did not obtain the manuscript then owned by Bartolo Sis, he was able to transcribe the K'ichean text. In addition, Brasseur helped revive the dramatic performance, which he witnessed in 1856, the first time it had been played in some 30 years. As it turns out, his 1862 publication of the Rabinal Achi in French and the Achi dialect of K'iche' also helped ensure the continuity of the drama in Rabinal, as Brasseur sent a copy of the book to his assistant in Rabinal, Nicolas Lopez. Transcribed versions of the Achi K'iche' text from the Brasseur edition of 1862 have continued to be used by dance masters in Rabinal to this day.

Old Glory Stories: American Combat Leadership in World War II (review)

Old Glory Stories: American Combat Leadership in World War II (review)

Le cycle de Gédéon ou la condamnation du refus de la royauté

AbstractFar from exemplifying the anti-monarchist position of the Deuteronomistic author, Gideon's cycle underlines his impiety, which, unlike in the case of Abimelek, shows itself not through his thirst for leadership, but through his refusal to carry out the functions assigned by Yahweh. The portrait of a Gideon, as a Canaanite leader, contrasts with the proto-royal portrait of the Israelite Gideon, who is both a war leader and champions Yahweh's cult. The Canaanite figure not only rejects the signs of his divine appointment, whether they show themselves in the divine call or through military victories, but also is responsible for the institution of an idolatrous cult. The Deuteronomistic author thus resets distinct bodies of old traditions, establishing a close link between Gideon-Yerubaal and Abimelek. But the writing of Abimelek's cycle seems to be older than Gideon's one.

From Heart Mountain to Iraq: Lieutenant Watada and a Long Line of Resistance

A historic day. Two generations of Japanese Americans. Key players in political struggles, separated by sixty years, meeting virtually.First Lieutenant Ehren Watada is a third-generation Japanese American who refused military orders to deploy to Iraq. He talks by video conference2 with second generation Japanese Americans Frank Emi and Yosh Kuromiya, leaders of the World War II Japanese American internee draft resistance. Watada is traversing their path of solitary protest.

From Omaha Beach to Dawson's Ridge: The Combat Journal of Captain Joe Dawson (review)

Reviewed by Steven S. Minniear Dublin, California From Omaha Beach to Dawson's Ridge: The Combat Journal of Captain Joe Dawson. Edited by Cole C. Kingseed. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2005. ISBN 1-59114-439-6. Photographs. Notes. Selected bibliography. Index. Pp. xxviii, 272 pages. $29.94. This book should be read for what it does not say in the title. Cole C. Kingseed edited the letters written by a young volunteer in the U.S. Army [End Page 268] through enlistment, training, initial assignment, Officer Candidate School, initial deployment, combat command, and then to his final days before demobilization. Although famous for his, and his command's, service on Omaha Beach and at Dawson's Ridge outside Aachen, Germany, this is more than the story of what Captain Joe Dawson did at those places. It contains the poignant revelations of a son, brother, and friend to those on the home front. It is a study in leadership and motivation set in World War II. Contrary to the title, this book covers the author's experiences throughout his service in World War II, moving from Dawson's basic training to Officer Candidate School, joining the Big Red One (First Infantry Division), deployment overseas, and service in North Africa and Sicily. Next described are preparations for D-Day, the invasion in Normandy, the Breakout and Pursuit through France and Belgium, combat at Aachen, Germany, relief, and return to the U.S. Dawson then describes his reassignment to the Office of Strategic Services and a return to Europe, including trenchant reactions to his visits to concentration camps. The editor has done an exceptional job of interweaving his commentary with the letters. Dawson, as a person, a soldier, and a leader grows, changes, hardens, and almost breaks during the course of the war. It is a stirring and disturbing journey, as any war story is. The peeved enlistee complaining at the officious and wasteful Army life is transformed through training and experience into a divisional staff officer who sees the war across North Africa and Sicily. The young staff officer then becomes a seasoned commander who through his own force of character, and through the heroism of his troops, leads them off Omaha Beach, through the hedgerows and fields of France, and has his defining moment as a company commander beating off thirty-nine days worth of repeated, vicious counterattacks outside Aachen. This is a fine study of an individual's progress through World War II. It is a valuable addition to the collection of anyone interested in leadership, company command, and a personal look at war.

Japan’s Changing Security Norms and Perceptions Since the 1990s

Changes in Japanese security policy and institutions over the past decade and a half nullify cultural and institutionalist views of Japan's postwar pacifism. The boundary of the Self-Defense Force (SDF)'s activity-which had been understood exclusively as defending Japan's own territorial integrity-was expanded to UN peacekeeping activities in the early 1990s, and through a series of policy and institutional changes was expanded further to rear support for U.S. troops in regional contingencies and antiterrorist actions. These changes have been accompanied by significant shifts in Japanese attitudes on defense and security issues. Despite the public's fear of entrapment in war through the alliance relationship with the United States, most Japanese believe that Japan needs to strengthen its defense capability through closer military ties with its alliance partner, and that it is better to revise the peace constitution in order to legitimize the SDF and provide it with military flexibility. Key words: Japan, East Asian security, U.S.-Japan relations Dominant Views Postwar Japanese security norms and institutions generally have been regarded as being consistently pacifist. Based on his public opinion survey analysis from 1945 to 1984, for example, Bobrow maintained that Japanese security perceptions had been passive, with the nation relying on its alliance with the United States and pursuing military minimalism with no clear principles. 1 Since the end of World War II, the Japanese have embraced peace as the integral part of postwar democracy.2 Ikenberry and Kupchan argue that this resulted from socialization by a hegemonic power, the United States. During the post-World War II occupation, the United States was able to force the acquiescence of Germany and Japan through diffusion of a set of normative ideals of democratization and demilitarization and the internal reconstruction upholding these ideals.3 Both culturalists and institutionalists in the field of international relations argue for the continuity of Japanese security norms and the maintenance of Japan's postwar security policy, which allow only for a basic defense capability. Katzenstein finds that Japan has indeed kept to its passive and peace-oriented security policy, despite changes in material relations following the end of the cold war, precisely due to the consolidated anti-military culture. He points out that the anti-military culture has effectively limited Japanese government's security policy options, helped by Japanese procedural norms respecting a vocal minority such as radical pacifists.4 Berger also emphasizes that anti-military sentiments still bind post-cold war leaders of Japan and Germany so that, most recently, neither country could opt for participation in the coalition forces during the Gulf War despite belief in its desirability.5 Institutionalists take the general public policy structure to be more accountable for the continuity of security policy in Japan. Katzenstein and Okawara point out that bureaucratic control of the Japanese military and the decision-making process of public policy prioritizing economics have prevented the centralization of security policy and its autonomy. In addition, social isolation of the military and its lack of legitimacy in society make defense and security policy much weaker.6 Risse-Kappen classifies the Japanese security policy process as quasi-corporatist, where major policy groups participate through institutionalized channels rather than seek broader political coalition.7 These groups tend to be much weaker, however, compared to those in other policy areas. Calder says defense policy remains an orphan in Japanese distributive politics since there are no visible interest groups representing defense policy and politicians specialized in defense issues generally do not draw popular support.8 Gradual but Substantial Changes in Japan's Security Policy The aforementioned arguments rightly point to the importance of identity, norms, and institutions in shaping national interest and security policy. …

Pareja de reyes hispanos en la Antigüedad y la Alta Edad Media: cuestiones comparativas, tipológicas y genéticas

This paper studies pairs of Spanish kings during the Second Punic War, and also other pairs or groups of kings that existed in Early Medieval Spanish Christian kingdoms. Comparative data suggest the existence of the institution of the «associated king». I discuss the possibilities of a genetic explication by the Celtic or Germanic heritage, and, secondly, I propose an alternative typological explication, our kings are war leaders. Both explications are not self-contradictory, and as appendix we survey evidences of a pan Celtic institution, that of «associated king» – it was not only Celtic and it doesn’t explain every Spanish fact under examination.

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Volume 6 (review)

Reviewed by: Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Volume 6 Chandra Miller Manning Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Volume 6. Edited by Peter Cozzens. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004. Pp. 606. Cloth, $39.95.) In 1888, Century magazine editors Clarence Clough Buel and Robert Underwood Johnson began publishing Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, collections of memoirs and reminiscences written mainly by officers. In 2002, Peter Cozzens revived the work with Battles and Leaders, volume 5. Like the original editors, Cozzens includes chapters from magazines and newspapers unadorned by editorial comment, but he also introduces two innovations. Volume 6 pays "greater attention" (five of forty-seven chapters) to the enlisted "soldier's view of the war," and it pursues the "war's undying controversies" with "greater vigor" (xvii, xviii). The type of controversy is telling. Volume 6 helpfully recalls the importance of contingency with chapters about tactics, campaigns, and disagreements between generals. At the same time, the chapters uniformly avoid hard questions about the war's causes, and they omit many of the war's participants. As a result, volume 6 of Battles and Leaders is at least as valuable for what it reveals about postwar reconciliation as for its commentary on the war. Many chapters treat military episodes the author feels have been neglected and also revisit long-standing quarrels. Gen. Orlando B. Willcox's account of the 1861 capture of Alexandria, Virginia, argues that the death of Union colonel Elmer Ellsworth as he hoisted a Union flag played an unheralded role in fanning the "spark" lit by Fort Sumter into the "flame" of a four-year war (37). Daniel E. Sickles, John Newton, Daniel Butterfield, and John Gibbon argue in print over General George Meade's performance at Gettysburg. Meanwhile, John S. Mosby contests unflattering portraits of J. E. B. Stuart at Gettysburg. While they might argue with and about officers on their own side, many of the authors write fondly about their former foes. In 1878, Union major Benjamin Crowinshield praises Confederate troops in the Shenandoah in 1864. Confederate Colonel Prentiss Ingraham in 1902 urges Congress to grant belated Medals of Honor to Union troops who fought courageously at Port Hudson. Former Ohio musician John Cockerill's 1893 account, "A Boy at Shiloh," remembers that when the young Cockerill came upon the fallen body of a Georgia teenager, "I burst into a regular boo-hoo" (137). The reconciliatory flavor of these writings reveals something important about the war's aftermath. Renewed good feeling between former-enemies-turned-fellow-citizens had obvious benefits. When Cockerill's piece appeared in Blue and Gray in 1893, the editors called his sentimental tears "more valuable today to a reunited nation than any act of bravery done during that dreadful day in April" (594). Yet the reunion came at a cost. As David Blight demonstrates in Race and Reunion (2001), after the war white Northerners and Southerners agreed on a particular version of [End Page 174] the war that overlooked causes, ignored slavery, emphasized shared heroism and valor, and excluded black Americans. The articles in Battles and Leaders reflect habits of amnesia and exclusion prevalent from the 1880s through the 1910s, and in so doing remind us that the war's memory has its own important history. Volume 6 continues the Battles and Leaders tradition by making the words of some of the war's participants available to a wider audience. It also provides important evidence about the nationwide emergence of the Lost Cause. Finally, it suggests a direction for future volumes. Like its predecessors, Volume 6 portrays an insistently white war, drawing its articles from periodicals that catered only to white audiences. The only passage of the book to treat substantively the issue of race consists of a white Union officer's description of wounded black Union troops captured during the Battle of the Crater, stripped of most of their clothing, and marched through the streets of Petersburg. Including accounts from African American publications such as The African Repository or the Christian Recorder could help end the distortionary exclusion of a major group of war participants from the memory of the war and indeed would enrich...

Brigadier General John D. Imboden: Confederate Commander in the Shenandoah (review)

Reviewed by: Brigadier General John D. Imboden: Confederate Commander in the Shenandoah James A. Ramage Brigadier General John D. Imboden: Confederate Commander in the Shenandoah. By Spencer C. Tucker. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2003. Pp. 372. $32.00.) Spencer Tucker provides the first critical biography of the life and career of Confederate general John D. Imboden, and it will likely endure as the standard study. The book identifies exaggeration and uncorroborated statements in Imboden's writing and separates fact from fiction. This was indeed a formidable task, given the fact that James I. Robertson and other historians have declared Imboden's postwar writing unreliable and almost worthless. Harold R. Woodward Jr., in [End Page 205] Defender of the Valley: Brigadier General John Daniel Imboden (Berryville, Va., 1996), the only previous biography, solved the dilemma by accepting Imboden's tales as truth. Tucker attacked the problem head on and discovered that Imboden exaggerated as well in his official reports and other writings during the war. However, with extensive research in primary and secondary sources, Tucker highlights Imboden's strengths and points out that he has not received proper credit for his contributions to the Confederate war effort. The most well known Imboden tale is his Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (1887–88), an account of Thomas J. Jackson's great B&O rolling-stock heist at Harper's Ferry in May 1861. Imboden was present, as captain of a Virginia artillery battery, but Tucker concludes that his story is "a bit bizarre" (40) and "there simply is no proof of the event having transpired" (41). At First Manassas, Imboden's battery contributed to Jackson's defense of Henry House Hill, and as commander of the First Virginia Partisan Rangers, Imboden scouted and guarded wagons for Jackson in the Valley Campaign. The other famous Imboden tale is that before the battle of Port Republic Jackson met with him in private and told him the details of his battle plan. Tucker found Imboden's claim "indeed strange" (88) in light of Jackson's policy of secrecy, and "probably not true" (89). As a partisan raider, Imboden displayed initiative, used hit and run, and avoided wasting his men in attacking stronger enemy forces. Robert E. Lee approved, promoted him to brigadier general, and incorporated his command into the regular cavalry. Imboden defended Lee's supply wagons on the retreat from Gettysburg, and Lee appointed him commander of the Valley District. In 1864 Imboden delayed Franz Sigel's advance up the Valley and gave time for Gen. John C. Breckinridge to bring up his men. However, Imboden stretched the truth when he claimed that he won the battle of New Market by pushing back the Union cavalry on the Confederate right. Tucker points out that actually Imboden's men were not involved in the fighting in any meaningful way. Nevertheless, Tucker shows that historians have given Imboden too little credit for holding the first line of defense in the battle of Lynchburg and stalling the Union attack long enough for Jubal Early to organize and win the battle. Tucker interprets that Imboden saved Lynchburg with this significant action. Weakened by typhoid fever, in December 1864 Imboden was relieved of duty in the Valley and placed in charge of prison camps that included Andersonville. Tucker shows that he was a capable administrator who did everything within his power and beyond to relieve the suffering in the camp. He conducted an unannounced inspection and took action to improve living conditions. He realized the situation was hopeless, and without approval from Richmond began paroling prisoners and having them taken to Union lines. Tucker's analysis contributes perspective to the problem of Andersonville, revealing just how unmanageable the situation was on the scene. [End Page 206] After the war, Imboden entered a career that was ahead of its time. Today we would call him the state director of economic development for Virginia. He had offices in Richmond and New York City and traveled to London and throughout the United States to promote development of Virginia's railroads, land, timber, and coal. He was successful and had his happiest moments promoting Virginia at expositions such as the...

The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865 (review)

Reviewed by: The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865 Lesley J. Gordon The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865. By Robert R. Mackey. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004. Pp. 288. $34.85.) One of the ongoing debates among Civil War historians revolves around the question of whether Confederates could have effectively waged guerrilla warfare after their conventional forces surrendered in the spring of 1865. Some contend that if Southerners heeded President Jefferson Davis's call for guerrilla war, the Confederacy would have triumphed. Others insist that this plan was doomed to failure. Robert E. Lee himself rejected the idea, believing surrender was the only honorable option. Robert R. Mackey's fascinating new study examines this controversial issue and comes to some surprising conclusions. Mackey is particularly concerned with accurately defining the term "guerrilla warfare." He notes that the term had a different meaning in the mid-nineteenth century than it has today. Citing the writings of influential nineteenth-century European military theorists Antoine Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausowitz, Mackey contends that Civil War commanders did not conceive of guerrilla warfare as a pure, ideologically driven "people's war." He explains that guerrilla fighters in Civil War terms best match Francis Lieber's definition of disorganized, unpaid, undisciplined marauders who fought sporadically in the most brutal manner. Such men had no formal designation in the organized Confederate [End Page 214] army and preyed mercilessly on civilians. Partisans, however, were formally organized units within the Confederate army. Partisans fought with unconventional tactics, including ambushes and raids, but they were legitimate soldiers with a clear organization and purpose. Mackey's final type of irregular fighters, cavalry raiders, were also legitimate soldiers, but with a generally closer alliance to and tighter restraint from the rebel high command. Mackey contends that the Confederacy tried all three forms of this "irregular warfare" throughout the conflict (6). He draws the most dramatic examples from the upper Southern states of Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Arkansas. Arkansas, Mackey argues, came the closest to an all-out guerrilla fight. Geographically and politically remote from the rest of the Confederacy, Arkansas was ideally suited for this kind of irregular warfare. When conventional forces abandoned Arkansas in 1862, district commander Maj. Gen. Thomas R. Hindman called for fighters to organize themselves into independent companies and operate against the Union army without any formal orders. By 1863, the Confederacy had lost complete control of these guerrillas and attempted to force them into regular service. Federals also sought to disband the roving marauders by developing an innovative counter-insurgency plan that created "fortified colonies"—essentially safe havens for Unionists, guarded by the residents themselves (66). These colonies also provided supplies and base stations for Federal troops. Eventually, the Union army isolated and weakened the guerrillas, turning Arkansans against the Confederacy, convincing them that the Federal government ensured law and order rather than the rebels. In Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee, the story differed. In Virginia, the Confederate government sanctioned John Mosby as a partisan fighter to harass Northern troops, destroy property, and gather intelligence. Mackey insists that Mosby and his men were not guerrillas, despite the fact that the Union reacted to them as if they were. Instead, as disciplined and specially selected volunteers, Mosby and his men practiced unconventional warfare in a very controlled, deliberate manner. Federals overreacted, seeking revenge for Mosby's exploits. Phil Sheridan developed his 1864 Shenandoah Valley Campaign partly as a response to Mosby. This destructive campaign only cemented Mosby's mythic stature. Nonetheless, Mackey judges Mosby's strategic effect on the war limited. The Virginian's operations were just too small, and the Federal forces he faced were too large. The remainder of Mackey's book concentrates on famed Confederate cavalry commanders John Hunt Morgan, Joe Wheeler, and Nathan Bedford Forrest. Conducting mounted raids in Tennessee and Kentucky, these three men wreaked havoc on Union operations. Unlike Mosby, though, these were regular cavalry officers, operating in an acceptable manner against the enemy. Morgan and Forrest, whom Mackey names "two of the greatest cavalry leaders of the Civil War," [End Page 215] had dramatic success as raiders in 1862 (125...

The Promise and Failure of ‘Developed Socialism’: The Soviet ‘Thaw’ and the Crucible of the Prague Spring, 1964–1972

This article examines the international history of the early Brezhnev era, 1964–72, when the Soviet Union simultaneously became more politically stable and socially stagnant. Evidence from a variety of sources indicates that, contrary to the presumptions of many observers, Brezhnev had a serious programme (‘developed socialism’) for revitalising the Soviet system. This programme included a number of international and domestic measures to improve Soviet technology and consumer economy within a strictly managed political framework of authority. Improved relations with the United States and Western Europe (‘détente’) were crucial to this programme. Continued Cold War competition gave ‘developed socialism’ a necessary source of legitimacy. Brezhnev succeeded in selling this programme to other Cold War leaders, but he confronted debilitating resistance at home. Rising domestic expectations within the Soviet empire, the maturation of the post-Stalin generation of citizens, and pervasive social unrest exposed the hypocrisy and shallowness of ‘developed socialism’. Although Brezhnev's programme sought to give the Soviet system a new start, by the late 1960s it contributed to a deepening rot.

"How Changeable Are the Events of War": National Reconciliation in the Century Magazine's "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War"

"How Changeable Are the Events of War": National Reconciliation in the Century Magazine's "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War" Timothy P. Caron In the October 1884 issue of the Century Magazine, editor Richard Watson Gilder began his column, "Topics of the Time," with an auspicious announcement: beginning in the next month's issue, the Century would inaugurate a new series, "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War." In Gilder's words, the new series would feature essays "written by officers who wore either the blue or the gray;—in most cases by generals who, on one side or the other, held either the chief command in the battles described, or commands so important as to clothe them with special authority to speak of events of which they were a part." 1 The series went on to run for three years (November 1884 to November 1887) instead of the projected two and helped to drive the magazine's circulation from 127,000 at the series' beginning to over 250,000 at the height of its popularity, making the Century the most popular magazine of the age and Gilder the most powerful arbiter of literary tastes in late nineteenth-century America. Gilder and the Century's editorial staff agreed that the timing for beginning such a project was perfect; enough time had passed since the war to allow for calm reflection and summing up, and most of the principle players of both the Union and Confederate generals were still living and would eventually be convinced to write for the magazine. Gilder went on to announce the aims of the new series: "It is not part of the plan of the series to go over the ground of the official reports and campaign controversies, but . . . to clear up cloudy questions with new knowledge and the wisdom of cool reflection; and to soften controversy with that better understanding of each other, which comes to comrades in arms when personal feeling has dissipated, and time has proven how difficult are the duties and how changeable are the events of war—how enveloped in accident and mystery." 2 [End Page 151] Gilder's pronouncements regarding the Century's "Battles and Leaders" series proved to be even truer of the "literary" pieces which accompanied the official statements of Northern and Southern strategists. Freed from the constraints of writing official "history," the authors of the "literary" pieces printed during the series' run proved just how "changeable" the narratives of the war actually were once these stories entered the communal exchange of the nation's largest magazine. The essays, poems, and short stories which helped to fill out the pages of the magazine during the series' run provided a forum in which the North and South could express their views on the war. What emerged from the exchange of sectional loyalties and viewpoints between and among Northern and Southern contributors was a cultural narrative—shaped and inflected by the editorial staff of the Century—that proved to be instrumental in promoting sectional reconciliation without blame and in constructing a national romance of reconciliation in the aftermath of the Civil War. Whereas the war years themselves were filled with rhetoric justifying the bloody conflict on the grounds of ending slavery, the historical and literary pieces published in the Century during the run of its "Civil War Series" were willfully silent on matters pertaining to the freedmen, preferring instead to emphasize a knitting together of the nation's white citizens. Most of the essays commissioned for the series and written by Union and Confederate strategists were collected into a four volume compendium, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, which has become the cornerstone of Civil War historiography. 3 A quarter of the material in Battles and Leaders originated in the magazine series, which occupied about one third of each...

THE FRENCH ARMY, 1624–1914: FROM THE KING'S TO THE PEOPLE'S

Richelieu's army: war government and society in France, 1624–1642. By David Parrott. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xxiv+599. ISBN 0-521-79209-6. £65.00.The dynastic state and the army under Louis XIV: royal service and private interest, 1661–1701. By Guy Rowlands. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xxiv+404. ISBN 0-521-64124-1. £55.00.The French army, 1750–1820: careers, talent, merit. By Rafe Blaufarb. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002. Pp. xii+227. ISBN 0-7190-6262-4. £45.00.The people in arms: military myth and national mobilization since the French Revolution. Edited by Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. xi+268. ISBN 0-521-81432. £50.00.From revolutionaries to citizens: antimilitarism in France, 1870–1914. By Paul B. Miller. Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 2002. Pp. xiii+277. ISBN 0-8223-2766-X. £13.95.Although all the books under review are military histories, international conflict is not their central concern. They are not primarily campaign histories, nor studies of strategic or tactical innovations, nor biographies of great commanders. If they help to answer the military historian's traditional question – how is military might created and used on the battlefield – then they do so indirectly, through an exploration of how the state marshalled its resources for war, particularly in terms of manpower. This is not just a question of emphasis, or of filling in gaps in the historiography; these books mount a sustained critique on the explanatory models favoured by military historians. Military history, David Parrott suggests, too readily falls into a ‘whiggish trap’: a series of clear-sighted war leaders grasp the potential of technology in achieving the state's foreign policy objectives; technological shifts drive changes in the size and organization of armies, and consequently in the development of the state. And thus was the modern world of large, complex, disciplined organizations made. In contrast, we are offered here a selection of error-prone war leaders, constrained at every turn by the social, political, and financial realities of their day, who were intent not on ‘progress’ but on manipulating the system of which they themselves were a part, and as much for their own ends as for those of the state they served.

Socio-political change on a slave-raiding frontier: war, trade and 'Big Men' in nineteenth century Sisalaland, Northern Ghana

Life in nineteenth century northern Ghana was characterised by insecurity as inhabitants experienced frequent slave-raiding. Local villages forged alliances with raiders as a means to alter the local political balance in their favour. Preliminary research indicates that many of the local powerbrokers who emerged as war leaders during this period also occupied easily defensible locations or well-fortified villages with access to trade routes. Archaeological investigations at the hilltop site of Yalingbong reveal that the community was well-situated to take advantage of increased trading opportunities but that status differences within the site are not marked.

Reason and history as guides for hospital pharmacy practice leaders

Leadership has certainly become a well-discussed topic in hospital pharmacy and, indeed, in all of society. America’s obsession with celebrity has fostered interest in the charismatic, colorful leaders in various fields, including business, religion, politics, diplomacy, and war. I suspect that

Welty's Golden Imagination

One Writer's Imagination: The Fiction of Eudora Welty. By Suzanne Marrs. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 2002. xix + 280 pp. $59.95 cloth; $24.95 paper. Suzanne Marrs's publications, following her dissertation, have all been devoted to Eudora Welty and her work. Consequently, her latest book on Welty, One Writer's Imagination: The Fiction of Eudora Welty, illustrates the benefits and drawbacks of focusing a career's work on a single author. Marrs can provide us with a sensitive and thoroughly researched view of the artist's imagination through her mastery of biographical and archival materials, but loses that authority when she strays beyond Welty's strengths and her own. There is little attempt in this book to place Welty's work in the contexts of literary theory and American literary history. Although Chapter 3 concerns history and memory in The Robber Bridegroom and The Wide Net, there are no references to theoretical works on historical fiction, from Lukacs on down, which would actually support Marrs's argument that Welty uses her historical fiction to comment on the present as well as the past. Marrs claims that "We still have no generic name for the closely linked book of stories that Welty produced," The Golden Apples, when such works are generally called short story sequences or cycles, and, again, there are books devoted to this topic, particularly American short story sequences, which are not referenced. More seriously, there are no references to Henry James and The Art of Fiction when Marrs describes the way Welty transformed a seemingly trivial anecdote she had heard into a meaningful and significant work of fiction, as in "the Death of a Traveling Salesman." This process is remarkably similar to James's accounts of how a "germ" from reality acted upon his imagination until it became fiction. Again, there is a body of scholarship here that could help illuminate Welty's imaginative process. [End Page 141] Like any other artist, Welty had her favored themes and topics and had the sense to work from these strengths. Marrs, however, does not seem to be willing to concede Welty her areas of imaginative expertise, but repeatedly tries to assert her interest in politics and world events and the ways these matters appear in her fiction as if Welty were under some obligation to treat these topics. While it would be difficult for most readers to believe that these were central topics for Welty, Marrs succeeds when she discusses the two stories, "Where Is the Voice Coming From?" and "The Demonstrators" that are explicitly about the violence and hatred of the civil rights era in Mississippi. She is also illuminating when she discusses the portrait of Aaron Burr in "First Love" as Welty's exploration of fascist leaders in World War II or comments on the "dramatic irony" in Delta Wedding since the Fairchilds are oblivious to the fact that they would have "to face a severe economic depression and a world war" and leave "the relatively secure world of 1923." Often though, the discussion seems forced, as if Marrs were dutifully bowing to race, class, and gender. For example, the discussions of race at the end of the chapters on and The Optimist's Daughter seem anticlimactic and irrelevant after the excellent analyses of Welty's imaginative process which precede them. Marrs's strengths, and they are formidable, lie in her use of biographical knowledge of Welty and of the Welty archives, and here she uses her knowledge of Welty's life to argue against fashionable trends in scholarship and focus on what worked for Welty. While many might assert that Welty's choice to live in Mississippi with her widowed and later ailing mother limited her autonomy as a woman and experience as a writer, Marrs shows how much Welty benefited from these apparent constrictions. She proves through her account of Chestina Welty's life that she was not interested in conforming to a conventional woman's role herself, nor did she...

Les écrits militaires de Charles de Gaulle et le classicisme militaire prussien

Charles de Gaulle's military writings and the classical Prussian military tradition ; The important place of Prussia and Germany in Charles de Gaulle’s military writings raises the cpiestion of how far the latter agreed or disagreed with German military principles and practices. After the Reich's foundation in 1871, German military thought steadily departed from the classical Prussian model, whose dominant figures had been Clausewitz and Moltke. This drift, within a Germany beset with gro¬ wing power pretensions, did not escape the notice of de Gaulle. Among the factors that contributed to Germany's defeat in 1918, he remarked on the taste for over-ambitious enterprises, excessive boldness, and the domination exerted by the military high command over the political authorities. Thus the Reich had partly broken with Prussian political and military principles and practices. To analyse Prussian writings is to discover a close convergence between them and de Gaulle’s own thought -true whether one scrutinizes the general principles of war, or action, the value of doctrine, or the qualities that make a good officer, or civil-military relations. To be sure, Captain de Gaulle had criticised what he called «the Moltke system » in the higher conduct of operations. But his critique bore chiefly upon the corrupted application of this system in the days leading up the Battle of the Marne in 1914. The refusal of dogmatism, the high regard for the spirit of initiative, and the continual adaptation of actions to circumstances were the enduring characteristics of Prussian practices that de Gaulle completely approved of. And when he characterised the ideal war leader, one can hardly avoid concluding that Moltke matches his description. Finally, de Gaulle’s own conduct confirms in large measure that he did embrace Prussian classical military tenets.

“Citizens of a Free People”: Popular Liberalism and Race in Nineteenth-Century Southwestern Colombia

“Citizens of a Free People”: Popular Liberalism and Race in Nineteenth-Century Southwestern Colombia