Layoff Decisions Research Articles

CEO EQUITY PORTFOLIO INCENTIVES AND LAYOFF DECISIONS

AbstractCEOs with higher equity‐based compensation are widely believed to be more likely to act in shareholders' interests. Unlike less common acquisitions, voluntary liquidations, or seasoned equity offerings, layoffs are comparatively common elements of firms' operating strategies. We find that CEOs with at least one year of tenure who possess greater incentives from portfolios of restricted stock and stock option grants are more likely to announce layoffs, and that these layoffs create shareholder value. We conclude that accumulated portfolios of restricted stock and stock option grants encourage CEOs to adopt operating strategies that improve operating profits and stock performance.

How Do Shareholders Respond to Downsizing? A Meta-Analysis

Massive layoffs announcements often attract extensive media coverage. Beyond the newsworthiness of such events, is such a decision in any way correlated to the company's stock market performance? Do some firms resort to massive layoffs simply to please shareholders? In this paper, we offer a thorough review of the literature in an attempt to answer these questions. The core of the paper is a meta-analysis. We show that layoffs announcements have an overall negative effect on stock market prices, and this remains true whatever the country, the period of time or the type of firm considered. However, some factors may ease as well as worsen the stock market's reaction to such announcements. The reason for the layoff decision is among the most decisive factors and the market sanction will be more severe in the case of defensive layoffs (taken by firms facing difficulties) than for offensive layoffs (when they are part of a more general reorganization strategy).

CEO Cash and Stock‐Based Compensation Changes, Layoff Decisions, and Shareholder Value

AbstractThe chief executive officers (CEOs) of firms announcing layoffs receive 22.8% more total pay in the subsequent year than other CEOs. The pay increases result almost entirely from increases in stock‐based compensation and are found to persist. In addition, layoff announcements are accompanied by shareholder value increases averaging $40 million to $95 million. One‐time labor cost savings from layoffs average $65 million. We conclude that CEOs receive pay increases following layoffs as rewards for past decisions and to motivate value‐enhancing decisions in the future.

Evaluating the Characteristics of Corporate Boards Associated with Layoff Decisions

The paper evaluates the characteristics of corporate boards associated with layoff decisions using a large sample of UK firms suffering performance declines over the period 1994–2003. The results show that firms are less likely to respond to performance declines with employee layoffs when they have large boards. Further analysis shows that layoff decisions are positively associated with the proportion of outside directors and directors’ remuneration. The findings provide some support to the recommendations of the Cadbury Report (1992) and Higgs Review (2003) on the importance of the structure and composition of board of directors in the corporate governance process.

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND EXPERIENCE RATING: INSURANCE VERSUS EFFICIENCY*

Unemployment insurance (UI) distorts firms' layoff decisions by reducing the cost of laying off workers. To dampen this increase, it has been suggested that UI should be financed with an experience‐rated tax. Despite the fact that increasing the level of experience rating can reduce unemployment, it can reduce the insurance coverage workers receive. With high experience rating, firms may reduce their severance payments by more than the UI benefit. We build a model where competitive firms offer contracts with severance payments to risk‐averse workers. Frictions in the labor market lead to incomplete insurance. This article shows that less than full‐experience rating enables the government to increase the insurance coverage workers receive. Welfare implications are also investigated.

Unemployment Insurance and Experience Rating: Insurance Versus Efficiency

Unemployment insurance (UI) distorts firms' layoff decisions by reducing the cost of laying off workers. To dampen this increase, it has been suggested that UI should be financed with an experience-rated tax. Despite the fact that increasing the level of experience rating can reduce unemployment, it can reduce the insurance coverage workers receive. With high experience rating, firms may reduce their severance payments by more than the UI benefit. We build a model where competitive firms offer contracts with severance payments to risk-averse workers. Frictions in the labor market lead incomplete insurance. This paper shows that less than full experience rating enables the government to increase the insurance coverage workers receive. Welfare implications are also investigated.

Recalls and unemployment insurance taxes

The US unemployment insurance (UI) system draws its funds from a payroll tax on employers. The tax rate varies directly with an employer's layoff history. There exists extensive evidence on the effect of this so-called experience rated tax on layoff decisions. However, since firms are typically liable for each dollar of regular UI benefits paid to laid off former employees, experience rating may also affect recall behaviour. This note therefore measures the effect of the UI financing system on the duration of unemployment. This article finds some evidence that higher layoff tax costs shorten the duration of recall unemployment.

If the River Stopped: A Talmudic Perspective on Downsizing

In a weak economy, both managers and scholars may seek an ethical framework to guide decisions about layoffs and downsizing. Agency and stakeholder theories offer limited practical guidance about ethical norms. This paper looks to the Talmud, an ancient compilation of law, legend, and critical analysis for insights into the modern employment relationship. In its method of analysis and in its specific discussion of the treatment of employees, the Talmud provides an approach and a framework for assessing the ethical standing of particular layoff decisions. The article introduces readers to elements of Talmudic analysis and then applies that framework to particular kinds of corporate downsizing decisions.

Exploring the Dynamics of Business Values: A Self-affirmation Perspective

In this paper our aim is to augment the value-congruency literature by demonstrating the dynamics of business value structures. The relationship between cognitive discomforts and value restructuring is examined by applying self-affirmation theory. Subjects (N = 115) were randomly assigned either to the treatment group (n = 69) or control group (n = 46). Those subjects in the treatment group were tasked with deciding between two different organizational re-structuring options that involved downsizing. The values of job-entitlement, and obligations to the disadvantaged shifted in emphasis in a direction that legitimated and justified the lay-off decision. The value of economic nationalism remained unchanged. Implications for research and practice are discussed.

Labour‐market Institutions and Macroeconomic Shocks

Abstract. Macroeconomic shocks and labour‐market institutions jointly determine employment growth and economic performance. The effect of shocks depends on the nature of these institutions and the effect of institutional change depends on the macroeconomic environment. It follows that a given set of institutions may be appropriate in one epoch and not in another. We derive a dynamic model of labour demand in which the effect of firing costs on labour demand depends on the macroeconomic environment: when the level of macroeconomic activity is expected to drop and/or the trend rate of productivity growth is small, a rise in firing costs affects mainly (and adversely) the hiring decision and not the layoff decision. This makes firing costs harmful to employment when it may appear most appropriate. In contrast, firing costs can raise employment during periods of high growth and positive shocks. Our hypothesis is supported by empirical results using OECD data.

Severance Pay Rules and Structural Layoff Decisions

Severance Pay Rules and Structural Layoff Decisions

The Role of Education in Determining Labor Market Outcomes in Urban China's Transitional Labor Markets

Abstract Chinese urban workers are no longer shielded from market forces. They are bearing the brunt of the adjustment costs as enterprises shed redundant workers. This paper focuses on the role of education in determining labor market outcomes in China’s rapidly changing urban labor environment. The empirical work, based on enterprise and worker survey data gathered in the fall of 1999 and spring of 2000, demonstrates that education is a key determinant of labor market outcomes. Educational attainment is an important and significant factor in the lay-off decision—the more education a worker has the better his/ her protection from lay off. Similarly, the more education a worker has the better his/her chances of finding new employment once laid off. The human capital accumulation of re-employed workers is rewarded more, as measured in terms of incremental earnings for each additional year of schooling, than that of continuously employed workers. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Codes:

Who goes? Who cares? Who stays? Who wants to?

Traditional employment practices since the Second World War had usually ensured job security for a company’s workforce. However, the increasingly competitive environment and the restructuring of companies in the 1980s and 1990s have made this practice impossible to continue; therefore, layoffs have become a fact of life for employees in an increasing number of industries. The purpose of this study was to examine attitudes in two employment environments, one in which temporary workers were used to shield permanent employees from layoffs and another in which layoff decisions were made without regard to permanent or temporary status. Specifically, examination was made of the relationships among perceived organizational support (POS), organizational commitment, and intention to quit, and the relative levels of these variables across two environments and the two classes of workers. It was found that, as expected, the relationships among the commitment variables and intention to quit were similar within both environments. Also, as expected, levels of commitment in the “shield” environment were higher than in the “layoff” environment; and POS was higher among temporary employees in the “shield” environment than among permanent workers in the “layoff” environment. A particularly interesting finding was that, in the “layoff” environment, POS among temporary workers was higher than among permanent workers.

Who’s Displaced First? The Role of Race in Layoff Decisions

We test empirically the proposition that race significantly affects an employee’s layoff chances. Using data from a financial firm (N = 8918), we find that whites are less likely to be laid off than nonwhites and that, among nonwhites, Asians are less likely to be laid off than blacks or Hispanics. These findings are statistically significant after controlling for structural factors (business unit, occupation, and job level) and individual characteristics (tenure and performance rating). A similar pattern of racial differences exists in other employment practices more actively monitored by the firm, including promotions, pay raises, and performance ratings. Yet these differences are smaller than those in layoffs and are significant for blacks only, not for Hispanics. Our findings suggest that monitoring personnel decisions can reduce racial inequality. Furthermore, our findings highlight that racial differences in employment outcomes vary among minority groups.

Severance Pay Rules and Structural Layoff Decisions

The paper develops a formal model of the optimal age-tenure structure in layoff decisions. Based on a linear Bayesian learning process a severance pay rule, which is derived from voluntary participation and separation conditions for individual workers, determines the dismissal costs. An optimal selection policy generally equalizes the expected profit contributions over the marginal workers retained in each age-group. Given plausible assumptions, the selection criteria and layoff rates for older workers decrease. However, the effect of tenure on selection and layoff rates remains ambiguous.

Layoffs, shareholders' wealth, and corporate performance

We examine the relation between layoffs and stockholders' wealth, and corporate performance subsequent to layoffs. We find that layoffs are preceded by a period of poor stock market and earnings performance, and are followed by significant improvements in both. On average, layoff announcements are associated with a significantly negative stock market response, with the lowest returns associated with layoffs attributed to declining demand. We do not find any evidence that layoff announcements are followed by reduced total employment in the subsequent 3 years; however, we find evidence of improving profit margins and improved labor productivity following layoffs. We find no evidence that the eventual turnaround in firm performance following layoff decisions is due to mean reversion in accounting earnings. Finally, we find that layoff firms tend to increase corporate focus. Our findings support the view that a layoff decision is a rational response to ensure corporate survival.

Unemployment Outflow and Unemployment Insurance Taxes

The system of Unemployment Insurance (UI) financing in the US draws its funds from a payroll tax on employers and varies the tax rate according to the individual employer's layoff history. There exists extensive evidence on the effect of this so-called experience rated tax on layoff decisions. However, since firms are liable for each dollar of regular UI benefits paid to laid off former employees, experience rating may also affect recall behavior. The present study therefore measures the effect of the UI financing system on the duration of unemployment. Using duration data is essential since tax charges to the firm vary over the duration of unemployment spells. Empirical results based on data with various sources of variation suggest that higher layoff tax costs shorten the duration of recall unemployment.

Escalation in groups: Focus on information sampling

The purpose of this experiment was to examine if groups escalate more than individuals when information is not distributed to all group members. The experiment also attempted to replicate Bazerman, Beekun, and Schoorman's (1992) findings, that participants with high responsibility escalate more than participants with low responsibility. The task was a modified version of the Heeley Store Case (Bazerman et al., 1992). The dependent measures fell into three categories: rewards, appropriateness of layoff/demotion, and forecasted future performance. The results showed little support for the hypotheses. First, high responsibility participants escalated significantly more than low responsibility candidates for only one of the six measures. This may have been due to the fact that all participants felt responsible for their decisions. For the other dependent variables, the effect was either not significant or in the wrong direction. Second, no significant interaction was found between responsibility and decision-making context (individual, groups with all shared information, and groups with shared and unshared information). We then analyzed the data using a measure of felt responsibility as a covariate. The interaction between felt responsibility and decision-making context was significant only for layoff decision. For all of the other measures, no significant interaction was found. One possible reason why our hypotheses were not supported may have been that the groups felt a diffusion of responsibility. Larger groups may have also demonstrated the effects of group processes more effectively. No clear conclusions can be made regarding the influence of information sampling on escalation.

Unemployment Outflow and Unemployment Insurance Taxes

The system of Unemployment Insurance (UI) financing in the US draws its funds from a payroll tax on employers and varies the tax rate according to the individual employer's layoff history. There exists extensive evidence on the effect of this so-called experience rated tax on layoff decisions. However, since firms are liable for each dollar of regular UI benefits paid to laid off former employees, experience rating may also affect recall behavior. The present study therefore measures the effect of the UI financing system on the duration of unemployment. Using duration data is essential since tax charges to the firm vary over the duration of unemployment spells. Empirical results based on data with various sources of variation suggest that higher layoff tax costs shorten the duration of recall unemployment.

Human Capital, Employment and Bargaining.

This book examines human capital investment, employment and bargaining at the level of the firm. It attempts a summary of results that incorporate both human capital investment and employment decisions within firm union bargaining models, emphasising investment in teams, or groups, of workers. The authors also examine human capital in relation to labour demand as well as the delineation between neoclassical and coalitional firms. Further they investigate connections between, on the one hand, turnover costs and firm-specific human capital and, on the other, unemployment. Labour market policy topics recur throughout the book and include the choice between pure wage and profit sharing remuneration systems, the issue of whether training should be subsidized by governments, and work-sharing versus layoff decisions. This book is aimed mainly at the academic economics profession, but is easily accessible to final-year undergraduate and postgraduate students.