Law In Times Of Crisis Research Articles

Exponential Inequalities: Equality Law in Times of Crisis ed. by Shreya Atrey & Sandra Fredman (review)

Exponential Inequalities: Equality Law in Times of Crisis ed. by Shreya Atrey & Sandra Fredman (review)

Poland ∙ Testing the New Public Procurement Law in Times of Crisis

Poland ∙ Testing the New Public Procurement Law in Times of Crisis

A Bridge and a Pivot: The ILO and International Organizations Law in Times of Crisis

A Bridge and a Pivot: The ILO and International Organizations Law in Times of Crisis

Enforcement of Competition Law in Times of Crisis: Is Guided Self-Assessment the Answer?

One common criticism of the EU’s competition regime is that it hinders adequate mitigation of crises by preventing a collaborative response to the problem. We suggest that this view is incorrect. We suggest that a collaborative response is unlikely to effectively mitigate most problems. Yet some forms of cooperation can facilitate a crisis solution. These may be at the margin of legality, giving uncertainty as to whether the proposed practice is permitted. With the possibility of significant penalties for competition infringements, most undertakings will not engage in such cooperative practices. There are significant legal and institutional impediments to providing this Guidance. Such gaps lead to uncertainty found in the nature of the EU competition rules and in NCA practice. We argue that the means forward is with greater engagement and guidance by the Commission and NCAs.

Defending Ukraine with EU weapons: arms control law in times of crisis

AbstractThe wish from 24 February 2022 onwards to help Ukraine defend against Russian aggression has led to the provision of unprecedented lethal European Union (EU) military assistance. As the ‘taboo’ of supplying lethal assistance into non-EU conflicts is swept aside, what is the role of international arms control law? The legal requirements of the EU Common Position on arms exports and the Arms Trade Treaty compel EU Member States to assess various short- and long-term risks associated with arms exports. But it is unclear how arms control norms are being taken into account by the EU Council in its rapidly evolving role as a peacemaker.The standards that are being used to shape EU decision-making on Ukraine matter both for their precedent-setting as reflecting the trajectory of EU normative power, as well as on the long-term blowbacks of proliferation on illicit arms trafficking. While from the EU Council, there has been limited public articulation of these risks, greater consideration thereof would serve as a reminder of the reality of post-conflict arms proliferation, ie. illicit arms trafficking of weapons leached from the conflict, and their subsequent misuse by undesirable actors. Geostrategic precedent is being set, with implications that extend far beyond Ukraine, including to other conflicts where the EU is already intervening. The EU’s delivering of massive lethal military assistance alters also the reflexive perception of its institutions.

Put Even More Women and Minorities in Charge

This Essay offers an interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary, and transdisciplinary analysis of the international successes of many women leaders in responding to COVID-19. This Essay is based on the keynote speech at the South Carolina Journal of International Law & Business fall 2020 Symposium: International Law in Times of Crisis.

Competition law in times of crisis—tackling the COVID-19 challenge

Competition law in times of crisis—tackling the COVID-19 challenge

Competition law in times of crisis—tackling the COVID-19 challenge: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

Competition law in times of crisis—tackling the COVID-19 challenge: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

Competition law in times of crisis—tackling the COVID-19 challenge: a producer perspective

Competition law in times of crisis—tackling the COVID-19 challenge: a producer perspective

Criminal Law in Crisis

In this Essay, I offer a brief account of how the COVID-19 pandemic lays bare the realities and structural flaws of the carceral state. I provide two primary examples or illustrations, but they are not meant to serve as an exhaustive list. Rather, by highlighting these issues, problems, or (perhaps) features, I mean to suggest that this moment of crisis should serve not just as an opportunity to marshal resources to address the pandemic, but also as a chance to address the harsh realities of the U.S. criminal system. Further, my claim isn’t that criminal law is in some way unusual in this respect (i.e., similar observations certainly could be and have been made about the pandemic’s exposure of long-lasting problems associated with the health care/insurance system, the tethering of social benefits to employment, pervasive inequality, and many other features of U.S. political economy). Nevertheless, the current moment provides an opportunity to appreciate the ways in which some of the most problematic aspects of criminal law in times of crisis are basic features of the U.S. carceral state in times of “normalcy.” To this end, my argument proceeds in two Parts, each addressing one of the aspects or pathologies of U.S. criminal policy that the pandemic has exacerbated. In Part I, I address the absence of “sentencing realism” or, perhaps more accurately, the failure to consider the reality of jails and prisons when imposing sentences or pretrial detention. In Part II, I address the basic limitations of thinking of “the criminal system” as a single monolithic “system,” or, even, as “systematic” at all. What do commentators and lawmakers miss when they suggest or assume that criminal law and its administration are the same in a rural county in Colorado as in an urban county in New York? In each Part, I explain how the pandemic has made each phenomenon more easily identifiable, but also how each phenomenon defined the criminal system in pre-coronavirus days. Ultimately, I argue that the “crisis” frame provides an opportunity for reform, but we must not allow the crisis frame to obscure the ways in which the criminal system was in crisis well before the first COVID-19 tests came back positive.

Soft and hard law in times of crisis: budget monitoring, migration and cybersecurity

European integration is associated with the idea of an ‘ever closer Union’, achieved in part through ‘integration-through-crisis’. However, while crises have led to higher regulatory pressure, responses to these crises have not always taken the form of stronger commitments and legally binding rules. Based on the study of three policy areas recently affected by crises, this article aims at analysing why in one of these policies (migration) more soft rules have been adopted, while the two other policies have evolved towards a greater use of hard law (budget monitoring, cybersecurity). Three potential explanations are analysed: the intensity of crises impacting political systems; the quality of prior norms and their (perceived) implementation; the entrepreneurship and heterogeneity of the coalition. Although all of these factors have explanatory powers, the capacity of policy entrepreneurs to build a large coalition appears to be the central explanation.

The Theory of EU Constitutional Pluralism: A Crisis in a Crisis?

Abstract The paper deals with the validity of constitutional pluralism as a constitutional theory for the European Union and a paradigm for the understanding of EU law in the current times of crisis. It reconstructs the way in which constitutional pluralism came to the fore, the different ways in which the theory was presented, and considers historical criticism it has faced. It then looks at the anomalies that, allegedly, cannot be explained today by constitutional pluralism as a paradigm, linked to the current economic and political crises in the Union. The reconstruction of the debate is complemented with reflections on both the descriptive and normative validity of EU constitutional pluralism’s claims.

Reflections on the ‘Administrative, Not Constitutional’ Character of EU Law in Times of Crisis

Abstract As is broadly recognized, the realm of administrative power greatly expanded over the course the twentieth century (particularly after 1945). This essay argues that this expansion, along with differential conceptions of legitimacy deeply bound up with it, are crucial to understanding not just the modern administrative state but also the nature of EU governance and the law governing its operation. Despite a dominant paradigm that seeks to understand EU governance in autonomously democratic and constitutional terms, the legitimacy of integration as a whole has remained primarily ‘administrative, not constitutional’. The EU’s normative power, like all power of an ultimately administrative character, finds its legitimacy primarily in legal, technocratic and functional claims. This is not to deny that European integration involves ‘politics’ or has profound ‘constitutional’ implications for its member states or citizens. The ‘administrative, not constitutional’ paradigm is meant only to stress that the ultimate grounding of EU rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication comes closer to the sort of administrative legitimacy that is mediated through national executives, national courts, and national parliaments to a much greater extent than the dominant paradigm supposes. This is the reality that the ‘administrative, not constitutional’ paradigm on EU law has always sought to emphasize, and it is one that is particularly pertinent to the integration process in times of crisis. It is unsurprising, in these circumstances, that the public law of European integration has continually resorted to mechanisms of nationally mediated legitimacy in order to ‘borrow’ legitimacy from the national level. Unless and until Europeans begin to experience democracy and constitutionalism in supranational terms, the ‘administrative, not constitutional’ paradigm suggests that the EU’s judicial doctrines must be adjusted. The purpose should be to address the persistent disconnect between supranational regulatory power and its robust sources of democratic and constitutional legitimacy on the national level.

Between International Standards and Transnational Greed

The article discusses the process of transnationalisation of the rule of law in times of globalisation. The economic crisis serves as a stage for our analysis, in which the preconditions of the rule of law are challenged. The Austrian case study focuses on the breakdown of the Austrian banking systems and enables us to understand how international standards and European regulation affect the domestic concept of the rule of law, especially in terms of helping to re-establish the rule of law in times of crisis. The example provides insights into how, in the specific interrelation between the domestic rule of law shaped by Austrian legal culture and the implementation of international and European elements of the rule of law, a unique transnational concept of the rule of law is developed. The article concludes that it is necessary to understand the rule of law in a global context in its plurality of transnational rules of law, which depend on the unique interrelation between the respective national legal systems and the international level.

The importance of the principle of justification in the firing: the paradox of "free paid dismissal" in spanish labour law in times of crisis

L’importanza del principio di giustificato motivo per il licenziamento: il paradosso del libero pagato nel diritto del lavoro spagnolo in tempi di crisi In questo articolo viene descritta la legislazione spagnola in materia di licenziamento, come riformata nel 2010 e, di nuovo, nel 2012, nel pieno della crisi economica. L’analisi, condotta dal punto di vista strettamente giuridico, si incentra sulla transizione da un sistema basato sulla limitazione del potere di libero recesso del datore di lavoro, attraverso la previsione di specifiche causali giustificative, al modello del libero pagato. L’evoluzione del sistema spagnolo dimostra che l’oblazione del principio di giustificatezza del licenziamento puo incentivare comportamenti economicamente irrazionali dell’imprenditore, che rischiano di danneggiare l’efficienza del mercato del lavoro.

The Rule of Law in Times of Crisis - A Legal Theory on the State of Emergency in the Liberal Democracy

This article aims to contribute to the theoretical discussion about the rule of law and about its definition by looking at situations where the rule of law is put to the test – states of emergency. states of emergency and laws of exception have specific characteristics, one fundamental characteristic being that legislative power is shifted to the executive – in other words, democracies become less democratic. By analysing the principle of the rule of law in conjunction with the nature of emergencies and the structure of states of emergency, their interconnection will become more transparent. It will logically demonstrate that rules regarding states of exception concern only liberal democracies and that the rule of law has to continue its rule also within times of crisis. I will argue that there is no democracy without a conception of the rule of law and the rule of law only works in democracies and is therefore inapplicable to authoritarian regimes. Having established that, this article adds to the legal-theoretical understanding of the rules of emergency powers by elaborating them on the basis of the concepts democracy, rule of law and separation of powers.

The Rule of Law in Times of Crisis

This article aims to contribute to the theoretical discussion about the rule of law and about its definition by looking at situations where the rule of law is put to the test - states of emergency. States of emergency and laws of exception have specific characteristics, one fundamental characteristic being that legislative power is shifted to the executive - in other words, democracies become less democratic. By analysing the principle of the rule of law in conjunction with the nature of emergencies and the structure of states of emergency, their interconnection will become more transparent. It will logically demonstrate that rules regarding states of exception concern only liberal democracies and that the rule of law has to continue its rule also within times of crisis. I will argue that there is no democracy without a conception of the rule of law. The rule of law only works in democracies and is therefore inapplicable to authoritarian regimes. Having established that, this article adds to the legal-theoretical understanding of the rules of emergency powers by elaborating them on the basis of the concepts democracy, rule of law and separation of powers.

I Book Review: Law in Times of Crisis. Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice

I Book Review: Law in Times of Crisis. Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice

Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and in Practice

Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and in Practice

Law in Times of Crisis, Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice by Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin (Eds)

Law in Times of Crisis, Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice by Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin (Eds)