Abstract
European integration is associated with the idea of an ‘ever closer Union’, achieved in part through ‘integration-through-crisis’. However, while crises have led to higher regulatory pressure, responses to these crises have not always taken the form of stronger commitments and legally binding rules. Based on the study of three policy areas recently affected by crises, this article aims at analysing why in one of these policies (migration) more soft rules have been adopted, while the two other policies have evolved towards a greater use of hard law (budget monitoring, cybersecurity). Three potential explanations are analysed: the intensity of crises impacting political systems; the quality of prior norms and their (perceived) implementation; the entrepreneurship and heterogeneity of the coalition. Although all of these factors have explanatory powers, the capacity of policy entrepreneurs to build a large coalition appears to be the central explanation.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
