Years ago, it seems now decades ago, I outlined in a little book some of the most widespread dissatisfactions with what was at the time the study of comparative government-the way it was taught, the kinds of preoccupations and research it inspired, and more generally its place in the discipline.' I concluded, not unjustifiably it seems to me in retrospect, that the traditional approach was essentially parochial, monographic, descriptive, bound to the West and particularly to Western Europe, excessively formalistic and legalistic, and insensitive to theory-building and theory-testing. I suggested at the time a crude conceptual outline in terms of which individual systems could be studied and compared. It comprised the following three categories: interests and interest configuration, ideology, and governmental structures. The first corresponded to what are generally referred to today as the input factors. I defined interest in a broad sense. It encompassed primarily manifested and articulated interests rather than latent interests. My definition had, therefore, a concrete and direct relevance to the political process. Ideology was a loose term I gave to all the relevant political attitudes as they manifest themselves and as they have crystallized in various political systems over a period of time. I think it corresponds to what some call today the political culture. Finally, by government I understood the structures through which public officials, selected in one manner or another, make decisions. I viewed a political system in terms of its capacity to translate interests and aspirations into policy and to resolve conflicts2 by transforming both interests and aspirations into decisions that are widely accepted. In this view, stability and consensus correlate directly with performance and responsiveness. I did not go beyond this crude formulation. Perhaps I lacked the appropriate theoretical sophistication. But I also felt, and continue to feel, that given the state of our discipline, an attempt to. develop a well-knit and broad-gauge theoretical scheme was, and remains, not only premature but downright unproductive. I felt, and continue to feel, that the major task of comparative politics was, and remains, that of raising political questions,