Larry Diamond Research Articles

Class, Race, and Higher Education in America

Class, Race, and Higher Education in America Martin Trow Goldman School of Public Policy University of California, Berkeley Social Class and Higher Education Mass higher education in the United States, with universal access in many places, has many functions that it shares with similar institutions around the world. However, it has one function which is perhaps unique to us: it is the central instrument for the legitimation of a society around the principle of broad (and in principle, equal), opportunities open to all individuals, opportunities to improve themselves and to make their careers and lives through their own efforts and talents. Our 3,500 accredited colleges and universities, offering course work at every level of standard and difficulty to an enormously diverse student body, serve a wide variety of functions for the students and for the society at large. While most of them offer some liberal and general studies, they serve as the chief avenue of entry to middle class occupations--even to quite modest lower-middle class occupations, which in most countries would not require or reward exposure to post-secondary education. These institutions, without the kinds of educational ceilings common in European non-university forms of post-secondary schooling, encourage students to raise their aspirations through further study, full or part- time, and provide the possibility of transfer to advanced studies elsewhere if they do not have such provisions themselves. They thus reflect and reinforce the radical individualism of American values, a set of values deeply opposed to socialist principles which center on cooperative efforts at group advancement, and on the common effort to create a society whose members all profit (more or less equally) from the common effort. American higher education, as a system, both serves and celebrates the American Dream of individual careers open to talents, a dream given much of its institutional reality in the contemporary world precisely by America's system of mass higher education offering a clear alternative to socialist principles of class identification and horizontal loyalty. The contrast between these competitive visions is captured in the stirring appeal of Eugene Debs, the last socialist leader in the United States with any significant following (he gained nearly a million votes Published in Gary Marks and Larry Diamond, eds., Reexamining Democracy, London, Sage Publications, 1992, pp. 275-293.

Class, Race, and Higher Education in America

Class, Race, and Higher Education in America Martin Trow Goldman School of Public Policy University of California, Berkeley Social Class and Higher Education Mass higher education in the United States, with universal access in many places, has many functions that it shares with similar institutions around the world. However, it has one function which is perhaps unique to us: it is the central instrument for the legitimation of a society around the principle of broad (and in principle, equal), opportunities open to all individuals, opportunities to improve themselves and to make their careers and lives through their own efforts and talents. Our 3,500 accredited colleges and universities, offering course work at every level of standard and difficulty to an enormously diverse student body, serve a wide variety of functions for the students and for the society at large. While most of them offer some liberal and general studies, they serve as the chief avenue of entry to middle class occupations--even to quite modest lower-middle class occupations, which in most countries would not require or reward exposure to post-secondary education. These institutions, without the kinds of educational ceilings common in European non-university forms of post-secondary schooling, encourage students to raise their aspirations through further study, full or part- time, and provide the possibility of transfer to advanced studies elsewhere if they do not have such provisions themselves. They thus reflect and reinforce the radical individualism of American values, a set of values deeply opposed to socialist principles which center on cooperative efforts at group advancement, and on the common effort to create a society whose members all profit (more or less equally) from the common effort. American higher education, as a system, both serves and celebrates the American Dream of individual careers open to talents, a dream given much of its institutional reality in the contemporary world precisely by America's system of mass higher education offering a clear alternative to socialist principles of class identification and horizontal loyalty. The contrast between these competitive visions is captured in the stirring appeal of Eugene Debs, the last socialist leader in the United States with any significant following (he gained nearly a million votes Published in Gary Marks and Larry Diamond, eds., Reexamining Democracy, London, Sage Publications, 1992, pp. 275-293.

Political Corruption: Nigeria's Perennial Struggle

Political CorruptionNigeria's Perennial Struggle Larry Diamond (bio) As Nigeria wends its way toward its third attempt at democracy in as many decades, it confronts daunting challenges: persistent ethnic and regional tensions, growing religious conflict, shallow political institutions, an assertive military and secret police establishment, a deeply depressed economy, and a cynical and increasingly despairing populace. No problem, however, is more intractable and more threatening to the future of Nigerian democracy than political corruption. Few students of modern Nigeria would gainsay Chinua Achebe's claim that political corruption has grown more "bold and ravenous" with each succeeding regime.1 During the last decade of colonial rule, as the scope of the state expanded and an indigenous political elite achieved power, bribery, nepotism, embezzlement, and extortion became rampant. In these final preindependence years, and under the First Republic (1960-66), state contracts and loan programs were systematically milked to enrich elected officials and their cronies at both the regional and federal levels. Although the First Republic fell mostly because of ethnic and regional conflict, growing public disgust with corruption-and with politicians as a class-also played a role. In the late 1960s, the onset of the Biafran civil war and major oil production coincided with a marked increase in the scale of corruption. Under the administration of General Yakubu Gowon (1966-75), military governors, federal ministers, and others closely associated with the regime flaunted scandalous wealth. The oil boom of 1973-74 more than tripled government revenue virtually overnight, giving dramatic boosts to [End Page 73] corruption, ostentatious display, and sheer waste. A commission of inquiry, appointed by General Murtala Muhammed after he assumed power in an August 1975 coup, convicted ten of the country's twelve military governors of diverting funds totaling over $20 million. The popular Murtala, a vigorous reformist, was assassinated on 13 February 1976. His successor, General Olusegun Obasanjo, hewed faithfully to Murtala's timetable for a return to civilian, democratic government. The Second Republic began with many important institutional innovations, including a 19-state federal system, a ban on ethnic parties, and provisions requiring the government to "reflect the federal character of Nigeria" in major appointments and the distribution of resources. The National Party of Nigeria (NPN), which took power in October 1979, reflected the spirit of the new republic. The NPN was a broad, multiethnic (albeit northern-dominated) party, devoid of ideology and preoccupied with the business of distributing Nigeria's resources. Distribute resources the NPN did: to its ministers, party officials, supporters, contributors, and business allies, in a staggering outpouring of public wealth that peaked with the second oil boom in 1979-80. The boom rapidly doubled government revenue to $24 billion, but corruption and a plunge in oil prices bankrupted the country within three years. Of course, the NPN was not the only offender, even though it was the most brazen. The other four parties, each of which controlled at least two state governments, were also implicated in extensive wrongdoing. Corruption had become truly systemic, the standard practice of the politicians from every political party and ethnic group, crippling the functioning of almost every state. Directly and indirectly, this systemic corruption generated enough popular disaffection to undermine the legitimacy of the Second Republic. In addition to the demoralizing and seemingly endless trail of scandals and exposés, there was the sheer economic drain caused by so much fraud and mismanagement. State governments became unable to pay teachers and civil servants or to purchase drugs for hospitals, and many services (including schools) were shut down by strikes. The growing disparity between the opulence of the elite and the misery of the average household compounded the problem, as did the widespread violence associated with party politics. As the 1983 elections approached, political thuggery reached frightening proportions, leaving some cities virtual ghost towns on the first day of voting. Massive electoral rigging by the ruling party triggered riots that left more than 100 people dead and over $100 million worth of property destroyed. Although the Second Republic briefly staggered on, its fate had been sealed. On the last night of 1983, the military struck to popular rejoicing. Generals Muhammadu Buhari and Tunde Idiagbon took...

Nigeria’s Third Quest for Democracy

Essay| May 01 1991 Nigeria’s Third Quest for Democracy Larry Diamond Larry Diamond Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution Larry Diamond is coeditor of the Journal of Democracy and of the four-volume Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987-1991). He is also the editor of The Democratic Revolution: Struggles for Freedom and Pluralism in the Developing World (New York: Freedom House, forthcoming, 1991). He is currently coediting, with Anthony Kirk-Greene, Oyeleye Oyedrian and Thomas Biersteker, a three-volume study, Democratic Transition and Structural Adjustment in Nigeria (forthcoming, 1992). Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Current History (1991) 90 (556): 201–204. https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1991.90.556.201 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Larry Diamond; Nigeria’s Third Quest for Democracy. Current History 1 May 1991; 90 (556): 201–204. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1991.90.556.201 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentCurrent History Search This content is only available via PDF. © 1991 by The Regents of the University of California1991 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Nigeria's Search for a New Political Order

Nigeria'S Search for a New Political Order Larry Diamond (bio) For the third time in just over 30 years, Nigeria finds itself in the midst of a transition to democratic rule. Like previous transitions—first under the auspices of British colonial rule in the 1950s, and then under the Nigerian military in the late 1970s—this one is unfolding gradually, according to an elaborate timetable devised with the help of civilian intellectuals and opinion leaders. Indeed, the current six-year program, due to culminate in October 1992, must rank as one of the most carefully staged and imaginatively designed transitions from military to civilian rule anywhere in recent history. There are many reasons to hope that, after two false starts, democracy will finally take hold in Nigeria's Third Republic. The transition itself is a bold experiment in political and cultural engineering. Concurrently with the political transition, the military government of President Ibrahim Babangida has been implementing an ambitious structural adjustment program—probably the most far-reaching in Africa—designed to reduce the state's massive role in the economy and build a market-oriented foundation for sustainable economic growth. Strong cultural factors also favor democracy. While the country boasts a wide array of cultural traditions, Nigerians generally tend to be outspoken and assertive; they will not abide authoritarian rule for long. The nine-year rule of General Yakubu Gowon was toppled in a popular countercoup in 1975 after he indefinitely postponed a promised democratic transition. General Babangida himself rode to power in [End Page 54] August 1985 on a wave of popular revulsion over the unprecedented repression unleashed by his military colleague, General Muhammadu Buhari. The country's very ethnic complexity—there are three dominant ethnic groups (the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo, collectively about two-thirds of the population) and more than 200 ethnic "minorities"—defies successful management through any but democratic and rigorously federalist principles. Nigeria has been a pioneer in designing and applying such principles; while ethnicity remains the most basic plane of social and political cleavage, its divisive potential has been mitigated in ways that make a reprise of the 1967-70 civil war most unlikely. Moreover, since the dawn of the anticolonial movement in the 1940s and 1950s, an increasingly pluralistic, vocal, and confident civil society has grown up to demand protection for basic freedoms of expression, association, and due process. If democracy is to take hold in the Africa of the 1990s, it must succeed in Nigeria. It is the continent's most populous country, with over 100 million people—more than a fifth of all Africans south of the Sahara; its largest oil producer—almost two million barrels a day; its richest sub-Saharan economy (excluding South Africa). No other black African country boasts so many daily newspapers (more than 20), so many magazines (more than 50), so many universities (some two dozen), and so many multi-millionaires. There is, however, a tragic underside to Nigeria's persistent aura of promise and expectation, hope and re?iewal. This tragedy is by now deeply (and an increasing number of Nigerians are inclined to feel, unalterably) rooted in history. The military ended both previous attempts at democracy when it became clear that they were not working and had forfeited their claim to popular legitimacy. The First Republic (1960-66) was burdened by the British colonial authorities with an unworkable federal system that reified cleavages among the three largest ethnic groups, each of which then dominated one of the country's three regions. It was further plagued by a profound contradiction between the socioeconomically preeminent southern ethnic groups (especially Yoruba and Igbo), who were greatly advantaged in trade and education by their earlier and fuller contact with the British, and the politically dominant north with its more conservative Hausa-Fulani elite. Nigeria also suffered at the hands of its own politicians, whose corruption, intolerance, distrust, and brutality turned elections into desperate, fraud-ridden, zero-sum struggles for power. With its 19-state federal system and more fluid multiethnic parties and alliances, the Second Republic (1979-83) made impressive strides in dispersing and containing ethnic and regional conflict. Yet history repeated itself anyway, with brazenly...

Why the "Journal of Democracy"

Why the "Journal of Democracy" Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner The decade of the 1980s witnessed a remarkable worldwide resurgence of democracy. Freely elected civilian regimes replaced dictatorships throughout much of Latin America, and a democratic transition neared completion in Chile. In Asia democracy emerged, against difficult odds, in the Philippines, South Korea, and Pakistan. Almost everywhere, state-dominated economies became mired in stagnation, and dictatorial governments faced pressures for democratic change. Even many communist regimes, including the Soviet Union, found themselves compelled by economic failure and popular dissatisfaction to adopt policies aimed at greater "democratization." As the decade drew to a close, democratic opposition forces made unprecedented gains in Poland and Hungary, and breathtakingly sudden crises of totalitarian rule erupted in East Germany, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. The resurgence of democracy may be attributed in part to the failure of its rivals. Marxism-Leninism and the various brands of authoritarianism that have dominated the Third World have proven themselves incapable both of securing popular legitimacy and of achieving satisfactory economic progress. Moreover, people who experience life under these repressive regimes gain a new appreciation of the essential human freedoms guaranteed by democratic government. Yet despite its intrinsic appeal and its recent triumphs, democracy remains comparatively weak in the realm of political ideas and organization. In many developing countries, the bookstores and the universities are dominated by Marxists. Elsewhere, Islamic fundamentalism and other extremist. or authoritarian doctrines exert a powerful influence. There are still significant areas of the world where prodemocratic intellectuals are lonely and embattled, or reluctant to raise their voices. Democrats are typically less well organized than adherents of antidemocratic ideologies. Because democracy naturally appeals to those who value moderation and believe in the importance of the private sphere, its supporters are sometimes less committed to political struggle than their opponents. Yet the achievement and consolidation of democracy require strong nongovernmental organizations devoted not only [End Page 3] to advancing the interests of particular sectors but to building and defending the democratic system as a whole. Without a vigorously organized civil society, it is unlikely that the many powerful obstacles to democratic transitions can be overcome or that new democracies will be able to survive. Dedicated men and women around the world are responding to this challenge, but their task is a formidable one. In many cases Third World democrats feel beleaguered and isolated. There is surprisingly little contact between activists and intellectuals, even within the same country. Prodemocratic forces have also been much less effective than their antidemocratic rivals in establishing international contacts and cooperation. Often democratic groups are not aware of the efforts being carried out by their counterparts in other countries, much less the ideas, strategies, and tactics that are being successfully employed in mobilizations for democracy around the world. Particularly striking is the almost total lack of communication between democrats in the Third World and those in the communist countries—or indeed even between Western scholars who study issues relating to democracy in these areas. The Journal of Democracy seeks to bridge some of these gaps. We hope that it will help to unify what is becoming a worldwide democratic movement. But like genuine democracy itself, the journal will be pluralistic. Its pages will be open to a wide variety of perspectives and shades of opinion, and it will seek to encourage lively debate among competing democratic viewpoints. The journal will also provide its readers with timely information, thoughtful analysis, and the latest scholarship on democracy. It will attempt not only to document and explain democratic developments in specific countries but also to advance understanding of the broader conditions and strategies for instituting, consolidating, and maintaining democratic government. The Journal of Democracy is edited and published in the United States, and it can play an important role in helping political and opinion leaders in this country to gain a better understanding of the activities and concerns of democrats abroad. But our goal is to be a truly international publication, providing authors and readers all over the globe with an opportunity not only to express their own views but also to keep abreast of the ideas and experiences of their fellow democrats. (We hope that...

Managing the Military

Managing the Military Larry Diamond (bio) Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone by Alfred Stepan. Princeton University Press, 1988. 167 pp. In the study of democratic transition and consolidation, no problem is more vexing and inescapable than the role of the military. When civilian politicians fail, the military intervenes to restore order, or at least a military version thereof. Once the Rubicon of political intervention is crossed, both the institutional mission and the structure of the armed forces expand, as does their appetite for power. Democrats find that bringing the generals into power is much easier than getting them out, and that even after they relinquish formal control of the state, soldier-politicians may leave behind a drastically altered balance of power and an ominous array of new institutional constraints on democracy. Despite the voluminous scholarly literature on the causes and consequences of military intervention in Third World politics, rather little attention has been given until recently to the behavior of the military in the transition to democracy, and especially to the means for restoring the eroded boundary between civil and military authority. Of the emerging new generation of scholarly works, this brilliant collection of essays by Alfred Stepan is sure to become a classic. Stepan takes as his focus Brazil—about which he has been writing since 1964—and the three countries of Latin America's Southern Cone: [End Page 113] Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina. His analysis, however, is rich with implications for nations throughout the developing world. In South America and elsewhere (for example, South Korea, and more recently Nigeria), the 1960s and 1970s saw the emergence of a new type of military rule. This "new professionalism," as Stepan first termed it in the early 1970s, focused on defense against internal threats to national security. It encompassed—and socialized new officers into—a highly expanded and politicized role for the military, involving both internal security and national development and requiring not only military but political and administrative skills. Hand in hand with this new national security ideology and expansive military mentality went—most ominously for the democratic prospect—an enduring expansion in the size, scope, and autonomy of military intelligence agencies. Stepan's scholarly exposure of this chilling and little-studied phenomenon is an original and sorely needed contribution. Although Brazil's military regime committed the smallest number of human rights violations (in proportional terms), it created the most powerful, autonomous, and entrenched intelligence apparatus in Latin America, the Serviço Nacional de Informaçõdes ( SNI). Paradoxically, the SNI not only formed one of Latin America's most troubling institutional impediments to democracy, but also helped to undermine the authoritarian regime it was supposed to serve. For as the SNI came to invade and monopolize more and more state functions, with no oversight short of the head of state, it increasingly became—as unaccountable intelligence agencies are wont to do—a law unto itself. The SNI had a virtual monopoly over all intelligence operations and training; a statutory right to a cabinet seat for its director; an office in every government department, state enterprise, and university; and privileged, covert access to resources. Along with other new and even less accountable military intelligence organizations below it, it became a "state within a state." Like Frankenstein's monster, the SNI and its cohorts found themselves powerful enough to challenge their creator, the military regime itself. These new military intelligence networks, which operated outside the normal chain of command, were evidently responsible for the worst human rights violations in Brazil, including torture and "disappearances." In the ominous expansion of these agencies, Stepan also finds an explanation for the anomalous growth of disappearances during the early years of regime liberalization or abertura (opening): "the repressive apparatus itself had acquired a significant degree of autonomy and was struggling as much against the [official policy of] abertura as it was against the armed combatants of the Left." Using political ploys, threats, and actual violence, this hardline faction within the Brazilian national security establishment stubbornly resisted the transition to democracy until its completion in 1985. [End Page 114] Costly though it was in human terms, this division within the regime proved a crucial...

Democracy in Developing Countries, Vol. 2, Africa edited by Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers; London, Admantine Press; 1988. Pp. xxx + 314. £22.50. $32.50. $14.95 paperback. - Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa edited by Walter O. Oyugi, E. S. Atieno Odhiambo, Michael Chege, and Afrifa K. Gitonga Portsmouth, N. H.,

Democracy in Developing Countries, Vol. 2, Africa edited by Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers; London, Admantine Press; 1988. Pp. xxx + 314. £22.50. $32.50. $14.95 paperback. - Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa edited by Walter O. Oyugi, E. S. Atieno Odhiambo, Michael Chege, and Afrifa K. Gitonga Portsmouth, N. H.,

Book Reviews

Book reviewed in this article: Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: the Failure of the First Republic. By Larry Diamond Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic. By Richard A. Joseph The Nigerian State: Political Economy, State, Class and Political System in the Post‐Colonial Era. By William D. Graf The State and Rural Economic Transformation: the Case of the Punjab 1950–1985. By G. K. Chadha Popular Struggles in South Africa. Edited by William Cobbett and Robin Cohen After Apartheid: Renewal of the South African Economy. Edited by John Suckling and Landeg White The Enterprise Initiative ‐ Promoting Growth in Developing Countries. By Peter Young India's International Payments Imbalances. By Neela Mukherjee Poverty, Policy, and Food Security in Southern Africa. Edited by Coralie Bryant The Gene Hunters: Biotechnology and the Scramble for Seeds. By Calestous Juma Squandering Eden: Africa at the Edge. By Mort Rosenblum and Doug Williamson Preventing Famine: Policies and Prospects for Africa. By Donald Curtis, Michael Hubbard and Andrew Shepherd Project Monitoring and Evaluation in Agriculture. By Dennis J. Casley and Krishna Kumar The Collection, Analysis, and Use of Monitoring and Evaluation Data. By Dennis J. Casley and Krishna Kumar Democracy in Developing Countries, Volume Two: Africa. Edited by Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset Practical Economics for the Real Economist. By Peter Bowbrick Organizing Development Through Participation. Co‐operative Organization and Services for Land Settlement. By Liam E. Pickett Women, Development and Change: The Third World Experience. Edited by M. Francis Abraham and P. Subhadra Abraham A Home Divided: Women and Income in the Third World, Edited by D. Dwyer and J. Bruce The Political Economy of Chinese Socialism. By Mark Selden World Resources, 1988–89, World Resources Institute

Explaining Democratic Failure in Nigeria - Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: the failure of the First Republic by Larry Diamond Basingstoke and London, Macmillan, 1988. Pp. xiv+376. £35.00.

Explaining Democratic Failure in Nigeria - Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: the failure of the First Republic by Larry Diamond Basingstoke and London, Macmillan, 1988. Pp. xiv+376. £35.00.

Class, Ethnicity, and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic. By Larry Diamond. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1988. 376p. $39.95.

Class, Ethnicity, and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic. By Larry Diamond. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1988. 376p. $39.95.

Reviews

The South Pacific: An Introduction, by Ron Crocombe (4th edition, Auckland, Longman Paul, 1987, pp. viii + 283, index, £9.95 paperback). Fiji: Opportunity From Adversity, by Wolfgang Kasper, Jeff Bennett and Richard Blandy (St. Leonards N.S.W., Centre for Independent Studies, 1988, pp. xvii + 168, $16.95 paperback). Teachers, Education and Politics in Jamaica 1892–1972, by Harry Goulbourne (London and Basingstoke, Macmillan Caribbean, 1988, pp. x + 198, £9.95 paperback). The Changing Irish Party System, by Peter Mair (London, Frances Pinter, 1987, pp. 245, £25) The Fourth Labour Government: Radical Politics in New Zealand, edited by Jonathan Boston and Martin Holland (Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1988 pp. 276, £11.95) ANZUS In Crisis: Alliance Management in International Affairs, edited by Jacob Bercovitch (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1988, pp. 267, £33). Marxist State Governments in India: Politics Economics, and Society, by T.J. Nossiter (London, Pinter Publishers, 1988, pp. 212, £25 hardback, £9.95 paperback). The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, by Lowell S. Gustafson (New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press. 1988, pp. XIII + 268, £32.50) India's Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State‐Society Relations, by Atul Kohli (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 334, £23.50). Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic, by Larry Diamond (London, Macmillan, 1988, pp. 376, £35.00). Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic, by Richard A. Joseph (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 237, £27.50). Articulated Agricultural Development: Traditional and Capitalist Agricultures in Papua New Guinea, by Mike Donaldson and Kenneth Good (Aldershot, Ave‐bury, 1988, pp. ix + 160, £19.50/$39.50). Bureaucratic Authoritarianism; Argentina, 1966–73, in Comparative Perspective, by Guillermo O'Donnell, translated by James McGuire in collaboration with Rae Flory, (Berkeley and Los Angeles London: University of California Press, 1988, pp. xiv + 338).

Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria; The failure of the First Republic

Journal Article Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria; The failure of the First Republic Get access Larry Diamond, Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria; The failure of the First Republic. Macmillan, London, 1988. xxi+376 pp. £35 hardback. ISBN 0 333 39435 6. OLUFEMI VAUGHAN OLUFEMI VAUGHAN St Antony's College, University of Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar African Affairs, Volume 88, Issue 351, April 1989, Pages 286–287, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a098168 Published: 01 April 1989

ISSUES AND SUBSTANCE IN THE PRESCRIPTION OF LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC FORMS FOR NIGERIA'S THIRD REPUBLIC

THE INITIAL CONTRIBUTION to African Agairs debate about the role of constitutions in contemporary Africa with special reference to Nigeria's current attempt once again to design a liberal democratic structure for itselfl is sadly reminiscent of the long eclipsed as one had thought structuralfunctional and modernization discussion of the 1950s and 1960s the same ethnocentric theory that infused the constitutional debate in Nigeria prior to the promulgation of the Second Republic. Indeed, the author of that contribution is part of a scholarly team whose main intent, one may infer, is to resurrect, update and disseminate the central elements of the American structural-functional paradigm.2 The basic argument advanced by Larry Diamond is that Nigerian democracy can be established and made functional if only (1) a constitution can be 'engineered' so as 'to check, balance and decentralize political power as extensively and innovatively as possible'3 and (2) 'the economically dysfunctional consequence of state control over the economy' can be eliminated through privatization and incentives.4 Democracy is thus a function of a well-designed constitution combined with limited state involvement in the economy. In what follows, I will argue that such prescriptions are based on a grave misreading of the causes of the collapse of formal liberal democracy and hence would, if realized, merely recreate the pathologies of the Second Republic. Rather, the 1979 constitutional order must be seen as essentially a rationalization of intra-elite power relationships, a kind of balance-sheet of the socio-economic status quo.5 It therefore could not address thefundamental problems of Nigeria's political economy-economic disarticulation, unequal distribution, pre-hegemonic elite structures, and the like. In

NIGERIA: THE QUEST FOR A STABLE POLITY: ANOTHER COMMENT

LARRY DIAMOND'S article 'Constitutional Design of a Third Nigerian Republic' (Africarz Affairs, April 1987), is a significant contribution to the ongoing debates on a future democratic experiment in Nigeria. I find myself in agreement with most of, if not all, the suggestions he has proposed.1 The purpose ofthis comment is, therefore, to take advantage ofthe platform provided by African Affairs, to comment on Larry Diamond's article and to present an overview of the political history of Nigeria with a view to justifying the need for a system of 'zoning'.2

FEDERALISM AND NIGERIA'S POLITICAL FUTURE: A COMMENT

GIVEN THE LEGACY of conflict engendered by the competition for resources 'between ethnically-defined constituencies'1 in Nigeria, it is not surprising that a great deal of the debate concerning the country's political future has resolved around the requisites for an equitable federal system. Larry Diamond's splendid essay in the April 1987 number of the Zournal addresses quite a number of the prominent themes in this debate2 and my aim in this comment is to elaborate on some of them by exploring their key dimensions. The release of the Federal Government's White Paper on the Report of the Political Bureau appointed to coordinate a debate on Nigeria's future politics,3 simultaneously with the announcement, on 1 July 1987, of the guidelines for transition to civilian rule4 will also enable me to discuss some of the choices that have already been made regarding Nigeria's federalism in the Third Republic.

Nigeria Between Dictatorship and Democracy

Essay| May 01 1987 Nigeria Between Dictatorship and Democracy Larry Diamond Larry Diamond Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution Larry Diamond is a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. In addition to his articles on Nigerian politics and development, he is the author of the forthcoming books, Class Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic (London: Macmillan) and Nigeria in Search of Democracy (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers). Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Current History (1987) 86 (520): 201–204. https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1987.86.520.201 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Larry Diamond; Nigeria Between Dictatorship and Democracy. Current History 1 May 1987; 86 (520): 201–204. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1987.86.520.201 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentCurrent History Search This content is only available via PDF. © 1987 by The Regents of the University of California1987 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Dīmukrātīyah fī al-Sirā’i al-Fikrī al-Islāmī fī Indūnīsīyā

In 1998 Indonesia entered what has become known as the Reformation era, a period defined by the relative dominance of democratic ideas and practices, both in the socio-political sense and the religious sense. This piece of writing retraces the ideological struggle of prominent Indonesian Muslim figures to bring democracy to lndonesia, a struggle which began in the 1980s. In this way, this article endeavors to respond to the critics and doubters - like Larry Diamond and Juan Linz - who believe that the ideals of democracy conflict with those of Islam and thus argue that the two cannot co-existDOI: 10.15408/sdi.v14i3.549