Larger-later Reward Research Articles

Measurement of impulsive choice in rats: same- and alternate-form test-retest reliability and temporal tracking.

Impulsive choice is typically measured by presenting smaller-sooner (SS) versus larger-later (LL) rewards, with biases towards the SS indicating impulsivity. The current study tested rats on different impulsive choice procedures with LL delay manipulations to assess same-form and alternate-form test-retest reliability. In the systematic-GE procedure (Green & Estle, 2003), the LL delay increased after several sessions of training; in the systematic-ER procedure (Evenden & Ryan, 1996), the delay increased within each session; and in the adjusting-M procedure (Mazur, 1987), the delay changed after each block of trials within a session based on each rat's choices in the previous block. In addition to measuring choice behavior, we also assessed temporal tracking of the LL delays using the median times of responding during LL trials. The two systematic procedures yielded similar results in both choice and temporal tracking measures following extensive training, whereas the adjusting procedure resulted in relatively more impulsive choices and poorer temporal tracking. Overall, the three procedures produced acceptable same form test-retest reliability over time, but the adjusting procedure did not show significant alternate form test-retest reliability with the other two procedures. The results suggest that systematic procedures may supply better measurements of impulsive choice in rats.

Mechanisms of impulsive choice: II. Time-based interventions to improve self-control

Impulsive choice behavior has been proposed as a primary risk factor for other maladaptive behaviors (e.g., gambling, substance abuse). Recent research has suggested that timing processes may play a key role in impulsive choice behavior, and could provide an avenue for altering impulsive choice. Accordingly, the current experiments assessed a set of time-based behavioral interventions to increase self-control while simultaneously assessing effects on timing processes within the impulsive choice task. Three experiments assessed temporal interventions using a differential reinforcement of low rates task (Experiment 1) and exposure to either a variable or fixed interval schedule (Experiments 2–3). The efficacy of the interventions was assessed in Sprague-Dawley (Experiments 1–2) and Lewis (Experiment 3) rat strains. Impulsive choice behavior was assessed by measuring preferences of a smaller-sooner (SS) versus a larger-later (LL) reward, while timing of the SS and LL durations was measured during peak trials within the impulsive choice procedure. The rats showed an increased preference for the LL following all three time-based interventions and also displayed increased temporal precision. These results add to the increasing evidence that supports a possible role for temporal processing in impulsive choice behavior and supply novel behavioral interventions to decrease impulsive behavior.

Eye Movement Analysis of Time Discounting

This paper reveals the decision process of solving time discounting task by using eye tracker. There is a hypothesis that the time discounting anomalies result not from calculating the present discount values of smaller-earlier and larger-later rewards but from comparing the attributes such as the timing of receipts and the amount of rewards in each option separately. The eye movement data shows that the proportion of calculating the present discount values is almost the same as that of comparing the attributes. First the subjects mainly calculate the present discount value in earlier option and then they gradually combine calculating the present discount values with comparing the attributes at the same proportion. The experimental result supports the attention focusing hypothesis which implies that when the timing of receipts is written in the delay subjects are more prone to calculate discounting rate than when it is written in the date. The subjects who have hyperbolic discounting function are the higher proportion of calculating the present discount value in the “today” reward than the subjects who have exponential discounting function. The longer subjects fixate on the timing of receipt and the amount of reward in the earlier option, the more they choose the option, and vice versa. JEL classification numbers: D81, D87

Mechanisms of impulsive choice: I. Individual differences in interval timing and reward processing.

Impulsive choice behavior incorporates the psychological mechanisms involved in the processing of the anticipated magnitude and delay until reward. The goal of the present experiment was to determine whether individual differences in such processes related to individual differences in impulsive choice behavior. Two groups of rats (Delay Group and Magnitude Group) were initially exposed to an impulsive choice task with choices between smaller-sooner (SS) and larger-later (LL) rewards. The Delay Group was subsequently exposed to a temporal discrimination task followed by a progressive interval task, whereas the Magnitude Group was exposed to a reward magnitude sensitivity task followed by a progressive ratio task. Intertask correlations revealed that the rats in the Delay Group that made more self-controlled (LL) choices also displayed lower standard deviations in the temporal bisection task and greater delay tolerance in the progressive interval task. Impulsive choice behavior in the Magnitude Group did not display any substantial correlations with the reward magnitude sensitivity and progressive ratio tasks. The results indicate the importance of core timing processes in impulsive choice behavior, and encourage further research examining the effects of changes in core timing processes on impulsive choice.

Impulsivity and cigarette smoking: discounting of monetary and consumable outcomes in current and non-smokers.

RationaleIn delay discounting, temporally remote rewards have less value. Cigarette smoking is associated with steeper discounting of delayed money. The generality of this to nonmonetary outcomes, however, is unknown.ObjectivesWe sought to determine whether cigarette smokers also show steep discounting of other delayed outcomes.MethodsSixty-five participants (32 smokers and 33 non-smokers) completed four delay-discounting tasks, each involving different hypothetical outcomes. In the monetary task, participants indicated their preference for a smaller amount of money available immediately (titrated across trials) and $100 awarded at delays ranging from 1 week to 25 years (tested in blocks). In the three other discounting tasks the larger-later reward was $100 worth of a favorite food, alcoholic drink, or a favorite form of entertainment. All other aspects of these discounting tasks were identical to the monetary discounting task.ResultsAs previously shown, smokers discounted delayed money more steeply than non-smokers did. In addition, smokers discounted delayed food and entertainment rewards more steeply than did nonsmokers. A person’s discounting of one outcome was correlated with discounting of other outcomes. Non-smokers discounted money less steeply than all other outcomes; smokers discounted money significantly less than food.ConclusionsWhen compared to nonsmokers, cigarette smokers more steeply discount several types of delayed outcomes. This result, together with the finding that cross-commodity discounting rates were correlated within subjects, suggests that delay discounting is a trait that extends across domains.

Personality influences temporal discounting preferences: Behavioral and brain evidence

Personality traits are stable predictors of many life outcomes that are associated with important decisions that involve tradeoffs over time. Therefore, a fundamental question is how tradeoffs over time vary from person to person in relation to stable personality traits. We investigated the influence of personality, as measured by the Five-Factor Model, on time preferences and on neural activity engaged by intertemporal choice. During functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), participants made choices between smaller-sooner and larger-later monetary rewards. For each participant, we estimated a constant-sensitivity discount function that dissociates impatience (devaluation of future consequences) from time sensitivity (consistency with rational, exponential discounting). Overall, higher neuroticism was associated with a relatively greater preference for immediate rewards and higher conscientiousness with a relatively greater preference for delayed rewards. Specifically, higher conscientiousness correlated positively with lower short-term impatience and more exponential time preferences, whereas higher neuroticism (lower emotional stability) correlated positively with higher short-term impatience and less exponential time preferences. Cognitive-control and reward brain regions were more activated when higher conscientiousness participants selected a smaller-sooner reward and, conversely, when higher neuroticism participants selected a larger-later reward. The greater activations that occurred when choosing rewards that contradicted personality predispositions may reflect the greater recruitment of mental resources needed to override those predispositions. These findings reveal that stable personality traits fundamentally influence how rewards are chosen over time.

Individual differences in impulsive and risky choice: Effects of environmental rearing conditions

The present experiment investigated early-rearing environment modulation of individual differences in impulsive and risky choice. Rats were reared in an isolated condition (IC; n=12), in which they lived alone without novel stimuli, or an enriched condition (EC; n=11), in which they lived among conspecifics with novel stimuli. The impulsive choice task involved choices between smaller-sooner (SS) versus larger-later (LL) rewards. The risky choice task involved choices between certain-smaller (C-S) versus uncertain-larger (U-L) rewards. Following choice testing, incentive motivation to work for food was measured using a progressive ratio task and correlated with choice behavior. HPLC analyses were conducted to determine how monoamine concentrations within the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and nucleus accumbens (NAC) related to behavior in different tasks. IC rats were more impulsive than EC rats, but they did not differ in risky choice behavior. However, choice behavior across tasks was significantly correlated (i.e., the more impulsive rats were also riskier). There were no group differences in monoamine levels, but noradrenergic and serotonergic concentrations were significantly correlated with impulsive and risky choice. Furthermore, serotonin and norepinephrine concentrations in the NAC significantly correlated with incentive motivation and the timing of the reward delays within the choice tasks. These results suggest a role for domain general processes in impulsive and risky choice and indicate the importance of the NAC and/or PFC in timing, reward processing, and choice behavior.

Preference on Cash-Choice Task Predicts Externalizing Outcomes in 17-Year-Olds

Delay-discounting, the tendency to prefer a smaller-sooner reward to a larger-later reward, has been associated with a range of externalizing behaviors. Laboratory delay-discounting tasks have emerged as a useful measure to index impulsivity and a proclivity towards externalizing pyschopathology. While many studies demonstrate the existence of a latent externalizing factor that is heritable, there have been few genetic studies of delay-discounting. Further, the increased vulnerability for risky behavior in adolescence makes adolescent samples an attractive target for future research, and expeditious, ecologically-valid delay-discounting measures are helpful in this regard. The primary goal of this study was to help validate the utility of a "cash-choice" measure for use in a sample of older adolescents. We used a sample of 17-year-old twins (n = 791) from the Minnesota Twin Family Enrichment study. Individuals who chose the smaller-sooner reward were more likely to have used a range of addictive substances, engaged in sexual intercourse, and earned lower GPAs. Best fitting biometric models from univariate analyses supported the heritability of cash-choice and externalizing, but bivariate modeling results indicated that the correlation between cash-choice and externalizing was determined largely by shared environmental influences, thus failing to support cash-choice as a possible endophenotype for externalizing in this age group. Our findings lend further support to the utility of cash-choice as a measure of individual differences in decision making and suggest that, by late adolescence, this task indexes shared environmental risk for externalizing behavior.

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) can wait, when they choose to: a study with the hybrid delay task

Self-control has been studied in nonhuman animals using a variety of tasks. The inter-temporal choice (ITC) task presents choices between smaller-sooner (SS) and larger-later (LL) options. Using food amounts as rewards, this presents two problems: (a) choices of the LL option could either reflect self-control or instead result from animals' difficulty with pointing to smaller amounts of food; (b) there is no way to verify whether the subjects would not revert their choice for the LL option, if given the opportunity to do so during the ensuing delay. To address these problems, we have recently introduced a new protocol, the hybrid delay task, which combines an initial ITC with a subsequent accumulation phase in which selection of the SS option leads to its immediate delivery, but choice of the LL option then leads to one-by-one presentation of those items that continues only as long as the subject does not eat any of the accumulated items. The choice of the LL option therefore only reflects self-control when the number of items obtained from LL choices during the accumulation phase is higher than what could be received in the SS option. Previous research with capuchin monkeys demonstrated that their apparent self-control responses in the ITC task may have overestimated their general self-control abilities, given their poor performance in the hybrid delay task. Here, chimpanzees instead demonstrated that their choices for the LL option in the ITC phase of the hybrid delay task were confirmed by their ability to sustain long delays during accumulation of LL rewards.

Effects of reward bundling on male rats' preference for larger-later food rewards.

In both humans and nonhumans, prior research demonstrates increased preference for larger-later over smaller-sooner rewards when rewards are bundled together in a series (i.e., when an operant choice produces multiple discrete reward deliveries, as opposed to only a single delivery). These findings can be predicted using a traditional hyperbolic delay-discounting model. The present study was designed to examine the parametric effects of the size of the reward bundle on larger-later reward preference in male rats. During a reward-bundling phase, rats were exposed to bundle-sizes of either 1 (i.e., no bundling), 3, or 9 rewards. Rats in the Bundle-size 9 group showed significantly greater larger-later reward preference across a range of delays (0-17.5 s) than rats in any other group, but no other significant differences in choice were observed between groups. In addition, when choice for unbundled rewards was assessed following the reward-bundling phase, rats in the Bundle-size 9 group showed a significant increase in larger-later reward preference (compared to a pre-test). Obtained data from the reward-bundling phase are compared to model-predicted data, and potential mechanisms of the observed increase in self-control for unbundled rewards are discussed.

Environmental rearing effects on impulsivity and reward sensitivity.

Previous research has indicated that rearing in an enriched environment may promote self-control in an impulsive choice task. To further assess the effects of rearing environment on impulsivity, 2 experiments examined locomotor activity, impulsive action, impulsive choice, and different aspects of reward sensitivity and discrimination. In Experiment 1, rats reared in isolated or enriched conditions were tested on an impulsive choice procedure with a smaller-sooner versus a larger-later reward, revealing that the isolated rats valued the smaller-sooner reward more than the enriched rats. A subsequent reward challenge was presented in which the delay to the 2 rewards was the same but the magnitude difference remained. The enriched rats did not choose the larger reward as often as the isolated rats, reflecting poorer reward discrimination. Impulsive action was assessed using a differential-reinforcement-of-low-rate task, which revealed deficits in the enriched rats. In Experiment 2, rats reared in isolated, standard, or enriched conditions were tested on reward contrast and reward magnitude sensitivity procedures. The rats were presented with 2 levers that delivered different magnitudes of food on variable interval 30-s schedules. Across all tests, the enriched and social rats displayed more generalized responding to the small-reward lever, but a similar response to the large-reward lever, compared with the isolated rats. This confirmed the results of Experiment 1, indicating poorer reward discrimination in the enriched condition compared with the isolated condition. The results suggest that enrichment may moderate reward generalization/discrimination processes through alterations in incentive motivational processes.

THE INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE BEHAVIOUR: CLASSICAL AND ALTERNATIVE DELAY DISCOUNTING MODELS AND CONTROL TECHNIQUES

Hyperbolic discounting refers to the tendency for people to increasingly choose a smaller-sooner reward over a larger-later reward as the delay occurs sooner rather than later in time. When offered a larger reward in exchange for waiting a set amount of time, people act less impulsively (i.e., choose to wait) as the rewards happen further in the future. Put another way, people avoid waiting more as the wait nears the present time.

Impulsive choice behavior in four strains of rats: Evaluation of possible models of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder

Several studies have examined impulsive choice behavior in spontaneously hypertensive rats (SHRs) as a possible pre-clinical model for Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). However, this strain was not specifically selected for the traits of ADHD and as a result their appropriateness as a model has been questioned. The present study investigated whether SHRs would exhibit impulsive behavior in comparison to their control strain, Wistar Kyoto (WKY) rats. In addition, we evaluated a strain that has previously shown high levels of impulsive choice, the Lewis (LEW) rats and compared them with their source strain, Wistar (WIS) rats. In the first phase, rats could choose between a smaller-sooner (SS) reward of 1 pellet after 10s and a larger-later (LL) reward of 2 pellets after 30s. Subsequently, the rats were exposed to increases in LL reward magnitude and SS delay. These manipulations were designed to assess sensitivity to magnitude and delay within the choice task to parse out possible differences in using the strains as models of specific deficits associated with ADHD. The SHR and WKY strains did not differ in their choice behavior under either delay or magnitude manipulations. In comparison to WIS, LEW showed deficits in choice behavior in the delay manipulation, and to a lesser extent in the magnitude manipulation. An examination of individual differences indicated that the SHR strain may not be sufficiently homogeneous in their impulsive choice behavior to be considered as a viable model for impulse control disorders such as ADHD. The LEW strain may be worthy of further consideration for their suitability as an animal model.

Interacting mechanisms of impulsivity in bipolar disorder and antisocial personality disorder

Background Bipolar disorder and antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) overlap in clinical characteristics and behavioral consequences. Impulsivity is prominent in both, but there is little information on how specific mechanisms of impulsivity differentiate, bridge, or underlie the disorders. Methods Subjects, all males, were controls ( n = 46), bipolar disorder without cluster B personality disorder ( n = 21), ASPD without bipolar disorder ( n = 50), and bipolar disorder with ASPD ( n = 16). Impulsivity measures were the Immediate Memory Task (IMT), a continuous performance test of response inhibition measuring ability to evaluate a stimulus before responding, and the Two-Choice Impulsivity Paradigm (TCIP), a choice between smaller-sooner and larger-later reward. Data were analyzed using general linear models analysis. Results Subjects with bipolar disorder had fewer IMT correct detections and slower reaction times than controls. Reaction times were faster with combined diagnoses than in bipolar disorder alone. TCIP responding in either diagnosis alone resembled controls, but was more impulsive in combined disorders. These differences persisted after correction for age and education, which had significant independent effects. In combined ASPD and bipolar disorder, increased reaction speed, impulsive response bias, and reward-delay impulsivity occurred independent of substance-use disorder history. Conclusions Impulsivity was increased in the combined disorders over either disorder alone. Results were consistent with at least partially distinct mechanisms of impulsivity in ASPD and bipolar disorder. Compensatory mechanisms for impulsivity in uncomplicated ASPD or bipolar disorder appear to be compromised or lost when the disorders are combined.

Personal relative deprivation, delay discounting, and gambling.

Several lines of research have provided evidence for a relation between personal relative deprivation and gambling. Despite this knowledge, little is known about possible psychological mechanisms through which personal relative deprivation exerts its influence on gambling. The authors of this research sought to examine one such mechanism: the desire for immediate rewards. Using complementary approaches to studying psychological mechanisms, they tested in four studies the general hypothesis that personal relative deprivation translates into gambling urges and behavior in part via increased desires for immediate, even if smaller, rewards. Study 1 showed that an experimental manipulation of personal relative deprivation increased participants' preferences for smaller-sooner over larger-later rewards during a delay-discounting task. Studies 2 and 3 showed that a decreased willingness to delay gratification led to increased gambling behavior. Study 4 showed that preferences for smaller-sooner over larger-later rewards statistically mediated the relation between self-reported personal relative deprivation and gambling urges among a community sample of gamblers. The implications and potential applications of these findings are discussed.

The relationship between addiction and reward bundling: an experiment comparing smokers and non‐smokers

Previous studies indicate that addicts show reduced preference for more delayed versus more immediate rewards compared to non-addicts. This may reflect a lower propensity to view such decisions in terms of the larger sequences to which they typically belong (e.g. smoking is a frequently repeated act). Therefore, this study aims to test whether, in a sequence of decisions involving smaller, sooner (SS) versus larger, later (LL) rewards, suggesting or forcing people with a propensity to addiction to make the decision for the series as a whole would increase LL preference. It is hypothesized that people without a propensity to addiction should benefit less from being encouraged to think of reward sequences because they already tend to take that view. Thirty regular smokers (as exemplars of addicted individuals) and 30 non-smokers chose between small short-term and larger long-term monetary rewards over a sequence of four decisions spaced 2 weeks apart. Subjects were divided into three groups: one who made each decision independently with no suggestion that they be considered as a series ('free'), a group to whom it was suggested from the start that they consider each decision as part of the series ('suggested') and a group who were told that their very first choice in the series would be used for the remaining decisions ('forced'). All subjects were paid the amounts they had chosen. A laboratory room at the University of Cape Town (UCT). UCT undergraduate volunteers. The proportion of LL choices in each subgroup was evaluated by χ(2) tests and a probit model. Smokers increased their preference for LL rewards when 'bundling' of individual decisions into a sequence was either suggested or forced. This preference increased with repeated experience. Non-smokers showed neither pattern. The propensity of smokers to prefer small short-term rewards over larger delayed rewards may be mitigated, over a sequence of decisions of this kind, by encouraging or forcing them to think of the sequence as a whole. If replicated, this finding may form the basis of an intervention that could attenuate the choice patterns characteristic of addiction.

Procrastination and Impatience

There is a large body of literature documenting both a preference for immediacy and a tendency to procrastinate. O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999a,b, 2001) and Choi et al. (2005) model these behaviors as the two faces of the same phenomenon. In this paper, we use a combination of lab, field, and survey evidence to study whether these two types of behavior are indeed linked. To measure immediacy we had subjects choose between a series of smaller-sooner and larger-later rewards. Both rewards were paid with a check in order to control for transaction costs. To measure procrastination we use the subjects' actual behavior in cashing the check and completing tasks on time. Our results lend support to the hypothesis that subjects who have a preference for immediacy are indeed more likely to procrastinate.

Temporal Discounting of Hypothetical Monetary Rewards by Adolescents, Adults, and Older Adults

The present experiment examined temporal discounting across 3 different age bands: adolescents, adults, and older adults (mean ages 14, 46, and 73 years, respectively). A computerized task was employed in which participants were asked to choose between larger rewards available at a specified time in the future—either £100 or £1,000 (approximately $200 and $2,000, respectively)— or a smaller reward available immediately. The subjective value of the reward decreased with increasing delay for each of the 3 age groups. A hyperbola-like function adequately described the group discounting data. The adolescent group discounted significantly more than the adult group when the larger later reward (LLR) was £100 but not when the LLR was £1,000. The adolescents discounted significantly more than the older adult group when the LLR was either £100 or £1,000. There were no significant differences in discounting between the adult and older adult groups. The results of the present study suggest that the rate of temporal discounting is higher in adolescents than in adults but is stable from middle adulthood to older adulthood. Furthermore, the process of temporal discounting appears to be quantitatively similar across the life span. The term temporal discounting refers to the tendency of individuals to prefer smaller sooner rewards (SSRs) over larger later rewards (LLRs). For example, if presented with the choice between $85 now and $100 in 1 year, some people would choose $85 now. Those who choose the SSR can be considered impulsive; those who prefer the LLR can be said to have exercised self-control (e.g., Rachlin & Green, 1972). One widely used procedure to measure the rate of temporal discounting involves a choice option between an amount of money, hypothetical or real, that is available immediately and a larger amount that is available at a later date. The SSR is manipulated over successive trials, while the LLR is kept constant. The aim of this procedure is to identify the current subjective value of the temporal rewards, which is defined as the magnitude of SSR that

Delay and reward choice in ADHD: An experimental test of the role of delay aversion.

Children with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) choose smaller sooner (SS) over larger later (LL) rewards more than controls. Here we assess the contributions of impulsive drive for immediate rewards (IDIR) and delay aversion (DAv) to this pattern. We also explore the characteristics of, and the degree of familiality in, ADHD SS responders. We had 360 ADHD probands; 349 siblings and 112 controls (aged between 6 to 17 years) chose between SS (1 point after 2 s) and LL reward (2 points after 30 s) outcomes on the Maudsley Index of Delay Aversion (Kuntsi, Oosterlaan, & Stevenson, 2001): Under one condition SS choice led to less overall trial delay under another it did not. ADHD participants chose SS more than controls under both conditions. This effect was larger when SS choice reduced trial delay. ADHD SS responders were younger, had lower IQ, more conduct disorder and had siblings who were more likely to be SS responders themselves. The results support a dual component model in which both IDIR and DAv contribute to SS choice in ADHD. SS choice may be a marker of an ADHD motivational subtype.

The hidden-zero effect: representing a single choice as an extended sequence reduces impulsive choice.

Splurge on a vacation, or save for retirement? Sleep in late, or get up to exercise? The ability to resist a tempting, immediately available reward in order to obtain a larger delayed reward is the hallmark of self-control, and predicts important life outcomes such as academic achievement (Duckworth & Seligman, 2005) and social adjustment (Mischel & Ayduk, 2004). Unfortunately, immediate rewards are often difficult to resist. One key factor that makes them so appealing is temporal discounting – the tendency to consider events as less important if they occur in the distant future, rather than in the near future (Ainslie, 2001). This tendency tempts us to a choose small immediate reward over a larger delayed reward, simply because the first is immediately available – a choice that can greatly sabotage the attainment of our long-term goals. To study temporal discounting, researchers (e.g. Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2007) typically have participants choose between smaller-sooner rewards and larger-later rewards (e.g., “Would you prefer [A] $5 today, OR [B] $6.20 in 26 days?”). Decision-makers commonly view such situations as a choice between a good alternative soon and a better alternative later. However, what is not mentioned explicitly in such situations is the fact that choosing to receive one alternative also means choosing not to receive the other. In other words, decision-makers are implicitly encouraged to choose between one-shot events, rather than between sequences of events, in which choosing an immediate reward also means choosing to receive nothing later, and vice versa (e.g., “Would you prefer [A] $5 today and $0 in 26 days, OR [B] $0 today and $6.20 in 26 days?”). People’s choices are heavily influenced by ways in which the alternatives are framed, even when the different frames are logically equivalent (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Given that people prefer sequences that improve over time (Ariely & Zauberman, 2003; Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002), we hypothesized that representing each alternative as a sequence of outcomes, by explicitly referring to the hidden zero in each alternative, would increase participants’ willingness to choose larger delayed rewards over smaller immediate rewards, as they would prefer to choose sequences that appear to improve over time.