Large-scale Cooperation Research Articles

Impact of discrepant accumulations strategy on collective cooperation in multilayer networks

Understanding large-scale cooperation among related individuals has been one of the largest challenges. Since humans are in multiple social networks, the theoretical framework of multilayer networks is perfectly suited for studying this fascinating aspect of our biology. To that effect, we here study the cooperation in evolutionary game on interdependent networks. Importantly, a part of players are set to adopt Discrepant Accumulations Strategy. Players employing this mechanism not only use their payoffs in the multilayer network as the basis for the updating process as in previous experiments, but also take into account the similarities and differences in strategies across different layers. Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate that considering the similarities and differences in strategies across layers when calculating fitness can significantly enhance the cooperation level in the system. By examining the behavior of different pairing modes within cooperators and defectors, the equilibrium state can be attributed to the evolution of correlated pairing modes between interdependent networks. Our results provide a theoretical analysis of the group cooperation induced by the Discrepant Accumulations Strategy. And we also discuss potential implications of these findings for future human experiments concerning the cooperation on multilayer networks.

Cooperation and social organization depend on weighing private and public reputations

To avoid exploitation by defectors, people can use past experiences with others when deciding to cooperate or not (‘private information’). Alternatively, people can derive others’ reputation from ‘public’ information provided by individuals within the social network. However, public information may be aligned or misaligned with one’s own private experiences and different individuals, such as ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’, may have different opinions about the reputation of others. Using evolutionary agent-based simulations, we examine how cooperation and social organization is shaped when agents (1) prioritize private or public information about others’ reputation, and (2) integrate others’ opinions using a friend-focused or a friend-and-enemy focused heuristic (relying on reputation information from only friends or also enemies, respectively). When agents prioritize public information and rely on friend-and-enemy heuristics, we observe polarization cycles marked by high cooperation, invasion by defectors, and subsequent population fragmentation. Prioritizing private information diminishes polarization and defector invasions, but also results in limited cooperation. Only when using friend-focused heuristics and following past experiences or the recommendation of friends create prosperous and stable populations based on cooperation. These results show how combining one’s own experiences and the opinions of friends can lead to stable and large-scale cooperation and highlight the important role of following the advice of friends in the evolution of group cooperation.

Who is a Leader in the Leading Eight? Indirect Reciprocity under Private Assessment

Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism that explains large-scale cooperation in human societies. In indirect reciprocity, an individual chooses whether to cooperate with another based on reputation information, and others evaluate the action as good or bad. Under what evaluation rule (called “social norm”) cooperation evolves has long been of central interest in the literature. It has been reported that if individuals can share their evaluations (i.e., public reputation), social norms called “leading eight” can be evolutionarily stable. On the other hand, when they cannot share their evaluations (i.e., private assessment), the evolutionary stability of cooperation is still in question. To tackle this question, we create a novel method to analyze the reputation structure in the population under private assessment. Specifically, we characterize each individual by two variables, “goodness” (what proportion of the population considers the individual as good) and “self-reputation” (whether an individual thinks of him or herself as good or bad), and analyze the stochastic process of how these two variables change over time. We discuss the evolutionary stability of each of the leading-eight social norms by studying the robustness against invasions of unconditional cooperators and defectors. We identify key pivots in those social norms for establishing a high level of cooperation or stable cooperation against mutants. Our finding gives an insight into how human cooperation is established in a real-world society. Published by the American Physical Society 2024

Collective action problems in planetary defense

In recent years, growing awareness of potential threats posed by near-Earth objects (NEOs) has led to increased interest in developing and implementing planetary defense measures. International cooperation and public support are crucial to ensuring the long-term success of planetary defense initiatives. However, a number of economic, political, legal, and social issues stand in the way of effective large-scale cooperation in pursuing planetary defense. This article examines the major challenges to international cooperation in planetary defense. The article begins by considering the major types of collective action problems facing international collaboration toward planetary defense. The article then examines the way in which adjacent space-related aspects of international affairs influence the arena of planetary defense. The article then analyzes the legal aspects of these cooperation problems, focusing on sources of perceived uncertainty that interfere with effective development of norms for cooperation. The article then proposes various possible strategies for avoiding cooperation problems and increasing collective buy-in. Noteworthy examples include the use of treaties as pre-commitment devices (which parties agree to undertake in order to limit their future options and commit themselves to pre-established lines of conduct) and amendments to existing legal frameworks to decrease perceived uncertainty and promote objective standards of cooperation. The article concludes by reflecting on the importance of promoting a widespread cultural perspective that emphasizes the pursuit of collective planetary welfare over competing national interests.

Indirect reciprocity undermines indirect reciprocity destabilizing large-scale cooperation

Previous models suggest that indirect reciprocity (reputation) can stabilize large-scale human cooperation [K. Panchanathan, R. Boyd, Nature 432, 499-502 (2004)]. The logic behind these models and experiments [J. Gross et al., Sci. Adv. 9, eadd8289 (2023) and O. P. Hauser, A. Hendriks, D. G. Rand, M. A. Nowak, Sci. Rep. 6, 36079 (2016)] is that a strategy in which individuals conditionally aid others based on their reputation for engaging in costly cooperative behavior serves as a punishment that incentivizes large-scale cooperation without the second-order free-rider problem. However, these models and experiments fail to account for individuals belonging to multiple groups with reputations that can be in conflict. Here, we extend these models such that individuals belong to a smaller, "local" group embedded within a larger, "global" group. This introduces competing strategies for conditionally aiding others based on their cooperative behavior in the local or global group. Our analyses reveal that the reputation for cooperation in the smaller local group can undermine cooperation in the larger global group, even when the theoretical maximum payoffs are higher in the larger global group. This model reveals that indirect reciprocity alone is insufficient for stabilizing large-scale human cooperation because cooperation at one scale can be considered defection at another. These results deepen the puzzle of large-scale human cooperation.

The Effect of Income and Wealth on Behavioral Strategies, Personality Traits, and Preferences.

Individuals living in either harsh or favorable environments display well-documented psychological and behavioral differences. For example, people in favorable environments tend to be more future-oriented, trust strangers more, and have more explorative preferences. To account for such differences, psychologists have turned to evolutionary biology and behavioral ecology, in particular, the literature on life-history theory and pace-of-life syndrome. However, critics have found that the theoretical foundations of these approaches are fragile and that differences in life expectancy cannot explain vast psychological and behavioral differences. In this article, we build on the theory of optimal resource allocation to propose an alternative framework. We hypothesize that the quantity of resources available, such as income, has downstream consequences on psychological traits, leading to the emergence of behavioral syndromes. We show that more resources lead to more long-term orientation, more tolerance of variance, and more investment in low marginal-benefit needs. At the behavioral level, this translates, among others, into more large-scale cooperation, more investment in health, and more exploration. These individual-level differences in behavior, in turn, account for cultural phenomena such as puritanism, authoritarianism, and innovation.

Large-Scale Cooperative Task Offloading and Resource Allocation in Heterogeneous MEC Systems via Multiagent Reinforcement Learning

Large-Scale Cooperative Task Offloading and Resource Allocation in Heterogeneous MEC Systems via Multiagent Reinforcement Learning

Coevolution of norm psychology and cooperation through exapted conformity.

People willingly follow norms and values, often incurring material costs. This behaviour supposedly stems from evolved norm psychology, contributing to large-scale cooperation among humans. It has been argued that cooperation is influenced by two types of norms: injunctive and descriptive. This study theoretically explores the socialisation of humans under these norms. Our agent-based model simulates scenarios where diverse agents with heterogeneous norm psychologies engage in collective action to maximise their utility functions that capture three motives: gaining material payoff, following injunctive and descriptive norms. Multilevel selective pressure drives the evolution of norm psychology that affects the utility function. Further, we develop a model with exapted conformity, assuming selective advantage for descriptive norm psychology. We show that norm psychology can evolve via cultural group selection. We then identify two normative conditions that favour the evolution of norm psychology, and therefore cooperation: injunctive norms promoting punitive behaviour and descriptive norms. Furthermore, we delineate different characteristics of cooperative societies under these two conditions and explore the potential for a macro transition between them. Together, our results validate the emergence of large-scale cooperative societies through social norms and suggest complementary roles that conformity and punishment play in human prosociality.

Dyadic inter-group cooperation in shotgun hunting activities in a Congo Basin village.

Understanding the dynamics of inter-group cooperation in human adaptation has been the subject of recent empirical and theoretical studies in evolutionary anthropology, beginning to fill gaps in our knowledge of how interactions across political, economic and social domains can - and often do - lead to stable, large-scale cooperation. Here we investigate dyadic intergroup cooperation in shotgun hunting in the Republic of the Congo. In the Congo Basin, inter-group cooperation between foragers and farmers is at the centre of an exchange system maintained by traditional norms and institutions such as fictive kinship. Here, we focused on what factors predict cooperative shotgun hunting exchanges between BaYaka and Yambe. We conducted structured interviews with 48 BaYaka hunters and 18 Yambe men who organise hunts in a village along the Motaba River. We used Bayesian multilevel regression models to investigate the influence of Yambe and BaYaka attributes on probability of dyadic cooperation. We found that BaYaka men's reputations as skilled hunters and their family size each predicted cooperation in shotgun hunting, whereas there was no effect of Yambe attributes (status, wealth, family size). We discuss the results in terms of evolutionary models of men as hunters and inter-group cooperation, as well as biodiversity conservation implications.

Advanced Directions for the Financial Sovereignty Formation within the Framework of the Great Eurasian Partnership

The new conditions for the implementation of economic activity at the national and international levels require the accelerated formation of sovereignty in critical areas, one of which is financial. The formation of full-fledged financial sovereignty is relevant for all states of Greater Eurasia, and therefore it is advisable to implement this task through joint and coordinated efforts within the framework of a broad Eurasian partnership.Aim. Find out the most promising areas for the formation of financial sovereignty within the framework of a large Eurasian partnership.Methods. A comprehensive analysis of the causes and conditions for the dependence of national economies on external financial systems, a comparative analysis of the factors of Western components dominance in the global financial architecture.Results. The main directions of the formation of the financial sovereignty for the countries of Greater Eurasia on the basis of increasing the level of independence of national financial systems from the Western infrastructure of the financial sector are identified. The most promising methods for achieving this goal are proposed based on the creation of new types of reserve assets within the framework of a large Eurasian partnership, which are an alternative to debt obligations of the United States and European countries, as well as the formation of an integrated system for financial instruments trading by the countries of Greater Eurasia.Conclusions. The growing economic confront ation between the West and a number of the largest economies of Greater Eurasia is extremely relevant to the problem of the formation of real financial sovereignty, the achievement of which requires new approaches, the creation of a number of specialized institutions and large-scale cooperation between the leading economic centers of the continent in order to deepen the integration of national financial systems and markets.

Reciprocity and Large-scale Cooperation: Evidence from the Field

Reciprocity and Large-scale Cooperation: Evidence from the Field

Governance of risky public goods under the threat of ostracism

How to enforce cooperation among unrelated agents is one of the main concerns in distributed artificial intelligence. The limited success of existing efforts to achieve large-scale cooperation is partly related to the lack of strong sanctioning mechanism to restrain defective agents who undermine cooperation. Here we use the framework of evolutionary game theory to investigate the emergence of cooperation in collective risk dilemma (CRD) through the implementation of instrumental ostracism on defective agents. By analyzing the stochastic model, we find that instrumental ostracism can better promote the emergence of widespread cooperation than punishment. Such advantage is more obvious when the risk is relatively low. Furthermore, we verify that the polycentric sanctioning institutions including punishment and ostracism are more effective than a single global one in improving the level of cooperation. Our model can be applied to many collective action problems, such as climate change and vaccination in Covid-19, so as to further provide some suggestions for decision makers.

The influence of language on the evolution of cooperation

Humans' sophisticated language system and advanced ability to cooperate with non-relatives are unique amongst animals. Verbal arguments have asserted that language, in particular, facilitated the evolution of large-scale cooperation—but the specific mechanisms by which language influences cooperation have not been tested in formal models. Here we develop a mathematical model that explicitly considers three possible influences of language on the evolution of cooperation: 1) increasing the payoff of cooperative interactions, 2) allowing cooperation to succeed with fewer cooperators in the group, and 3) promoting the positive assortment of cooperators. Our results show that the role of language in the evolution of cooperation is not as straightforward as often believed, with each model variant showing a different effect of language. Notably, when language decreases the number of cooperators needed to successfully reach a positive group payoff, the equilibrium frequency of cooperators can actually decrease with increasing language proficiency. Language does consistently favor the evolution of cooperation when it leads to higher payoffs of cooperation or facilitates the positive assortment of cooperators. However, language cannot lead to the evolution of cooperation in a population of only defectors, except when it leads to positive assortment in both cooperators and defectors. Overall, our results demonstrate that the way that language alters cooperative interactions determines its effect on social evolution.

Decentralized or Centralized Governance in Social Dilemmas? Experimental Evidence from Georgia

The vast majority of experimental studies on the effectiveness of punishments in promoting cooperation in social dilemma situation examine decentralized incentive systems where all group members can punish each other. Cross-societal experimental studies suggest that while decentralized incentives can successfully promote cooperation in one society, they fail to do so in another. So, how is social order, as a large-scale cooperation problem among strangers, maintained in such societies? Many modern societies overcome this problem through well-functioning top-down formal enforcement institutions. In the experimental setting of the public goods game, we compare a strong and weak exogenous centralized incentive system with a decentralized incentive system in the case of Georgia. Our experimental evidence suggests that in Georgia, self-governed groups are doomed to suffer from high inefficiencies under a decentralized peer-to-peer punishment incentive system. They are better off when punishment power is given to an external centralized authority that is not exposed to power abuse risks.

Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment

Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism that explains large-scale cooperation in humans. In indirect reciprocity, individuals use reputations to choose whether or not to cooperate with a partner and update others' reputations. A major question is how the rules to choose their actions and the rules to update reputations evolve. In the public reputation case where all individuals share the evaluation of others, social norms called Simple Standing (SS) and Stern Judging (SJ) have been known to maintain cooperation. However, in the case of private assessment where individuals independently evaluate others, the mechanism of maintenance of cooperation is still largely unknown. This study theoretically shows for the first time that cooperation by indirect reciprocity can be evolutionarily stable under private assessment. Specifically, we find that SS can be stable, but SJ can never be. This is intuitive because SS can correct interpersonal discrepancies in reputations through its simplicity. On the other hand, SJ is too complicated to avoid an accumulation of errors, which leads to the collapse of cooperation. We conclude that moderate simplicity is a key to stable cooperation under the private assessment. Our result provides a theoretical basis for the evolution of human cooperation.

Reversing the trend of increasing surface analysis errors

Complex and unfamiliar techniques paired with funding and publishing incentives create an environment of bad data analysis that will take large-scale cooperation to fix.

The intersection of evolutionary science and law

Humans' sophisticated language system and advanced ability to cooperate with non-relatives are unique amongst animals. Verbal arguments have asserted that language, in particular, facilitated the evolution of large-scale cooperation—but the specific mechanisms by which language influences cooperation have not been tested in formal models. Here we develop a mathematical model that explicitly considers three possible influences of language on the evolution of cooperation: 1) increasing the payoff of cooperative interactions, 2) allowing cooperation to succeed with fewer cooperators in the group, and 3) promoting the positive assortment of cooperators. Our results show that the role of language in the evolution of cooperation is not as straightforward as often believed, with each model variant showing a different effect of language. Notably, when language decreases the number of cooperators needed to successfully reach a positive group payoff, the equilibrium frequency of cooperators can actually decrease with increasing language proficiency. Language does consistently favor the evolution of cooperation when it leads to higher payoffs of cooperation or facilitates the positive assortment of cooperators. However, language cannot lead to the evolution of cooperation in a population of only defectors, except when it leads to positive assortment in both cooperators and defectors. Overall, our results demonstrate that the way that language alters cooperative interactions determines its effect on social evolution.

Data-driven evolutionary game models for the spread of fairness and cooperation in heterogeneous networks.

Unique large-scale cooperation and fairness norms are essential to human society, but the emergence of prosocial behaviors is elusive. The fact that heterogeneous social networks prevail raised a hypothesis that heterogeneous networks facilitate fairness and cooperation. However, the hypothesis has not been validated experimentally, and little is known about the evolutionary psychological basis of cooperation and fairness in human networks. Fortunately, research about oxytocin, a neuropeptide, may provide novel ideas for confirming the hypothesis. Recent oxytocin-modulated network game experiments observed that intranasal administration of oxytocin to a few central individuals significantly increases global fairness and cooperation. Here, based on the experimental phenomena and data, we show a joint effect of social preference and network heterogeneity on promoting prosocial behaviors by building evolutionary game models. In the network ultimatum game and the prisoner's dilemma game with punishment, inequality aversion can lead to the spread of costly punishment for selfish and unfair behaviors. This effect is initiated by oxytocin, then amplified via influential nodes, and finally promotes global cooperation and fairness. In contrast, in the network trust game, oxytocin increases trust and altruism, but these effects are confined locally. These results uncover general oxytocin-initiated mechanisms underpinning fairness and cooperation in human networks.

Intergroup Cooperation in Shotgun Hunting Among BaYaka Foragers and Yambe Farmers from the Republic of the Congo

Whereas many evolutionary models emphasize within-group cooperation or between-group competition in explaining human large-scale cooperation, recent work highlights a critical role for intergroup cooperation in human adaptation. Here we investigate intergroup cooperation in the domain of shotgun hunting in northern Republic of the Congo. In the Congo Basin broadly, forest foragers maintain relationships with neighboring farmers based on systems of exchange regulated by norms and institutions such as fictive kinship. In this study, we examine how relationships between Yambe farmers and BaYaka foragers support stable intergroup cooperation in the domain of shotgun hunting. In the study village, shotgun hunting is based on a specialization-based exchange wherein Yambe farmers contribute shotguns and access to markets to buy cartridges and sell meat while BaYaka foragers contribute their specialized forest knowledge and skill. To understand how costs and benefits are distributed, we conducted structured interviews with 77 BaYaka hunters and 15 Yambe gun owners and accompanied hunters on nine hunting trips. We found that hunts are organized in a conventional manner within a fictive kinship structure, consistent with the presence of intercultural mechanisms to stabilize cooperation. However, because bushmeat demand is high, gun owners can gain significant cash profit, while compensating hunters only with cigarettes, alcohol, and a traditional hunter’s portion of meat. To level payoffs, hunters strategically hide kills or cartridges from gun owners to feed their own families. Our results illustrate how each group prioritizes different currencies (e.g., cash, meat, family, intergroup relations) and provide insights into how intergroup cooperation is stabilized in this setting. The example of this long-standing intergroup cooperative system is discussed in terms of its contemporary entwinement with logging, the bushmeat trade, and growing market intersection.

Saving India's rivers: Ecology, civil society, religion, and legal personhood

In recent decades, India's environment has been severely compromised by riverine pollution combined with large-scale dams and exacerbated by diversion for irrigation. Most prominent among the rivers so affected has been the Ganges and its tributaries in northern India, which for Hindus include the country's most sacred bodies of water. This paper examines three campaigns opposing dam construction, arguably the most widely publicized and analyzed efforts of this kind since independence in 1947. One campaign was essentially secular with virtually no religious component, the second mostly secular with some religious support, and the third almost totally a religious initiative. In the end, only the third attained any real success, and that rested on circumstances unlikely to be replicated. The possibility that future campaigns of this scale can be taken up again appears remote.Meanwhile, riverine pollution has continued to increase everywhere despite massive governmental programs to reduce it. Theoretically, it would seem that environmentalists and Hindu devotees with their veneration of nature should be able to work in common cause to reduce pollution, but any large-scale cooperation seems unlikely between these two disparate realms. More recently an effort to protect rivers by endowing them with legal personhood enjoyed an initial success, holding the promise that lawsuits could be brought on behalf of a river against those polluting it. The paper concludes that while the legal personhood strategy is currently stalled, it offers the best chance for eventual success in attenuating riverine pollution. In the course of the paper, a comparative theoretical framework for assessing anti-dam protests will be tested.