Large Bank Holding Companies Research Articles

Leverage and the cost of capital for U.S. banks

We examine the relationship between leverage (the assets-to-equity ratio) and the weighted-average cost of capital (WACC) for an unbalanced panel of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) over the period spanning 1996 through 2019. We assess the extent to which changes in capital requirements affect the WACCs of these institutions and find significant differences across three, mutually exclusive asset-size classes of BHCs. In particular, the WACCs of small and medium-sized BHCs are found to be more sensitive to changes in capital requirements than the WACCs of large BHCs. For a hypothetical doubling of Tier-1 capital, we find that the largest BHCs saw their WACCs increase by 42 basis points, while the WACCS of small and medium-sized BHCs are estimated to have increased by 62 and 76 basis points, respectively. We attribute differences between these results to differences in the strength and scope of government guarantees and in the composition of BHCs’ assets and liabilities as reported on their balance sheets.

Dismantling Large Bank Holding Companies for Their Own Good and for the Good of the Country

This paper suggests that bank holding com- panies are in fact malls. I demonstrate the problems that they pose for the financial system, not only by size but by inefficient and inappropriate concentra- tion. The article suggests restructuring of bank holding companies by introducing more market discipline to the various shops in the mall as well as concentrating services for the purpose of efficiency. The article con- cludes with the suggestion that rather than imposing a restructure by law, it may perhaps be possible to entice managements that look to the long-term future to fol- low a restructure voluntarily.

Productivity and efficiency at bank holding companies in the U.S.: a time-varying heterogeneity approach

This paper investigates the productivity and efficiency of large bank holding companies (BHCs) in the United States over the period 2004–2013, by estimating a translog stochastic distance frontier (SDF) model with time-varying heterogeneity. The main feature of this model is that a multi-factor structure is used to disentangle time-varying unobserved heterogeneity from inefficiency. Our empirical results strongly suggest that unobserved heterogeneity is not only present in the U.S. banking industry, but also varies over time. Our results from the translog SDF model with time-varying heterogeneity show that the majority of large BHCs in the U.S. exhibit increasing returns to scale, a small percentage exhibit constant returns to scale, and an even smaller percentage exhibit decreasing returns to scale. Our results also show that on average the BHCs have experienced small positive or even negative technical change and productivity growth.

Productivity and Efficiency at Bank Holding Companies in the U.S.: A Time-Varying Heterogeneity Approach

This paper investigates the productivity and efficiency of large bank holding companies (BHCs) in the United States over the period 2004–2013, by estimating a translog stochastic distance frontier (SDF) model with time-varying heterogeneity. The main feature of this model is that a multi-factor structure is used to disentangle time-varying unobserved heterogeneity from inefficiency. Our empirical results strongly suggest that unobserved heterogeneity is not only present in the U.S. banking industry, but also varies over time. Our results from the translog SDF model with time- varying heterogeneity show that the majority of large BHCs in the U.S. exhibit increasing returns to scale, a small percentage exhibit constant returns to scale, and an even smaller percentage exhibit decreasing returns to scale. Our results also show that on average the BHCs have experienced small positive or even negative technical change and productivity growth.

Post-Crisis Lending by Large Bank Holding Companies

This note analyzes recent trends in loan growth at domestic bank holding companies (hereafter, banks) and reviews factors related to bank loan growth such as capital and loan write-downs.

Bank Holding Company Dividends and Repurchases during the Financial Crisis

Many large U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) continued to pay dividends during the recent financial crisis, even as financial market conditions deteriorated, large losses accumulated, and emergency capital and liquidity were being provided by the official sector. In contrast, share repurchases by these BHCs dropped sharply in the early part of the crisis. Documenting this divergent behavior is one of the key contributions of this paper, as previous analysis has tended to focus on dividend payments alone. The paper also examines the role that repurchases played in large BHCs' decisions to reduce or eliminate dividends. Did BHCs with a high level of repurchases prior to the financial crisis cut dividends later, or by less, than BHCs with lower levels of pre-crisis repurchases? The key findings are that the smaller BHCs in the sample (those with assets between $5 billion and $25 billion) with higher levels of repurchases before the financial crisis reduced dividends later and by less than BHCs with lower pre-crisis repurchases. In contrast, larger BHCs with higher pre-crisis repurchases tended to reduce their dividends earlier in the financial crisis, though there is no relationship between pre-crisis repurchases and the size of dividend reductions for these institutions.

Determinants of Financial Distress in U.S. Large Bank Holding Companies

With a sample of 354 U.S. large bank holding companies, this paper investigates the determination of financial distress in financial institutions. We find that: (1) the house price index is consistently significant and positively associated with the Distance-to-Default (DD) measure in the U.S. banking market; (2) all the three major banking risk characteristics i.e. non-performing loans, short-term wholesale funding, and the credit-risk indicator are reliable factors behind DD determination; (3) for the two alternative measures of BHC activity diversification, non-interest income is positively related with BHCs’ DD whereas off-balance-sheet activity is negatively associated to the financial distress measure; and (4) Relevant capital requirements indicators including Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratio, Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio, Tier I Leverage Ratio should be taken in regulatory assessment of BHCs’ financial distress.

IACPM/Oliver Wyman Survey: Perspectives on the Evolving Role of Enterprise-Wide Stress Testing

Global Credit ReviewVol. 04, No. 01, pp. 99-116 (2014) No AccessIACPM/Oliver Wyman Survey: Perspectives on the Evolving Role of Enterprise-Wide Stress TestingAndy McGee and Ilya KhaykinAndy McGeeOliver Wyman, USA and Ilya KhaykinOliver Wyman, USAhttps://doi.org/10.1142/S2010493614500068Cited by:0 PreviousNext AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack CitationsRecommend to Library ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail References Cope, D. and A. McGee (2012), Improving the Measurement of Capital Adequacy — The Future of Economic Capital and Stress Testing. Oliver Wyman Point of View . Google Scholar M. Duane , T. Schuermann and P. Reynolds , Journal of Risk Management in Financial Institutions 7 , 72 ( 2014 ) . Google Scholar Federal Reserve (2013), Capital Planning at Large Bank Holding Companies: Supervisory Expectations and Range of Current Practice, August . Google Scholar FiguresReferencesRelatedDetails Recommended Vol. 04, No. 01 Metrics History PDF download

Governance, crash risk, and systemic risk: evidence from large US banks

This study investigates how the governance structure of bank holding companies (BHC) influences two types of market risks: crash risk and systemic risk. Using a sample of large BHC in the USA, we find limited evidence that high pay sensitivity is positively associated with banks' crash risk. In addition, high pay sensitivity and weak governance increase the systemic risk of banks. This study provides empirical support that governance decisions impact banks' risk exposure differently compared to those of corporate firms: 1) in opposite to the desired direction; 2) in conflicting manner. The study lends thus more credence to the recent call for redesigning the incentives and monitoring structure of banking industry. Our findings are important to regulators as they evaluate how best to intervene in the banking industry to forestall market contagion and failure. In particular, recent changes in capital requirements might not suffice to prevent future system shocks.

Bank Board Structure and Performance: Evidence for Large Bank Holding Companies

The subprime crisis highlights how little we know about bank governance. This paper addresses a long-standing gap in the literature by analyzing the relationship between board governance and performance using a sample of banking firm data that spans 34 years. We find that board independence is not related to performance, as measured by a proxy for Tobin’s Q. However, board size is positively related to performance. Our results are not driven by M&A activity. But, we provide new evidence that increases in board size due to additions of directors with subsidiary directorships may add value as BHC complexity increases. We conclude that governance regulation should take unique features of bank governance into account.

THE EFFECTS OF SFAS NO. 133 ON FINANCIAL STATEMENTS IN BANK HOLDING COMPANIES: EARNINGS VOLATILITY AND EQUITY VOLATILITY

This paper investigates the effects of SFAS 133 on earnings volatility, earnings predictability, and equity volatility in bank holding companies (BHCs). In contrast to large BHCs' assertion prior to the adoption of SFAS 133, the three income-affecting portions (i.e. hedge ineffectiveness gains/losses, gains/losses excluded in the assessment of effectiveness, and effects from canceled forecasted transactions once designated as cash flow hedge) did not increase earnings volatility in the top 30 BHCs for the first 12 quarters after adoption. Also, the three income-affecting portions did not deteriorate analysts' forecast performance. In addition, there is no evidence that volatility of stockholders' equity significantly increases due to SFAS 133. Further investigation of notes to financial statements reveals that some BHCs adjusted their usage of derivatives prior to SFAS 133 to mitigate the impact of SFAS 133 on earnings volatility.

Board Independence and Compensation Policies in Large Bank Holding Companies

We use a sample of large bank holding companies to empirically examine the association between financial performance and organizational structure. We regress firm accounting performance on measures of board independence, CEO pay-performance sensitivity, the product of board independence and CEO pay-performance sensitivity, and other organizational features and control variables. We find that both CEO pay-performance sensitivity and the relative tenure of independent outside directors have a positive effect on accounting performance. Their interactive effect tends to be negative. Thus, the marginal value of each mechanism for accounting performance declines as the use of the other mechanism increases. These results are robust in a simultaneous equations framework that accounts for endogeneity issues. We also find a positive relation between the percentage of independent outside directors and CEO pay-performance sensitivity.

The interstate banking and branching efficiency act of 1994: A wealth event for acquisition targets

The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) represented a significant step in the deregulation of interstate banking and branching. The IBBEA's passage had a positive wealth effect on a sample of large Bank Holding Companies (BHCs). Cross-sectional tests of abnormal returns reveal that BHCs having characteristics associated with acquisition targets and BHCs headquartered in states that prohibited interstate branching experienced significantly higher returns. Collectively, the evidence suggests that investors anticipated that the IBBEA would provide for increased corporate control activities among banks and that a large portion of the BHC gains stems from the relaxation of interstate branching restrictions.

Diversification, Size, and Risk at Bank Holding Companies

This paper shows that large bank holding companies (BHCs) are better diversified than small BHCs based on market measures of diversification. The authors find, however, that better diversification does not translate into reductions in risk. The risk-reducing potential of diversification at large BHCs is offset by their lower capital ratios and larger commercial and industrial loan portfolios. The authors' results suggest that diversification may provide an important motive for consolidation by allowing BHCs to pursue riskier lending while operating with greater leverage. Copyright 1997 by Ohio State University Press.

The Relationship between Corporate Compensation Policies and Investment Opportunities: Empirical Evidence for Large Bank Holding Companies

This paper investigates whether the firm's set of investment opportunities drives the amount and type of executive compensation by conducting a detailed empirical analysis of the executive compensation plans of large bank holding companies. We examine intra-industry changes in compensation policy over a period of significant change in the investment-opportunity set, 1979 to 1985. Our empirical findings reveal that total real compensation and the ratio of incentive compensation-to-total compensation increased substantially at regional bank holding companies but remained stable at money-center bank holding companies. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that during the early 1980s financial innovation and deregulation created greater growth opportunities for regional bank holding companies than for money-center bank holding companies.

Financial Innovation, Investment Opportunities, and Corporate Policy Choices for Large Bank Holding Companies

AbstractThis study determines the effects of agency costs on bank management by investigating the relationship between investment opportunities and corporate policy choices for large bank holding companies from 1977 to 1985. The financial innovations in this period resulted in numerous investment opportunities for banks and their holding companies. The market‐to‐book ratio, a proxy for these opportunities or growth options, reveals significant differences in the opportunity sets of regional and money center banks. Since the growth options are negatively related to both debt financing and dividend payout, a policy prescription for reducing bank holding company (BHC) leverage is to allow bank/BHC investment opportunities to expand through product and geographic deregulation.

The shifting value of federal deposit insurance: Implications for reform

This research examines the relationship between the value of federal deposit insurance and bank size. We conclude that the value of deposit insurance has often been greater for the largest bank-holding companies since 1981. This differential is consistent with the notion that largest banks have greater ability to circumvent regulatory and/or market discipline. The source of this differential appears to be due to holding less capital rather than greater asset risk. Insurance costs net of the value of deposit insurance are also relatively lower for the largest banks and have become more so since 1981. These results suggest that recent proposals to improve the deposit insurance system should be evaluated based on their ability to effect even-handed discipline throughout the banking industry to eliminate and forestall further creation of this large institution bias.

The Effects of Affiliation with Large Bank Holding Companies on Commercial Bank Lending to Agriculture

AbstractThis article examines whether the agricultural loan ratios of rural subsidiaries of large bank holding companies differ from the ratios of other banks in the same rural counties. In each of the years 1975, 1980, and 1985, the ratio of agricultural loans to total assets is significantly lower for the subsidiaries of large bank holding companies. These results are interpreted as evidence that the subsidiaries of large bank holding companies have greater opportunities to diversify risk by lending to businesses in a variety of industries.