Timber supply analysts often prescribe forest landowner behavior by assuming that owners schedule standing timber or sales to maximize the financial return to their investment in forest land and timber investment (USDA-Forest Service 1982; Hyde 1980; Samuelson 1976; McConnell et al. 1983; Pearse 1967). The primary alternative to this investment hypothesis is a utility maximization hypothesis (Binkley 1979) which maintains that stumpage is sold whenever the utility gained from the sales proceeds is greater than the utility gained from both having the trees for recreational, aesthetic, and other purposes and from holding the trees for future sale. Both of these maintained hypotheses presume the stumpage owner has full information about prices, costs and yields. Neither hypothesis assigns a significant role to the costs of obtaining the information needed to make the sale. Observation suggests that the sale of stumpage takes place in a market where information about quantity, quality, and value of product is costly to obtain. Quantity and quality are usually ascertained from a timber cruise which requires professional skill, training, time, and effort. Value is the result of a tallying process which requires both knowledge of how trees convert to logs and other stumpage products and information on the current prices of these products (Beuter 1971). Stumpage buyers, consulting foresters, and professional timberland managers acquire the necessary skills and knowledge to evaluate stumpage as part of their work. But nonindustrial private woodland owners seldom have the opportunity to develop comparable skills or knowledge. The resulting lack of information creates a situation in which the private nonindustrial owner must decide whether to expend time and money to gain stumpage sales information or to negotiate a stumpage sale with limited information. This paper seeks to develop a model of information acquisition and market behavior by timber owners who face revenue uncertainty. Information is chosen ex ante to maximize the expected utility of wealth, following the Sandmo (1971) approach. Acquired information shapes the owner's subjective probability distribution of sales revenue and also may affect the owner's assessment of the value of keeping the timber for recreational, investment, or other purposes. Optimality conditions for information acquisition are presented, and the circumstances in which the owner will find it desirable to collect information are explored. The sales decision of the optimally informed owner is then determined by a comparison between a received bid, the value of having the trees, and a critical bid derived from the optimized revenue distribution. The critical bid is defined as the value which leaves the individual indiffer-