At long last, the material in the Lins-Barry paper has been presented in a public forum where it can be evaluated and, if appropriate, challenged. To the uninitiated, it may seem strange that much of the paper merely presents conclusions of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Arthur D. Little (ADL) studies cited, as would a library term paper. But it contributes more than that because these studies are in the library! The USDA study was never released. The Farm Credit System (FCS), which paid for the ADL study, apparently considers it an internal rather than a public report. Nevertheless, the main conclusions of these studies have appeared in the rural press and have been used by policy advisors. Thus the Grace Commission found its empirical basis for recommending restraints on FCS lending in the implicit ADL conclusion (attributed in turn to a Chase Econometrics model) that such lending was largely responsible for land price increases. Lins and Barry politely describe this conclusion as controversial and not ... consistent with past research on land values. As research results showing that land prices have been determined mainly by land income and rents continue to accumulate, stronger language such as worthless might be considered. Unfortunately, both studies also reached a similar and erroneous conclusion-that a private FCS, although relatively creditworthy, would find it difficult to market even its current volume of securities. Before challenging this notion and offering a different argument for retaining agency status, however, it should be noted that Lins and Barry have assembled a useful summary and analysis of FCS regulatory and tax preferences. In several instances, they show why the preference affects the competitive position of the FCS less than one might at first suppose, which implies that these preferences may be a less important issue than many private lenders appear to believe. The viability of a private FCS, however, was the question highlighted by the USDA and ADL studies, and thus their flawed analyses of this question deserve greater attention than the contrary view briefly stated by Lins and Barry in their concluding comments. On the basis of discussions with security dealers and investors, the USDA and ADL studies concluded that a private FCS would be unable to raise the volume of funds now required or projected. But, at the same time, both studies indicated that a private FCS would enjoy a relatively good credit rating. This is an incompatible combination; in fact, impossible. Let us see why this is so, and then how the studies erred. In the nation's credit markets, there is on one side of the ledger a schedule of the total flow of funds supplied by savers, the Federal Reserve System, and others, which is much altered, if at all, by switching the FCS from agency to private status. On the other side, competing for this total flow, are potenti l borrowers that range throughout the full spectrum of credit quality, with credit quality representing an assessment of the odds that the borrower will develop repayment difficulties. Each borrower has a demand schedule that shows the amount of funds he wants to borrow at alternative interest rates. In such a market, it is axiomatic that, as one descends down the spectrum of credit quality, each borrower in turn receives all of the funds he wants-at increasing interest rates, of course -until the total funds supplied to the market are exhausted, leaving the remaining potential borrowers with lower quality ratings crowded out. That is, if one finds a borrower of given quality successfully borrowing at a certain interest rate, then all borrowers of higher quality will have obtained their full demands at that rate or lower; otherwise, lenders Emanuel Melichar is a senior economist in the Division of Research and Statistics, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System