This article discusses the theoretical foundations of the concept of jurisdictional uncertainty, which means, the uncertainties associated to the settlement of contracts in the Brazilian jurisdiction, and that manifests itself predominantly as an anti-saver and anti-creditor bias. According to Arida et al (2005), Brazilian judges tend to favor the weak part in the claim, not the just, as a form of social justice and redistribution of income in favor of the poor people. The article shows that there is no point for the judge in deciding against the law to favor the poor. A utility function is discussed, taking into account the advantages the judge could gain from this behavior, outweighed by the penalties such as professional criticism and the reversal by a higher court. As a result, its predicted that the judge will refrain itself from deciding disregarding the original tenor of legislation, and this behavior could favor the wealthy and politically powerful. An empirical test was conducted, analyzing 181 judicial decisions, and the results were supportive to the main ideas, showing that a contract has 45% more of chances of being maintained if it is beneficial to the richer. The judiciary disregards the contract only in the areas that the Legislative decided to protect the weaker part, such as in labor contracts, social security and environment. In areas like financial contracts, commercial law and landlord-tenant relations, the judges do not interfere.
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