The widespread adoption of the rhetoric of normal science, revolutionary science, paradigms, and exemplars by sociologists of science and sociologists in general suggests the strong influence that Thomas S. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962, 1970) has had on sociological inquiry. But claims that Kuhn's work is antiMertonian, nonnormative, relativistic, an alternative to positivism and logical empiricism, and even compatible with Marxism are all part of the myth of the Kuhnian revolution in the sociology of science.1 The central dogma in the Kuhnian mythology is that Kuhn's paradigm is a significant, indeed a radical, alternative to Merton's. Some Mertonians (see Gaston, 1979, pp. 118-119) have been more perceptive about the Kuhnian mythology than have critics of Mertonian sociology of science. Gaston suggests (correctly I think) that Kuhn's reception is
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