Independence Of Kosovo Research Articles

Populus Interruptus: Self-Determination, the Independence of Kosovo, and the Vocabulary of Peoplehood

AbstractThis article uses the contested independence of Kosovo as an opportunity to re-examine the theoretical imagery behind the concept of self-determination, and then confront those findings with the more recent approaches to polity formation from other theoretical genres: normative theories of secession, on the one hand, and the global governance approach to self-determination, on the other. What emerges from the encounter between these bodies of thought is not a new interpretation, or a theory of self-determination and its relationship to uti possidetis, but rather a plea for an approach to polity formation which is simultaneously critical and prudential. That is, an approach which would accept the role of external actors as inevitable, but goes further and unmasks them as complicit in labelling certain projects as ‘civic’ and ‘multicultural’ on the one hand and ‘ethno-nationalist’ on the other. Equally, the proposed approach reveals the ever-present aspiration to unanimity as a concealed ideal of polity formation, shared by both the ‘civic’ and the ‘ethnic’ variants of self-determination. Finally, this approach to polity formation sketches the contours of an alternative, thin vision of a political community – one not wearing the badge of peoplehood – one glued together not by normative imperatives of participation and solidarity, but rather by the acknowledgement of geopolitical fiat.

Reflections on a ‘Meditrated’ Conflict

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes Interestingly, one conflict is watching the other closely. The Turkish Cypriot community expresses great interest in the process and result of Kosovo's independence efforts. Between June and August 1996 three Greek Cypriots were killed: A Greek Cypriot soldier was shot in the buffer zone on 3 June 1996; on 11 August, Tassos Isaac was killed during a demonstration protesting about the 1974 Turkish incursion; 4 days later his cousin, Solomos Solomou, was shot while trying to remove a Turkish flag from a flagpole in the buffer zone. Haravghi newspaper, 2004. Phileleftheros newspaper, 2004, 2005, 2006. Although not with the attention and rigorous strategic analysis that has governed its post-2004 efforts. Member of UN core negotiating team in Cyprus. Confidential interview with author, October 2006.

Kosovo: Cultural Heritage in Conflict

The secession of territory represents a unique challenge in the protection of cultural heritage in conflict. The declared independence of Kosovo has considerable implications for international cultural heritage. This paper focuses on the deliberate destruction of examples of historic architecture such as Dečani Monastery and Hadum Mosque as a means of contextualizing the nature of heritage in conflict with respect to international cultural heritage law. It offers a preliminary examination of aspects of cultural heritage in conflict, particularly in regard to the secession of territory and how it applies to historic monuments. The aim of this paper is two-fold: to address the considerations of immovable cultural property within the borders of Kosovo; and to utilize the examples of Visoki Dečani Monastery and Hadum Mosque to highlight the significance of cultural property in conflict.

Re-Examining Sovereignty Claims in Changing Territorialities: Reflections from ‘Kosovo Syndrome’

Current legal and normative doctrine forbids de jure recognition to those territorial units whose political leadership has been resisted by metropolitan central authorities. Recognition on the basis of uti possidetis juris makes the self-determination of people a territorial issue. This paper presents a framework for conceptualising and analysing the impact of ‘indivisible sovereignty’ and territoriality dilemmas on self-determination claims, resonating most strongly in the recent Kosovo campaign for independence. It then re-examines seceding motivations and birth-giving processes in Northern Cyprus, Transnistria and Republika Srpska, all which could be defined as self-proclaimed post-conflict entities deemed to gain international recognition. Finally, the paper illustrates the impact of ‘Kosovo syndrome’ on the preservation of status quo while concluding that the immediate reactions to Kosovo independence diverged from case to case to the extent where Turkish Cypriots found new stimulus for reunification, Transnistrians advocated a new model of conflict resolution and Bosnian Serbs increased their bargaining power.

From Pristina to Tskhinvali: the legacy of Operation Allied Force in Russia's relations with the West

This article reviews the main developments in the Kosovo crisis in the context of relations between Russia and NATO/the West. For Moscow, Operation Allied Force constituted a flagrant breach of international law, a threat to post-Cold War European security governance and a challenge to Russia's status in the international order. Official Russian interpretations, heavily influenced by domestic politics, reflect a perception among Russia's political elite that, rather than upholding liberal democratic values, NATO's intervention constituted a selective defence of the interests of the leading western powers. Such views have influenced Moscow's position on the thorny question of Kosovo's independence and Russia's more assertive foreign and security policy in the recent period, not least in the conflict over South Ossetia in August 2008. Ultimately, Operation Allied Force resulted in the Russian governing elite reassessing its views on statehood, the international order and the norms underpinning international society.

US Policy toward Kosovo: Sowing the Wind in the Balkans, Reaping the Whirlwind in the Caucasus

For the past decade, the United States has been promoting national transformation in the Balkans. In pushing the independence of Kosovo, Washington policy makers apparently believed that Serbia would acquiesce, most nations would recognize the newest independent state, and Russia would accept America's decision. None of these assumptions came to pass. Unfortunately, the war in the Caucasus was an inadvertent consequence of US policy in the Balkans. The West acted contrary to international law, violated the sovereignty of another state, and carelessly sacrificed the interests of neighboring states. The point is not that Russia acted correctly or legitimately in Georgia but that American policy makers must learn that actions have consequences, even actions by the US government. They need look no further than from Kosovo to Georgia.

Croatia: Strengthening the Rule of Law and Economic Competitiveness

Three events dominated Croatia's foreign policy in 2007 and 2008: the accession to NATO, the election into the UN Security Council, and the negotiation on EU accession. Regional policy has been dominated by Croatia's recognition of Kosovo's independence and political disputes with Slovenia concerning the Adriatic sea border. The most important national event was the parliamentary election of 2007. Macroeconomic stability has been maintained by the monetary policy of the Croatian National Bank (HNB). Domestic policy has been dominated by anti-corruption campaigns in government institutions, the universities, the national healthcare system, local governments and other institutions. Organized crime groups have become more active. The government has responded by enacting anti-mafia laws and measures, as well as by establishing new law-enforcement agencies to enable the institutions of the state to deal more efficiently with violence and crime.

United Nations General Assembly Resolution Requesting an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, and Related Documents

United Nations General Assembly Resolution Requesting an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, and Related Documents

The Independence of Kosovo: A Unique Case of Secession?

The issuance of the Declaration of Independence by Kosovar authorities in February 2008 has been treated by the United Nations as not capable of creating a precedent in international law. The question remains as to whether the act was in conformity with international law. In resolution A/RES/63/3, the United Nations General Assembly decided to request the International Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion on that question. The Kosovo case, consequently, raises issues that merit further consideration. A legal finding by the Court would be worth all this trouble if it clarified the rules regarding post-colonial-age secessions, even though its conclusion on the situation of Kosovo will not be likely to affect the matter of recognition to any great extent. International intervention as a title to sovereignty is given some truth following these events concerning Kosovo. The conformity or not with international law of a unilateral act always depends on the legality of both the root for its initiation and the original rationale. From this perspective, the independence of Kosovo is indeed a unique case of secession.

Independence, Intervention and Great Power Patronage: Kosovo, Georgia and the Contemporary Self-Determination Penumbra

This article contends that despite the increased currency of self-determination in contemporary international political debate the issue remains highly ambiguous and problematic. Two situation in 2008 - Kosovo's declaration of and Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia – brought this issue to the top of the international agenda and yet neither case has clarified the self-determination penumbra. The issue remains the preserve of political expediency rather than objective legal doctrine. This article assesses the evolution of Kosovo highlighting the highly contingent nature of this case and the conditional nature of Kosovo's independence

Precedents in the Mountains: On the Parallels and Uniqueness of the Cases of Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia

International law, especially its customary part, evolves to a great extent through acts of State practice serving as precedents. If States do not want that their behaviour becomes law (i.e. if they prefer to act contrary to Kant's categorical imperative), they claim that certain acts of their behaviour are so unique, so peculiar that they must not be considered as contributing to the change of law (they express their opinio non juris). In the 1990s, the UN Security Council also found that only uniqueness of situations in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia-Herzegovina justified the use of “all necessary means” to deal with those situations. More recently, the recognition of the independence of Kosovo by a number of States and the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia were described by recognizing States as being so unique, so sui generis that they could not serve as precedents. The article argues that the uniqueness, or parallels for that matter, is usually in the eye of the beholder. Whether certain situations, facts or acts serve as precedents depends to a great extent on whether one is interested in seeing them as precedents or not. People too often act upon their ideologies, beliefs and prejudices, not upon facts; the latter are interpreted in the light of preconceived ideas, or as Charles King, writing of the Georgia-Russian war, observes, “unfortunately, Western thinking of Russia has too often substituted analogy for analysis” (“Putin's March to the Sea”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 6, November-December 2008). Then this article proceeds to study in greater detail parallels and differences between Kosovo, on the one hand, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on the other. The study ends with an inquest into the matter of how different States (or categories of States) deal with secessionist problems.

The Inevitable Independence of Kosovo

This note claims that the declaration of independence by Kosovo has been inevitable because it is the end-product of the process of territorial administration. This process changed the legal, political, social, economic fabric of the territory and nurtured claims to statehood.

A dangerous precedent? The political implications of Kosovo's independence on ethnic conflicts in South-Eastern Europe and the CIS

AbstractKosovo's declaration of independence on 17 February 2008 has re-ignited debates about the interaction among the fundamental international legal principles of self-determination, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The question of conformity with international law was interrelated to scenarios on the political implications of secession. After more than one year the following article elaborates if the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo had a precedent-setting impact for long-standing autonomist and secessionist conflicts in South-Eastern Europe and in CIS. The Kosovo-precedent formula had its biggest impact in the secessionist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where a powerful external actor Russia, made effective use of the precedent-formula in its coercive diplomacy against Georgia. Generally speaking, in South-Eastern-Europe, the independence of Kosovo had only minor destabilizing effects with the exception of Bosnia and Hercegovina and Macedonia where political entrepreneurs used the opportunity to play the nationalist card and to profit from worst case scenarios of a disintegration of their country.

Russia, Post‐Communist Europe, and the Geopolitics of Eurasia

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, due to impressive economic growth on the back of high energy prices, Russia has begun to reassert itself in international politics. In the last decade of the twentieth century, Russia was bereft: it had lost an empire, its sphere of influence, and with the collapse of communism its sense of identity. The once proud superpower was at that time confronted with an economy in freefall, a decaying military, a demographic crisis (life-expectancy tumbled to levels found in some poor third-world countries), and an uncertain place in world affairs. Russia's first post-Soviet, post Communist president, Boris Yeltsin, had sought to move the country closer to the West. His successor in 2000, Vladimir Putin, at first continued with this trend. However, differences on a number of important issues prevented this initial goal being reached. Russia and the United States have asymmetrical interests or serious conflicting views over a number of issues that are largely centered in Europe: the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), especially plans for further expansion to include Ukraine and Georgia; U.S. designs for national missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic; Western support for the color revolutions in the post-Soviet territories; gas and oil pipeline routes; and the question of independence for Kosovo. This all came to a head with the short Russo-Georgian war in August 2008, and the subsequent increase in tensions between Moscow and Washington. There are also differences between Russia and the United States over how to deal with some problems in the Middle East, including the Iraq War, sanctions against Iran, and the status that Hamas should be accorded in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some see tensions giving rise to a new Cold War.

Selbstbestimmung, Sezession und Anerkennung: Völkerrechtliche Aspekte der Unabhängigkeit des Kosovo (II)

Selbstbestimmung, Sezession und Anerkennung: Völkerrechtliche Aspekte der Unabhängigkeit des Kosovo (II)

The Regional and International Implications of Kosovo Independence

The support of the United States and some European Union countries for Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence has in many ways contributed to a deterioration of the security situation in southeastern Europe. The fundamental strategic assumption of promoters of Kosovo's independence—that Kosovo was the last open question left over from the breakup of Yugoslavia—is likely to prove wrong. Thus, given the breakdown in the international and regional consensus on the contours of a legitimate Balkan political and security order, the instability of Kosovo and other states in the region is in reality likely to increase in the post-Kosovo independence period.

Kosovo's final status

The Ahtisaari comprehensive proposal for a settlement of the status of Kosovo met with deadlock in the UN Security Council. It would neither be endorsed nor imposed upon the parties. In view of that position, a new round of negotiations, conducted by the EU, Russia and the US, was launched over a period of 120 days. During these discussions, Serbia's President Boris Tadic revealed a significant measure of flexibility when putting forwards options for wide-ranging self-government for Kosovo. However, these forward-looking positions were undermined by a less advanced proposal emanating from other parts of the Belgrade government, including the Prime Minister. Moreover, the Serbian parliament sought to preempt developments by unilaterally adopting its own constitutional amendments relating to Kosovo, further undermining the credibility of Serbia's position at the international level. However, it could be argued that had Belgrade been willing to begin the previous round of negotiations let by Martti Ahtisaari with the advanced offers it was putting at the very end of the process, a different outcome might have resulted. Such action might have put pressure on western governments to impose an advanced autonomy settlement on Kosovo, rather than putting Belgrade under pressure to accept the Ahtisaari plan. In the end, Kosovo's independence was unilateral in two senses. On the one hand, Kosovo declared independence without the benefit of agreement from Belgrade or cover from the UN Security Council. On the other hand, Kosovo unilaterally accepted the provisions emanating from the Ahtisaari talks. These concessions had been made in the expectation that agreed independence would be forthcoming in return. Belgrade was therefore able to oppose independence and work against its consolidation, while profiting from Kosovo's agreement to the plan it had rejected.

The United States and the Balkans: Achieving Kosovo's Independence

Abstract This analysis was the focal point of a speech delivered by Ambassador Frank Wisner to the National Committee on American Foreign Policy on June 16, 2008, on the occasion of the resumption of the Angier Biddle Duke Lecture Series.

The Independence of Kosovo and the Consolidation of Macedonia—A Reason to Worry?

Macedonia should not worry about Kosovo becoming independent. This article reviews the current state of affairs in the northern neighbour. The author analyses whether there is a potential danger of an independent Kosovo negatively affecting internal politics in Macedonia. Is there the danger of the escalation of a new conflict. Presenting the factors that impeded democratic consolidation, it is argued that since the configuration of factors that existed in early 2001 and contributed to the mini-war in Macedonia are either non-existent or have been ameliorated, the chances are good that Macedonia will instead continue on its path to European integration. Macedonia should only be concerned if the situation in Kosovo deteriorates and partition is implemented.

Learning the Lessons of Ethnic Conflict Management? Conditional Recognition and International Administration in the Western Balkans since the 1990s

The unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in February 2008 catapulted the Western Balkans back to the centre stage of international security concerns. Despite affirmations to the contrary, the recognition of Kosovo's independence by major Western powers is seen as a significant precedent in international law and the way in which self-determination conflicts are handled by the international community. At the same time, it raises major questions for the stability of borders across the Western Balkans region, and possibly beyond. At the centre of many of these questions is the role of the international community—defined by the international and regional organizations present in the region, as well as by their powerful member states—in tackling the complexity of interrelated self-determination conflicts, incomplete democratization processes, growing concerns about the economic viability of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia and an ever-increasing presence of transnational organized crime networks with significant reach beyond the region.