Kosovar Albanians Research Articles

Collapse and Reconstruction of Ajudicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor

Within the span of only a few months in 1999, the United Nations was faced with one of the greatest challenges in its recent history: to serve as an interim government in Kosovo and East Timor.In Kosovo, in response to massive attacks on the Kosovar Albanian population, including orchestrated and wide-scale “ethnic cleansing,” the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted an eleven-week air campaign against Yugoslav and Serbian security forces and paramilitary groups. The campaign resulted in the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to withdraw all Yugoslav and Serbian security forces from the territory. On June 10,1999, one day after the suspension of NATO’s air strikes, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 (1999), establishing the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK).

The Risks of Selective Europeanization

A LITTLE MORE THAN TEN YEARS AFTER the fall of the Berlin Wall, two intertwined processes are unfolding east of the Oder River: the de-Europeanization of Russia and the re-Europeanization of eastern Europe.(1) The first is more the result of inattention, insensitivity, or, at worst, negligence rather than clear calculation. The second has been conducted with considerable fanfare and has raised great expectations in eastern Europe and caused considerable trepidation in Russia. Both processes and the interaction between them are likely to have profound security implications for the region and for long-term international stability.THE DE-EUROPEANIZATION OF RUSSIATsarist Russia and the Soviet Union not only occupied a bi-continental geographic space but also had a strong political interest in both Europe and Asia. The bulk of the population and industry and much of the cultural focus were in Europe, although Russia had diverged from European political developments. The collapse of communism has created a historic opportunity for Russia not only to democratize and build markets but also to create a strong new democratic European identity without neglecting its Asian connections. That European identity would be an important component both in fostering democratic development and in bringing Russia into a security architecture that would ensure stability from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Three factors, however, threaten the creation and the retention of such an identity: Western attitudes and policies toward Russia; east European fears and insensitivities; and nationalistic, anti-democratic forces within Russia.Despite Western proclamations on the importance of Russia to international security and concern over political and economic stability in that vast state, Western attention to Russia has been rather sporadic and mostly crisis-oriented. The West has tended to focus on immediate political, economic, or military crises rather than on long-term processes. Western responses have often involved no more than band-aid measures. Ill-conceived loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have more often been used as political rewards and economic placebos than as components of a clear economic recovery programme. Poorly prepared summits, whether at the presidential or foreign minister level, have at best temporarily assuaged Russian anger rather than addressed long-term security issues. The June 2000 summit in Moscow between President Bill Clinton of the United States and President Vladimir Putin of Russia falls into this category. Despite agreements to build a Russian-American centre to detect missile launches and for each side to dispose of 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium, despite the statement that both countries would try to enhance the viability and effectiveness of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in the future, 'taking into account any changes in the international security environment,' the substantive results of the summit were disappointing. Not only were there no significant improvements in Russian-American relations, but, barely a week later, during a crucial visit to Germany, Putin reiterated Russia's strong opposition to changing the ABM treaty and its refusal to accept the deployment of an American national defence system, and declared that he saw no actual or potential nuclear threat from 'rogue states' in the Middle East or Asia.All too often Western policy has been merely reactive. Two Western actions, however, have been particularly damaging to Russian democratic transition and long-term security in the region: the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the bombing of Yugoslavia over the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians. True, the West appears to have gained Russia's grudging acquiescence in both cases. And there seems to be an impression in many Western capitals, particularly Washington, that these matters have at least been transcended, if not fully resolved. …

Human Wrongs in Kosovo: 1974–99

On 25 September 1998, Fernando del Mundo, a worker for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Kosovo, made a startling observation. Writing in his diary, he noted that this day was one of particularly intense fighting in the province. His white jeep passed a convoy of Yugoslav government trucks adorned with signs announcing that they contained ‘Social Humanitarian Aid of Kosovo and Metohija’. As they passed, the wind blew up the tarpaulin on one of trucks, revealing blue uniformed special police units of the Serbian Ministry of Interior (MUP).l How was it that these perpetrators of numerous crimes throughout Kosovo came to travel under the banner of humanitarianism? According to Human Rights Watch, these policeman, along with the Yugoslav Army (VJ), ‘have attacked a string of towns and villages’ and what is more, ‘the majority of those killed and injured have been civilians’. 2 Before and during NATO’s Operation Allied Force, VJ, MUP and local Serbian militia forces committed horrendous crimes against the Kosovar Albanian population. Although commentators and Western politicians have been criticised for using the word ‘genocide’ to refer to what happened, under the terms of the 1948 Genocide Convention, I believe that it is valid to describe what happened in Kosovo between March and June as genocide. 3 After NATO’s operation, extremist elements claiming to be members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) wreaked a terrible vengeance on the Serbian population of Kosovo. Following the deployment of the multinational KFOR force, a series of well-publicised incidents of murder and beatings forced around 170,000 Serbs to flee Kosovo for Serbia and Montenegro. 4 All these examples raise the central question of this essay: what is the value of life in Kosovo? This essay investigates a trajectory of decline in the value of human life from the 1970s to the conflict of 1999.

Mental health, social functioning, and attitudes of Kosovar Albanians following the war in Kosovo.

The 1998-1999 war in Kosovo had a direct impact on large numbers of civilians. The mental health consequences of the conflict are not known. To establish the prevalence of psychiatric morbidity associated with the war in Kosovo, to assess social functioning, and to identify vulnerable populations among ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Cross-sectional cluster sample survey conducted from August to October 1999 among 1358 Kosovar Albanians aged 15 years or older in 558 randomly selected households across Kosovo. Nonspecific psychiatric morbidity, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms, and social functioning using the General Health Questionnaire 28 (GHQ-28), Harvard Trauma Questionnaire, and the Medical Outcomes Study Short-Form 20 (MOS-20), respectively; feelings of hatred and a desire for revenge among persons surveyed as addressed by additional questions. Of the respondents, 17.1% (95% confidence interval [CI], 13.2%-21.0%) reported symptoms that met Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition criteria for PTSD; total mean score on the GHQ-28 was 11.1 (95% CI, 9.9-12.4). Respondents reported a high prevalence of traumatic events. There was a significant linear decrease in mental health status and social functioning with increasing amount of traumatic events (P</=.02 for all 3 survey tools). Populations at increased risk for psychiatric morbidity as measured by GHQ-28 scores were those aged 65 years or older (P =.006), those with previous psychiatric illnesses or chronic health conditions (P<.001 for both), and those who had been internally displaced (P =.009). Populations at risk for poorer social functioning were living in rural areas (P =.001), were unemployed (P =.046) or had a chronic illness (P =.01). Respondents scored highest on the physical functioning and role functioning subscales of the MOS-20 and lowest on the mental health and social functioning subscales. Eighty-nine percent of men and 90% of women reported having strong feelings of hatred toward Serbs. Fifty-one percent of men and 43% of women reported strong feelings of revenge; 44% of men and 33% of women stated that they would act on these feelings. Mental health problems and impaired social functioning related to the recent war are important issues that need to be addressed to return the Kosovo region to a stable and productive environment. JAMA. 2000;284:569-577

Mental health and nutritional status among the adult Serbian minority in Kosovo.

Since the beginning of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization intervention in Kosovo in June 1999, few objective data have been available on relevant health indicators for the Serbian ethnic minority in Kosovo. To determine the prevalence of undernutrition among Serbian adults aged 60 years or older and psychiatric morbidity among the adult Serbian population in Kosovo. A systematic random sample survey of 212 households was conducted between September 27 and October 2, 1999, in Pristina, the capital city, and in 10 towns in the rural municipality of Gnjilane in Kosovo. Of the 212 households surveyed, 204 adults aged 15 years or older completed the General Health Questionnaire-28 (GHQ-28) and anthropometric measurements were taken for 98 adults aged 60 years or older and for a comparison group of 51 adults aged 18 to 59 years. Body mass index of less than 18.5 kg/m(2) in older adults; nonspecific psychiatric morbidity among adults; and self-reported use of health care services, access to food rations, and primary sources of prewar and postwar income. Undernutrition was found in 11.2% (95% confidence interval [CI], 5.7%-19.2%) of Serbian adults aged 60 years or older compared with 2.0% (95% CI, 0.1%-11.8%) of Serbian adults aged 18 to 59 years. The mean (SE) total score for the GHQ-28 was 13.0 (0.52). In a comparison of the GHQ-28 scores of the Serbian adults with the Kosovar Albanian adults (data from a recent survey), the mean (SE) score adjusted for age and sex was 12.8 (0.52) vs 11.1 (0.58); P =.03, respectively. The GHQ-28 scores were also higher for the Serbians in the subcategories of social dysfunction (2.8 [0.17] vs 2.2 [0.13]; P =.008) and severe depression (1.9 [0.15] vs 0.9 [0. 09]; P<.001), respectively. Serbian women and persons living alone or in small family units were more prone to psychiatric morbidity. Of the 141 respondents reporting the need for health care services, 83 (57.6%) reported not obtaining such services; 204 of 212 (96.2%) households were on a food distribution list. The majority of prewar income came from government jobs compared with farming and humanitarian aid for postwar income. The undernutrition of older Serbian adults in Kosovo should be monitored. The high prevalence of symptoms of social dysfunction and severe depression suggest the need for implementation of mental health programs in the Serbian community. JAMA. 2000;284:578-584

Victims and victors: reflections on the Kosovo War

Both the ‘CNN effect,’ whereby images revealing large-scale suffering push governments into humanitarian interventions, and the ‘bodybags effect’, whereby images of casualties pull them away, were evident in the Kosovo War, as was the ‘bullying effect,’ whereby the use of excessive force risks draining away public support for interventions. Although Serbs deliberately tried to present themselves as victims, however, the harsh methods used to suppress Kosovar Albanian aspirations ensured that it was they who appeared as the victims. The Serb effort was also counter-productive in that it made the KLA harder, instead of easier, to defeat.

War and mortality in Kosovo, 1998–99: an epidemiological testimony

The total number, rates, and causes of mortality in Kosovo during the last war remain unclear despite intense international attention. Understanding mortality that results from modern warfare, in which 90% of casualties are civilian, and identifying vulnerable civilian groups, are of critical public-health importance. In September 1999 we conducted a two-stage cluster survey among the Kosovar Albanian population in Kosovo. We collected retrospective mortality data, including cause of death, for the period of the conflict. The survey included 1197 households comprising 8605 people. From February, 1998, through June, 1999, 67 (64%) of 105 deaths in the sample population were attributed to war-related trauma, corresponding to 12,000 (95% CI 5500-18,300) deaths in the total population. The crude mortality rate increased 2.3 times from the pre-conflict level to 0.72 per 1000 a month. Mortality rates peaked in April 1999 at 3.25 per 1000 a month, coinciding with an intensification of the Serbian campaign of "ethnic cleansing". Men of military age (15-49 years) and men 50 years and older had the highest age-specific mortality rates from war-related trauma. However, the latter group were more than three times as likely to die of war-related trauma than were men of military age (relative risk 3.2). Raising awareness among the international humanitarian community of the increased risk of mortality from war-related trauma among men of 50 years and older in some settings is an urgent priority. Establishing evacuation programmes to assist older people to find refuge may prevent loss of life. Such mortality data could be used as evidence that governments and military groups have violated international standards of conduct during warfare.

Lessons unlearned: Why coercive diplomacy failed at Rambouillet

On 29 January 1999, the Contact Group of states that had monitored the Bosnian war summoned the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians to Rambouillet and presented them with an ultimatum: accept the proposed settlement by 21 February or face the use of military force. This article considers the use of coercive diplomacy at Rambouillet, and its attempt to replicate the conditions which produced the Dayton settlement in 1995. It will be argued that the environment in which the Rambouillet ultimatum was issued was considerably different from the permissive environment at Dayton. This meant that the use of the ultimatum, while appearing innovative and forward‐thinking, was actually untimely, misplaced and likely to fail.

Turkey's Warm Welcome of Kosovar Refugees

Turkey's immediate and ongoing acceptance of Kosovar refugees stands out among NATO nations. This article investigates the cultural and historical bonds between Kosovar Albanians and Turks, the widesprad and active support for the refugees in Turkish society, and the precedent of three earlier waves of Kosovar refugees who settled in Turkey earlier in the 20th century. It notes the problem of dealing only with humanitarian concerns while ignoring the political causes of refugee flows.

NATO's Ethnic Cleansing: The Kurdish Question in Turkey

Of all the arguments put forward in defense of the NATO war against Yugoslavia, that which invokes the plight of Kosovar Albanians is certainly the most powerful. The claim that NATO is an appropriate instrument to pursue the aim of defending the lives and rights of the Kosovars is logically the fundamental premise of the pro-intervention left. Leaving aside all of the other problems concerning this kind of approach to imperialism and war, we need only look to one of the member countries of the alliance to see the utter hypocrisy of the NATO claim of humanitarian intentions in response to ethnic cleansing and oppression. That country is Turkey, whose planes are participating in the air operations in Yugoslavia and which has prepared special forces to be used for eventual ground combat. This is the same country which, for decades (practically since the foundation of the republic in 1923), has subjected its Kurds to the most ignominious oppression and that recently carried out one of the dirtiest wars ever waged against a national liberation movement Turkey also resorted to one of the most massive operations of ethnic cleansing since the Second World War.This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

The Kosovo conflict: The strategic use of displacement and the obstacles to international protection

This article argues that the armed conflict in Kosovo illustrates that forced displacement resulting in both internally displaced persons and refugees is an intentional, deliberate strategy of the parties to the internal conflict, and not just a consequence or unintended effort of the hostilities between ethnic Albanians and Serbs. The escalation of hostilities was also framed by the international community's lack of coherent conflict management strategy for Kosovo. The two principal assumptions guiding the international community's policymaking — that separation and independence for Kosovo was not a legitimate objective and that Kosovar Albanian armed resistance was considered terrorism ‐ generated incentives for both parties to use force to achieve contrary objectives. This created considerable difficulties for the international community to effectively protect non‐combatant civilians and forcibly displaced persons.

Kosovo's Next Masters?

The rumbles of yet another nationalist earthquake are shaking the former Yugoslavia. Rising from the fetid hovels of Pristina and the concrete-block family farms of rural Kosovo is the newest political and military force to beset the Balkans?the Kosovo Liberation Army (kla), known to Albanians as the Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves. The emergence of this militant armed group, now numbering several thousand fighters, has dimmed hopes that even a compromise agreement with Belgrade could be successfully implemented. Emboldened by nato's March bombing of the Serbian military, the kla will wage a protracted guerrilla war in the Serbian province that could ignite a wider war in neighboring Macedonia and Albania, potentially even dragging in Greece and Bulgaria. The kla is uncom promising in its quest for an independent Kosovo now and a Greater Albania later. And it has, to the consternation of Washingtons would-be peacemakers, supplanted the ineffectual leadership of the moderate voice of Kosovos ethnic Albanian majority, Ibrahim Rugova. The kla is important out of all proportion to its size?not merely because it will probably eventually get Kosovo to secede from Serbia, but because it now represents the aspirations of most Kosovar Albanians. To understand the current conflict in Kosovo and America s stakes in its

International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo

This article examines key elements of international diplomacy and the Kosovo crisis. From very early on, it is shown, the Kosovar Albanians were accorded differential treatment by the international community in relation to the other national minorities of the former Yugoslavia. Whether warranted or not, this approach helped ensure that Kosovo would fail to become a major international concern, thus allowing the conflict to smoulder for years. The explosion of pent-up frustration we are witnessing today in Kosovo is only one consequence of these actions. Another is that the scope for moderate solutions has narrowed. Genuine democratization of Serbia may enlarge the political space required to restore credibility to compromise solutions but the prospects for such a development in the short term are weak. The international community favours a solution to the conflict which would preserve Serbia’s territorial integrity, just as it did earlier with respect to Yugoslavia. But if the Albanians’ desire for independence cannot be sublimated or if the granting of autonomy to Kosovo is used as a cover for the Serbian leadership to pursue its campaign of violence, then persistent opposition to any adjustments to Yugoslavia’s boundaries may be a prescription for further tragedy in the region.