Korean Leader Research Articles

Patriotism as a System-­forming Principle in the Genre-thematic Paradigm of Fine Arts in North Korea

The article considers the theme of patriotism in the fine arts of the DPRK. It is argued that North Korean artists, working within the strict framework of Juche realism, strive to convey the idea of ​​patriotism no matter what they depict and no matter what genre they turn to. The comprehensive direction of “ideological painting”, chujehwa, which forms the aesthetic and content side of the creative process in the DPRK, often levels out the genre division. It is reduced to key plots and motifs, the main task of which is the propaganda of patriotism. The images of North Korean leaders, presented in an inextricable connection with the fate of the nation and the homeland, are analysed as the most striking example of patriotic pathos in the fine arts. The idea of patriotism makes it possible to develop a visual chronicle of the exploits of an individual hero and an entire nation, acting according to a certain “heroic” scheme and corresponding to the canon of selfless loyalty to the fatherland. Moreover, it makes it possible to rethink the military theme in the DPRK painting in an original way. The theme of labour is also subordinated to the concept of love for the socialist homeland, raising everyday life to ideological heights. The fine arts of North Korea attach great importance to the themes of women, motherhood, family, youth and sports, which are used as messengers for patriotism. Even landscape painting, which has deep national traditions, carries a powerful ideological message designed to instil a sense of awe and pride in the viewer, and to strengthen devotion to their country. The equally ancient Flowers and Birds genre, in addition to its aesthetic content, emphasises the theme of abundance, prosperity, and social contentment. Naturally, the poster, being deeply politicised and ideological, also has a patriotic feel. The author concludes that the patriotism motif is central in the fine arts of the DPRK. To artists, North Korean propaganda dictates a vision of patriotic ideas as a standard and unchanging set of themes that they are obliged to reflect in their work.

Цифровая дипломатия в контексте соглашения США и Северной Кореи в мировых медиаресурсах: оценки и особенности

A specific feature of the period of US President Donald Trump’s term of office is his practice of covering current and planned events in international politics both by the United States itself and other countries and international organizations and associations in his unofficial Twitter account, which, however, did not find a large number of followers of such a practice of publicizing foreign policy decisions among politicians of the conditional collective West, and in the media, this practice has received a mixed assessment. In the article, the author examines the phenomenon of “digital diplomacy” and “twitter diplomacy” using the example of coverage of the meeting between D. Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Based on an analysis of the assessments formulated in the Twitter accounts of North American and European politicians, as well as an analysis of the coverage of the meeting between D. Trump and Kim Jong-Un, held on June 30, 2019. in the demilitarized zone on the 38th parallel of the Korean Peninsula, the author concludes about the ambiguity of such assessments and their significant difference in comparison with those assessments that were posted on Internet resources in the United States and other countries belonging to the conditional West before the meeting of the two leaders and immediately after it took place. It is also noted that the mechanism actively used by D. Trump to announce foreign policy events and intentions without prior coordination with diplomatic structures has not found support in the practice of communication between leaders of states.

Children of the Juche Revolution: Picturing North Korean Youth Culture at the Thirteenth World Festival of Youth and Students

Abstract: In this article, I analyze three dimensions of the Thirteenth World Festival of Youth and Students, which was held in Pyongyang in 1989. I focus on the discourse that unfolded in the lead-up to the event as North Korean leaders met with international representatives; encounters between North Koreans and international delegates on the ground during the festival; and North Korean artworks produced for and exhibited during the festival. Mobilizing Giorgio Agamben’s theoretical frame of contemporaneity, I unfurl the competing ways in which the North Korean state and the festival’s backing constituencies representing the global youth sought to establish their relevance in a shifting global order—one in which North Korea increasingly appeared an anachronistic holdover from the Cold War era. The tension that runs through each of the dimensions of the festival explored here provides useful insight into the Cold War ideological forces that subsisted during the frenzied political juncture of 1989 even as many sought to define this moment as marking the end of the Cold War and the arrival of a global community.

North Korea in the Twilight of Communism: Ideological Transformation and International Relations during the Cold War's Final Decade

Abstract The 1980s were a time of considerable ideological transformations in North Korea and the Soviet Union. North Korean leaders revived orthodox Marxism-Leninism, whereas the opposite was true in the Soviet Union, as Mikhail Gorbachev ushered in a fundamental reassessment of Marxism-Leninism that led to the downfall of ideological orthodoxy. Previous scholarship has barely explored this revival and the impact of Soviet ideological changes on North Korea. Drawing on newly released archival evidence and North Korean party publications, this article explores these interrelated and often contradictory phenomena. North Korea's revival of Marxism-Leninism, far from being superficial, was profound and strategically designed to link North Korean foreign policy much more closely with state ideology. The reoriented North Korean policy actively reached out to the Communist world to attain economic and diplomatic superiority vis-à-vis South Korea. Soviet ideological changes under Gorbachev threatened to undermine the DPRK's foreign policy goals and new ideological commitments, thus resulting in sharp ideological disagreements and ultimately the end of North Korea's Marxist-Leninist renaissance.

An introduction to the “balance of fear”: case studies of North Korea’s challenge to the United States and South Korea’s KMPR against North Korea

ABSTRACT In late 2023, North Korea announced its intention to attack and annex South Korea despite the US’ nuclear umbrella for South Korea. Simultaneously, South Korea has been threatening a its decapitation operation against the North Korean leader. How does a small nuclear state, North Korea, ignore the nuclear umbrella of the United States, the nuclear superpower, and a non-nuclear South Korea challenge North Korea? This article introduces the “balance of fear” concept to search for answers to these two questions. It argues that the conventional “balance of terror” concept and the “balance of resolve” concept as well cannot provide a sufficient answer. In contrast, the balance of fear concept explains that not the strength of nuclear forces, but the amount of fear decides the failure or success in deterrence: North Korean leaders may have less fear for US massive retaliation than the US leaders’ fear for North Korea’s suicidal nuclear attack on US cities.

Shifting from top-down to bottom-up nationalism: an analysis of YouTube speeches from the 2016/17 candlelight revolution in South Korea

ABSTRACT While the ‘top-down’ variant of nationalism is engendered by elites and emphasizes loyalty to the state and ethnic solidarity, little is known about the ‘bottom-up’ variant, which focuses on people’s interest in the state’s and political leaders’ care for the masses. South Korea’s ‘Candlelight Revolution’ of 2016/17 ignited a national protest against the abuse of power by then-President Park Geun-Hye, the unfair distribution of wealth, and changes to Korean culture. This article explores grassroots’ expressions of bottom-up nationalism by analysing YouTube speeches from the Candlelight rallies. Protesters criticized the corruption and abuse of power by Korean leaders, which were seen to perpetuate the structure of injustice for decades. Some aspects of the Korean cultural contexts were politicized by national leaders, such as conservative leaders labelling their critics ‘commies’. By contesting the structure and culture of Korean society, protesters transformed themselves into social actors at the personal level and then called for long-term rather than temporary remedies at the societal level. By espousing ‘calculated nationalism’, protesters illustrated their interest in what they can get from the Korean nation-state, rather than what they can do to the state.

The Role of The Korean Leadership of Dimsum Sidoarjo in Improving Employee Morale and Performance

The Role of The Korean Leadership of Dimsum Sidoarjo in Improving Employee Morale and Performance

Deciphering Consistency and Coherence in U.S Foreign Policy: North Korea under Trump and Biden

Propose: This study investigated how consistent and coherent U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea was under President Trump and Biden. Methodology: Through qualitative analysis of policy shifts and diplomatic strategies, this paper explored how effectively both administrations advanced their policy objectives within the intricate dynamics of U.S.-North Korea relations. Data were collected from primary sources like official government documents and secondary sources like academic journal articles and media reports. Thematic and content analyses were employed to identify recurring motifs and evaluate the articulation and implementation of policy strategies. Findings: Findings indicated that Trump's untraditional approach of involving North Korean leader Kim Jong-un directly, alongside a "maximum pressure" campaign, yielded mixed outcomes. While it broke long-standing diplomatic deadlocks, it faced challenges such as inconsistencies and limited progress on denuclearization. In contrast, Biden's administration focused on multilateralism, alliance-building, and a structured policy framework. Nonetheless, it also encountered several challenges in making tangible progress toward denuclearization. The study underscored the importance of future U.S. administrations integrating the strengths of both approaches to enhance foreign policy effectiveness. Unique Contribution to Theory Practice and Policy: This study improved understanding of contemporary international relations by dissecting American interactions with North Korea under two different administrations. It provided crucial insights for policymakers, highlighting how maintaining consistency and coherence is pivotal in forming effective foreign policy.

1910년대 일본의 재만 조선인 회유와 유교 지도자의 귀국

The dynamics of Korean Confucian movement found in colonial Korea in the late 1910s and early 1920s were the result of the rapid response of domestic confucian intellectual groups to domestic and international situations, but it was also the result of the return of the Confucian leaders. After returning home, they revitalized the Confucian community by urging the conservative Confucian intellectuals to participate in the independence movement and leading the establishment of Confucian organizations.
 The return of the Confucian leaders was closely related to the Japanese government’s conciliatory policy. In August 1918, Suenaga Misao, a ronin of Japan, and Jang Woo-geun, a pro-Japanese Korean, wrote ‘an opinion on the conciliation and unification of Koreans abroad’ together and proposed a conciliation for Korean leaders in Manchuria, China, through observation groups. In fact, between 1919 and 1920, Maeng Bo-soon, Lee Sang-gyu, and Jeong An-rip, who had participated in the Observation Group to Yeosun and Dalian or had often met with Japanese officials and exchanged opinions, returned home, and became a new leading group of the Confucian movement in 1920s.

Whipsawed by Woori and Washington: South Korea's growing challenges in handling Middle Eastern affairs

AbstractThe history of the past two decades has proved that top Korean leaders can make a real difference in terms of their previous experiences and personal engagement in securing the Republic of Korea's (ROK) vested interests in the Middle East. For decades, South Korea had handed over its day‐to‐day interactions with Middle Eastern countries to the Korean bureaucracy led by the relevant departments and subaltern officials at the foreign ministry and other state institutions. This approach, however, seems rather dysfunctional today, requiring key Korean officials, especially the president, to get involved personally in the ROK's increasingly multifaceted relationships with Middle Eastern nations. This article reappraises the new Korean orientation by highlighting some of the major developments involving both sides during the past several years. The main argument is that the ROK is facing increasingly serious difficulties in sorting out its policy behaviors toward Middle Eastern countries as Korea is striving to strike a delicate balance between its own expanding commercial interests in the region and what the United States expects from South Korea with regard to the topsy‐turvy world of politics in the Middle East.

Cunnilingus in North Korea and other Sensations of Non-Nationalism

ABSTRACT: Cunnilingus in North Korea is a fictional, early 2000s, text-based Flash animation piece by Young-Hae Chang Heavy Industries in which the North Korean leader Kim Jong-il delivers a speech to the South Korean people reprimanding them for their prudishness, a supposed product of capitalism, and encouraging all Koreans to adopt the North’s policy of constant nationwide cunnilingus, which is a communistic elixir that makes for harmonious, triumphant societies. By situating this piece within scholarship on contemporary U.S. imperialism and the neoliberalization of South Korea, this article argues that Cunnilingus in North Korea deploys estrangements and reversals in order to enliven and decompose the postcolonial common sense in which North/South Korean nationalisms self-organize along the oppositionality of their respective political economies. Further, I show how the piece hails erotics—theorized as a poetic practice and sense of world—as vital to digital aesthetic forms that agitate against logics of contemporary imperialism.

한국의 경제제재 대응 결정요인 분석 - 제재국에 대한 기회/제약인식과 제재 대응의 상이성 -

한국의 경제제재 대응 결정요인 분석 - 제재국에 대한 기회/제약인식과 제재 대응의 상이성 -

북한 마약산업의 주요 실행 주체와 생산 시설 연구

The purpose of this study is to examine the main actors and production facilities in the North Korean drug industry and their implications. North Korea's drug production and smuggling are known to have started in the 1970s, but this is a long-standing crime since the division of Korea in August 1945 and continues to serve as its traditional source of income. The North Korean authorities' drug crimes have not been cut off, and the “drug business,” which was relatively small until the 1970s, has expanded to an industrial level from the 1980s that continues to this day. Despite the fact that North Korea's drug problem is an old problem, the current situation is known only in a fragmentary manner. Therefore, this paper is a follow-up on the studies dealing with North Korean drug problems from 1945 to the 1980s, with a focus on unveiling the reality of the development of the North Korean drug industry that began to thrive in the 1990s. Moreover, this is a foundational study to better understand North Korea's drug production capacities (technology and scale), networks and patterns, and the ripple effect it has on the Korean Peninsula and the international community. Unlike the typical criminal syndicate, the actors in North Korea's drug industry are workers and special agencies delegated and entrusted with the authority to operate the drug industry by suryong, or the great leader. In other words, these syndicates are actors that carried out operations in espionage, terrorism, weapons, and trade under the suryong dictatorship and were granted additional authority to operate the drug industry. These actors include Kim Jong Il’s younger sister Kim Kyung Hee and her husband, Jang Song Thaek, Office 39, Reconnaissance General Bureau, Ministry of State Security, Military Security Command, and the Second Economic Committee. The production facilities managed by these syndicates include the Ranam Pharmaceutical Factory, the Mannyon Pharmaceutical Factory, the Hungnam Pharmaceutical Factory, the State Academy of Science, espionage agencies, and third-country production facilities. The actors in North Korea's drug industry can be executed, dismissed, purged, expelled, or replaced at any time at the will of the leader. In addition, production facilities are repeatedly closed, restarted, and relocated due to personnel changes or security reasons. In other words, suryong and the North Korean leadership are unlikely to give up the drug industry as long as they generate huge profits even if temporary changes such as replacing intermediate managers, production facilities, and trafficking routes occur like a typical drug cartel. All North Korean officials under the Kim Jong Un dictatorship are also easily crossing the borders of law, morality, and national borders by any means for the sake of serving Kim Jong Un's interests and goals. Looking only at drug crimes led by North Korean authorities, the use of the term “state” itself may not be appropriate for North Korea as it goes beyond “criminal state” or “mafia state.” The reason is that in North Korea, “private” criminal organizations cannot infiltrate the regime on their own, and the leader and the leadership themselves possess criminal characteristics, making it contradictory to be the subject of punishment for drug crimes committed by themselves.

북한의 백두산 인식 변화와 함의

In the 1960s, North Korea faced internal and external crises such as the Sino-Soviet dispute and the implementation of a parallel economic and defense policy. These internal and external crises made the North Korean leadership reflect on the difficult times when they led the anti-Japanese guerrilla army at the end of Japanese colonial rule. North Korea mythologized Kim Il-sung’s anti-Japanese armed struggle, promoted it as a war criminal to emulate the guerrilla-style life, and demanded that the people learn and live by its style. In the process, Baekdu Mountain began to be symbolized as a sacred place of anti-Japanese revolutionary tradition. Baekdu Mountain is a place that reminds us of the revolutionary tradition of the anti-Japanese armed struggle, and is depicted as a symbol of the so-called ‘Baekdu bloodline’ and a medium to justify hereditary succession. For this reason, the majority of research on Mt. Baekdu has tended to interpret it in relation to the process of establishing North Korea’s revolutionary tradition or its idolization. However, Baekdu Mountain was not portrayed as the site of Kim Il-sung’s anti-Japanese armed struggle or stereotyped as a symbol for the idolization of Kim Il-sung’s family immediately after liberation. Even in the early 1950s, Baekdu Mountain was depicted as an object to be developed and the territorial belonging of it was confirmed, and in the process of building a ‘guerrilla state’, it was also a stage that had to be occupied first in the competition between Kim Il-sung and the Gapsan faction. In addition, after the dissolution of the Cold War, it became a symbol of the unification ofNorth and South Korea as well as a medium to unite the people in the midst of a systemic crisis

The Republic of Korea Between China and the United States in the Face of Confrontation Over Taiwan

The article gives a tentative analysis of factors impacting the domestic and foreign policy of the Republic of Korea amid the growing confrontation between the “global West” spearheaded by the U.S. and the “global East” led by Russia and China. While the conflict between Washington and Beijing is being escalated, the South Korean leadership is likely to find itself in a precarious situation where it has to make a choice between its main economic partner and theideological overlord in terms of value orientation and security . Understanding the upcoming political course of Seoul, especially in light of the conflict over Taiwan, is of great scientific value and is important for applied international relations studies. Based on the analysis of the main trends of global turbulence and regional security, the authors propose a scenario prognosis developed on the basis of situational analysis and author’s modeling techniques , which would include both the general trends of the country’s foreign policy and the level of potential involvement of South Korea into a probable conflict between the U.S. and China in the Taiwan Strait. It is also worth noting that the most evident outcome will be the preserved alliance with Washington which is closer to South Korea when it comes to its social and political values and a gradual deterioration in relations with China, the speed of which may vary. However, the authors conclude by saying that Seoul will go to great lengths to postpone this uneasy choice and will try to distance itself from direct participation in a military conflict.

Analisa Persepsi Interpersonal Karyawan PT Minu Garment Sukses Pada Penggunaan Kata Umpatan Korea

This study aims to analyze organizational communication in the application of interpersonal perceptions in Minu Garment companies Success in the use of Korean swear words by Korean leaders which has an impact on employee psychological disruption. Participants in the study were employees of PT. Minu Garment Success which includes Top Management and Middle Management statff. Top management staff are Korean company leaders and middle management staff are Indonesian employees. This research is a qualitativedescriptive research with interview method. Based on this study, it was found that the application of interpersonal perception to employees was able to overcome the psychological impact in the use of Korean swear words.
 
 

Red Star over Seoul: Facts and the Myths of the Ninety-Day-Long Communist Rule over the South Korean Capital in 1950

During its long history, the city of Seoul has suffered three major sieges and occupations. The first happened in 1592, the second occupation of the capital was in 1636, and the third occasion when the city was besieged and occupied by an enemy army was during the first phase of the Korean War. The main goal of this study is to describe facts and myths about the ninety-day-long communist rule over the South Korean capital in 1950. During my research, I compared all available documentary sources with recollections and memoirs to ascertain how the city and its citizens survived that difficult period. I collected impressions about the North Korean invaders to examine everyday life in the occupied city. I also attempted to determine if there is any truth to the myth that the North Korean leader Kim Il Sung visited occupied Seoul. The main primary sources used here are the contemporary newspapers of the DPRK: the Rodong Sinmun, which published several news items about occupied Seoul, and the Haebang Ilbo (Liberation Daily), which was published in Seoul during the North Korean occupation. The documentation about the ninety-day-long occupation of Seoul began right after the liberation of the capital in fall 1950. The first book, which collected the experiences of some elite members of South Korean society, was published by the Soodo Munhwasa company, under the title Konan ŭi 90 il (90 days of suffering).1 The reminiscences of the authors—university professor Yu Chin-oh, poet Mo Yun-suk, lawyer-scholar Yi Geon-ho, and news reporter Ku Chul-hoi—were published in English soon after the Korean version. The Reds Take a City was the first non-Korean book that collected available pieces of infor- mation about the occupation.2 In the second year of the Korean War, another important collection titled Chok Hwa Sam Sak Kuinjip (赤禍三朔九人集, Three Months under the Reds) was published.3 The book contained nine recollections from those who experienced communist rule and were forced to collaborate with the North Koreans regarding minor matters. Its publisher was the anti-communist Podo yŏnmaeng (보도연맹, Podo League) organization, which was established before the Korean War to “erase” citizens’ leftist ideologies.4 Some other important sources of the ninety-day-long occupation of Seoul are the personal recollections, written by well-known South Korean intellectuals. Park Wan-suh’s popular novel Ku manhtŏn shinga nun nuga ta mŏgŏssŭlkka? (그 많던 싱아는 누가 다 먹었을까? Who Ate up all the Shinga?) and Kim Seong-chil’s famous diary, Yŏksa ap’ eso (역 사 앞에서 In Front of History), included important observations about that period. Kim Won-Il’s reminiscences, which are particularly meaningful because his father had been involved in the developments, also provide useful information.5 To add more North Korean elements to the puzzle of the ninety-day-long occupation, one important source is the novel 50 nyŏn yŏrŭm (50년 여름, Summer of the year 50), which contains details about Kim Il Sung’s alleged trip to Seoul at that time.6 In my capacity as the Ambassador for Hungary to the DPRK, I also studied the local publications available in Pyongyang. Often, Central and Eastern European sources proved to be most beneficial as the archives of these former communist states proved to be far more accessible than North Korean archives, which are very restricted. At that time, the party organs of the Soviet bloc countries published daily about the developments, and their journalists reported personally from the battlefield of Korea. These include archive diplomatic reports from the Hungarian legation in Pyongyang, which are available now in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Directory at the National Archives of Hungary.

Chosen aspects of intangible and tangible legacies of Confucianism in North Korea

The purpose of the paper is to discuss the intangible and tangible assets related to Confucianism in North Korea. The study aims to demonstrate that there is a dichotomy between the official discourse, the adherence of the North Korean leaders to Confucian values, and the policy toward Confucian and neo-Confucian assets existing in North Korea. The method which is used in this essay is based on an analysis of various historical sources relevant to the description and analysis of the functions of Confucian and neo-Confucian assets in North Korea. It is concluded that the concepts of filial piety and the role of women were culturally transformed. This essay is based to a large extent on North Korean documents. It also briefly mentions North Korean researchers who studied Confucianism and neo-Confucianism in the Korean Peninsula. The answer to the research problem will allow us to determine what the place is of Confucianism in the official discourse and in the cultural heritage of North Korea. The essay also provides elements explaining why Confucian and neo-Confucian tangible assets constitute cultural and economic tools of North Korean government policy.

Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran: North Korea's Relations with Iraq and Iran during the Cold War

Abstract This article explores how North Korean leaders tried to maneuver between Iran and Iraq to gain greater leverage in the Cold War. Both of these Middle Eastern countries seemed potentially attractive partners for Pyongyang, but they were often on hostile terms with each other. The article considers how the Iraq-Iran rivalry and domestic changes in Iraq and Iran affected North Korean policy. Even when Pyongyang's cooperation with one or the other of the two states reached a high level, the North Koreans also reached out to the other country, regardless of the position of either state and of external actors such as the Soviet Union and China. The North Koreans generally avoided taking a public stand on the Iraq-Iran dispute, but on occasion they became more deeply involved. Mainly, the North Korean government sought to maximize the number of its partners, rather than to make a stable commitment to just one state. In turn, both Iraq and Iran eventually came to perceive North Korea as a state that was mostly out to benefit itself rather than helping either of them.

The Formation of the Memories of Economic Development in North and South Korea

This article focuses on the state-sanctioned and state-led formation of memories related to economic development in the service of post-colonial nation-building. Looking at North and South Korea in the 1940s through the 1960s as a case study, it examines the different strategies utilized by the “pedagogical states” on opposite sides of the Cold War divide to create in the national consciousness a lasting historical myth, in this case – the myth that both countries’ economic development was truly national and had no relation to their former metropole Japan. Based on primary sources, including public speeches by North and South Korean leaders and archival documents, this article explores the importance of public historical education to the formation of memories related to economic development, ways of achieving that, and the role played by nationalism in each country as the memories were formed. Finally, it assesses the role of public historical education in nation-building, its longterm efficacy, and its influence on the present day.