Kohlberg's Stages Research Articles

Moral Reasoning in Early Childhood: Lying and Stealing

Summary First graders' responses to questions designed to elicit their reasons for not lying and stealing were analyzed in terms of Kohlberg's stage theory. Contrary to expectations, only about 20% of the responses fell into Stage 1. Very few of the responses were in Stage 2. Approximately three-quarters of the responses were in Stage 3. A distinction was made between stereotypic and nonstereotypic Stage 3 responses. Approximately 40% of Stage 3 responses were nonstereotypic: i.e., manifesting concern with social approval, not harming others, and preservation of social relations. Questions are raised concerning the appropriateness of using a cognitive developmental theory to understand young children's moral reasoning.

A Chinese perspective on Kohlberg's theory of moral development

This essay uses the Chinese culture as an example to underline the culturally specific contextual problems regarding Kohlberg's theory of moral development and to point to a new direction for cross-cultural research in this area. The Western view of man as an autonomous being who makes free and rational choices as a moral agent is clearly reflected in Kohlberg's stages of moral development as well as his methodology. The Confucian view of man as an integral part of an orderly universe with an innate moral sense to maintain harmony is quite different. Further, the preferred mode of resolving human conflict in China is reconciliation and collective decision making rather than individual choice, commitment, and responsibility as in the West. In the light of these fundamental differences in the two cultural traditions, an alternative to Kohlberg's theory is suggested.

Experiences that motivate moral development: The role of cognitive dissonance

It has been found in previous research concerning Kohlberg's stages of moral development that engagement in a “real-life” moral dilemma sometimes leads to an advance in an individual's level of moral thought. It is argued in this study that such moral growth is often motivated by the need to reduce cognitive dissonance, which, it is suggested, frequently accompanies choice and commitment in moral contexts. Subjects in the present study delivered counterattitudinal messages that contained arguments that were either 1 stage higher or 1 stage lower than their characteristic level of moral reasoning. Half of the subjects freely chose to deliver these messages, and half did not. Afterwards, subjects' attitudes toward the issues discussed in their messages and their tendency to conceptualize moral issues in terms of the higher or lower levels of reasoning contained in their messages were assessed. The subjects who (a) had freely chosen to deliver the message, and (b) had delivered the message containing higher level arguments used significantly more advanced moral reasoning after their counterattitudinal advocacy than they had before it. These subjects showed greater change in their attitudes regarding the topic discussed in their message than other subject groups. These results suggest that moral behavior will be likely to promote moral growth (a) if it occurs under circumstances that promote cognitive dissonance (e.g., free choice) and (b) if advanced moral ideas are made salient during the dissonance reduction process.

The Sequentiality of Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development

WALKER, LAWRENCE J. The Sequentiality of Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development. CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1982, 53, 1330-1336. Kohlberg's claim that moral development proceeds through an invariant sequence of stages was examined experimentally by attempting to induce regression and stage skipping. Fifththrough seventh-grade children were tested to determine their cognitive, perspective-taking, and moral development. Those children with the stages of cognitive and perspective-taking development held by Kohlberg to be prerequisite to further moral development were exposed, in a brief role-playing situation, to 1 of the treatment conditions: 1-stage-below reasoning, 1-stage-above reasoning, 2-stages-above reasoning, neutral treatment, or no treatment. Moral-reasoning posttests followed 1 and 7 weeks later. Results supported the sequentiality claim as development was always to the next higher stage. However, contrary to the view that exposure to 1-stage-above reasoning represents the optimal means to induce development, it was found that 2-stages-above reasoning was just as effective.

Guttman Scaling of Moral Comprehension Stages

This study examined whether Rest's (1979) objective test of moral comprehension could yield comprehension stage data that form a Guttman scale. If so, the test's construct validity and its usefulness for certain research purposes would be enhanced (Rest, 1973). Subjects were 197 adults in junior college, college, or graduate school. Each completed Rest's (1979) Defining Issues Test and an 11-item version of Rest's multiple-choice test of moral comprehension, which assesses comprehension of Kohlberg's Stages 4, 5A, and 5B. For each comprehension item the subject chooses one of four multiple-choice alternatives. A subject was scored as comprehending Stage 4 if he answered at least three out of four Stage 4 items correctly, Stage 5A if he answered three out of four Stage 5A items correctly, and 5B if he answered both Stage 5B items correctly. These criteria were chosen because the probability of reaching or exceeding each criterion by randomly guessing is low and quite uniform across the three stages: 5% for Stage 4 and Stage 5A, and 6% for Stage 5B. Using Henry's (1952) method for assigning scale scores to non-scale-types (see Nie, et al., 1975), the coefficient of reproducibility was .95 and the coefficient of scalability was .84. Thus, the comprehension stage data do form a Guttman scale.

The Sequentiality of Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development

The Sequentiality of Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development

Moral reasoning and type of criminal offence

Many studies have investigated the relationship of Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning to criminal behaviour, the consensual finding being that known delinquents tend to use less advanced forms of moral reasoning than control subjects. An assumption common to the majority of these studies is that moral stage relates equivalently to all forms of criminal behaviour. It is argued that this assumption is incompatible with cognitive‐developmental theory as elaborated by Kohlberg since the theory implies that developmentally primitive moralities will be associated with delinquent behaviour only to the extent that the behaviour in question is differently evaluated at the different moral stages. On this basis it is hypothesized that preconventional moral reasoning will be associated only with crimes in which the offenders believe they have a good chance of evading punishment. In support of this hypothesis prisoners whose current offence is of this type are shown to use more preconventional moral judgement than either other offenders or non‐offenders. Various possible alternative explanations of this finding are discussed.

Kohlbergian Theory: A Philosophical Counterinvitation

There can be little doubt that the work of Lawrence Kohlberg in the fields of moral psychology and moral education is (a) important and (b) of interest to moral philosophers. It is important because represents a research program of tremendous scope that offers promise of a coherent, transcultural model of human moral development, a model that appears to be both methodologically and substantively different from the dominant one in the field: that provided by social-learning theory. Its interest to moral philosophers is more elusive. One has the sense that such a rich picture of human development should somehow be relevant to philosophical ethics-but is not easy to say precisely what the relevance amounts to. Or, at least, that is the burden of these comments. Puka invites his readers to appreciate Kohlberg's efforts both in terms of their empirical warrant and in terms of their philosophical significance. Most of the paper is devoted to discussion of the empirical warrant, defending Kohlberg's stages and sequence against alternative models (continuum, complex stage, and social learning/information processing). In this comment, I shall not address this (significant) part of the argument except to say that I am sympathetic but ill-equipped to assess fully the psychological data. The first part of the paper is devoted to questions of philosphical significance. I shall concentrate my remarks on this part of the paper, being patient with its brevity but wishing that were elaborated more fully for a philosophical audience. Puka laments the fact' that philosophical commentators have most often fixed on relatively peripheral features of Kohlberg's theory of moral development to the neglect of its central core. He seems to be inviting philosophers to cool it with respect to potshots at questionable philosophical claims in the Kohlbergian literature and to take a fresh look at the basic assumptions (conclusions?) of cognitive-developmentalism. In order to do justice to Puka's suggestions, as I understand them, I propose to offer something of a counterinvitation to the Kohlbergian. In the course of developing this counterinvitation, I hope I will treat fairly the main observations that Puka offers us, though I will press beyond those observations. It should be emphasized from the outset, however, that the spirit of the comments to follow is openly constructive. My

Kohlberg's moral stages as a critical tool

Lawrence Kohlberg's pioneering research into moral development has resulted in a theory of moral development based upon six stages. This essay introduces the reader to Kohlberg's moral stages theory, and offers a suggestion for the application of that theory to rhetorical criticism.

Development in moral judgment as indicated by rejection of lower-stage statements

Previous failures of preference rating scales to identify developmental differences in moral judgment may have occurred because the focus was on acceptance of high-stage reasons rather than on consistent rejection of lower-stage reasons. Attention focused on seventh-, ninth-, and eleventh-grade students' ( N = 178) rejection of the lower-stage statements that they presumably comprehend but have to varying degrees dropped from their spontaneous-production repertoire. Students rated the adequacy of the reasons presented in statements written to exemplify Kohlberg's stages 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. Ratings of Stage 1, 2, 3, and 4 statements showed clear age discrimination (all p's < .001). As in previous preference studies, higher-stage items produced no significant age differences. Implications for evaluation of change studies were noted.

Longitudinal Evidence for the Sequentially of Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Judgment in Adolescent Males

Summary The stepwise invariant sequence hypothesis of Kohlberg's six-stage theory of moral judgment development was assessed in 35 males (ages 11 years 8 months to 14 years 7 months) over a 2 1/2-year interval. The interview version of Kohlberg's measure and the latest scoring method were employed. Results generally supported the hypothesis with significant upward movement in Moral Maturity Scores and upward movement in Global Stage Scores by 77% of the Ss (where no stage-skipping occurred), while only 6% decreased and 17% were unchanged. Most of the changes could be characterized as small decreases in usage of a lower stage and increases in usage of the adjacent higher stage.

Moral Development and the Forgiveness of Sin

It is the purpose of this article to contribute to the dialogue between religion and morality by examining the Christian conception of forgiveness of sin (an aspect of the doctrine of justification) as interpreted by individauls at each of Kohlberg's stages of moral development. The thesis of this article is that justification is a developmental process as well as a un [temporal event in the individual's life. At each higher stage of moral development one becomes increasingly aware of the scope of sin. In order to accommodate this growing realization, individuals at different stages of moral development turn to different ways of interpreting the doctrine of justification. However, it is maintained that only at Stage 7 docs one come to full understanding of one's inability to achieve forgiveness by one's own deeds and thus turn to God in a posture of faith alone, realizing that such forgiveness can come solely from him.

The Condition of Sophomoritis and its Educational Cure

Abstract A problematic phase in the transition from conventional to principled moral judgement is characterized as the condition of ‘sophomoritis’. Then an experimental course designed around this problem is described. The course sought to integrate material from ‘Introductory Ethics’ courses with perspectives on moral development from Kohlberg's theory. The effects of the course are described in terms of change on Kohlberg's stages and in terms of qualitative analysis of interview data. The quantitative data indicate an average development of one‐third of a stage, compared to no change in a comparison group. The qualitative analysis presents a framework within which the condition of sophomoritis can be understood in more depth and the impact of this educational experiment can be described.

A study of moral development and personality relationships in adolescents and young adult catholic students

Explored the relationship between personality and moral development. Using Kohlberg's stages of moral development, it was conceived as possible that some of the characteristics measured by the California Psychological Inventory would be related significantly to preference for principled levels of moral judgment (stages 5 and 6 of Kohlberg's schema) for three groups of Catholic students (N = 549) in attendance at Catholic high schools and universities. The results indicated that those who preferred principled levaels of moral reasoning were seen as being dependable, rational, creative, intelligent, and accepting of rules and constraints of society, but at the same time, able to think independently and aware of the need for change.

Locus of Control and Stages of Moral Reasoning

This study investigated the relationship between belief in personal control and Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning. Responses of 57 male and 56 female pupils of two residential secondary schools in Kano City indicated that subjects at Stage 3 of moral reasoning tended to exhibit significantly more internality than those at Stages 1, 2, and 4. Significant sex differences were found neither in belief in personal control nor in moral reasoning.

The Relationship of Preschoolers' Reasoning about Prosocial Moral Conflicts to Prosocial Behavior

EISENBERG-BERG, NANCY, and HAND, MICHAEL. The Relationship of Preschoolers' Reasoning about Prosocial Moral Conflicts to Prosocial Behavior. CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1979, 50, 356-363. The purpose of the present study was to determine the relationship between preschoolers' moral reasoning about altruistic moral conflicts and their sharing, helping, and comforting in a naturalistic environment. 35 preschoolers aged 48-63 months were observed for a minimum of 70 2-min timings and responded to four simple moral-reasoning stories about helping and sharing. The results demonstrated that moral reasoning was differentially related to the various types of prosocial behavior. The children's sharing (particularly spontaneous sharing rather than sharing in response to a request) was significantly, negatively related to hedonistic reasoning and positively related to needs-oriented reasoning. Helping/comforting behaviors tended to be related to sociability in the nursery rather than to moral reasoning. Furthermore, the preschoolers did not use Kohlberg's stage 1 punishment and authority reasoning in their moral reasoning about helping and sharing conflicts. The children did use much hedonistic and needs-oriented reasoning.

Sex Biases in the Measurement of Moral Judgment

The most commonly used method for measuring levels of moral reasoning has been the Kohlberg/Rest technique of presenting subjects wirh a story in which the main character is faced with a moral dilemma (2, 3). Holstein (1) has argued that this method may be biased in favor of men, since all of the main story characters are males. The present study is designed to determine whether altering the sex of the story characters on Rest's Defining Issues Test differentially affects male and female subjects' test scores. A total of 84 freshman men and women completed either the standard short form of the test (N = 38) or a sex-reversed form (N = 46). For this latter form, each of the main story characters was a woman. Subjects also responded to questions asking them to report how believable and realistic the story characters' acrions were, and how easily the subjects could identify wirh the main story character. In scoring the protocols, a P-score is computed for each subject. The P-score is the percentage of items representing principled reasoning (Kohlberg's Stages 5 and 6) rated as important considerations by the subject. P-scores for the present sample 'ranged from 3 to 70. The mean score for the regular form was 33.6 (SD = 18.1), while [he mean score for the sex-reversed form was 32.0 (SD = 16.2). Application of a 2 (sex of subject) X 2 (form of test) analysis of variance yielded non-significant main effects for sex and form. - The interaction, however, was significant (F,,so = 4.05, ? = .05). Examination of the means showed differences between groups in the non-predicted dlrectlon. Males who took the form with female characters (sex-reversed form) had higher P-scores than males who took the regular rest with male characters (134 = 36.2, SD = 18.6 for the sex-reversed form, and M = 30.2, SD = 19.9 for the regular form). However, females who took the regular version had higher P-scores (M = 37.0. SD = 16.3) than females who took the test with female story characters (M = 27.9, SD = 13.9). Thus, individuals who read dilemmas with main characters who were the opposite sex had higher moral judgment scores than those who read stories in which the main characters were the same sex as themselves. The analysis of the subjects' responses to the believabiliry and identifiabiAity items showed no significant differences associated with subject sex or story character sex. The present results do nor support Holstein's (1) contention that tests such as the Defining Issues Test are biased in favor of males. The results do suggest, however, that the sex of the story characters can be a confounding variable in measuring moral judgment on this test. Research should attempt to replicate and extend these preliminary findings.

Conscience: Developmental Perspectives from Rogers and Kohlberg

AbstractTheories of personal development can contribute to the understanding of conscience and conscience formation. (I) Clinical psychologist Carl Rogers has formulated a description of stages in the process of personal growth. While Rogers' stages run parallel to Kohlberg's stages of moral development, they contribute a more sensitive appreciation of some aspects of moral conscience. (II) Kohlberg's idea of conscience appears to be a postconventional phenomenon characterized by moral rationalism. This fact raises certain questions about the value of Kohlberg's work as a paradigm for Christian conscience formation. (III) Both Rogers and Kohlberg contribute to an understanding of conscience. In Christian theology, however, conscience is a multifaceted reality which represents a plurality of moral dimensions. While stage advance describes some characteristics of mature conscience, conscience is a broader reality than either Rogers' or Kohlberg's stages will satisfy to describe.

道徳判断の発達に影響を及ぼす社会的相互作用の検討 Role-Taking Opportunityの観点からの分析

The relationship between moral development and role-taking opportunities (RTO) in adolescence was investigated. Subjects were classified into Kohlberg's Stage 3, 4 or 5 by Defining Issues Test. From the subjects' questionnaire responses to five social interaction situations, i.e., interpersonal interaction, group activity, voluntary social activity, contact with mass media, and contact with books three RTO scores were computed, which were assumed to correspond to the three stages. The results showed (a) that the higher the subject's stage, the more post participation in social interactions and (b) that a subject in a given stage had often participated in activities which offered many opportunities of role-taking needed in his stage.

The relationship of moral judgment, self-awareness, and sex to complicance behavior

Sixty male and sixty female college students, representing three of Kohlberg's stages of moral judgment, were exposed to a complicance situation in which their personal count of a series of metronome clicks was contradicted by a unanimous group. Group differences were either one or two steps from veridical. For half of the subjects self-awareness was experimentally increased. The results indicated that subjects in moral judgment Stages 3 and 4 complied significantly more than Stage 5 subjects. The self-awareness manipulation produced a complex pattern of results in the form of a three way interaction with moral judgment and type of compliance. Finally, sex differences in compliance behavior were significant, with females complying more than males. The results were discussed in terms of a cognition-behavior relationship.