Knowledge Of Features Research Articles

Children's inferences from ‘knowing’ to ‘pretending’ and ‘believing’

Three studies investigatedchildren's ability to drawinferences fromtheproperties of one mental state to the properties of another. Inferences from knowledge/ignorance to the possible contents of pretends and beliefs are crucial to developing a representational theory of mental states. In Experiment 1, we replicated Lillard's (1993) finding that 4‐ and 6‐year‐olds fail to appreciate that a character who does not know about an entity cannot pretend to be that entity. We show that these children also fail a similar task in which the inference to be made is from not knowing to thinking (false belief). Lillard's inference tasks may be difficult because of their performance demands—specifically, children are not offered a plausible alternative content for the agent's pretence or belief state. In a second experiment, children were presented with know‐pretend and know‐think inference tasks which offered two options for the content of a character's mental state. One option was consistent with that character's knowledge state, while the other was not. Under these conditions, 4‐ and 6‐year‐oldchildren's performance improved significantly on both pretend and think. A third experiment investigated the role of the salience of the character's ignorance and the possible use of an association strategy in producing successful performance in Experiment 2. When the salience of the character's ignorance was reduced, children still succeeded on know‐pretend inferences but failed on know‐think inferences. These results suggest that children do not really grasp the theory of mental representation. The results better support the ToMM‐SP model of ‘theory of mind’ development. Accordingto this model, conceptpossession is prior to, and therefore does not depend upon, knowledge of theories, and task success depends upon the control of salience.

KNOWLEDGE AND ORGANISATION STRATEGIES IN INNOVATION SYSTEMS

The purpose of the following analysis is to identify the most promising organisational strategies of innovative agents under different environmental constraints. To do so, the processes of the relationships between these agents are taken into account by putting three aspects together. First, it is shown that the transfer, storage, and use of knowledge are significantly influenced by this knowledge's characteristics. Second, the main principles of the generation and selection of innovation are introduced from the systemic point of view. As a third element, the variety of possible relationships between innovative agents are categorised to identify the different organisational principles that can be employed. By putting all these elements together, it is possible to show which strategies are the most promising under different constraints given by the innovation possibilities, the relevant institutions, the knowledge employed, and the kind of innovation expected.

Knowledge and Organisation Strategies in Innovation Systems

International Journal of Innovation ManagementVol. 05, No. 01, pp. 105-127 (2001) No AccessKNOWLEDGE AND ORGANISATION STRATEGIES IN INNOVATION SYSTEMSCLAUDIA WERKERCLAUDIA WERKERUniversity of Greifswald, Chair of Economics and Growth, Structural Change and Trade, Friedrich-Loeffler-Straße 70, D-17487 Greifswald, Germany Search for more papers by this author https://doi.org/10.1142/S1363919601000300Cited by:3 Previous AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack CitationsRecommend to Library ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail AbstractThe purpose of the following analysis is to identify the most promising organisational strategies of innovative agents under different environmental constraints. To do so, the processes of the relationships between these agents are taken into account by putting three aspects together. First, it is shown that the transfer, storage, and use of knowledge are significantly influenced by this knowledge's characteristics. Second, the main principles of the generation and selection of innovation are introduced from the systemic point of view. As a third element, the variety of possible relationships between innovative agents are categorised to identify the different organisational principles that can be employed. By putting all these elements together, it is possible to show which strategies are the most promising under different constraints given by the innovation possibilities, the relevant institutions, the knowledge employed, and the kind of innovation expected.Keywords:knowledgeinnovationorganisationinnovation system Remember to check out the Most Cited Articles! Be inspired by these New Titles in Business and Management FiguresReferencesRelatedDetailsCited By 3Networks of entrepreneurs driving the Triple Helix: two cases of the Dutch energy systemClaudia Werker, Jolien Ubacht and Andreas Ligtvoet4 December 2017 | Triple Helix, Vol. 4, No. 1Innovation in a Heterogeneous CCS Research Centre, Managerial and Organizational ChallengesAasen Tmb, MØlnvik Mj, Aarlien R, Bredesen R and Munkejord St et al.1 Jan 2012 | Energy Procedia, Vol. 23Toward a framework of innovation management in logistics firms: A systems perspectiveHao Shen, Longwei Wang, Qiang Xu, Yuan Li and Xunfeng Liu1 Mar 2009 | Systems Research and Behavioral Science, Vol. 26, No. 2 Recommended Vol. 05, No. 01 Metrics History Received 10 August 2000 Revised 1 February 2001 Accepted 2 February 2001 Keywordsknowledgeinnovationorganisationinnovation systemPDF download

Linking lost voices: reading 'The Dead'.

The author presents an individual reading of James Joyce's short story. 'The Dead' from 'Dubliners'. Language evokes subjective responses and associations that become part of the depth of experience one finds in a book. The author describes how uses of language give the reader a sense of sharing the main character's experience. She focuses on nodal moments in the story, in which external and internal worlds intersect. Images focused on include those of seeing and touching, inside and outside, crossing gaps between worlds and the way in which these sensory events shift the character's knowledge of his internal objects. The metaphor of lost voices highlights the presence of the dead throughout the story. The main character's evolution from being in a constricted state to one of expanded self-awareness is discussed. Britton's concept of triangular space is used to describe the character's transformation at the story's conclusion.

Distinguishing Lies from Jokes: Theory of Mind Deficits and Discourse Interpretation in Right Hemisphere Brain-Damaged Patients

Right-hemisphere brain damaged (RHD) patients and a normal control group were tested for their ability to infer first- and second-order mental states and to understand the communicative intentions underlying ironic jokes and lies. Subjects listened to stories involving a character who had either a true or a false belief about another character's knowledge. Stories ended either with an ironic joke or a lie by this character. In the joke stories, the speaker knew that the listener knew the truth (a true second-order belief) and did not expect the listener to believe what was said; in the lie stories, the speaker did not know that the listener actually knew the truth (a false second-order belief) and thus did expect the listener to believe what was said. RHD patients performed significantly worse than control subjects on one of two measures of second-order belief, which suggests that the ability to make second-order mental state attributions is fragile and unreliable following right-hemisphere damage. RHD patients in addition performed worse than controls when asked to distinguish lies from jokes, confirming their known difficulties with discourse interpretation. For both groups, the ability to distinguish lies from jokes was strongly correlated with two measures of the ability to attribute correctly second-order beliefs. These results suggest that the fragility of RHD patients' understanding of second-order mental states underlies a portion of their difficulties in discourse comprehension, but that the underlying impairment is not restricted to right hemisphere dysfunction.

Narrating knowledge: presupposition and background in Flannery O'Connor's fiction

Clausal presupposition in Flannery O'Connor's fiction is examined and shown to contribute stylistically to O'Connor's explorations of the fallibility of human knowledge. Marked presuppositional constructions - those in which the narrator and narratee do not share the background knowledge of the presupposition - are analysed as attempts on the part of the narrator to put into a shared gestalt background contested knowledge. These attempts have three main effects: (1) an ironic comment on false knowledge held by a character; (2) a displacement of knowledge from a character's awareness; (3) an empathetic response to a character's knowledge of mystery or destiny. A call is made to develop a typology of literary uses of marked presuppositional constructions making reference not only to the quality of knowledge among the narrator, narratee, and character(s), but also to the specific literary effect of marked presupposition, e.g. irony, narrative suspense, empathy. If it is true that marked presupposition is a fundamental characteristic of literary enjoyment (Kock, 1976), a typology of a narrator's use of contested presuppositions tells us much about a particular author's characteristic strategies of engaging a reader's interest. It is left an open question whether all authors whose narrators use contested presuppositions are as concerned as O'Connor was with the fallibility of human knowledge.

A Critique of Liberalism: The Application of Unger'sKnowledge and Politicsto Rawls'sTheory of Justice

InKnowledge and PoliticsRoberto Mangabeira Unger offers an extended critique of liberalism. He formulates a conception of liberalism as a framework of ideas that is embodied in particular institutions and practices, constituting a way of life and a form of consciousness. He evaluates this liberal framework, its crystallization in the seventeenth century, its powerful but unacknowledged hold over developed Western societies, its fragmentation into specialized perspectives, its dilemmas of thought and practice, and the possible emergence of an alternative framework. Our reading ofKnowledge and Politicsinitially led us both to a provisional agreement with Unger and to the realization that if his project is successful he has made a contribution of great importance to political theory. Our hesitation in fully endorsing his theory was due to this characteristic ofKnowledge and Politics: while Unger often refers to individual liberal thinkers for purposes of illustration, he does not systematically apply his critique to any theorist. He realizes that he might be accused of erecting and toppling a “straw man,” for he states that “it might be objected that the view I discuss is a view nobody has ever held.” He acknowledges that the liberal framework he constructs is not intended to fit exactly the thought of particular liberal theorists, that his references to philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke and Hume “are designed to illustrate rather than to prove their adherence to the doctrines that are the subject of the critique. In this sense, the critical argument remains hypothetical.”