King Agis Research Articles

Припреме спартанског краља Агиса III за рат са Македонцима

This article aims to give a survey of preparations conducted by Spartan king Agis III before he commenced his war against Macedonians. Based on the remaining narrative sources, mostly Arrian, Diodorus, Curtius Rufus and Justin, the author gives an account of king Agis’ doings up until the very beginning of his war. The author argues also why is that a real, full open war, not a "rebellion" as it is dubbed in some of the literature. Author gives his opinion about the beginning of the preparations for the open war and concludes that they began in November 333 BC, at latest. This article also tackles the question of mercenaries which Agis took after the Battle of Issus. Due to the uncertainty of the sources themselves it can be concluded at best that Agis hired a great number of them after Issus.

The Date of Agis III’s War in Greece

The purpose of this article is to review the evidence upon the chronology of the Greek attempt under the leadership of King Agis of Sparta to throw off Macedonian domination, on which two totally different views have recently been stated. The date of the war must form the basis of any consideration of the strategic soundness of Agis’ campaign and Alexander’s reaction to it and it is therefore important in any evaluation of Agis and Alexander as generals and statesmen. It is necessary to begin by setting out the evidence in full.

Argive Politics and Policy after the Peace of Nicias

IN THE summer of 418 B.C. the Spartans in full force, accompanied by their Helots, and the Tegeans with all their Arcadian allies marched out to attack the territory of the Argives. At the same time their allies from Boeotia and Corinth along with those from the rest of the Peloponnese gathered at Phlius to take part in the campaign. The magnitude of the force was well justified by the seriousness of Sparta's grievances against Argos. The Argives had seized upon the weakened condition of Sparta after the Archidamian war to try to recover the hegemony of the Peloponnese. They had allied themselves with Elis and Mantinea to form a league which powerfully threatened the Spartan position. More recently they had made a treaty with Athens and were engaged in besieging Epidaurus. The prestige of Sparta was at low ebb; some Peloponnesian states had already revolted and others were restive. With the Spartan position deteriorating daily King Agis set out against the Argives to destroy a serious threat to the hegemony of Lacedaemon. After some preliminary maneuvers to achieve a favorable position (these will be discussed later) Agis moved into the Argive plain and prepared for battle. The Argives were arrayed to meet him and all was in readiness for a great conflict; the armies had all but made contact when a remarkable event took place. Two Argives, Thrasyllus, one of the five strategoi, and Alciphron, proxenos of the Spartans, came forward to Agis asking him to avoid battle. They offered, as Thucydides tells us, to put to arbitration any grievances the Spartans might have against them and to make a treaty as well. Agis accepted the offer, struck a four months' truce with the Argives, and led his army homeward. The battle never took place. The decision of Agis is very surprising; the battlefield and his position on it had been of his choosing and he had at his disposal a formidable army. Thucydides tells us, moreover, that the Argives were hemmed in on all sides and that they were without cavalry to face the Boeotian horse. Why, then, did Agis agree to a truce ? Some have suspected that the decision was founded on political rather than military considerations without giving a fully satisfactory account of the political situation involved.' Others have rejected politics and explained the incident in purely military terms.2 It is the purpose of this paper to show that the military interpretation is inadequate and to suggest an explanation based on political factors. Thucydides tells us plainly that during the Peace of Nicias there were

Stoics, Cynics, and the Spartan Revolution

In one of the supreme ironies of history, the austere Lycurgan system at Sparta failed in its primary aim – the fossilization of martial virtue – and succeeded in military victories, the heady profits of which undermined the precarious communism of the bivouac state. Conditioned to repress fear, the Spartan compensated by indulging greed – bribery, not cowardice, was his fatal weakness. After the collapse of the Spartan Empire at the Battle of Leuctra in 371, mercenary service became the principal Spartan occupation, even for Xenophon's model officer and gentleman, King Agesilaus. With landed estates encroaching on the traditional lots and great fortunes swollen by the gains of empire and mercenary adventure, the common Spartan found himself reduced to an equality of obligation only. The inflation and economic stress of the Hellenistic era intensified the imbalance between wealth and poverty in Lacedaemon. In a brief reign (244–241), the idealistic young King Agis IV tried to revive Sparta's military glory by restoring „Lycurgan ways” and did effect the abolition of debts but failed to redistribute land lots – his agent, Agesilaus, avoided the issue until a counter-revolutionary coup led by the deposed King Leonidas overthrew the reformers and lynched Agis. In 227, Leonidas' son, Cleomenes III, seized power and completed the aborted reforms of Agis-his subsequent success forced his rival for leadership of the Peloponnse, Aratus of Sicyon, into an alliance with Macedon, and Cleomenes was defeated at Sellasia in 222 to die shortly after in exile in Egypt.

King Agis of Sparta and His Campaign in Arkadia in 418 B.C.W. J. Woodhouse

Previous articleNext article No AccessBook ReviewsKing Agis of Sparta and His Campaign in Arkadia in 418 B.C. W. J. Woodhouse Jakob A. O. LarsenJakob A. O. Larsen Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Classical Philology Volume 29, Number 2Apr., 1934 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/361724 PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

<italic>King Agis of Sparta and his Campaign in Arkadia in 418 B. C.</italic> By <sc>W. J. Woodhouse</sc>. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1933. Pp. viii, 161. 12<italic>s</italic>. 6<italic>d</italic>)

King Agis of Sparta and his Campaign in Arkadia in 418 B. C. By W. J. Woodhouse. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1933. Pp. viii, 161. 12s. 6d) Get access King Agis of Sparta and his Campaign in Ar\adia in 418 B. C. By Woodhouse W. J.. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1933. Pp. viii, 161. 12s. 6d.) A. D. Fraser A. D. Fraser The University of Virginia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 39, Issue 2, January 1934, Pages 300–301, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/39.2.300 Published: 01 January 1934

King Agis of Sparta and his Campaign in Arkadia in 418 B. C.

King Agis of Sparta and his Campaign in Arkadia in 418 B. C.

King Agis of Sparta, and his Campaign in Arkadia in 418 B.C. By W. J. Woodhouse. Pp. x + 161. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1933. 12s. 6d.

King Agis of Sparta, and his Campaign in Arkadia in 418 B.C. By W. J. Woodhouse. Pp. x + 161. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1933. 12s. 6d.

W. J. Woodhouse: King Agis of Sparta and his Campaign in Arkadia in 418 B.C. Pp. x+161; 4 maps and diagrams. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933. Cloth, 12s. 6d.

W. J. Woodhouse: King Agis of Sparta and his Campaign in Arkadia in 418 B.C. Pp. x+161; 4 maps and diagrams. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933. Cloth, 12s. 6d.

King Agis of Sparta and His Campaign in Arkadia in 418 B.C.

King Agis of Sparta and His Campaign in Arkadia in 418 B.C.

The Campaign and Battle of Mantineia in 418 B.C.

Among the more elaborate pieces of purely military history written by Thucydides is the section (of fourteen chapters in the Fifth Book) devoted to that Arkadian campaign of King Agis by which, in the late summer of 418 B.C., he ruined the far-reaching schemes of Alkibiades and restored the tarnished prestige of Sparta. According, to Thucydides, this fortunate achievement was due more to good luck than to good management; not in any wise is it exhibited as the reasonably forecast outcome of cunningly contrived, if somewhat delicately articulated, machinery. Something less than justice is thereby done to one of the most remarkable personages of that time. Both by Thucydides himself, and, after his example, by most modern historians, the Spartan king, in his connexion with these operations at any rate, is pilloried without further question as a bungler, and, indeed, as little better than a fool. It would seem that the time has come to ask whether that verdict is justified.