1. INTRODUCTIONGossip is a nearly ubiquitous speech act. Almost everyone does it. A lot of gossip is about people's character, especially their vices. It is not surprising then that it has long been disparaged. Yet it has largely been bereft of philosophical analysis, but for a bit of recent attention (Holland 1996; Cuonzo 2008; van Niekerk 2008; Bertolotti and Magnani 2014). Westacott (2011) considers the moral permissibility of gossip, but without reaching any conclusions. This article argues that gossiping well is a virtue. This is not to say that all gossip is virtuous. Several limitations must be placed on gossip, but there remains a range of cases in which one can gossip well. Interestingly enough, the virtue of gossip includes some instances of false gossip in which someone's character is caricatured. The permissibility of some kinds of caricature is then important for virtue ethics generally due to the role false gossip can play in creating moral exemplars.2. DEFINING GOSSIPIn order to focus on the moral status of gossip, we first need at least a working conception of the speech act. At its core, gossip is a kind of asserting; to gossip is to assert something of someone other than the speaker and addressee. The subject of gossip is people. You can gossip about one person or a group of people, but not about other things like plants, dogs, or houses. Beyond this, defining gossip enters much murkier waters. A set of necessary and sufficient conditions will likely be open to alleged counterexamples that some (but not all) take to be instances of gossip. For our current purposes, however, it suffices to note four conditions that typify gossip but are not necessary conditions. First, gossip can be either true or false. Second, it may be unsubstantiated or not. Third, gossip is typically about a person who is not part of the conversation (though it may still count if the person is within earshot). Fourth, usually gossip is directly or indirectly about a person's actions (Frank cheated) or traits (Frank's a cheater). Part of the reason that people often attribute traits to others is that trait ascriptions are informationally richer than action ascriptions. Saying lied only tells the addressee what did once. Calling a liar, however, not only relates that has lied, but also relays two other pieces of information. It explains Jane's behavior: she is disposed to lying and does so because she has a robust and reliable character trait that prompts her to lie. Additionally, because she has this character trait, will likely lie again.One important point remains in conceptualizing gossip, namely what we gossip about. In most contexts, telling someone else, Jane is at dinner is boring and not gossip. There has to be something juicy or scintillating about what is asserted of a third party. There are a variety of ways that an assertion can be scintillating enough to count as gossip, but most of these ways can be captured by distinguishing between what well call evaluative and idle gossip. Evaluative gossip evaluates a person's behavior or character relative to some norm. Negative evaluative gossip notes that a norm has allegedly been violated, such as, Martin is a gossip.1 The allegedly violated norm need not be a moral norm. People are gossiped about for violating many different kinds of norms, including legal, aesthetic, political, epistemic, or descriptive norms. Saying Look at what John is wearing; he has the worst fashion sense ever is not necessarily attributing a moral failing to John. Negative evaluative gossip not only describes an alleged norm violation, it also claims that the wrongdoer should be condemned. Though less common, evaluative gossip can also be positive, such as Frank is a sweetheart. In this case a norm is often being fulfilled or surpassed. This form of evaluative gossip commends, instead of condemns, the person in question.Idle gossip on the other hand is scintillating for some reason other than a norm violation by the person in question. …
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Jun 30, 2020
Hitoshi Yamamoto + 2
Open Access
