Kind Of Normativity Research Articles

Legal Transitions without Legitimate Expectations*

Legal Transitions without Legitimate Expectations*

Edith Landmann-Kalischer on Aesthetic Demarcation and Normativity

Abstract Two perennial questions in aesthetics, among others, are the demarcation question, viz., what, if anything, distinguishes the aesthetic domain from the cognitive or moral domains, and the normative question, viz., what kind of normativity, if any, does the aesthetic domain involve. Although recent attempts to answer these questions can be found in contemporary literature, in this paper I examine the answers defended by the early phenomenologist Edith Landmann-Kalischer. I show that Landmann-Kalischer answers the demarcation question by blending together a cognitivist account of aesthetic judgment with an objectivist account of beauty, and that she builds an account of aesthetic normativity on this cognitivist and objectivist basis. I contend that her subtle and unified account of aesthetic demarcation and normativity has advantages over other competing hedonist and Kantian views and, as such, merits further consideration in contemporary debates.

In AI We Trust Incrementally: a Multi-layer Model of Trust to Analyze Human-Artificial Intelligence Interactions

Real engines of the artificial intelligence (AI) revolution, machine learning (ML) models, and algorithms are embedded nowadays in many services and products around us. As a society, we argue it is now necessary to transition into a phronetic paradigm focused on the ethical dilemmas stemming from the conception and application of AIs to define actionable recommendations as well as normative solutions. However, both academic research and society-driven initiatives are still quite far from clearly defining a solid program of study and intervention. In this contribution, we will focus on selected ethical investigations around AI by proposing an incremental model of trust that can be applied to both human-human and human-AI interactions. Starting with a quick overview of the existing accounts of trust, with special attention to Taddeo’s concept of “e-trust,” we will discuss all the components of the proposed model and the reasons to trust in human-AI interactions in an example of relevance for business organizations. We end this contribution with an analysis of the epistemic and pragmatic reasons of trust in human-AI interactions and with a discussion of kinds of normativity in trustworthiness of AIs.

Faith in international agricultural development: Conservation Agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa

The role of faith and religion in international development cooperation is hotly debated today. The legitimacy of this role remains, however, often confided to instrumental reasons. Yet, thinking about faith and religion only in instrumental terms leaves unquestioned the possibility of a religious background of development cooperation as a practice itself and the potential role of faith through individual practitioners that operate within secular NGOs, and research and policy institutes. The aim of the present paper is therefore to consider the structural role of faith and worldview in relation to agricultural development, moving beyond the discourse of instrumentality. We do this by focusing on Giller and Andersson’s political agronomy analysis of the promotion of Conservation Agriculture in Zimbabwe by the faith-based organisation ‘Foundations for Farming’. We argue that a distinction should be made between religion as a practice of believers and faith functioning as a worldview in every practice. In addition, we argue that it is helpful to distinguish between different kinds of practices involved in agricultural development in sub-Saharan Africa, namely farming practice, agronomic scientific practice, and faith practice. The value of this philosophical analysis is that it challenges a dichotomous model of ‘science-based versus faith-based’ approaches to agricultural development. Furthermore, specific kinds of normativity are identified as always already functioning inside practices, rather than practices being neutral spaces that are (subjectively) infused with normativity by applying external ethical standards.

Ideas, Ideology, and the Roots of the Islamic State

ABSTRACTThe ideals that gave rise to Daesh are not so much those of pre-modern Sunni Islam, including Salafism, as they are the ideals that post-colonial Arab states have propagated since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In contravention to long-established ideals of Islamic law, post-colonial Arab states have attempted to legitimate their own despotisms through a formal commitment to a certain kind of Islamic normativity. Inasmuch as Islam provides a ready political discourse to resist despotism, it is unsurprising that pan-Arab “Islamist” movements have made resistance to despotism their central concern. Daesh, however, rejects the anti-despotic politics of modern pan-Arab and “Islamist” political movements and instead offers a despotic and apocalyptic religious conception of the political that is as far from the Sunni mainstream as the political despotisms of the post-colonial Arab states. In this respect, there is a deep synergy between Daesh and the despotisms of the modern Arab state, both of which portray themselves as the only alternative to the murderous tyranny of the other. The only long-term solution to Daesh, therefore, is reform of the despotisms of the post-colonial Arab states.

Normativity in the Philosophy of Science

AbstractThis paper analyzes what it means for philosophy of science to be normative. It argues that normativity is a multifaceted phenomenon rather than a general feature that a philosophical theory either has or lacks. It analyzes the normativity of philosophy of science by articulating three ways in which a philosophical theory can be normative. Methodological normativity arises from normative assumptions that philosophers make when they select, interpret, evaluate, and mutually adjust relevant empirical information, on which they base their philosophical theories. Object normativity emerges from the fact that the object of philosophical theorizing can itself be normative, such as when philosophers discuss epistemic norms in science. Metanormativity arises from the kind of claims that a philosophical theory contains, such as normative claims about science as it should be. Distinguishing these three kinds of normativity gives rise to a nuanced and illuminating view of how philosophy of science can be normative.

Cultural appropriation and oppression

In this paper, I present an outline of the oppression account of cultural appropriation and argue that it offers the best explanation for the wrongfulness of the varied and complex cases of appropriation to which people often object. I then compare the oppression account with the intimacy account defended by C. Thi Nguyen and Matt Strohl. Though I believe that Nguyen and Strohl’s account offers important insight into an essential dimension of the cultural appropriation debate, I argue that justified objections to cultural appropriation must ultimately be grounded in considerations of oppression as opposed to group intimacy. I present three primary objections to the intimacy account. First, I suggest that in its effort to explain expressive appropriation claims (those that purportedly lack an independent ground), the intimacy account doubles down on the boundary problem. Second, I question whether group intimacy possess the kind of bare normativity that Nguyen and Strohl claim for it. Finally, I argue that these objections give us reason to accept the importance of group intimacy to the cultural appropriation debate, but question the source of its significance as identified by Nguyen and Strohl.

Normativity in Empirical Youth Ministry Research

Normative considerations are an important part of empirical research on the youth ministry. In the presentation of results in many practical theological studies on the youth ministry, however, rarely a sufficient reflection is provided on the kind of normativity that plays a role in the way practices are investigated or on how normativity is present in the practices that have been studied. Partly based on the case studies of three PhD studies on the youth ministry from the Dutch Research Centre for Youth, Church and Culture, this article aims (a) to give an overview of the layers of normativity that can be distinguished in current practical theological youth ministry research and (b) to give directions for the design, execution, and reporting of practical theological youth ministry research in terms of a sufficient reflection on normativity.

Normativity of Scientific Laws (I): Two Kinds of Normativity


 [full article, abstract in English; only abstract in Lithuanian]
 This article presents the results of a broader research project which aims to argue for the normativity of scientific laws. Usually scientific laws are regarded as descriptive, which contrasts them to prescriptive norms. To show their normativity, I utilize the logical account of explicitly normative systems by Carlos Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin (1971). I identify the characteristic elements of normativity and analyse accounts of implicit normativity in science using those terms to show the affinities of explicit and implicit normativities. The research project continues with the substantiation of the normativity of scientific laws in detail and the results will be presented in Normativity of Scientific Laws (II) (Mets 2018).

Is There a Distinctively Political Normativity?

A slew of recent political theorists—many taking their cue from the political writings of Bernard Williams—have recently contended that political normativity is its own kind of normativity, distinc...

Normativity in Lewis' and Bicchieri's Accounts of Conventions and Norms

Abstract Lewis [3] argues that, generally, we ought to conform to conventions because that answers (1) our own preferences, and (2) the preferences of others. While (1) is based on instrumental rationality, (2) is based on a moral principle or norm: other things being equal, we should do what answers others' preferences. Bicchieri [1] claims there is a third kind of normativity, neither rational nor moral, that applies to social norms. I argue that conventions draw their normativity from instrumental rationality and other independent moral principles or norms, and that it is unclear what further normativity could there be.

How to know one’s experiences transparently

I would like to propose a demonstrative transparency model of our immediate, introspective self-knowledge of experiences. It is a model entirely in line with transparency. It rests on three elements: mental demonstration, the capacity to apply (non-mental) concepts to what is given in experience, and ordinary inference. The model avoids inner sense, acquaintance, and any special kind of normativity or rationality. The crucial and new ingredient is mental demonstration. By mental demonstration we can refer indexically to the contents of our own experiences in a unique way. This allows for the application of ordinary, non-mental concepts in order to arrive at a judgment about what it is that one is experiencing. In a transparent way one can then move inferentially to the self-ascription of an experience with such a content. I compare the demonstrative model with other accounts of introspective self-knowledge.

Auf Nichts gebaut

Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945) is considered by many as the most important 20th century Japanese philosopher for his ability to employ modern concepts and terminologies, and use them to construct a unique system carrying a distinctly East Asian flavour. In this system, the notion of nothingness plays a fundamental part both in terms of epistemology and ontology. While this conceptual choice was also inspired by Buddhist sources, Nishida also drew on the theoretical philosophy of Hermann Cohen to elaborate, how nothingness could function as both the guarantor of unity and generator of plurality. Close analysis, however, shows that Nishida’s appropriation of Cohen’s concept of the me on as a necessary feature in the „logic of pure knowledge“ sheds the constraints carefully put in place by Cohen. As becomes evident in a comparison between both thinker’s analysis of sensation, Nishida’s unrestricted use of Cohen’s terms collapses precisely those distinctions that give sensation its meaning in the rational assessment of reality. This leaves Nishida’s concept of reality without the critical potential to distinguish between different kinds of normativity and their inter-subjective validity. Nothingness, as Nishida uses the term, is not a logical concept, but functions as an aesthetic symbol invoking sublime ideas of a perfect reality that is one and whole, and at the same time rich and diverse.

PRESUNÇÃO DE INOCÊNCIA NO HABEAS CORPUS N. 126.292 JULGADO PELO STF: STANDARDS DECISÓRIOS E O ADVENTO DA PRISÃO CAUTELAR OBRIGATÓRIA

O artigo pretende discutir o impacto causado pela recente mudança de interpretação do STF quanto aos limites, sentidos e alcance do princípio da presunção de inocência. Partindo-se da compreensão de que a presunção de inocência é um princípio do qual podem ser extraídas três espécies normativas (regra de juízo, regra probatória e regra de tratamento), analisou-se o aspecto “norma de tratamento”, identificando no julgado, um conjunto de argumentos que indicam uma orientação repressivistas do tribunal. Além disso, constatou-se que tais argumentos utilizados pelos ministros, em grande parte, são epistemologicamente insustentáveis, especialmente diante de um processo penal democrático.

What Kind of Normativity is the Normativity of Grammar?

AbstractThe overall goal of this article is to show that aesthetics plays a major role in a debate at the very center of philosophy. Drawing on the work of David Bell, the article spells out how Kant and Wittgenstein use reflective judgment, epitomized by a judgment of beauty, as a key in their respective solutions to the rule‐following problem they share. The more specific goal is to offer a Kantian account of semantic normativity as understood by Wittgenstein. The article argues that Wittgenstein's reason for describing language as a collection of language games is to allow for a perspective that shows those games as internally purposive without any extralinguistic purpose. This perspective also allows for that union of the general rule and its particular application in practice that the original paradox of rule‐following is wanting.

A Poststructuralist View on Student’s Project Groups: Possibilities and Limitations

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how poststructuralism and social constructionism can contribute to the empirical research on groups in problem-based learning (PBL). The paper outlines the analytical complexity and shows, through empirical examples, the potentials and limitations of this perspective as an alternative to traditional group psychology. While the potentials of poststructuralism and social constructionism as an analytical complex seem to be the endeavor for relentless critique, the limitations are the ‘empty subject’ and the avoidance of any kind of normativity that leave no guidance for practice. Though both limitations raise serious problems for the practitioner, I intend to argue that the potentials of the analytical perspective are far more important than the challenges when it comes to social psychological research in groups in PBL.

Epistemic Normativity as Performance Normativity

Virtue epistemology maintains that epistemic normativity is a kind of performance normativity, according to which evaluating a belief is like evaluating a sport or musical performance. I examine this thesis through the objection that a belief cannot be evaluated as a performance because it is not a performance but a state. I argue that virtue epistemology can be defended on the grounds that we often evaluate a performance through evaluating the result of the performance. The upshot of my account is that when a belief is evaluated under performance normativity, what we evaluate is not belief, but cognitive performance. My account of virtue epistemology offers a simple explanation of why knowledge is more valuable than true belief.

Can ‘Ready-to-Hand’ Normativity be Reconciled with the Scientific Image?

In this paper, first, I will focus on the divergent interpretations of two leading Sellars’ scholars, Willem deVries and James O’Shea, as regards Sellars’ view on the being of the normative. It will be suggested that this conflict between deVries’ and O’Shea’s viewpoints can be resolved by the provision of an account of what I shall call ‘ready-tohand’ normativity (i.e. the phenomenological presence of normativity in our everyday practical dealings with the world), which incorporates the insights of both deVries’ and O’Shea’s interpretive perspectives, while at the same time going beyond them. It shall be further argued that the resulting ‘phenomenologically’ informed view of normativity, pointing as it does towards its ideal integration not only with practical action but also with perceptual experience, in the form of what I shall call ‘kinaesthetic’ normativity, can potentially pose problems to Sellars’ own view on the matter, and, in particular, to the way normativity can allegedly be ‘stereoscopically fused’ with the ultimate ontology of the ideal scientific image. However, I shall argue that these problems are not unsurpassable: although the possibility of a specifically ‘kinaesthetic’ form of normativity seems to have eluded Sellars’ grasp, his views about the way in which the productive imagination is implicated in perceptual experience, do indeed provide the conceptual resources that make possible the stereoscopic fusion of this kind of normativity with the ontology of the ideal scientific image.

Tsong kha pa and the Myth of the Given

Tsong kha pa and the Myth of the Given Edward Falls My thesis is that Tsong kha pa’s distinction between the methodological approaches of Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas and Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas has been widely misinterpreted.1 As the distinction is usually construed, it is taken to turn on the different appraisals, by Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas, of the epistemological and ontological costs and benefits of foundationalism. The standard interpretation of Tsong kha pa’s distinction ascribes to him the claim that Svātantrikas underestimate the ontological costs of foundationalism, in particular the cost of ontological commitment involved in accepting a form of the Given, as Svātantrikas seem to do in their use of svalakṣanas to claim authority for observation reports. A lemma in my argument here is that Sellars’s famous critique of foundationalism is misunderstood when taken as a total rejection of empiricist foundationalism. Sellars’s critique of the Given does not bear on the sort of foundationalism concerned with the authority of particular observation reports, such as are needed to block the inferential regress that lends significance to the metaphor of foundations. Sellars’s critique is concerned rather with the question of entitlement, which has to do, more fundamentally, with the kind of normativity associated with the very notion of ascribing justificational authority to any observation reports whatsoever. In light of this understanding of Sellars’s critique of the Given, I argue that Tsong kha pa’s Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction turns on what he sees as a divergence [End Page 132] in the therapeutic efficacy of their respective methodologies, and that it does not imply a difference in the two schools’ ontological commitments. For Tsong kha pa, the crux of the matter is that it is impossible for a Mādhyamika and a non-Mādhyamika to have commensurable perceptual apprehensions of the logical subject of an inference in any debate about intrinsic existence. Svātantrikas take one approach to dealing with this inevitable incommensurability, while Prāsaṅgikas take a different approach. The Prāsaṅgika approach involves the use of opponent acknowledged inferences (gzhan grags kyi rjes su dpag pa, or gzhan grags kyi sbyor ba), which, as I shall show, operate on the presupposition that even where total commensurability is impossible, partial commensurability, at the level of observation reports, is a necessary condition for the possibility of rational discourse between two individuals (or between opposing perspectives within a single individual’s divided consciousness). So, Tsong kha pa’s account of opponent-acknowledged inferences, as worked up in the final section of my paper, is relevant, more broadly, to the contemporary discussion of the foundations of rationality as evinced in the work of such figures as Habermas and Brandom. The doxographic distinction between Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas and Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas is a topic that is of central importance for Tibetan Buddhist philosophers, with differences between the main “schools” or “sects” of Tibetan Buddhism finding expression in distinct interpretations of how to understand the difference between the two sub-schools of Madhyamaka philosophy. The basic difference between the two sub-schools arises from a procedural difference classically delineated in the works of Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti. Svātantrikas follow Bhāvaviveka in countenancing the use, by Mādhyamikas in debate with non-Mādhyamikas, of certain types of inferences which require both parties to the debate to agree as to the mode of presentation or ontological status of the parts of the inference (subject, predicate, reason, and so forth). Prāsaṅgikas, on the other hand, following Candrakīrti, insist that Mādhyamikas in debate with non-Mādhyamikas cannot use such inferences because it is precisely the mode of presentation and ontological status of the subject of debate that is in dispute for Mādhyamikas and non-Mādhyamikas. In the Tibetan context, there are, speaking generally, two basic types of interpretation of the significance of this procedural disagreement between Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas. On one interpretation, the difference between Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas is thought to involve no significant consequences for the way in which...

Does Population Health Have an Intrinsically Distributional Dimension?

Verweij and Dawson claim that population health has a distributive dimension; Coggon argues that this presupposes a normative commitment to equity in the very definition of population health, which should, rather, be neutral. I describe possible sources of the distributive view, several of which do not presuppose egalitarian commitments. Two relate to the nature of health as a property of individuals (it cannot be aggregated and exploited like wealth; its absence is more significant than its surplus); two relate to the epistemology and pragmatics of public and population health (social justice is an inherent value of public health practice; public health science and intervention rest on the clustering to identify causal factors). A fifth source of the distributive view is a critical stance on the concept of population health; I contrast this with Coggon’s account of the public as a shared political imaginary. None of these views is ‘neutral’: they exhibit several different kinds of normativity and quasi-normativity, but this is not problematic. I argue that the critical stance appropriately distinguishes and relates social justice and public health.