Kind Of Economic Activity Research Articles

National Accounts of Nigeria: An Analysis of the Official Data

forms an important part of the economy's total output. Unmarketed goods (goods consumed by their producers and bartered) escape their recording in national accounts. The national accounts of a developing country should bring out this special feature. Furthermore, the governments of developing countries attempt to play a dominant role in the process of economic development because of the lack of indigenous enterprise and capital. For this reason, preparation of detailed public sector accounts is desirable. These public accounts can also show the extent to which a particular economic activity, such as the oil industry in Nigeria, dominates national production and export. The UN is fully aware of the need to incorporate these special features of developing countries in national accounts and has recommended a set of supplementary accounts corresponding to each of the special features listed above. Its recommendations include a set of selected area accounts to reflect the dualistic nature of developing economies; accounts for key kinds of economic activity to reflect the significance of the dominant activity in the economy; and a set of accounts for the public sector to assess its impact on the economy. These special accounting designs, since they focus on specific features of the economy, may not fit together. Moreover, the needs of a particular country would determine the order of priority in which the UN acounts are to be compiled. Some guidelines regarding the order of priorities are also given in the UN System of National Accounts (SNA). The ultimate aim, however, should be to fulfill the requirements of a complete system of accounts which would integrate national income and product accounts, input-output tables, flow-of-funds accounts, and the national balance-sheet in

The new enterprise

Our current economic woes have elicited a flood of analyses. These analyses have generally overlooked motives for investment as a factor in determining extent and kind of economic activity. Taken as axiomatic and self-evident is the assumption that profit is the prime investment motivator. It is here maintained, however, that people invest primarily for security reasons and only secondarily or incidentally for purely profit motives. It is further maintained that current investment vehicles are ill-suited for providing security. Instead of satisfying security needs, current investment vehicles generate ever intensifying pressures for the creation of further investment opportunities. Such pressures eventually lead to excess production capacity, increasing debt, recession, wasteful use of resources for superfluous products, obsolete technology, and even inflation. New kinds of investment vehicles are suggested as a means to avoid the ill effects of inappropriate investment institutions. The new investment vehicles are designed primarily to provide security for the value of invested capital and not to provide a sizable return on investment. More specifically, new kinds of corporations are suggested. The new corporations will be self-sustaining, low-profit organizations engaged in the production of useful goods and services. Venture capital will be raised by selling to the public unique kinds of shares. The value and rate of return to investor of these new kinds of shares will be tied to the consumer price index and not to return on investment or asset growth. To wit, the purchasing power value of the shares at the time of purchase will be guaranteed. It will thus be the purchasing power value, fured at the time of purchase, that will be returned when a share is cashed in and not the face value of the share. The rate of return or dividends, on the other hand, will be inversely pegged to the consumer price index, i.e., high rate of return in recessionary times, and a low or zero rate of return in inflationary times. The dividends, however, even in recessionary times will be relatively low compared to dividends given by ordinary type corpora-

The Economics of Regulation: A Critique

intensively with the manner in which regulation affects the economy; not since the New Deal have we had occasion to re-examine the scope and complexity of regulation as it affects our economic activities on every level. I cannot begin to pinpoint the cause of the current concern about pervasive government regulation. Perhaps many of the institutions themselves have been rendered obsolete by changed economic conditions. Perhaps the social acceptance of economic regulation has spurred firms in specialized sectors of the economy to compete not in the actual marketplace, but in the marketplace, and government in general has been only too happy to respond to their interests. Certainly, during the last decade, recognition of the need for new social goals such as a cleaner environment, avoidance of an energy crisis, safer foods, drugs, and working conditions has left in its statutory wake a plethora of regulations that impinge on every kind of economic activity. In any event, the public's recognition of the scope and complexity of economic regulation is growing daily. And common to both the public at large and to the regulatory community is the perception that the lawyers are responsible. No self-respecting lawyer would decline the chance to assume major responsibility for the mechanics of a scheme, although he or she might decline to criticize some of the particulars on the grounds of professional courtesy. It is true that, in many areas of economic regulation, the policy behind the regulation, as well as the manner in which it is applied and its subsequent tests of validity in the courts, has been largely controlled by lawyers. Whether we should perceive this control as bringing a flow of benefits to lawyers to the detriment of society in general is a question that could be endlessly debated. Personally, I would not trust an economist to do that analysis. However, economists are beginning to have an expanded role in current regulation. This does not mean just analyzing the nuances of established schemes, but also determining whether a regulation is necessary or beneficial in the first place. This is as it should be. Economists have a particular advantage in taking a direct role in the process since the task is extremely technical and becomes more so each year. Moreover, the economist's role is not and should not be limited either to cost-benefit analysis or to forecasting the many effects of a particular issue; rather, economists should be prepared to make substantial contributions to the ultimate issues of public policy. As a lawyer who has had substantial professional contact with economists, I would not deprecate the importance of the increased role of economists either in assisting the process in a technical sense or in the formation of basic policy. In the former role, there is no question that, as Alfred Kahn has observed, lawyers who do not seek the cooperation of economists cannot understand what their opponents' witnesses are saying (p. 15). In the latter role, bearing in mind that value judgments are implicit in applied economic theory, there is no reason why economists are not at least as qualified to render judgment on issues of public policy as are lawyers, politicians, and other social scientists. Besides, most lawyers generously would make room for economists to share their role as the bearers of bad

Max Weber and American Puritanism

M1AX WEBER'S essay on the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism represents a highly fruitful, if also controversial, encounter between history and sociology. Any adequate appraisal of the validity of Weber's thesis must necessarily look at both the empirical data and the theoretical propositions in two ways. These considerations have determined the structure of this paper. First, I shall indicate very briefly my understanding of Weber's thesis. Second, as the main burden of this paper, I shall look at seventeenth century American Puritanism. Finally, I shall try to indicate the place of these findings in the larger framework of Weber's preoccupation with the rise of modern capitalism. Weber's argument does not concern itself with the rise of capitalism as such and even less with accounting for the existence of human acquisitiveness. Both of these had existed long before Calvinism or Puritanism. The historical phenomenon to be explained is modern Western capitalism with its economic rationalism, formally free market, and formally free labor. What Weber sees in this capitalism is that it includes, among other dominant traits, a particular quality of mind, a set of attitudes towards economic activity. In Calvinism and more especially in Puritanism we find the formation of a character structure which is explicitly religious in intent but which nevertheless could contribute to the formation of an economic ethos. The religious ethic did not indeed approve of the quest for profits and ever-renewed profits; the goal of man's activity was to glorify God. But under conditions in which particular kinds of economic activity could flourish, once these activities were set in motion, the religious norms and impulses could fall away; men could continue to be diligent in worldly employments, find sufficient incentive in the rewards which their activities provided, and eventually find other ideological justifications for their enterprises. The religious forces had removed the inner resistance to the development of certain types of practical rational conduct. The rise of modern capitalism is thus an unanticipated consequence of the Protestant ethic.'

Commercial and Industrial Bank of Russia. v. Aktiebolaget Göteborgs Bank.

Jurisdiction — Territorial — Effect of Decrees of Foreign Government Purporting to Monopolise Certain Kinds of Economic Activity, to Dissolve Existing Companies, and to Nationalise Their Property.