Kinds Of Obligations Research Articles

On Power and Obligation in Publishing

Welcome to Volume 5 of Commoning Ethnography. We’ll start with the obvious: this issue was a challenge to produce. It arrives nearly three calendar years after our last issue. This was not our plan. There are myriad reasons for the issue’s untimeliness. Chiefly, these have to do with a quite volatile period in the life of our institution in the long wake of the COVID-19 pandemic as it played out in its own untimely way in Aotearoa. They also have to do with changes in our personal circumstances and shifting personnel on the editorial collective. Rather than unpack these circumstances, the experience of trying desperately to publish the journal while also keeping up with all the other things in life has raised a different set of questions: What is the nature of the relationship between author and editor? What kinds of obligations, responsibilities, and power relationships are enfolded into that relationship? What happens when those asymmetries shift around?

Brokerage Agreement as Contractus Uberrimae Fidei

Obligation relationship results from a particular legal circumstance. In current Polish legislation, the legislator provides neither for a systematized catalogue of sources of obligations, nor for a compiled version thereof. An obligation can result not only from a legal basis, but also from case law or administrative decisions. Under substantive civil law, obligations can be divided into unjust enrichments, unlawful acts and acts in law. In addition, acts in law can take form of unilateral acts or form of agreements which are discussed in this article. Brokerage agreement, which is an innominate contract not specified by the Polish legislator, also constitutes a contractual obligation. This type of agreement is subject of constant evolution in the insurance law doctrine, by becoming a kind of obligation which takes shape and assumes its unique features, distinguishing it from other agreements. The author makes an attempt to define the essential aspects of a contract concluded between subjects seeking insurance protection and professional insurance intermediaries, and to determine whether this agreement requires the standard of the utmost good faith. Having applied dogmatic and empirical legal methods, he considers the legitimacy of demands for treating this obligation as a nominate agreement.

WOMEN'S RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE PRACTICE OF VIRGINITY TESTING CONDUCTED BY THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMED FORCES AND THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL POLICE FORCE

Virginity testing is a practice that is discriminatory, degrading to the honor and dignity of women, and is also a violation of human rights, which is carried out by the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) towards female police officer candidates as well as the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) towards female soldier candidates. Therefore, two problems arise in this research, namely what kind of obligations and responsibilities does Indonesia have in regards to providing legal protection for women according to international law, and how is the legality of the practice of the virginity tests carried out by POLRI and TNI according to international law. This study uses a qualitative, normative-legal approach. The result of this study are as follows: The obligations and responsibilities that Indonesia has in regards to providing legal protection for women is mandated by Article 7 of UDHR, Article 4 letters d, e, f, and l of Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW), Article 2 letters a, b, c, and f of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), as well as Article 3 and Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In regards to the legality of the virginity tests carried out by POLRI and TNI, such practice violates article 1, article 2, article 5 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), article 1, article 2 section (3), article 3, and article 4 letter b of DEVAW, article 1 and article 2 letter d of CEDAW, article 7 of ICCPR, as well as article 16 and article 10 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).

La Agenda 2030 y el desarrollo sostenible: reflexiones en torno a su naturaleza jurídica y aplicación en el derecho internacional por parte de los Estados y las empresas

La Agenda 2030 fue aprobada por la Asamblea General en 2015. Sin embargo, sus resoluciones no son jurídicamente vinculantes, por lo que resulta confuso qué tipo de obligaciones establece y la posible responsabilidad internacional que se derivaría de su incumplimiento. Siendo un instrumento de derecho indicativo o soft law, su aplicación depende, en mayor medida, de la aceptación de los Estados, lo que resulta una ventaja política que no debe subestimarse. Asimismo, este tipo de normas a menudo impulsan el desarrollo del derecho internacional, contribuyendo a sentar las bases para la codificación e incluso facilitando la creación de derecho internacional consuetudinario. Con este artículo, se pretende analizar la naturaleza jurídica de la Agenda desde un punto de vista normativo internacional y examinar, asimismo, cómo puede articularse su contenido conforme al derecho internacional para los Estados y para las empresas como actores no estatales, cuyo papel es clave en la consecución de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS).

Kant’s Account of Epistemic Normativity

Abstract According to a common interpretation, most explicitly defended by Onora O’Neill and Patricia Kitcher, Kant held that epistemic obligations normatively depend on moral obligations. That is, were a rational agent not bound by any moral obligation, then she would not be bound by any epistemic obligation either. By contrast, in this paper, I argue that, according to Kant, some epistemic obligations are normatively independent from moral obligations, and are indeed normatively absolute. This view, which I call epistemicism, has two parts. First, it claims that in the absence of other kinds of obligations, rational agents would still be bound by these epistemic obligations, i. e., that the latter are normatively independent. Second, it claims that, no matter what other obligations are at stake, rational agents are bound by these epistemic obligations, i. e., the normativity of these epistemic obligations is absolute in that it cannot be undercut by any moral or other sort of obligation. The argument turns on an exploratory reading of Kant’s remarks in “What Is Orientation in Thinking?” (1786) about the maxim of “thinking for oneself” as the “supreme touchstone of truth”. In contrast to O’Neill and Kitcher, I argue that if we interpret this maxim as stating the unifying principle of theoretical and practical reason, then we must interpret it as stating an epistemic, and not merely practical imperative. This result, I argue, vindicates epistemicism and illuminates interesting lessons about Kant’s conception of the category of “epistemic” norms. Further, it helps us make headway with Kant’s enigmatic remarks about the unity of practical and theoretical reason in the Groundwork, the first and second Critiques, and the Lectures on Logic. On my proposal, principles of the practical and theoretical uses of reason are unified through a formal epistemic principle.

Distressed But Not Helpless

Distressed But Not Helpless Katie Harster*, PhD Both woody and Wharne provided insightful commentary on my view that survivors of trauma have a duty to repair any impaired natural powers caused by symptoms of trauma by seeking empirically informed treatment. While Woody agrees with the main aspects of my view, they disagree with the motivation for seeking treatment. Woody argues that the “helplessness” caused by symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) should motivate survivors to pursue treatment. I disagree with this characterization and will discuss my concerns in the first part of this reply. Wharne contends that the symptoms of PTSD should be characterized as understandable responses to trauma rather than deviations from normal experience. We should seek to understand why the survivor of trauma is experiencing these symptoms rather than coldly excising the perceived aberrations. While I agree that we cannot simply remove symptoms of trauma like cancerous tumors, I maintain that these symptoms must be treated in order to reduce distress. I will discuss and respond to Wharne’s concerns in the second part of this reply. Woody and Helplessness Woody describes the experience of trauma as “overwhelming,” creating the feeling of being “derealized,” a sense “loss of agency,” and overall rendering the survivor “helpless.” Woody argues that the helplessness created by trauma provides sufficient impetus for a survivor to seek treatment. Woody rightfully attributes some of these sensations to flashbacks or reexperiencing the traumatic event, a symptom of PTSD listed in the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Other symptoms like intrusive memories, nightmares, memory loss associated with the traumatic event, and “feelings of detachment or estrangement from others” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) can all further contribute to feelings of helplessness. However, while the symptoms of trauma may create feelings of helplessness, these sensations do not render the individual helpless and in many cases does not motivate the survivor to seek treatment. The fictional Sandra from the original article, for instance, is not rendered helpless by her symptoms. Sandra experiences many of the symptoms of trauma that can generate a feeling of helplessness and I conclude that these symptoms “impair Sandra’s ability to respond appropriately to morally-relevant reasons and stimuli.” While this impairment is severe, I also argue that Sandra is able to seek treatment for these symptoms and “repair the relevant faculties.” Survivors feel the impact of the symptoms of trauma but are still capable of seeking treatment. Woody does not [End Page 165] dispute this, but argues that feelings of helplessness lead survivors to seek treatment. As it turns out, survivors of trauma choose to seek or not seek treatment based on a variety of reasons, including symptom severity (Gavrilovic, Schützwohl, Fazel, & Priebe, 2005). Yet not all survivors who feel “helpless” seek treatment. As I discussed above, feelings of helplessness can be created by a number of trauma symptoms yet only 53% to 33% of survivors seek treatment (Roberts, Gilman, Breslau, Breslau, & Koenen, 2011). Survivors of trauma do not seek treatment for a variety of reasons (Kantor, Knefel, & Lueger-Schuster, 2017). A metanalysis found that survivors of trauma did not seek treatment because they were not well-informed about mental health, they experienced difficulties accessing services, they worried about stigma and shame, they could not afford treatment, amidst other reasons (Kantor et al., 2017). While symptom severity may motivate some survivors to seek treatment (Gavrilovic et al., 2005), we cannot ignore that one-half of all survivors will not seek treatment despite feelings of helplessness. This is why it is important to motivate the duty to seek treatment through Kantian natural powers rather than through the symptoms of trauma alone. No matter how a survivor perceives their symptoms, as long as they impair their moral faculties they have a duty to seek treatment. The individual does not need to feel helpless and helplessness need not motivate the individual to seek treatment. Furthermore, we might worry that someone who is helpless cannot be subject to certain kinds of obligations. Seeking treatment can be an emotionally and practically difficult process. It seems excessively onerous to require someone who is helpless to seek out and participate in this process. My Kantian account stipulates...

Moral Topography of Memory, Time Control and Accumulation of Identity

The aim of this paper is to analyze the basis for the moral obligation to remember. As the moral relation to the past is primarily a matter of shared identity, the kind of obligation in question splits into two related issues, namely, that of political, state-oriented and state-organized memory on which the political identity rests and that of memory labour grounded in social identities based in shared, time-extended projects. Drawing upon tensions between these two, I discuss time control and the accumulation of identity as central to memory labour and, referring to John Zerzan’s critique of symbolical roots of power, pinpoint the moral basis of such an accumulation. On the basis of this, I argue for nesting the duty to remember in acknowledging the agent’s recognition of the relatedness and dependency of their agency and possibilities of flourishing which can be obtained thanks to adjusting the field of the virtue of practical wisdom so that it includes members of the time-extended community.

Türkiye’nin Suriye Krizindeki Koruma Sorumluluğu Politikası (2011-2015)

The Syrian civil war, which has been going on for more than eight years, gave rise to an unprecedented humanitarian crisis within both Syria and be- yond. The human tragedy that unfolded is a stark reminder of the unfulfilled responsibilities of the international community as embodied in the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). RtoP, involving both prevention and coercive tools, impose different kinds of obligations on different actors of the international community. Among state actors of the international community, close neighbours are critical players in the sense that they are the ones that are likely to be the most negatively affected by the conflict beyond their borders and thus are expected to have the greatest will, if not always the capacity, to effect the course of events. This paper seeks to examine how RtoP found expression in the foreign policy of Turkey that shares its longest border with Syria. Together with other neighbouring countries that host millions of refu- gees, Turkey, which also experienced serious security problems in its borders, stood as one of the most affected countries by this crisis and kept RtoP on its agenda both for instrumental and normative reasons for a long time. The aim of this study is to examine how RtoP in general and its preventive and coer- cive pillars in particular came to be understood and what concrete steps were taken to breathe life into them by the officials in Ankara. In pursuit of this aim, the policies from the beginning of the crisis (2011) till the period when national security discourse gained priority over protection discourse (2015) are analysed through official rhetoric and practices.

Joint and several liability and separate liability of the heirs for hereditable obligations – short comparative and historical overview

The article researches the different approaches for regulation of the liability of the heirs for hereditable obligations. Historical and comparative researches were made. The European legislations can be divided in two big groups. The legislations form the first group set a separate liability of the heirs - each one of them owes only a part of the debt equal to his share of the estate. The legislations of France, Ukraine, Bulgaria, etc. are included in this group. The legislations from the second group govern joint and several liability for the heirs. A creditor of the estate has a right to demand an enforcement of the whole size of hereditable obligation from one of the heirs and this enforcement releases all of the heirs from their liability. This group includes the civil legislations of German, Switzerland, Spain, Russian federation, Macedonia, etc. The author position is that the separate liability is more proper for regulation of the heir’s liability for hereditable debts. Historical, comparative and theleological methods are used for proof of this thesis. The historical development of this liability from Roman private law is traced and researched. A short overview of the aims of each one of the two kinds of liability is made in the article. The joint and several liability protects only the interest of the creditors of the estate. It is considered in the doctrine as a debt security. The separate liability protects the interest not only of the creditors, but of the heirs too. But only the liability for divisible obligations is separate. The liability for indivisible obligations is joint and liability. The separate liability can’t be applicable for them because of the specific of this kind of obligations.

Identifying and evaluating layers of vulnerability - a way forward.

“Vulnerability” is a key concept for research ethics and public health ethics. This term can be discussed from either a conceptual or a practical perspective. I previously proposed the metaphor of layers to understand how this concept functions from the conceptual perspective in human research. In this paper I will clarify how my analysis includes other definitions of vulnerability. Then, I will take the practical‐ethical perspective, rejecting the usefulness of taxonomies to analyze vulnerabilities. My proposal specifies two steps and provides a procedural guide to help rank layers. I introduce the notion of cascade vulnerability and outline the dispositional nature of layers of vulnerability to underscore the importance of identifying their stimulus condition. In addition, I identify three kinds of obligations and some strategies to implement them.This strategy outlines the normative force of harmful layers of vulnerability. It offers concrete guidance. It contributes substantial content to the practical sphere but it does not simplify or idealize research subjects, research context or public health challenges.

Społeczna rola prawników: odpowiedzialność, podmiotowość, zaufanie

This article attempts to answer the question why is it worth to exhibit the category of agency in the legal practice. Answering the question I started my discussion from the presentation ideas related to the issue of the social role of the lawyers. In the completion of this objective, I discussed three ideas: moral responsibility, trust and subjective agency. Putting forward the role of the lawyer, I paid attention to the relationship between the notion of trust in the lawyer’s role and moral responsibility. This relationship is based on an ethical link, which is founded on a kind of obligation. This idea can be demonstrated by looking into confidence in the lawyer’s role as a special form of obligation to consider individual, institutional and social arguments. In the presented approach the state of limbo between the individual dimension, which focuses on the relationship between a specific individual and their rights, and the public dimension, where attention is paid to institutional and social arguments, is a characteristic feature of the professional role of a lawyer. The shaping of a professional role in a subjective and structural authorship is based on the idea of a two-way movement. It consists in highlighting the institutional structure with simultaneous reinforcement of the role of the subject who acts within it.

The Author's Ethical Responsibility and the Ethics of Reading

Inspired by Ranjan Ghosh and J. Hillis Miller's intervention in Reading Literature across Continents, this essay discusses the narrative ethics of two narratives: Olga Horak's first-person narrative from the Holocaust and W. G. Sebald's novel Austerlitz (2001). While Sebald is an internationally acclaimed author, Horak is a Holocaust survivor whose story, orally transmitted to the author of the essay in Sydney in 2013, is presented as written text in Time's Witnesses: Women's Voices from the Holocaust (2017). Even though these narratives are very different, the essay argues that both are possessed of a strong ethical dimension that not only highlights the authors' sense of ethical responsibility, but also that of the reader. This article argues that, first, even in narratives as different as these two, the author's sense of ethical responsibility is closely linked to the reader's ethical obligation; second, as an integral part of the reader's interest in and engagement with the narrative text, this kind of obligation is generated and shaped by the narrative as textual structure; and, third, two of the most important constituent elements of this kind of form – that is, elements of narrative form possessed of a distinctly ethical dimension – are narrator(s) and characters, and the interplay of both with the author on the one hand and the reader on the other. In order to support the argument, the essay discusses a selection of illustrative examples from both narratives.

Collectives’ and individuals’ obligations: a parity argument

AbstractIndividuals have various kinds of obligations: keep promises, don’t cause harm, return benefits received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy and so on. How does this work for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals. The second is whether groups’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do to the same degree that individuals’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do. We argue for parity on both counts.

A Humean Constructivist Reading of J. S. Mill's Utilitarian Theory

There is a common view that the utilitarian theory of John Stuart Mill is morally realist and involves a strong kind of practical obligation. This article argues for two negative theses and a positive thesis. The negative theses are that Mill is not a moral realist and that he does not believe in certain kinds of obligations, those involving external reasons and those I callrobustobligations, obligations with a particular, strong kind of practical authority. The positive thesis is that Mill's metaethical position can be interpreted as a Humean constructivist view, a metaethical view that is constructivist about value and entails the existence of practical reasons, but not external reasons or robust obligations. I argue that a Humean constructivist reading of Mill's theory is reasonable, and strengthens Mill's argument from desire for the value of happiness, an important but notoriously weak aspect of his theory.

The Effect Of Father's Permission With Relying On Juridical Teaching and Civil Rights

Islam has identified conditions and circumstances for establishing family and forming marriage that guarantees community safety. A kind of obligations and restrictions in relation with women could be construed according to verses, narratives, and jurists’ verdicts. In the other words a female should perform a variety of her activities and behaviours with another person's permission and administration that is her father or grandfather before a marriage moreover he is her wife after marriage. In some of jurists’ sentences, the matured virgins should achieve father's or grandfather's permission at the marriage stage. That means she is not free and deliberated in marriage phase, therefore it should be accomplished by father or grandfather's acknowledgments. In this article we seek to reply this question “if marriage is performed without father's permission, how is the contract of the marriage, in addition what is its warranty in practice?”

Relationships between obligations and actions in the context of institutional agents, human agents or software agents

The paper presents a logical framework for the representation of interactions between institutional agents, human agents and software agents. A case study is used to analyze how obligations on institutional agents are "propagated" to human and software agents, and how actions performed by these agents count as actions that satisfy the obligations imposed to institutional agents. It is shown that the relationship between the different kinds of obligations and actions can be represented in terms of the concept of "count as" proposed by Searle, of role and of causality. The logical framework focus on those three concepts.

Advance as a kind of obligation

Advance as a type of providing of execution of obligation is Analysed current legislation of Ukraine, which regulates an advance as type of providing of execution of obligation. Functions and legal nature of advance are certain. In the article grounded expedience of improvement of determination of advance in a current legislationand law consequences of non-fulfillment of agreement of well-to-do by an advance.

« L’avis psy ». Quel avis, pour quelle demande et pour quelle éthique ?

The response of the psychiatrist to a demand of “psy advice” varies according to its theoretical orientation. An ethical structure corresponds to each practice. On the contrary, if this response becomes the condition of a possible statement of the complaint, then it is possible to define the ethics of psychiatry as this kind of obligation where I answer ‘in front of’ the other. Inspired by the work of Levinas, this ethics of this response defines the ethics of psychiatry.

Calculating Interests: Climate Change and the Politics of Life

Calculating Interests: Climate Change and the Politics of Life

Challenges in the Use of Direct-to-Consumer Personal Genome Testing in Children

In the target article, McGuire and colleagues (2009) found that 54% of social networkers would consider using direct-to-consumer personal genome testing (DTC PGT) for their child and that 63% agreed that parents should be able to have their children tested with DTC PGT (McGuire et al. 2009). These results suggest that the use of DTC PGT may significantly broaden the scope of pediatric genetic testing. Currently, some DTC PGT companies seem to simultaneously promote and discourage use of their services for children. For example, 23andMe suggests on its website that, its services are not “designed or intended to attract children under the age of 13” (23andMe 2009a), yet suggests that consumers can, “Add some excitement to your family reunion by comparing the DNA of children with other relatives” (23andMe 2009b). What are the ethical considerations of DTC PGT in children and how should they be addressed? Genetic testing in children is not a new challenge. Guidelines by the American Society of Human Genetics/American College of Medical Genetics (1995) and by the American Academy of Pediatrics (2001) address the use of genetic tests in children. These guidelines are based on a medical model of genetic testing that presumes the involvement of a clinician who has certain obligations to parents and children. The clinician acts as a gatekeeper, informing decisions about risk and benefit and determining whether testing is appropriate. The guidelines acknowledge that the risk-benefit ratio of much genetic information is unclear, and that in the absence of information, providers “may be obligated to avoid the possibility of harm, rather than to provide unclear benefits” (American Society of Human Genetics 1995, 1238). In contrast, the direct-to-consumer model, by definition, bypasses the medical gatekeeper and their guidance. As consumers of DTC PGT services, parents may not prioritize consideration of medical benefit to their children in the same way as parents of patients. Users of DTC PGT may include families who are not likely or able to obtain genetic testing under the traditional medical model, including families not at risk for any rare genetic diseases. For these reasons, in a DTC PGT model, considerations of medical benefit may be either absent or minimal. Outside a medical model of benefit, the key question becomes: what harms are associated with DTC PGT in children and do they differ from harms associated with medical genetic testing in children? Wilfond and Ross (2008) have suggested that genetic testing in children should be guided by parental-decision making “unless empirical social and behavioral data indicate that genetic testing is highly likely to cause serious harms to children” (1). Unfortunately, there are no empirical data on the harms of DTC PGT in children, including whether they differ from harms in a medical delivery model or whether they differ across populations and reasons for obtaining the service. Because DTC PGT shifts genetic testing from a physician-parent relationship to an institution-consumer relationship, it may be unclear who is responsible for minimizing harms. While the DTC PGT companies act as providers of the service, they do not assume the same kinds of obligations as a medical provider. Assent of the child is not required, and there appears to be no provision of information about the possible risks of genetic information to children or consideration of risk-benefit ratios. Furthermore, the scope of obligation to provide benefit is as yet unclear. We will illustrate some of the concerns raised by DTC PGT in children through two scenarios, using the services offered by 23andme as an example. These scenarios demonstrate the challenges in applying current guidelines on genetic testing in children and suggest the need to develop guidelines specific to the DTC PGT arena.