Kant's Work Research Articles

Critical Idealism in the Eyes of Kant's Contemporaries

Critical Idealism in the Eyes of Kant's Contemporaries BRIGITTE SASSEN THE IDEALISMDEBATESbetween Kant and his contemporaries were protracted and vehement. Interestingly, all parties in the debates--Kant's critics, defenders , and Kant himself--began with basically the same conception of (material/ empirical) idealism as a position that is either skeptical with regard to the independent existence of the external world (alternatively referred to, by Kant, as problematic, skeptical, or Cartesian idealism), or that denies the existence of material substance outright (dogmatic or Berkeleyan idealism, for Kant).' Positions quickly diverge, however, when it comes to transcendental idealism. Kant's critics argued consistently that transcendental idealism reduces to material idealism. Kant rejected these arguments, insisting, in turn, that transcendental idealism is the only escape from material idealism. 2Nonetheless, he was influenced by these criticisms. He repeatedly returns to the differentiation between transcendental and material idealism in the years following 1781,3 and he casts these differences ' This is a paraphrase of the definition that appears in the introductory paragraph of the BRefutation (B275). Kant's contemporaries might not have bothered to make the differentiation between skeptical and dogmatic idealism, but they certainly agreed with the general terms in which Kant describes idealism. His definition is closely echoed by Ernst Plamer, one of Kant's critics and an apparently generally respected historian of philosophy (PhilosophischeAphorismen, vol. I [Leipzig: Schwickert 1793], w 409- i 1) to whom even Kant's defenders referred. See, for instance, J. G. Schaumann, who attributes his definition of Berkeleyan idealism to an earlier version of the Aphorismen(Utherdie transcendentaleAesthetic[Leipzig: Weidmann, 1789], 133). References to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (KdrF) are to the pagination of the first and second original editions. References to Kant's other works are to the pagination of the Prussian academy edition of Kant's collected writings, cited as 'Ak' with volume in Roman and page in Arabic numerals. All translations are my own. 9For instance, Prolegomena,w Remark III, Ak. IV, 292. s In the ProlegomenaKant turns to the issue of idealism twice (in addition to the arguments from the A-edition that are paraphrased), first in Remarks II and III following w 3 (Ak. IV, 28894 ), and then more specifically in the Appendix (Ak. IV, 372-76). The B-edition of the Critiqut has the Refutation of Idealism (KdrV, B274-79), of course, as well as the elucidation of that argument in the Preface (KdrV, Bxxxix-xli, note). In addition, there are a number of handwritten [4~1] 429 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 35:3 JULY 1997 in what appear to be increasingly realist terms. However, while it is clear that Kant was annoyed by the numerous idealism charges and his critics' persistence in, as he saw matters, misunderstanding his thought on this and other issues, it remains unclear just how seriously he took the substance of their criticisms. I want to go some distance in answering this question by considering the development of Kant's treatment of idealism notjust text-internally,4 but by placing it in the context of the criticisms with which he was faced. These criticisms come in basically two groups. The first group contains critiques of the A-edition of the first Critique and of the Prolegomena. Among them are the famous G6ttingen or Feder/Garve review,5 Garve's original version of the review,6 and various other materials that pertain less directly to the idealism problem.7 In the second group are specific criticisms of the B-edition, notes. Prior to the Prolegomena, R5642 (AL XVIII, 279-82 ) stands out as Kant's first reaction to the idealism charge. In the years following the second edition of the Critique, there is a surprising amount of material: R5653-5654, dated t785-9o but see note 96 (Ak. XVIII, 3o5-13); R63126316 , dated t79o-9t (Ak. XVIII, 612-623); a recently found discussion loosely dated 1793 (Reinhard Brandt, "Eine neu aufgefundene Reflexion Kants 'Vom inneren Sinne' (Loses Blatt Leningrad 1)" in Reinhard Brandt/Werner Stark eds., Neue Autographen und Dokumente zu Kants Leben, Schriften und Vorlesungen [Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, t987], 1-3o); and additional remarks scattered throughout the Nacldafl and Opus Postumum...

The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant.

The Unity of Reason is the first major study of Kant's account of reason. Susan Neiman argues that Kant's philosophy reconceives the nature of reason, and she shows how that philosophy provides a basis for the unity of theory and practice. Exploring the historical background of Kant's notion of reason, as well as the role of reason in Kant's accounts of science, morality, religion, and philosophy, she provides a fundamentally new perspective on Kant's entire work.

The Prospects of Transcendental Pragmatism

American pragmatist William James admired spirit in philosophy, but he did not much admire greatest critical successor of British empiricists, namely, Immanuel Kant. There are occasional references to Kant in James's major writings, but brief treatment of Kant as an intellectualist or rationalist in Some Problems of Philosophy (1911) is perhaps James's most sustained published-albeit posthumous attempt to refute Kantian idealism (see e.g. pp. 24, 48). Alternatively, we might take a look at his 1898 paper The Pragmatic Method,1 in which he describes spirit as both intellectually, practically, and morally saner, sounder, and truer than Kant's and regards Kant's mind as the rarest and most intricate of all possible antique bric-a-brac museums (James 1978, p. 138). He goes on: true line of philosophic progress lies, in short, it seems to me, not so much through Kant as round him to point where now we stand. Philosophy can perfectly well outflank him, and build herself up into adequate fulness by prolonging more directly older English lines. (Ibid., p. 139.) Hence, even though annotations in James's copies of Kant's work show that James seriously and extensively studied Kant's philosophy,2 it is impossible to deny that his basic attitude to Kant was largely negative. He worked hard with Kant's views in order to be able to refute them. Moreover, James's own pragmatism, with its evident opposition to all strict transcendental principles, was in many important respects in sharp opposition to Kant's transcendental philosophy. This is not completely true of pragmatism in general, of course: it is well known that Peirce set out to modify Kantian picture ofthe categories in terms of which we structure reality, even claiming that Kant was nothing but a somewhat confused pragmatist.3 gap between pragmatism and Kantianism seems much wider, however, if one considers James's pragmatism instead of Peirce's (as I shall do), and especially if one stresses practical side of Kant's philosophy, namely, his ethical thought. In what follows, I shall make a modest attempt to bridge this gap-recognizing, though, both that James was somewhat unfair to Kant and that Kant's view as such is hopelessly outdated (i.e., that James is, to some extent, right in insisting that one should go round rather than through it). What I wish to show in this essay is that difference between Kantianism and Jamesianism is perhaps too easily exaggerated4 and that Jamesian pragmatism might be fruitfully reconciled with a kind of critical, transcendental idealism. My point is very general-I shall mainly discuss what can be called of making no attempt to interpret Kant's ethics in any detailed way. There are, basically, three reasons why I consider Kant/James reconciliation possible. I shall outline them in following three sections. My remarks are meant to be suggestions towards future work on these issues rather than final or conclusive interpretations of Kant and James. I am not so much concerned with what these great philosophers really thought about metaphysics of morals, after all; I am more interested in formulating a viable position that both neopragmatists and neo-Kantians of our day might be able to take seriously. upshot of my reconciliatory attempt will be a particular Kantian-pragmatic notion of moral subject, a notion surprisingly close to what one can find in tradition of existentialism (see my concluding section). This (transcendental) subject is not ontologically distinct from empirical subject living in this world of empirical sorrow and suffering. But she is a subject who, in a Kantian fashion, actively constitutes world within which she lives and, in accordance with James's pragmatism, bases this constitutive project on her social, purposive, value-laden (and thus historically changing) practice. …

Threadbare Crape: Reflections on the American Strand

I recover some that at one time or other, this writing of mine may fall into the hands of a sovereign, who will consider it himself (for it is short, and I think clear,) without the help of any interested, or envious interpreter, and by the exercise of entire sovereignty, in protecting the public teaching of it, convert this truth of speculation, into the utility of practice. The admonishing word is practice. No less than the austere, American theologian, Jonathan Edwards holds that 'holy practice' is the greatest sign of grace and that Christian practice is the principal sign of those twelve which distinguish Truly Gracious and Holy Affections. Of a profoundly different cast of mind and presentation, Immanuel Kant tells us likewise. For those intrepid souls who make it to the closing pages of Kant's epochal work, The Critique ofPure Reason, they read his telling us that the upshot of both the speculative and the reason come to these three questions: What can I know?; What I to do?; and What may I hope? For Kant, the doing is practical and he adds, warningly I take it, that we can only hope, if we do what we ought to do. Enough, although more, much more in this ameliorative vein could be cited, for it has struck me over and again that most of the major figures in the history of thought, despite their often dazzling speculative forays, maintain the abiding presence of the need for practice, the need to do something, to forage, to nurture, to sustain, to maintain, and to build. Sooner or later, sheer talk runs out and the great conversation becomes solipsistic. I turn now to the title of this presentation. Following the wisdom of Kierkegaard, who tells us that we should 'live forward' but

Kant on Duty to Oneself and Resistance to Political Authority

Kant on Duty to Oneself and Resistance to Political Authority SVEN ARNTZEN in ms DOCTRI~tE OF Law and related writings? Kant denies the subject's right to resist political authority in the strongest terms. His argumentation to support this denial is conceptual in character. The denial of a right of resistance follows from the relevant legal concepts of civil society, of the people as subject , of the head of state as the supreme power in civil society, as having only rights but no duties that he may be coerced to fulfill, and of a right as an authorization to use coercion. Civil society is the coexistence of persons as subject to a central authority, a supreme power, which is not itself subject to some other coercive authority. For the people as subject (or a member thereof) to have a right to resist the supreme power in civil society would be for it to have an authorization to use coercion to restrain that power, which would not, then, be the supreme power. In other words, a people's right to resist the supreme power would imply that the power is both supreme and not ' By Kant's Doctrineof Law I mean his Die metaphysischeAnfangsgriindederRechtslehre,the first part ofD/e MetaphysikderSitten, hereafter MdS (trans. Mary Gregor, TheMetaphysicsofMorals[New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991]). The other available translation of the DoctrineofLaw is by John Ladd, and is rendered as The MetaphysicalElementsofJustice (Indianapolis: The BobbsMerrill Company, a965). I will refer to the second part of MdS, DiemetaphysischeAnfangsgriindeder Tugendlehre,as the Doctrineof Virtue. The other main sources I will use are: "Uber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht fiir die Praxis," hereafter T&P (trans. Ted Humphrey, "On the Proverb: 'This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice'," in I. Kant, Perpetual Peaceand OtherEssays[Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1983]); Grundlegungzur Metaphysik der S/tten, hereafter GMS (trans. James w. Ellington, Groundingfor theMetaphysicsofMorals [Indianapolis : Hackett Publishing Co., x983]); KritikderpraktischenVernunft, hereafter KpV (trans. L. W. Beck, CritiqueofPracticalReason [Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965]). Page references for Kant's works are given in parentheses in the text by volume and page (e.g., V 34) of the Academy Edition: KantsgesammelteSchriflen(Berlin, 19lo- ). I have used available English translations when quoting from Kant's works. In some cases I have made modifications that I find appropriate. Where official translations are not available, the translations from Kantian sources are mine. [409] 41o JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 34:3 JULY 1996 supreme, and that the people is both subject and not subject to political authority . Thus, according to Kant, the notion of a people's right of resistance, or the statement that the people has such a right, involves a contradiction (VI 3182o ). ~ Furthermore, Kant argued that the formation (and preservation) of civil society is necessary, according to practical reason (VI 255-56, 3o7). It follows that the subject has a duty--a duty he may be coerced to fulfill--to obey political authority, even in the case of "what is declared to be an unbearable abuse of supreme authority" (VI 32o) or where the head of state exercises the oppressive power of a tyrant (VIII 382). These and similar assertions by Kant seem to be at odds with his view that civil society preserves, or at least ought to preserve, the freedom and equality of persons. By denying a right of resistance even where civil society fails short of the ideal civil society, he maintains that one has a duty to act according to a will which is not one's own and thereby seems to betray the person's autonomy and dignity that he has so strongly asserted in GMS and KpV.s Because of such tension, many commentators on this aspect of Kant's philosophy of law share the view that his denial of a right of resistance must be limited in scope. However, there is no general agreement concerning the conditions under which the subject may disobey or somehow resist political authority for Kant. According to Werner Haensel in his classical study on Kant's theory of resistance, Kant's conceptual argumentation can only...

The Wild and the Sublime: Lyotard's Post-Modern Politics

This paper examines the thought of Jean-François Lyotard in relation to the problems of justice and the constitution of a post-modern politics. It argues that Lyotard is highly influenced by Kant's aesthetics and specifically by the idea of indeterminate judgement in the formulation of a conception of justice that, in an age of social variegation and fragmentation, underlies a politics which strives to promote different ways of looking at, and living in, the world. The text concludes that Lyotard's conception of justice and its resultant politics are founded upon a skewed reading of Kant's work such that claims of truth and morality are separated from those of judgement. The result is a politics marked by radical individualism which poses the threat of social atomization.

Freedom and the End of Reason: On the Moral Foundation of Kant's Critical Philosophy (review)

684 .JOURNAL OF "rite HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 29:4 OCTOBER ~991 recasting of the argument of the book, showing the relevance of Hume's moral thought to the contemporary debate. Capaldi is especially concerned to show how the theoretical perspective has distorted social and political philosophy, and calls for a reform which would keep both firmly within the bounds of moral philosophy as understood from the Humean "We-Do" perspective. This book is not only the best account of just what Hume's moral philosophy is, it is also a philosophically challenging account. Those who read it will find new reasons to take Hume seriously as a moral philosopher. DONALD W. I.IVINGSTON Emory' University Richard L. Velkley. Freedom and the End o] Rea,~on: On the Moral Foundation of Kant's Critical Philosophy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989. Pp. xxi + 222. $29.95. This well-written and well-researched study should be of interest to a wide range of readers. Its major claims are that (i) Kant's "transcendental turn" is conditioned by a prior "Rousseauian turn" which (ii) "introduces an essential shift in Kant's determination of the end of reason based on new understandings of freedom and reason," (iii) in "response to a crisis in reason emerging in the eighteenth century" (xii). Velkley's work consists largely in tracing the implications of Kant's informal "Remarks " concerning Rousseau in 1764-65 . These were published by Lehmann in 1942 in the Academy edition of Kant's works (vol. 2o: 1-192 ). The new Kant Archive at Marburg will soon be presenting a new edition of the "Remarks" with considerable revisions of Lehmann. It is unfortunate that Velkley was not able to take this development into account. That Rousseau was a major influence on Kant has long been recognized, but Velkley's interpretation is unique because of the degree of influence that it claims and the mass of details it provides to support its claims. Velkley asserts that the "neglected ethical reflections of the 176os... are the necessary starting point for understanding the underlying logic" (1) of Kant's whole critical system. He takes Kant's "epistemological and moral idealisms" to be but "subordinate parts" of the doctrine of the "end of reason" which Kant developed in response to Rousseau. This doctrine involves accepting a primacy of practical reason which limits and unites all our reason through the "end" or goal of moral self-determination. What we know and what we are to do is to be determined not by things in themselves or given natural ends, but by the structure and telos of our own reason. Rousseau is important because he shows how reason itself is a problem, how the modern instrumental conception of it has led to a "crisis." We are caught with having to use reason to try to overcome the restlessness and increased unfreedom that the very development of reason in modern culture has brought with it. Kant comes from Rousseau with the idea of the need for a "theodicy of reason" to overcome its "peculiar self-conflicting... characteristics" (9). Velkley suggests this problem is a source of both Kant's notion of BOOK REVIEWS 685 antinomies and his doctrine of the highest good. Reason seeks an absolute whole, but while this cannot be found in the natural world, it is provided by the construct of a moral world of harmonious self-legislating agents. By building on the work of Schmucker and Henrich, Velkley can show that this idea of a moral end of all reason is not a late and desperate appendage to Kant's critical philosophy, but rather precedes and governs it. Theoretical philosophy becomes a "propadeutic" for turning back the "beclouding" of the morality of "common reason" by dogmatic or skeptical speculation. Unlike other moderns, Rousseau and Kant see this project as no mere moderate reform, but as aiming at a new "grounding of" the sacred and noble" (33) through philosophy, which brings us back from "self-inflicted alienation" (145) . Unlike Rousseau, Kant believes reason can provide its own pure source of motivation for this project through a demand for independence that is found in everyone and justifies an expectation...

Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 685 antinomies and his doctrine of the highest good. Reason seeks an absolute whole, but while this cannot be found in the natural world, it is provided by the construct of a moral world of harmonious self-legislating agents. By building on the work of Schmucker and Henrich, Velkley can show that this idea of a moral end of all reason is not a late and desperate appendage to Kant's critical philosophy, but rather precedes and governs it. Theoretical philosophy becomes a "propadeutic" for turning back the "beclouding" of the morality of "common reason" by dogmatic or skeptical speculation. Unlike other moderns, Rousseau and Kant see this project as no mere moderate reform, but as aiming at a new "grounding of" the sacred and noble" (33) through philosophy, which brings us back from "self-inflicted alienation" (145) . Unlike Rousseau, Kant believes reason can provide its own pure source of motivation for this project through a demand for independence that is found in everyone and justifies an expectation for "large-scaJe emancipation." Here Velkley introduces some of his few critical remarks, observing that Kant overlooks some of Rousseau's perceptions about the difficulty of this project (54, 69), and that in general it is not clear why Kant (and, in a worse way, later idealists) presumed reason is thoroughly systematic and "philosophy must answer [or the totality of human welfare" (168). This book is surely essential reading for students of the period, although its broad scope can disappoint those looking for analytic treatments of Kant's major works. And Velkley may go too far in making his point about the primacy of practical reason. It is no surprise that the practical should have practical primacy, but that does not mean ethics can determine logic, or the "end of reason" can legitimate the doctrine of transcendental idealism which first makes permissible Kantian freedom and morality. I would have preferred more respect for the gravity of the theoretical issue of determinism , for the objection that Kant's late reliance on a "fact of reason" is a reversion to dogmatism, and for the possibility that throughout his work Kant remains close to rationalism. Velkley holds that even the Dissertation claims no "dogmatic theoretical cognition" (131), but this seems contradicted by its account of substantial interaction grounded in God. Finally, while the insights of Strauss, Tonelli, Kuebn, Yovel, etc., are well documented in a very helpful set of notes, Velkley might have also compared his account with some of the following: Kroner, Auxter, Schneewind, O'Neill, Foucauh, Deleuze. KARL AMERIKS University of Notre Dame Roger J. Sullivan. Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Pp. xvii + 413 . Cloth, $49.5o. Paper, $16.95. Professor Sullivan's book is both modest and ambitious. His declared objective is merely to provide a "comprehensive survey" of Kant's practical (or "moral") philosophy rather than a highly original contribution to the field of Kant scholarship. To the layman this may seem an unassuming project, demanding no more than basic exposi- 686 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 29:4 OCTOBER t991 tory competence. Yet as any Kant specialist will attest, and as Sullivan is fully aware, it is in fact a bold undertaking. Books on Kant's practical philosophy usually concentrate on one of its two component parts, ethics or the theory ofjustice, or on a single text, typically the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals or the Critique of Practical Reason. Sullivan's project is larger: to give a "synoptic" account of the entirety of Kant's practical philosophy. Keeping in mind the scope, complexity, and notorious obscurity of much of Kant's thinking on moral questions, this is a daunting task. Sullivan is to be commended for having on the whole handled it quite well. Anyone who reads Sullivan's book will profit in some way. With a few exceptions I will discuss in a moment, the general reader will find it an accurate guide to the most important issues in Kant's practical philosophy. There are two admirably succinct and lucid chapters on Kant's political philosophy (Chapters 16 and 17), which manage in a brief twenty-eight pages to...

Perpetual War/Perpetual Peace: Kant, Hegel and the End of History

Recently our particular end of history has been characterized as the coming of age of a post-communist, liberal nation-state system and global political economy. On this interpretation of history and international relations, the philosophy of world history is no longer needed, since the meaning of history, its goal and end, are already known. In essence, we have arrived at the Kantian regulative ideal of perpetual peace, not in the form of a world state, but of an international order in which commerce can take over the role of war and deterrence in ensuring progress. In this paper, I will be arguing for a different understanding of the end of history, one which recalls the philosopher's attention to world history as the realm of the self-relation of spirit most in need of philosophical comprehension. In order to do this, I will be examining the differences between Kant's treatment of history and war in the critical philosophy, and Hegel's speculative transformation of that treatment in his own work. It will be argued that in Kant's work a posited end of history serves to undermine the philosophical comprehension of history, by removing that comprehension from history. Whereas in Hegel's work the experienced end of history opens up the understanding of history by acknowledging the philosopher's identity with his time. The paper falls into three sections. In the first part I will present a reading of Kant's philosophy of history and war, and try to illustrate its consequences for attempts to theorise and moralise about world history in the present. In the second part I will demonstrate how Hegel's philosophy of history and war differs from Kant's, giving us an alternative starting point for our contemporary comprehension of the end of history. Finally, I will comment on a recent Hegelian reading of world history by Hayo Krombach, Hegelian Reflections on the Idea of Nuclear War.

Kant and Darwin

The central theses of Kant's critical philosophy are sometimes said to have been overtaken by evolutionary biology. This paper considers how far this proposition can be sustained. I argue that the ‘architectonic’ or ‘system-building’ character of the mind, the categories and the forms of intuition, can indeed be seen as the outcome of a particular evolutionary lineage in a Darwinian world. I argue, further, that the principal motive energizing the critical philosophy is the 'nightmare' of physical determinism. An alternative escape route from this particular nightmare is rehearsed. If this route is taken, the intricate arguments of the Critiques are unnecessary to save moral action in a world of things. Nonetheless, insofar as 'first philosophy' necessarily starts from within the philosopher's own subjectivity, Kant's work retains its power. I suggest that the Kantian and the Darwinian interpretations are to an extent complementary. If this is so, some form of evolutionarily-informed dual-aspect psychoneural identity theory could combine the essence of the two interpretations.

The Coherence of Kant's Doctrine of Freedom.

The appears in many contexts in Kant's work, ranging from the cosmological to the moral to the theological. Can the diverse meanings Kant gave to the term be ordered systematically? To ask that question is to test the consistency and coherence of Kant's thought in its entirety. Widely praised when first published in France, The Coherence of Kant's Doctrine of Freedom articulates and interrelates the disparate senses of freedom in Kant's work. Bernard Carnois organizes all Kant's usages into a logical grammar, isolating and defining the individual meanings and pointing out their implications and limits. In a first step, he shows how Kant's notion of intelligible character makes possible a synthesis of transcendental freedom, as a problematic concept of theoretical reason, and practical freedom, as a fact demonstrated by experience. He then develops the concept of freedom under the rubric of the will's autonomy in the context of the moral law. And finally, Carnois persistently explores the role of negativity in Kant's idea of freedom. For within the magisterial coherence of the system the imperfection of human finitude is inscribed. This introduces the history of our freedom a freedom which posits itself, but then inevitably denies itself, even while preserving the possibility of its regeneration. The only work in English to consider in detail all of Kant's writings on freedom, this book also introduces French Kant scholars whose works have often been unavailable to English-speaking readers. As both an interpretation of Kant and a trenchant analysis of the relationship between ethical commitments and metaphysical assumptions, it will be a useful addition to moral, religious, and political philosophy as well as to Kant scholarship.

Boethius and Dialogue. Literary Method in "The Consolation of Philosophy," (review)

Reviews139 difficult diachrony which ensues from this honesty, that Weber finds operative to some degree in Speech and Phenomena, and highly intensified in The Post Card. In the latter we find the very poetic vertigo of translation and transference, destruction of bunker mentality, Derrida deploying missives whose paths and arrivals cannot be guaranteed in a nexus of relations extending from postmodern Paris to Plato. The institutional fate of all such missives is attracting the scrutiny of Derrida, Weber, and many other theorists. It should be emphasized that Weber's new book is not merely another searchand -destroy effort to track down totalizing critics and hidden signals of suppression . Yes, there is here the tacit and nuanced redundancy of the Heideggerian /early-Derridean surveillance project, so that many of Weber's critical specimens are located—inevitably—in some sort of metaphysical itinerary. But Weber's use ofFreudian theory, always sharp and interesting, keeps the windows ofhis own institution wide open. The notions of"debt" and "enabling exclusion" can bring the analysis ofour taken-for-granted inclinationsofthoughtto striking results, as when Weber retraces the liberal tradition in America. His nine essays are sandwiched by two suggestive pieces which discuss the epistemological dilemma of critical theory in terms of Kant's attempt, in the Critique ofJudgment, to institute particularity without recourse to pregiven concepts, without muting alterity. Here Weber works a line of inquiry neglected by other theorists who have been enmeshed in the Hegelian machinery. As readers of thisjournal are well aware, many theorists are starting to probe Kant's work as an early context for die (very institutional) problem ofthe "faculties." In this collection ofessays, and in his recendy revived Glyph, Weber is sparking a debate for them with some genuinely exciting investigations. Pennsylvania State UniversityC. S. Schreiner Boethius andDialogue. LiteraryMethodin "The Consolation of Philosophy," by Seth Lerer; ? & 264 pp. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, $28.00. While scholarship relating to Boethius' Consofotio Philosophiae has not languished in recent years, there has not, to my knowledge, been a book-length study devoted to the interpretation ofthe work. Seth Lerer's book is, therefore, all the more significant. The author's central purpose is "to demonstrate the thematic and methodological coherence of the Consolation ofPhUosophy" (p. 3), setting the work in the literature of Late Antiquity, in particular in the Latin dialogue tradition, and in the corpus of Boethius' writing. Modern critical 140Philosophy and Literature concepts and vocabulary have been used with moderation in the exploration of the Boethius persona, the reader's role, and the processes of reading, rewriting , and rereading. The firstchapterbegins by situating Boethius at the end ofa period, struggling with the writing of each new work, fitting his text to an audience, overcoming silence and postulating "a sequential relationship of world and word" (p. 30). This starting pointis supportedby a survey ofthe literary, historical, and cultural context to which the Consolatio belongs and precisely the student-teacher dialogue as seen in the writing of Cicero, St. Augustine, Fulgentius, and Boethius himself. Chapters H-V are a close reading of the ConsoMio, from the opening meter where the prisoner expresses himself as reader and writer, mourning the pastand needing tobe reeducatedby Philosophy both in the use oflanguage and in moral thinking. Philosophy brings from outside literary examples which she makes relevant to the prisoner's experience and a new style ofphilosophical discourse with which she infects her listener from the beginning of book IV. She imposes herself as the authority whose lectures, in the final prose of the work, the reader inside the text and the reader outside the text heed in silence. Lerer traces both "patterns of metaphor and imagery" (p. 7) and the transition from lethargy and speechlessness first to excessive rhetoric and then to awareness of the limitations of rhetoric, which gives way eventually to methodical philosophical demonstration (p. 96). The silence of prayer prevails finally (p. 236). An appendix, "Seneca's Plays in The Consolation ofPhilosophy," gives further evidence to support Lerer's thesis concerning Boethius' debt to Seneca. An index of names and subjects and another of Latin terms complete the book. Even if occasionally Lerer's insistence on the "reader" and "reading" seems obtrusive...

Korrespondenz 1773-1788. Volume 1 (review)

596 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 23:4 OCTOBER i98 5 Karl Leonhard Reinhold. Korrespondenz 1773-~788. Volume x. Edited by Reinhard Lauth, Eberhard Heller, and Kurt Hiller. Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag /Gtinther Hoolzboog und Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften , a983. Pp. xxix + 448. 315 DM. Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1757--1825) was the first successful popular expositor and defender of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. His Briefe fiber die kantischePhilosophie,first published in the Teutscher Merkur (a786-87), of which he was an editor, attracted more favorable attention to Kant from the learned public than any other writing. As a journalist, Reinhold in the Briefe said he spoke only of the "results" of the Kantian revolution in philosophy, without troubling the reader with the details of Kant's arguments; but Reinhold was also an accurate student of the more recondite aspects of Kant's work and was, in addition, an original philosopher. Largely on the basis of his exposition of Kant's philosophy to a member of the Weimar government (included here as letter no. 35), he was appointed Professor of Philosophy in Jena. There he lectured on the first Critique to large audiences, fought one of Kant's bitterest opponents, tried to start a journal like the later Kant-Studien, and wrote one of the first theories of knowledge based on Kant, his Versuch einerneuen Theoriedes menschlichen Vorstellungsverm6gens. The Versuch was one of the starting points in the development of post-Kantian German idealism. Like Solomon Maimon, F. H. Jacobi, and J. S. Beck, Reinhold objected to the pervasive dualisms in the Critiqueand attempted to replace them with more basic principles which would give rise to only derivative, not fundamental, dualisms. Instead of beginning, as he thought Kant did, with an irreducible ontological separation of subject and object, Reinhold tried to show how "the fact of consciousness " developed and differentiated itself into subject and intentional object. Hence Reinhold's so-called "Elementarphilosophie" was an important move in the direction from Kant to Fichte, who, incidentally, was Reinhold's successor in Jena. Most of the activity for which Reinhold merits our attention, however, occurred after the closing date of the correspondence in the present volume. The value of this correspondence for the student of the history of philosophy is therefore limited. The only letters likely to interest him are those between Kant and Reinhold, and he already knows them from the Akademie edition of Kant's correspondence. When the present volume is followed by others (approximately five more are projected), the letters included in this volume may assume a greater importance in the light of the later letters, which will undoubtedly have more philosophical content. If one takes a somewhat broader view of German intellectual history, one will find much of interest in Reinhold's early life and correspondence. The first letter is a pathetic complaint from the sixteen-year old novice in a Jesuit school in Vienna, written to his father when the school was closed and the Jesuits were about to be exiled. Reinhold moved into a Barnabite cloister, where he remained for ten years, some of the time as a teacher of philosophy. In 1783, however, he joined a freemasons ' lodge, and was from then on associated with the Illuminati and freemasons in their enlightenment efforts. The editors' notes are filled with information about this BOOK REVIEWS 597 phase of Reinhold's activities, but the threat of censorship or the destruction of letters kept most of this information out of the extant correspondence. Under threat of prosecution, Reinhold went to Leipzig, where he studied under Platner, and thence to Weimar, where he became assistant to Wieland in editing the TeutscherMerkur and married Wieland's daughter. He was converted to Protestantism by Herder, whose side he took in the controversy over Kant's review of the Ideen. The letters are mostly silent on Reinhold's clandestine political activities and his spiritual development; it is only from the copious notes supplied by the assiduous editors that we are able to follow Reinhold's odyssey from "Aberglaube und Unglaube " (as he wrote Kant, letter no. 66) or "from supernaturalism through materialistic atheism, Leibniz-Wolffianism, and theism, to...

Kant's Deduction of Freedom and Morality

Kant's Deduction of Freedom and Morality KARL AMERIKS I. IT HAS ALWAYSBEENRECOGNIZEDthat within Kant's philosophy the problem of a justification of freedom and the moral law has a central significance. ~Moreover, for any philosopher interested in a defense of freedom and morality in a strict sense, Kant is no doubt still the figure to whom one would first turn. Yet even among Kant scholars there remains a fundamental unclarity about not only the validity but also the very meaning of Kant's major treatment of these issues in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason. In particular, there has been a lack of agreement about how to explain one apparent striking difference between these two texts. In the first work Kant seems to desire and develop a theoretical argument for freedom in a sense which is absolute and from which the objective validity of the moral law is to be deduced. In the second work, however, Kant appears directly to reverse himself and to replace this project of a strict deduction2 with the idea that the moral law (i.e., its validity, not its entire exact formulation and implications) is simply given as an "a priori fact of reason" (from which alone freedom can then be inferred). Most commentators have admitted the appearance of a troublesome conflict here, but they have argued that there is a deeper "reconciliationist" interpretation which shows that Kant has a position that is both consistent and defensible. Thus some (e.g., H. J. Paton and Dieter Henrich) have said that in fact the Foundations properly anticipates the Critique by not genuinely meaning to offer a strict deduction. Others (notably Lewis White Beck) have accepted that there is something like a strict deduction in the Foundations but have taken it to be continued and in effect well continued in the second Critique . These lines of interpretation are obviously in conflict with one another, and I believe they are both unsatisfactory. I will argue not merely that Kant truly does change his Work on this article was made possible by a grant from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. The author is also indebted to Professors Gerold Prauss and W. D. Solomon, and to a referee of this journal. -' By "strict deduction" (or "categorical proof') here I mean a "linear" argument intended to be logically sound with premises that are all only theoretical as opposed to practical in any Kantian moral sense. I do not claim that this is generally what Kant must mean by a "deduction." (For details on Kant's notion of a "transcendental deduction" see my "Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument," KantStudien 69 [1978], and Dieter Henrich, "Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes," in Denken im Schanen des Nihilismus , ed. Alexander Schwan [Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975].) My main claim is simply that both the need for something at least approximating a strict deduction of freedom and morality, and a clear attempt to provide one, can be found in Kant's Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, whereas in Kant's later work this is definitely not the case. [531 54 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY position just as he appears to at first sight, but also that in each case he has a view that is intrinsically and Critically suspect. At the same time I will attempt to vindicate Kant somewhat by showing that his views undergo what is at least an understandable development , and that often the weaknesses of these views are best appreciated on the basis of considerations suggested by Kant himself. Ultimately, however, there remains in Kant a central and insufficiently justified belief in an intrinsic connection between morality and absolute freedom. For other philosophers who still believe in such a connection there is meant to be a challenge in my conclusion that a sympathetic but rigorous analysis of even Kant's view leaves it entangled in inconsistencies or very suspicious premises . In addition, at a strictly historical level my findings are meant to shed light on the central role of the notion of freedom in the development of Kant's entire system. Kant's attachment to absolute freedom can be shown to be rooted...

Bentham (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 357 may be seen as parts of one larger enterprise. The main theme is that the argument is meant "to establish a peculiarly practical viewpoint distinct from the theoretical that includes both pure and empirically conditioned reason" (p. 300). The Deduction is important because it shows that we must shift from a theoretical to a practical "framework" (a central notion throughout the book), and Chapters 2 and 3 have the role of showing how this can be the case despite the facts that a will must always have an object and that human wills are not entirely independent of sensible conditions. One striking implication of Benton's account is that the second Critique really has little to do with moral philosophy as this is usually conceived. This view, most explicit in his critical appendix on Beck, would regard the second Critique more or less the way A. R. C. Duncan's commentary treats Kant's Grundlegung: that is, as a metaphysical study of the relation between several human faculties rather than as the presentation of an ethical theory. Not only does Kant not attempt to justify the moral law, Benton contends, he does not even intend to explain how the moral law can be used in practice. This means that the usual interpretation (e.g., Beck, Paton, Murphy) of the section called "The Typic" must be mistaken: its aim is not to make the moral law applicable to real moral problems but, more generally, to explain "how categories of the practical understanding can be a priori subject to determination by pure reason" (p. 84). This thesis, in my opinion, is best viewed as an illuminating exaggeration. The dispute with Beck might reasonably be mediated the way T. C. Williams mediated a similar dispute between Duncan and Paton regarding the Grundlegung in his book, The Concept of the Categorical Imperative: that is, admit that Kant had multiple purposes which, sometimes without full consistency, he tried to serve at the same time. Setting aside controversial points of interpretation, about which readers will doubtless differ, the disappointing features of Benton's book for me are, first, its all too frequent acceptance of Kant's abstract terminology without adequate examination and explanation and, second, the absence of philosophical criticism of Kant's views. Kant's more difficult works, which surely include the Critique of Practical Reason, stand in need of, but rarely get, a double translation. That is, beyond a faithful rendering of Kant's German into Enghsh, they require, for adequate understanding , a second translation of the technical philosophical language into other terms on which we have a handle independently of Kant's text. In fairness to Benton, it must be admitted that this second translation is rarely attempted and in any case runs a risk of distorting the original thoughts. But until it is done, one must to some extent withhold one's praise, as well as harsh judgments, for both Kant and his commentators. Benton obviously knows his way around in Kant's works and is familiar with the leading commentaries, but he does not, I think, put us in a position to make an adequate assessment of the argument that is the main concern of his book. Perhaps, after all, this is the explanation for the second disappointing feature. Repeatedly Benton writes as if Kant had successfully accomplished all that he set out to do, and if there are points about which one might reasonably have doubts one gets little suggestion of this from his account. The contrast in this respect with Robert Paul Wolff's commentary on Kant's Grundlegung could hardly be more extreme. History of philosophy, I suspect, would profit from a compromise between the two approaches. THOMASE. HILL, JR. University of California, Los Angeles James Steintrager. Bentham. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977. Pp. 133. $11.50. The great majority of studies of Bentham begin by taking for granted and reasserting the alleged nalvet6 and inflexibility of his view of social existence and mankind in general. Bentham's inflexibility , however, does not seem to have allowed him to put forward an orderly and clear body of 358 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY thought, and it failed to...

Kant's Rational Theology.

In Kant's Rational Theology, Allen W. Wood explores Kant's views on the concept of God and on the attempt to demonstrate God's existence. We cannot have a full or balanced understanding of Kant's thought on religious subjects, he writes, long as we fail to take account of his reflections, often exceedingly abstract, obscure, and subtle, concerning the rational origin, content, and status of our concept of a supreme being.The importance of this aspect of Kantian thought, according to Wood, lies in its originality, in its historical influence, and in the insights it affords into the tradition of rational theology in medieval and modern philosophy. He believes that it also provides a means of understanding Kant's work as a whole and of achieving a proper appreciation of the contents of Kant's moral faith.The author focuses on Kant's chapter on the ideal or pure reason from the Critique of Pure Reason and also discusses other Kantian writings (especially the Lectures on Philosophical Theology, the Critique of Judgment, and several of Kant's precritical essays) where the topic of rational theology is prominent. A concise recapitulation and critical assessment of Kant's more speculative theses, this book is a complement to Wood's earlier book, Kant's Moral Religion.

The Development of Kant's Conception of Scientific Explanation

Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science is undoubtedly the most neglected and misunderstood of all his major works. It should, I believe, be interpreted as an attempted rational reconstruction of the mechanics of Newton and Euler. What Kant attempted to reconstruct, however, were the conceptual foundations of science rather than the logical structure. The reasons for this as well as the particular way in which it was done can best be understood in the light of Kant's own philosophical development. In summarizing this I will focus on two interrelated issues: Kant's concept of matter, which changed somewhat in the course of his long development; and his interpretation of scientific explanation, which changed considerably.Kant's earliest concerns with scientific explanation involved three aspects of interest here: Christian Wolff's (1679-1754) systematization of philosophy, which served as his point of departure; the ideas on scientific methodology, which he derived from Isaac Newton; and Kant's own work in science.

G. W. F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 241 think, including how he ought to think qua self-thinker. Thus it is the Logic which provides the context for the ordering and unification of all cognition and expands upon the notion of human freedom as the organizing principle for theoretical activity. Finally, the translation itself is quite good. By and large the philosophical terminology is well chosen and justifiable--surely an improvement over the unsystematic (and incomplete) Abbott translation which, as Hartman and Schwarz note, often renders the same German technical term by different English words, thus making Kant appear less consistent than he is. Yet they do not go to the opposite extreme and insist upon an expanded list of standard equivalences which obscure contextual differences and shifts in meaning. Translators are familiar with this particular Scylla and Charybdis and will appreciate the safe passage with Hartman and Schwarz. Nevertheless, the translation is not flawless. In the first place, there are some decisions, announced matter-of-factly in the "Note on Translation," which could use justification. For example, we are told that for Vorstellung "'Presentation' is preferable to 'representation', repraesentatio notwithstanding," without any indication of why it is preferable and what philosophical issues are involved. Is it that "representation" implies a "double affection" theory, as in Adickes's interpretation? Are there obvious reasons for ruling this out? Can the translators identify some widespread and persistent misunderstanding which has led so many translators, from Norman Kemp Smith to Henry Allison, to choose "representation "? Second, there are occasional inconsistencies. After resolving to translate the generic use of Schluss as "conclusion" (rather than "inference"), they translate the title of the entire section on Schliissen as "Of Inferences." Third, the translators rarely note the original German term, and the corresponding page numbers of the Akademie edition of Kant's works are not given in the margin. However, even after these reservations have been stated, the translation remains an accurate and systematic one. THOMAS AUXTER University of Florida G. W F Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom. By Stanley Rosen. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974. Pp. xxi + 302. $12.50) Were I to judge Rosen's exposition of Hegel in terms of his own standard, that it is "primarily for the English speaking philosopher with little or no knowledge of Hegel" (p. xi), I should judge it mostly a failure. And, indeed, even for a philosopher with knowledge of Hegel, it is by no means an unqualified success. The work suffers from infuriating faults. These faults I shall dispense with first, in part to put the reader off (as I think he should be), but in part to acknowledge that the qualified success of Rosen's analysis deserves the ultimate or at least the penultimate word. One fault is Rosen's often murky style. Take this unpropitious sentence on Fichte as by no means exceptional: "The pure spontaneous activity of the self-conscious synthetic unity of apperception takes the original (self-concealing) form (= image) of a reciprocally determining ego and non-ego, the borders of which vary from case to case" (p. 102). Combine the murky style with Rosen's tendency merely to touch on themes, and we have the following paragraph as representative of a weakness frequent to Rosen's explication, especially of Hegel's Phenomenology. We start with a fairly straightforward statement and then, helter skelter, go on and on. Were this a summary passage it might be acceptable, but it constitutes part of the substance of Rosen's analysis. As such it can satisfy neither the philosopher who has knowledge of Hegel nor the philosopher who has little or none. The former will recognize the themes in the Phenomenology but will long for the more elaborate and careful Hegelian exposition which gives them significance. The latter, I suspect, will conclude that Hegel is absurd. 242 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The Stoic identifies his interior daydreaming with the Whole. This Whole, however, is at once solipsistic and contradicted by the dreams of other solipsists.The Stoic, in asserting or "positing" himself, at once negates himself. He splits apart like an unstable atom into a multiplicity of equal duplications of the original Whole, and the result is...

La storia della filosofia secondo Kant (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 535 ception because Reid's aesthetics are part of his over-all philosophy of perception. Unfortunately , he neglects altogether a number of important and interesting topics in aesthetics which Reid discussed, e.g., eloquence, the improvement and progress of taste, the nature of expression in various of the fine arts, and the different ways the different fine arts are aesthetically pleasing. The elements of Kivy's exposition of Reid's theory of perception are derived wholly from Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind. Except for one footnote he ignores entirely Reid's later statement of his theory of perception in the Essays on the Intellectual Powers o[ Man. Odder still is Kivy's studied failure to discuss the relation of Reid's work on aesthetics in the Lectures on the Fine Arts to his essay "Of Taste" in the Intellectual Powers where Reid's aesthetic theories get their fullest, and only published, statement. Professor Kivy's justification for his peculiar focus is that he regards the Lectures on the Fine Arts as belonging to the same stage of Reid's philosophical development as the Inquiry into the Human Mind. I find this unconvincing. Reid's Philosophical Orations (1753; 1756; 1759; 1762) were delivered at an even earlier period in Reid's career than the Lectures on the Fine Arts and they contain important discussions of characteristic Reidian doctrines which are neglected in the Inquiry but which get taken up and discussed in detail in the Intellectual Powers. The fact seems to be that there is very little that in any rich sense can be called development in Reid's philosophy. His later works are not so much developments of his early views as amplifications and elaborations of them, so Kivy might well have utilized the Intellectual Powers to the advantage of himself and his readers. Various accounts of Reid's aesthetic theories are to be found in works on 18th century British aesthetics, but Kivy's Introduction exceeds them all in interest and importance. He argues, correctly I believe, that Reid's work on aesthetics deepened the epistemological significance of the fine arts in ways which only Kant was to surpass later in the century . Kivy's demonstration of Reid's proto-Kantianism in aesthetics will be of great interest to historians of ideas, and aestheticians will be interested in this account of how Reid attempted to relate aesthetic perception to the rest of human experience through an objectivist theory of aesthetic qualities which connects aesthetic qualities with an epistemological and ontological analysis of the primary/secondary quality distinction. Even so, Professor Kivy's neglect of the special topics in aesthetics which Reid discusses is a censurable defect. D. D. TODD Simon Fraser University La storia della filosofia secondo Kant. By Sergio Givone. (Milano: U. Mursica & Co., 1972. Pp. 197) This study, sponsored by the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Turin and supported by the Italian National Council for Research, is an examination of Kant's conception of the history of philosophy. The author deals with the problem in four stages: (1) the interrelation of philosophy and the history of philosophy; (2) Kant's philosophy as foundation of the history of philosophy; (3) the problem of that foundation as "the destiny of reason"; and (4) an attempt to reconstruct a history of philosophy on the basis of the fragmentary Kantian interpretation as a progressive manifestation of reason. The author bases his discussions on Kant's writings from the Dissertation of 1770 to the Opus postumum, stressing the teleological theme in all of Kant's works. The first problem---(1) above--the author discusses largely in connection with the early and the late sections of the Critique o[ Pure Reason (B8 to B27, B860 to B864), and the Prolegomena. He finds (a) that the period of the Enlightenment in the history of philosophy coincides in time with the period of Enlightenment in history in general; and (b) 536 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY that Kant gives us both, a mechanistic and a teleological interpretation of history, the one being a complement of the other (p. 43). In discussing the second theme--(2) above the author keys his analysis to...

How to apply the categorical imperative

Act only on that maxim that yo u can at the same time will as a universal taw. ''~ Many have thought that this formulation of the categorical imperative could not be successfully applied to particular moral situations to determine what kinds of actions are right and wrong. Others have thought that it could be, and have defended Kant against his critics. Much has been written about Kant's famous four examples in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Grundlegung), both to criticize and to defend Kant's sample application arguments. In fact, the application of the categorical imperative is by now a well worn topic. The aim of the present paper is to give a new positive interpretation of how the categorical imperative is to be applied. There have been critiques of Kant's applications and defenses of Kant against such criticism, but it is surprisingly seldom that a positive interpretation of how the categorical imperative is to be applied has been offered. 2 The present interpretation is presented by giving an account of the second of Kant's four examples in the Grundlegung 3 the argument against making a lying promise. In certain ways this application -a derivation of a perfect duty to others may serve as a model for other applications, though there are also important ways in which imperfect duties and duties to oneself are different from such a duty. Also, the kind of application set forth here is based on the doctrine of the Grundlegung, with some supplementation from Kant's later ethical works; but it does not take into account, for example, the detailed and quite different account of the application of the categorical imperative in the Metaphysics of Morals. In the context of that work the making of a lying promise would either be a violation of a contractual or property-right related obligation, 4 and hence fall under the philosophy of right (Recht), or else, as a lie be a