Kant's Political Philosophy Research Articles

Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy (review)

BOOK RZVIEWS 679 English in one convenient edition. Since the page numbers of the AkademieAusgabe are given in the margin of the transladons, it should facilitate the consultation of the German text for purposes of a deeper understanding of Kant, and for comparison and verification of the English translation. I am sure that these volumes will soon be the standard edition for citing Kant in English. The project will ultimately stand or fall with the translations of the first, second, and third Critiques. However, if these three volumes are any indication of what is to come, Kant scholarship will be well served by this edition. The volumes under consideration meet the highest standards. Furthermore, the books are handsome and well produced. I am sure that Kant scholars who read Kant in English will not only find them most useful, but will also be proud to have them on their shelves. It is to be hoped that a paperback edition of these works will be published very soon. MANFRED KUEHN Purdue University Howard Lloyd Williams, editor. Essayson Kant's PoliticalPhilosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. Pp. xix + 331. Cloth, $32.5o. While post-modernists and communitarians might seek to reinter the only recently revived body of Kant's political thought, this collection indicates the continuing vitality of Kantianism. Howard Lloyd Williams has assembled thirteen stimulating essays-seven of which have appeared elsewhere--written by a diverse group of scholars. Representing four countries and three disciplines, they include law professor Ernest Weinrib, political scientists Patrick Riley, Susan Shell, and Susan Mendus, and philosophers Otfried Htffe, Roger Scruton, and Samuel Fleischacker. The essays range from an exploration of Kant's precritical writings (Shell) through examinations of particular interpretive issues (Weinrib, Fleischacker, Kersting, Atkinson , and Nicholson) and attempts to situate Kant within a wider debate (Williams, Htffe, Scruton, Mendus, and Smith), to efforts to offer some sort of systematic account of Kant's philosophy and politics (O'Neill and Riley). There are advantages and disadvantages to encompassing so many topics in one collection. On the one hand, the reader can sample in one place a variety of approaches to Kant studies. American readers can become acquainted with the efforts of their colleagues abroad. Political scientists and philosophers can examine one another's scholarship. Indeed, inasmuch as they tend to display national and disciplinary insularity , some of the essays in the volume inadvertently argue for the necessity of such exchange and cross-fertilization. For example, Mendus's treatment of the place of women in Kant's political thought would have profited from Shell's presentation of the philosophical results of Kant's encounter with Rousseau. And Atkinson would have been less bemused by Kant's "rigorism" regarding punishment if he had been acquainted with Fleischacker's essay on that subject. On the other hand, the diversity of the collection makes it difficult to discern common themes. The reader longs for something more than Williams provides in his 680 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 32:4 OCTOBER i994 modest introduction to assess the significance of Kant and Kantianism for either contemporary political philosophy or the history of political thought. Fortunately, several of the essays provide clues as to how such an argument could be constructed. In "Hannah Arendt on Kant, Truth, and Politics," Patrick Riley insists that attempts to reconstruct Kant's political thought on currently fashionable nonfoundationalist grounds misconceive Kant's intent. Those who wish to " 'find a way out of pure subjectivity'" in political life by appealing to Kant must come to grips with his teleological accounts of morality, nature, and human nature (3o8). Developed at great length in his book, Kant's Political Philosophy (Rowman and Litflefield, 1982), Riley's argument is that the moral kingdom of ends can be approximated politically by using self-serving incentives to erect structures that resemble it externally. The moral law, in other words, gives rise to a political project. This exposition of Kant's intent leaves open a question about the plausibility of his presentation of universal practical reason. On one level, this issue isjoined by Steven B. Smith in "Defending Hegel from Kant." Agreeing with Kant that practical reason can be effective in...

Kant's System of Rights (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 297 and at the same time understand that philosophy will fit others differently" 093). Ultimately, what these quotations reveal is a lack of philosophical sophistication which does get in the way of the arguments that Siebert presents. There are, I believe, more significant difficulties. First, informing the whole book is the idea that Hume shapes his history for didactic purposes. What seemingly never enters Siebert's mind is that in his H/story, Hume is interested in getting at the truth of historical matters 059 is a possible exception). Second, outside of the first two chapters, Siebert does little to connect the arguments of the book together, leaving readers with an impressionistic mosaic that they have to piece together. Third, Siebert never discusses the tension between the central claim of the first chapter, that the purpose of the H/story is moral instruction, and the claim of the fourth chapter that moral philosophy is impotent. Finally, in several places, Siebert severs Hume the philosopher from Hume the historian . I would like to suggest that this leads to a distortion of both Hume's philosophy and his history. STUART D. WARNER Roosevelt University Leslie A. Mulholland. Kant's System of Rights. New York: Columbia University Press, 199o. Pp. xvii + 434. Cloth, $49.00. With this book, Professor Mulholland has made a significant contribution to the burgeoning literature on Kant's political philosophy by offering us an interpretation of Kant as a natural-law theorist. His goal is to demonstrate that Kant's theory of rights is grounded in a system of natural law. Professor Mulholland contrasts his reconstruction with what he considers to be the more prevalent consent or contractualist interpretations. The first four chapters explore the moral basis for Kant's political theory. Mulholland begins with an examination of Kant's rejection of teleological ethics, which he locates in Kant's conviction that morality must ultimately be grounded on a selfreferential law prescribing obedience to law as such. He then proceeds to the analysis and derivation of the categorical imperative and its relationship to moral goodness. Mulholland holds that the account developed by Kant in the first section of the Foundat /ore suggests the distinction between persons and things and presents "the conception that principles governing human action must be compatible with reason as the power determining action having moral worth" (69). From this starting point, he considers Kant's law of nature formula as a principle regulating human conduct. Mulholland construes this principle as mandating rational consistency in willing as applied to human nature in both its causal and teleological aspects. In determining whether a maxim can be a law of nature, one must consider"how the moral, rational features of the individual person can cohere in a unified whole with the natural desires and inclinations and the undeveloped talents and abilities" (99)- The author concludes his exposition of the moral underpinnings of Kant's theory by examining the idea of humanity as possessing intrinsic value. Mulholland claims that Kant's formulation of humans as ends in them- ~98 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 31:2 APRIL 1993 selves is fundamentally misleading due to its highly original character. According to the author, Kant's concern here is not with moral value but with the theoretical relation of rational beings to moral values. With this second formulation, Kant introduces an entirely new element, freedom. From the connection of rational agency with freedom, Kant derives what Mulholland calls the deed principle: a rational being can only acquire an obligation through some act he or she has performed. The opposition between the law of nature principle and the principle of humanity as an end in itself is central to Mulholland's reconstruction of Kant's political philosophy . Mulholland argues that the two principles are not entirely compatible with each other and that this leads to tension and ambiguity in Kant's political thought. It is the deed principle that makes Kant's theory appear to rely heavily on consent. However, as a result of the inadequacy of the deed principle as a basis of rights and political obligation, Kant is ultimately forced to fall back on the law of...

Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 685 antinomies and his doctrine of the highest good. Reason seeks an absolute whole, but while this cannot be found in the natural world, it is provided by the construct of a moral world of harmonious self-legislating agents. By building on the work of Schmucker and Henrich, Velkley can show that this idea of a moral end of all reason is not a late and desperate appendage to Kant's critical philosophy, but rather precedes and governs it. Theoretical philosophy becomes a "propadeutic" for turning back the "beclouding" of the morality of "common reason" by dogmatic or skeptical speculation. Unlike other moderns, Rousseau and Kant see this project as no mere moderate reform, but as aiming at a new "grounding of" the sacred and noble" (33) through philosophy, which brings us back from "self-inflicted alienation" (145) . Unlike Rousseau, Kant believes reason can provide its own pure source of motivation for this project through a demand for independence that is found in everyone and justifies an expectation for "large-scaJe emancipation." Here Velkley introduces some of his few critical remarks, observing that Kant overlooks some of Rousseau's perceptions about the difficulty of this project (54, 69), and that in general it is not clear why Kant (and, in a worse way, later idealists) presumed reason is thoroughly systematic and "philosophy must answer [or the totality of human welfare" (168). This book is surely essential reading for students of the period, although its broad scope can disappoint those looking for analytic treatments of Kant's major works. And Velkley may go too far in making his point about the primacy of practical reason. It is no surprise that the practical should have practical primacy, but that does not mean ethics can determine logic, or the "end of reason" can legitimate the doctrine of transcendental idealism which first makes permissible Kantian freedom and morality. I would have preferred more respect for the gravity of the theoretical issue of determinism , for the objection that Kant's late reliance on a "fact of reason" is a reversion to dogmatism, and for the possibility that throughout his work Kant remains close to rationalism. Velkley holds that even the Dissertation claims no "dogmatic theoretical cognition" (131), but this seems contradicted by its account of substantial interaction grounded in God. Finally, while the insights of Strauss, Tonelli, Kuebn, Yovel, etc., are well documented in a very helpful set of notes, Velkley might have also compared his account with some of the following: Kroner, Auxter, Schneewind, O'Neill, Foucauh, Deleuze. KARL AMERIKS University of Notre Dame Roger J. Sullivan. Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Pp. xvii + 413 . Cloth, $49.5o. Paper, $16.95. Professor Sullivan's book is both modest and ambitious. His declared objective is merely to provide a "comprehensive survey" of Kant's practical (or "moral") philosophy rather than a highly original contribution to the field of Kant scholarship. To the layman this may seem an unassuming project, demanding no more than basic exposi- 686 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 29:4 OCTOBER t991 tory competence. Yet as any Kant specialist will attest, and as Sullivan is fully aware, it is in fact a bold undertaking. Books on Kant's practical philosophy usually concentrate on one of its two component parts, ethics or the theory ofjustice, or on a single text, typically the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals or the Critique of Practical Reason. Sullivan's project is larger: to give a "synoptic" account of the entirety of Kant's practical philosophy. Keeping in mind the scope, complexity, and notorious obscurity of much of Kant's thinking on moral questions, this is a daunting task. Sullivan is to be commended for having on the whole handled it quite well. Anyone who reads Sullivan's book will profit in some way. With a few exceptions I will discuss in a moment, the general reader will find it an accurate guide to the most important issues in Kant's practical philosophy. There are two admirably succinct and lucid chapters on Kant's political philosophy (Chapters 16 and 17), which manage in a brief twenty-eight pages to...

Toward a Kantian Socio-Economics

(1987). Toward a Kantian Socio-Economics. Review of Social Economy: Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 37-47.

Kant's Political Philosophy: Rechtsstaat or Council Democracy?

Kant's political philosophy involves more than a deduction of a normative model of institutions from a set of normative premises. Certain empirical premises must be added to Kant's argument. In this paper the author argues that many of Kant's own empirical assumptions are doubtful if not false. A sketch is then made of a model of institutions that can be derived from Kantian normative principles together with more plausible empirical assumptions.

Kant's Political Philosophy (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 265 an absolute guarantee of truth. The theory of possibility fails as a replacement for the axiom because it does not fit well into Hume's epistemology: it is not empirical. Kreimendahl turns his attention to Hume's "fork" (relations of ideas and matters of fact), and finds its sources in Leibniz and the theological debates of Tillotson, who was particularly concerned with the question of the certainty of theological judgments . Kreimendahl asks how mathematical ideas, which are not based on previous impressions, can be reconciled with Hume's empiricism, and how it is possible for Hume to distinguish a priori between relations of ideas and matters of fact without violating his empiricism. He concludes that Hume's inconsistency reflects the different and disparate sources he drew upon. To show once again that Hume was inconsistent is to batter down an already open door. Kreimendahl's contribution is to show that this inconsistency has its roots in Hume's rationalism. The most interesting part of the book, to my mind, is Kreimendahrs historical detective work. Kreimendahl overstates, however, the influence some writers had on Hume. To show that Abb~ Pluche and Tillotson held views parallel to those held by Hume is not to show that they influenced him. It is by no means unheard of for two philosophers to come to similar conclusions quite independently. HAMILTON BECK Oklahoma State University Howard L. Williams. Kant's Political Philosophy. New York: St Martin's Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 29u. $3o.oo. In the past fifteen years, a number of books have been published on Kant's politica! philosophy: Murphy (197o), Saage (1973) , Saner 0973), Shell 098o), Riley (a983), and the text of some lectures by Arendt (1981). Howard Williams correctly notes, however, that none of them has succeeded either in showing "how Kant's views on politics square with the major tenets of his critical philosophy" or in establishing Kant as "a political philosopher of the first rank" (vii). In my judgment, Williams's book also leaves those tasks unaccomplished. Nevertheless, it makes a significant contribution to the literature on the topic and compares well with any of the books listed above. It is inappropriate of Williams to advertise his book as showing how Kant's political thought relates to the critical philosophy as a whole, for almost any of the books mentioned above does a better job of that. Williams's book is deliberately written in a "simple" and "modest" fashion, assuming little knowledge of Kant or of political philosophy (vii). This may account in part for the impression of philosophical naivet6 the book often gives. But the objective of showing how Kant's political thought arises out of his critical philosophy is hindered by the author's apparent lack of much knowledge of Kantian metaphysics and by his superficial treatment of Kantian moral philosophy. The book's strengths lie elsewhere, in Williams's thorough knowledge of the Kantian texts on political philosophy, and in his good judgment about the strengths and weaknesses of the ideas expressed there. Williams also refers regularly 266 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY and helpfully to other major political philosophers (such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau , Hegel, occasionally also Plato and Aristotle, Burke, and T. H. Green) and illuminates Kant's views by comparison with theirs. Williams begins with a comprehensive, well-written chapter on Kant's philosophy of history which provides the perspective from which he views Kant's political thought. The second chapter on Kant's moral philosophy and the relation of morals to politics is less strong. The next three chapters expound some of the main themes in the First Part of the Rechtslehre: Kant's conception of justice (Chapter 3); his theory of property (Chapter 4); and three other themes in the theory of Privatrecht--punishment , contract, and marriage (Chapter 5)Williams claims that his discussion of Kant's distinction between noumenal and empirical concepts of property "deals neatly with a seemingly intractable difficulty in liberal property theory" (viii). He also claims that "Kant expresses some surprising views on the role of women" (ix). These advertisements, however, appear only to set the reader up for disappointment. The difficulty in liberal...

On Ladd's Review of Kant's Political Philosophy

On Ladd's Review of Kant's Political Philosophy

On DeLue's Review of Arendt's Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy

On DeLue's Review of Arendt's Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy

Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy

Philosophical BooksVolume 25, Issue 2 p. 113-113 Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy First published: April 1984 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.1984.tb00260.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume25, Issue2April 1984Pages 113-113 RelatedInformation

Kant's Political Philosophy

Philosophical BooksVolume 25, Issue 2 p. 113-113 Kant's Political Philosophy First published: April 1984 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.1984.tb00259.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume25, Issue2April 1984Pages 113-113 RelatedInformation

Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy. Hannah Arendt

Previous articleNext article No AccessBook ReviewsLectures on Kant's Political Philosophy. Hannah Arendt Steven B. SmithSteven B. Smith Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 94, Number 3Apr., 1984 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/292570 Views: 5Total views on this site Copyright 1984 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, by Hannah Arendt. Edited and with an Interpretive Essay by Ronald Beiner

(1984). Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, by Hannah Arendt. Edited and with an Interpretive Essay by Ronald Beiner. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology: Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 317-319.

Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy. Edited with an Interpretive Essay by Ronald Beiner. Brighton, Harvester Press, 1982, pp. viii, 174, £16.95.

Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy. Edited with an Interpretive Essay by Ronald Beiner. Brighton, Harvester Press, 1982, pp. viii, 174, £16.95.

Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy. By Hannah Arendt

Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy. By Hannah Arendt

Arendt's Judgment on Kant's Political Philosophy - Hannah Arendt: Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy. Edited by Ronald Beiner. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. Pp. 192. $15.00.)

Arendt's Judgment on Kant's Political Philosophy - Hannah Arendt: Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy. Edited by Ronald Beiner. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. Pp. 192. $15.00.) - Volume 45 Issue 4

Vita Activa and Vita Contemplativa: Reflections on Hannah Arendt's Political Thought in The Life of the Mind

Hannah Arendt's last work, The Life of the Mind, was published in 1978 in two volumes entitled, Thinking and Willing. She planned to write a third volume, “Judging,” and in fact had just begun writing it the day she died. Instead of the final book, “Judging,” Willing, the second volume of The Life of the Mind, contains excerpts from her lectures on Kant's political philosophy and theory of judgment given at the New School for Social Research in 1970. From these excerpts we can get some idea of Arendt's theory of judgment, although we will never know her final thoughts on this subject since she intended to revise and expand the lectures for the “Judging” volume.

Freedom, Work, and the Scope of Democracy

Previous articleNext article No AccessFreedom, Work, and the Scope of DemocracyEdward SankowskiEdward Sankowski Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 91, Number 2Jan., 1981 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/292225 Views: 6Total views on this site Citations: 3Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1981 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Michael Y. Lee, Amy C. Edmondson Self-managing organizations: Exploring the limits of less-hierarchical organizing, Research in Organizational Behavior 37 (Jan 2017): 35–58.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.riob.2017.10.002A. Anthony Smith Kant's Political Philosophy: Rechtsstaat or Council Democracy?, The Review of Politics 47, no.22 (Aug 2009): 253–280.https://doi.org/10.1017/S003467050003672XSamuel Long Abstracts of Documents in this Supplement, (Jan 1982): 1–576.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-5214-1_1

Kant's Political Philosophy

These comments on Professor Gallie's paper, ‘Kant's View of Reason in Politics’ (Philosophy January 1979) are focused on a particular issue, and I shall explain at the outset what it is and why I have concentrated on it. Gallie's account of the details of Kant's political philosophy and his specific comments on them strike me as interesting and reasonable and I have, therefore, little to add. Instead I want to question Gallie's assumptions about, and dissatisfactions with, the philosophic framework on which Kant's political philosophy rests. There is, firstly, his complaint that reason is insufficiently defined (p. 23) though he takes a somewhat more positive view later. There is, secondly, his claim that Kant's moral philosophy is inferior to his epistemology (i.e. ‘less original, less illuminating, less architectonic’, p. 24). On these points Gallie is, in my view, not convincing and not even completely clear. Without disagreeing totally with Gallie's assessments—still less claiming that Kant is invariably right—I want to argue that Kant's conclusions are formidably supported by, and can best be understood in terms of, his own arguments. To me the question about the cogency of his case is more interesting than the details of his political philosophy. How rational are, in fact, his conclusions? So, at the risk of covering some familiar ground, I want to stress some of the general features of Kant's philosophy and argue, in particular, that his political philosophy is based on and, in turn, supplements, his moral one. The latter seems to me to be as intricate, interesting and fruitful as his epistemology and exhibits a similar architectonic. (This would also account for the parallel between the roles of reason in politics and knowledge on which Gallie comments (p. 28).)

Federalism in Kant's Political Philosophy

Federalism in Kant's Political Philosophy

Federalism in Kant's Political Philosophy

Kant argues in Eternal Peace that without a universal foedus pacificum (pacific federation) of republics there is no security anywhere for legal justice'; and in the Rechtslehre he adds that public legal justice perishes then it is no longer worthwhile for men to remain alive on this earth.2 This seems, then, to be a strong argument for some sort of federalism-at least in the international forum, between sovereign republics, if not necessarily within the structure of each of those republics. (One might think that any federalist would want to break down indivisible sovereignty by creating federal structures both beyond and within the national-state plane, and be a partisan of both domestic and international federalism3; but Kant's federalism moves mainly in one direction-beyond the national state.) A kind of international federalism, indeed, was more important to the political theory of Kant than to that of any other thinker, since for him the possibility of a public legal order on any plane was jeopardized by the absence of such an order on the broadest plane, the relations of independent states. Only an international peace (roughly) comparable to the peace which ought to be enjoyed by individual men in a particular state could guarantee state law.4