Kantian Ethics Research Articles

Examining the Agreement Object as Good Deeds from the Consequentialism and Deontology Perspective

<em>This study aimed to analyze the agreement object as good deeds from the legal philosophy perspective. Postulated to legal positivism, this rejects the deviation of the agreement on the good deed of transplanting organs or body tissues. The results compiled using normative legal research methods described the flow of consequentialism and deontology. These doctrines state that kidney transplant procedures conducted voluntarily based on humanity have benefited recipients and donors. Therefore, they increase the happiness level of both parties without leaving the concept of Kantian moral ethics.</em>

Sociability and education in Kant and Hessen

Sociability is a concept that reflects not only the individual's ability to enter into social communication, but also the dependence of the structure of social interaction on the degree of the individual's freedom in society. Kant's ethics arguably represents a key stage in the development of this idea. However, it was not until a later era that a comprehensive notion was formed according to which the social actualisation of individual freedom is a significant factor in social development. The Russian neo-Kantian, Sergey Hessen, develops a model of sociability where education forms free individuals who exercise their freedom through the development of culture. I reconstruct Hessen's model and establish that, proceeding from Rickert's axiology, he showed how education can improve the realisation of the ideals of freedom and equality in the framework of Kant's individualistic treatment of society. In his pedagogical philosophy, Hessen identifies stages in human development (anomie–heteronomy–autonomy), in the course of which the individual renounces arbitrariness. Hessen stresses the crucial significance of the secondary school in developing an awareness of freedom as duty and of society as the sphere of its actualisation. In his legal theory, Hessen strips the state of its law-making function and distributes that to the whole society. This enables free individuals to accept the need for universal subjection to the law under conditions of equality. Hessen proposes a new social structure: individuals create collective entities, each of which forms its own legal order, while the state coordinates these legal orders to prevent conflict and contradictions among them.

The Kantian origins of Sergei Rubinstein's theory of moral improvement

The early and late texts of the Russian psychologist and philosopher Sergei Rubinstein focus on ethical issues. The unfinished and fragmentary nature of these texts has contributed to the limited exploration of the ideas they contain. Rubinstein's main concern was the possibility of human moral improvement, a concern that originated in the young Rubinstein's study of the philosophies of Kant and Hegel, and somewhat later, the early manuscripts of Marx. In this paper, I show the pivotal importance of Kantian ethics for Rubinstein's theory of moral improvement. By criticising Kant's doctrine of the intelligible character of the human being, Rubinstein revises the relation between subjects and their deeds and shows that, in this relation, subjects not only express but also determine themselves. On the same basis, Rubinstein formulates the principle of creative self-activity, which he proposes to place at the foundation of a renewed ‘Socratic–Platonist pedagogy’ that can reveal the intersubjective nature of self-consciousness and will. In his critique of Kant, Rubinstein relies, to a large extent, on interpretations offered by Cohen, Natorp and Rickert. Rubinstein also attempts to solve Kant's problem of the dual nature of the human being, and in justifying the need to reconcile duty and inclination, he follows the same critical path as Schiller. Adducing the categorical imperative in its ‘formula of humanity’, and the principle of human self-determination through action, Rubinstein places the concept of educating behaviour at the core of his theory of moral improvement.

Kant on Remote Working: a Moral Defence.

In this article I maintain that when employers could free workers from the space constraint of the office without incurring unbearable economic losses, it is morally wrong not to grant workers the possibility to work remotely, as this violates the humanity formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative. The article therefore aims to contribute to the development of Kantian business ethics, taking into account a series of empirical evidence gathered in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. I firstly discuss the Kantian concept of meaningful work and explain why, due to a prejudice that existed with respect to remote work before the Covid-19 pandemic, the issue of freedom from the office was not given normative relevance. I then introduce a Kantian argument in defence of remote work and proceed to discuss two objections. The first objection is that remote work may well foster productivity, but it creates problems in terms of innovation and training of new staff. The second objection is that remote work hinders rather than fosters meaningful work because it deprives employees of social relations and inhibits workplace identity. I conclude by explaining why neither objection undermines the normative argument that workers should be allowed to work remotely as long as the “bearable costs” clause is met.

Ricoeur and Cheng’s Parallel Reconciliations of the Right and the Good

Abstract Drawing on Paul Ricoeur’s “little ethics” and Chung-ying Cheng’s work on Confucian and Kantian ethics, this essay reinforces the broad outlines of a cross- cultural framework for reconciling conflicts between the good and the right, teleology and deontology, and perfectionism and liberalism so that we can recognize dynamic concerns across the grand sweep of moral life. Ricoeur and Cheng describe roughly parallel sets of relations and highlight similar dynamics among three planes of ethical life.

Kantian Moral Agency and the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence

This paper discusses the philosophical issues pertaining to Kantian moral agency and artificial intelligence (AI). Here, our objective is to offer a comprehensive analysis of Kantian ethics to elucidate the non-feasibility of Kantian machines. Meanwhile, the possibility of Kantian machines seems to contend with the genuine human Kantian agency. We argue that in machine morality, ‘duty’ should be performed with ‘freedom of will’ and ‘happiness’ because Kant narrated the human tendency of evaluating our ‘natural necessity’ through ‘happiness’ as the end. Lastly, we argue that the Kantian ‘freedom of will’ and ‘faculty of choice’ do not belong to any deterministic model of ‘agency’ as these are sacrosanct systems. The conclusion narrates the non-feasibility of Kantian AI agents from the genuine Kantian ethical outset, offering a utility-based Kantian ethical performer instead.

Better in Pictures

Better in Pictures

The Rise of the "Other" and the Fall of the "Self":from Hegel to Derrida

Since time immemorial, due to its metaphysically grounded perspective, western philosophy has not been able to detach itself from the egoistic outlook, and thus, the interaction with the other” had no role in this philosophy. The world has always been interpreted from the perspective of self ignoring the Reviewing this mode of thought from Ancient Greece to Modern Age, one can reveal a kind of repression and forgetfulness of alterity and difference which Levinas has well highlighted in his philosophy. The very foundation of this egoism can be traced back to the Socratic slogan know yourself”. In the same spirit, a kind of self-centered moral philosophy has been developed, the clear example of which is Kant's ethics. In line with Hegelian tradition of recognition, contemporary thinkers have redefined ethics and politics and acknowledged the constitutional dependence of the “self” on the other. Based on the coordinates of their thought as well as the historical condition of their own time in the formation of subjectivity, these thinkers have criticized the neglect of the “other”. Hegel's role in underlining the importance of the vital status of the “other” is unique. Hegel bridges all post-Hegelian currents on the concept of “Other”. Then, in the present essay, we seek to show that since Hegel’s time up to Derrida, we have been witness to the rise of “Other” and the fall of “Self”.

(Re)Defining Fairy Tales: A Deontology Ethical Approach to Oscar Wilde’s Selected Fairy Tales

Fairy tales are often used by authors to impart their moral values and principles. This is commonly done through the portrayal of their main characters, including their personalities, actions, and the consequences of their actions. In some cases, authors use death as a moral lesson due to its connotation as a form of punishment for a character’s misdeed. However, Oscar Wilde’s fairy tales contradict the conventional aspect of death in classic fairy tales. His main characters experienced death or physical disfigurement in the end despite their actions which readers would perceive as good or morally permissible. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the theme of morality in Wilde’s selected fairy tales through a Deontology Ethical approach. This study addressed the relationship between the personalities and actions of Wilde’s selected characters, as well as the consequences of their actions. Furthermore, using Kantian Ethics, the study evaluated the moral permissibility of the characters’ maxims underlying their actions. The findings showed that the personalities of Wilde’s characters could be categorised into those who adhere to or oppose Kant’s definition of personality based on their actions. The study also highlighted the varying deaths that Wilde’s characters faced in the end. Additionally, the analysis suggests that the reasons behind the actions of Wilde’s characters could be categorised into “for duty” and “for other means”. At the end of this study, readers would be introduced to a different moral theory in understanding a character without justifying it based on the simple “right versus wrong” principle.

O universalismo moral kantiano: uma abordagem ética da dignidade humana no direito internacional público

PROBLEM: The problematic of this article discusses how the proposal of Kant's universalist ethics can support the universal foundation of human dignity, focusing on Kantian philosophical theory, through the analysis of the work The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. This article relates the Kantian philosophical conception with the issues of Public International Law of Human Rights. OBJECTIVES: The study aims to understand the necessity of a priori moral laws to constitute, through practical reason, the good will to act according to duty. The categorical imperative and the autonomy of the will of the universal legislator are conceptualized to identify the dignity of the human person, having man as an end in himself. It is shown that man is a possessor of duties (responsibilities)/rights (freedom-autonomy of will). Aspects of the ethical foundation of human dignity are identified in order to compare them with the current principles of public international law. METHODOLOGY: The research is qualitative bibliographical, focusing on Immanuel Kant's Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals, followed by the analysis of books and scientific articles on the subject. Following the doctrinal analysis, the subject is related to the exposition of the articles of international treaties of the human rights protection system. CONCLUSIONS: The research is justified on the basis of the universal ethical need to link national law with international law, independently of positivized international norms, according to contemporary requirements vis-a-vis all established powers, official or not. It is concluded that an international organization founded on principles based on universal morality is necessary for the protection of human dignity in order to achieve peace.

Die Idee des Schaminstinkts in Kants anthropologischen Schriften

Abstract This paper corrects a historical injustice that has been perpetrated against Kant for some time now. Mostly on good grounds, Kantian ethics have been accused of neglecting the role played by the emotions in moral deliberation and in morally informed action. However, the contemporary moral philosophers who have put forth such a claim tend to bypass textual sources, on the one hand, and to downplay the role played by the anthropological writings on Kant’s practical philosophy as a whole, on the other. Relying on highly relevant pre-critical texts in which Kant sketches future argumentative patterns and discusses the role of negative emotions like shame on the improvement of the human species, I address a mistaken conclusion about Kantian ethics as a whole that is common in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. Finally, I raise some paradoxical conclusions that follow from Kant’s argument, once its implicit premises have been brought to light.

The Kantian ethical perspective seen from the existential philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard’s Victor Eremita

Abstract This article compares two groundings of ethics: the ethical postulates of Immanuel Kant with the existential thinking of S. Kierkegaard. To achieve this goal, first, it proposes highlighting the fundamental ideas of Kantian ethics; then, secondly, highlighting Kierkegaard’s ethical stance; and finally, contrasting both approaches to identify differences and similarities. Conclusively, we can say that the pure Kantian ethical formality of duty for duty’s sake necessarily dispenses with existential and concrete content; it is an ethics that is grounded in itself, that refers to itself, to the rational nature of the human being and its universality. In contrast, Kierkegaardian ethics is a Christian ethics, it is the ethics of love for one’s neighbour and, above all, for God; it is a relational and existential ethics of the single individual.

Kantian Ethics Towards A Justifiable Business And Trade Practices: Envisaging A Humanitarian Society

The Kantian code of ethics is guided by pure practical reason and since reason is consistent and permits no exceptions to favor the lawmaker or its adherent, the moral law is also consistent and inflexible. This nature of the law is very significant for trade as trade norms cannot be flexed to favor a particular nation or company. This paper believes that Kantian cosmopolitanism should be the credo of business and trade. The reason for this assertion is because the ultimate goal of humanity is a prosperous living of all people in a spirit of unity. Humanity is at its best when rising above the barriers of race, caste and creed. And Kant's ethics has always recommended a path for humanity that leads to this cohesion. Ethical commonwealth, cosmopolitanism, League of Nations and Kingdom of ends have in themselves this one-point agenda to envisage a humanitarian society that takes pride in peaceable solidarity of human existence.

Financial institutions should decline hackers’ requests for voluntary compensation

Cybersecurity and data privacy have been prioritised by financial institutions due to legislative requirements, an increase in security breaches, and in fulfilment of their obligations to their customers. Despite this, financial institutions are still considered worthy targets by hackers. This article argues that financial institutions should decline requests for voluntary compensation from grey hat hackers who breach security controls and report discovered vulnerabilities. Following an overview of the motives of different groups of hackers, this article relies on the moral duty of respect for persons, mainly following Kantian ethics, to support the argument against voluntary compensation. The article concludes with an overview of the reasons that compensation is not an appropriate response.

Moral injury and the COVID-19 pandemic: A philosophical viewpoint

IntroductionMuch has changed in healthcare during the coronavirus disease (COVID)-19 pandemic. Medicine, a profession of traditional principles and virtues, has faced unprecedented challenges in the light of scarce and unequal distribution of ventilators, testing, and personal protective equipment. Healthcare workers have been- and are increasingly likely to be- forced into situations that require difficult decision making under life-and-death conditions. Concepts of “medical necessity” and “maximum benefit” challenge healthcare systems that already struggle to manage unequal treatment and access to services, giving rise to moral distress and moral injury on the front lines.MethodsThis article focuses on moral injury in the context of coronavirus disease (COVID)-19 pandemic. I review recent literature to highlight the psychological impact of many morally-injurious events that have been reported during the COVID-19 pandemic. With the help of a clinical vignette, I point out how healthcare systems adopt many utilitarian policies in times of excessive healthcare burden. A viewpoint is offered that many morally injurious events happen when healthcare workers, traditionally practicing Kantian and virtue ethics, are forced to follow utilitarian policies of healthcare system.ConclusionOne form of moral injury may arise from inherent conflicts between individual deontological moral judgments and organizational utilitarian moral judgments. More research is needed to validate the philosophical viewpoint as well as to explore whether increased awareness and education of key principles within moral philosophy can better equip healthcare workers in situations when public health takes precedence over individual health.

UNDER AN UNSTARRY SKY: KANTIAN ETHICS AND RADICAL EVIL

Kantian ethics and concept concerning “radical evil” represent one of the most interesting facets of moral reflection of German philosopher. Using anthropological and philosophical approach based on well-known critical method, I. Kant tried to find a comprise between “natural” behavior (i.e. not regulated by synthetic a priori judgments) but based only on sensation of pleasant unpleasant and “rational” behavior when humans tried to exit the realm of appearance and personal egoism for entering a new ethical dimension based on right (not pathological, if using I. Kant’s word) maxims being able to make human beings better than they are. In the paper it is underscored that main goal of Kantian ethics is the creation of a community where religion is a fact of reason and not of faith and reason, having as main actors men reaching an high level of self-consciousness and virtue that I. Kant granted as the greatest happiness one can have. The author tried to highlight the passage from “human being” as individuum (representative of a species) to ethically autonomous member of social consortium using as sources different Kantian works where this problem has been studied deeply and gave great emphasis to story of Job, representing in the best way the passage the Author wrote of. At the same time, he set for himself the goal of exploring progressive character of Kantian ethics aimed at making human beings better than they are, but not the best, considering noumenic nature of ethics hidden in the “Realm of goals”. Given such assumptions, the Author leads a debate with scholars distorting Kantian ethical thought by interpretation from Lacanian standpoints so that those scholars made I. Kant original source of totalitarianisms, where, in scholars’ opinion, humans do their duty both for saving their lives and express their sadistic tendencies and makes clear that Kantian ethics, throughout contradictory and complicated, is oriented to correction and education of human behavior for saving humans being from their own passions.

Persons with pre-dementia have no Kantian duty to die.

Cooley's argument that persons with pre-dementia have a Kantian duty to die has led to much debate. Cooley gives two reasons for his claim, the first being that a person with pre-dementia should end his/her life when he/she will inevitably and irreversibly lose rationality and be unable to live morally as a result. This paper argues that this reason derives from an unsubstantiated premise and general confusion regarding the condition for a Kantian duty to die. Rather, a close reading of Kant reveals that such a condition occurs when a person confronts an external handicap that does not undermine his/her rational ability but deprives him/her of the possibility of living the way a person should. People do not confront this experience with progressive dementia. The other reason Cooley proposes is that a person should not allow their continued existence to become a burden to others. This claim partly stems from a radical interpretation of a case discussed by Kant and is partly based on a misuse of Kant's formulation of humanity. Based on a prudent inference from Kantian ethics, this article argues against Cooley that persons with pre-dementia have no Kantian duty to die.

Kant’s Philosophy of Moral Luck

In the modern moral luck debate, Kant is standardly taken to be the enemy of moral luck. My goal in this paper is to show that this is mistaken. The paper is divided into six sections. In the first, I show that participants in the moral luck literature take moral luck to be anathema to Kantian ethics. In the second, I explain the kind of luck I am going to focus on here: consequence luck, a species of resultant luck. In the third, I explain why philosophers have taken Kantian ethics to reject moral luck and, in particular, consequence luck. In the fourth, I explain why these philosophers are mistaken, and I set out Kant’s theoretical framework for consequence luck. In the fifth, I clarify and defend this framework, and in the sixth, I interrogate and attack it.

Kantian Ethics and the Animal Turn. On the Contemporary Defence of Kant's Indirect Duty View.

Simple SummaryCriticism of Kant’s position on our moral relationship with animals dates back to the work of Arthur Schopenhauer and Leonard Nelson. Against this, Kantians have continued to defend Kant’s view that animals lack a moral status. Kant’s contemporary defenders have, however, highlighted extensive practical consequences for the protection of animals in favor of Kant’s position. This paper explores the argument from these extensive duties to animals in Kant’s ethics and seeks to show that Kantians underestimate essential differences between Kant and his rivals today (including proponents of animal rights and utilitarians) on both a practical and fundamental level. It also argues that those defending Kant tend to neglect theory-immanent problems in Kant’s ethics arising from unfounded value assumptions and unconvincing arguments for the denial of animal moral status. It is suggested that although the human-animal relationship was not a central concern of Kant’s, examination of the animal question within the framework of Kant’s ethics helps us to gain conceptual clarity about his duty concept and the limitations of the reciprocity argument, i.e., the notion that morality is a system of reciprocal relationships.Criticism of Kant’s position on our moral relationship with animals dates back to the work of Arthur Schopenhauer and Leonard Nelson, but historically Kantian scholars have shown limited interest in the human-animal relationship as such. This situation changed in the mid-1990s with the arrival of several publications arguing for the direct moral considerability of animals within the Kantian ethical framework. Against this, another contemporary Kantian approach has continued to defend Kant’s indirect duty view. In this approach it is argued, first, that it is impossible to establish direct duties to animals, and second, that this is also unnecessary because the Kantian notion that we have indirect duties to animals has far-reaching practical consequences and is to that extent adequate. This paper explores the argument of the far-reaching duties regarding animals in Kant’s ethics and seeks to show that Kantians underestimate essential differences between Kant and his rivals today (i.e., proponents of animal rights and utilitarians) on a practical and fundamental level. It also argues that Kant’s indirect duty view has not been defended convincingly: the defence tends to neglect theory-immanent problems in Kant’s ethics connected with unfounded value assumptions and unconvincing arguments for the denial of animals’ moral status. However, it is suggested that although the human-animal relationship was not a central concern of Kant’s, examination of the animal question within the framework of Kant’s ethics helps us to develop conceptual clarity about his duty concept and the limitations of the reciprocity argument.

Is there Such a Thing as a Good Profit? Taking Conventional Ethics Seriously

This paper will show that if we take conventional ethics seriously, then there is no moral justification for business profits. To show this, we explore three conventional ethical theories, namely Christian ethics, Kantian ethics and Utilitarian ethics. Since they essentially reject self-interest, they also reject the essence of business: the profit motive. To illustrate the relationship, we will concretize how the anti-egoist perspective expresses itself in business and business ethics. In business, we look at what many businesses regard as proof of their virtue. In business ethics, we look at what many business ethicists say about the relationship between morality and self-interest and, thus, the profit motive. Ultimately, we will argue that conventional ethics can, at most, only justify the means of business (i.e., aspects of running a business), but not the end of business (i.e., profits).