Kant's Aesthetic Theory Research Articles

The Beautiful and the Sublime: Kant's Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained

EVEN AT ITS CONCEPTION AND ITS VERY FIRST ARTICULATION IN THE critique Judgment, Kant's aesthetic theory may be seen as problematic. undeniable and unyielding contrast between and in particular, only turns second half analytic aesthetic into what Paul de Man calls most difficult and unresolved passages in entire corpus [his] works (1) but also compels Kant to dismiss notion sublime right inside his own discussion as not nearly so important or rich in consequences as concept beautiful or as mere appendix to aesthetical judging that purposiveness. (2) Yet urge to exclude sublime from Kant's aesthetic theory and to malign it as of [not] much interest to modern sensibilities (3) surely as unimaginative as attempt to promote sublime unilaterally and to vilify as outmoded--passe even. (4) In order to salvage Kant's insights and rebuild them into what Paul Crowther terms more general theory aesthetic judgment (139), what so necessary and important to see and appreciate only how there a complex relationship both similarities and differences between and sublime but also how such a relationship between them makes it possible for them to work out as Kant's paradise lost and paradise regained. No matter how sublime may differ from beautiful, two them nevertheless resemble each other at same time. Even though Kant touches upon former only after he completes analysis latter, only he therefore launching into something that fundamentally different from what he has till then called a taste but he also in a very real sense talking about same thing. The and sublime, as he says, agree in this that both please in themselves (Critique Judgment #23, 82). Taking place only during a cognitive interaction between a subject and an object but setting itself apart from both a sense and a logical determination, sublime as much a reflection as beautiful. As such, it analogously both similar to and different from pleasant and good. Like pleasant, for instance, sublime a singular experience, but unlike pleasant, it does derive its satisfaction from any current and therefore transient need for any particular object. Like good, on other sublime makes a universal claim for its judgment, but unlike good, at same time it separates validation such a collective contention from any ideas either utility or ultimate purpose. Totally disinterested and centrally concerned only with what Kant terms the mere [of object] or the faculty presentation (#23, 82), sublime as much about internal relationship man's cognitive capabilities as beautiful. In spite all their similarities, however, and sublime are nevertheless set apart from one another by their concurrent differences. The in nature connected with form as Kant points out, which consists in having [definite] boundaries (#23, 82). The on other hand, as he goes on to say, is to be found in a formless object, so far as in it or by occasion it boundlessness represented, and yet its totality also present to thought (#23, 82). Connected with the representation quality and the an indefinite concept understanding, pleasure directly brings with it a feeling furtherance life, and thus compatible with charms and with play imagination (#23, 82, 83). Bound up with representation quantity and an indefinite concept reason, satisfaction sublime instead pleasure that arises only indirectly; viz. …

Aesthetic Judging and The Intentionality of Pleasure

I point out some unclarities in Allison's interpretation of Kant's aesthetic theory, specifically in his account of the free play of the faculties. I argue that there is a tension between Allison's commitment to the intentionality of the pleasure involved in a judgment of beauty, and his view that the pleasure is distinct from the judgment, and I claim that the tension should be resolved by rejecting the latter view. I conclude by addressing Allison's objection that my own view fails to accommodate judgments of non-beauty or ugliness.

The Harmony of the Faculties

The primary task confronting an examination of the claimed connection between Kant's general theory of cognition and his account of aesthetic judgment requires clarifying perhaps the most obscure component of that account, the doctrine of the harmony of the faculties. Kant's presentation of this doctrine makes it notoriously difficult to penetrate. Much of what Kant says about the harmony of the faculties – perhaps the very phrase “the harmony of the faculties” – is rather imprecise and metaphorical. Yet, the importance of a correct understanding of the harmony of the faculties to assessing both the merits of Kant's aesthetic theory and his claims for the epistemological significance of reflection is difficult to overstate, for it is precisely this state of harmony that ultimately grounds the validity of judgments of taste and does so in virtue of being a state in which the most general prerequisites to conceptual judgment are present.

Aesthetic Licence: Foucault's Modernism and Kant's Post-modernism

Recently criticism and theory have maintained that Kant's aesthetic theory is central to modernism, and have used Foucault's archaeology to interrogate that modernism. This paper suggests that archaeology ultimately cannot escape Kant's hold because it depends on Kantian theses. The first section will consider how a recent exponent of an 'archaeological' viewpoint characterizes Kant's theory and will set out the critical role Kant ascribes to art. The second section compares Kant and Foucault to argue that despite appearances their projects turn out to be substantially coterminal. My interest in comparing these critics is not only to be provocative but also to show that post-modernist thinking, at least in the guise of Foucault, needs and uses standards that Kant proposes.

On Paul Guyer's Kant and the Experience of Freedom

This excellent volume is a welcome companion to Prof. Guyer's first book, his path-breaking Kant and Claims of Taste. That work gave an extraordinarily close analysis of Kant's deduction of taste. It also generated, many readers, a desire to know much more about how third Critique relates to broader aesthetic, historical, and moral issues, both within and beyond Kant' s own system. The present volume collects six recent articles which develop this broader focus, and it adds four substantive essays, which include outstanding historical studies of eighteenth century background of Kant's aesthetics. In his Introduction, Guyer is explicit about coming to a change of view on these issues. He says, in my earlier work I was rash enough to suggest that Kant's discussion of such topics as sublime and genius, which appear to be tied only loosely to basic architectonic of Critique of Judgment, were mere concessions to literary fashion of his day, thus not essential to his fundamental argument about conditions... inherent a judgment of taste. ...I might now be tempted to assert opposite.. .that it is Kant's exclusive focus on problem of intersubjective validity of judgments of taste, 'Analytic of Beautiful,' which is his mere concession to a literary fashion of his time... I might also claim that real heart of Kant's aesthetic theory and underlying motivation for its creation is connection to his moral theory which appears his discussion of sublime, of aesthetic ideas as content of works of aesthetic genius, and of beauty as a symbol of morality (pp. 2-3). This welcome re-orientation does not come with a revision of fundamentals of Guyer's earlier analysis of Kant's justification of judgments of taste, but rather is meant to supplement and deepen it. On that analysis, Kantian judgments of taste are understood as having a complex epistemological and psychological character, as being universally valid disinterested judgments based on a pleasurable response that is felt as rooted a special freedom from cognitive or practical constraint (see e.g., pp. 7-12, and 279). Guyer now adds, the sense of unity of aesthetic experience without its subordi-

Kant's Aesthetic Theory: An Introduction (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 145 Salim Kemal. Kant's Aesthetic Theory: An Introduction. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. Pp. vi + 197. Cloth, NP. In this relatively short book Kemal provides a comprehensive yet accessible introduction to Kant's aesthetic theory. The topics discussed include Kant's rejection of empiricist and rationalist theories, the four moments of the "Analytic of the Beautiful," the deduction or justification of judgments of taste, and the context of Kant's aesthetic theory. FoLlowing his account of Kant's deduction, Kemal provides a survey of other commentaries. A bibliographical note refers to more extensive bibliographies. The striking contrast between the tightly structured "Analytic of the Beautiful" and the rest of the "Critique of AestheticJudgment" virtuallydetermines the course of a commentary . It must give an account of Kant's deduction ofjudgments of taste and of the relevance to Kant's theory of a number of topics subsequendy introduced, e.g., the relation of natural beauty and fine art and the interest attached tojudgments of taste. The problem of the deduction is pervasive. Since Kant there relies upon two logical peculiarities ofjudgments of taste disclosed by his analysis, a commentator's handling of it will be reflected in his interpretation of the "Analytic." His decision as to where the deduction ends will influence the relevance he finds in the various topics later introduced. Given the single-minded thrust of Kemars commentary, the reader is well prepared for his handling of the deduction and for his treatment of natural beauty and fine art. Kemars position is that in Section 3o, "Deduction of Judgments of Taste," Kant is concerned only with the transcendental possibility of such judgments. In apparently reopening the question of their justification, his concern is, instead, with successfully making actual judgments of taste. Kemal's position is reflected in his treatment of two crucial issues. As for the sensu~ communis on which judgments of taste are based, he finds Kant progressing through three senses of the term, ending with that of an ideal norm. As for the question of whether pleasure precedes the activity of judging or the reverse, the answer to which Kant calls "the key" to the critique of taste, Kemal maintains that the activity of judging involves a double process of reflection, the first estimating an object that occasions pleasure, the second estimating that one's state of mind is communicable. This second reflection, on the origin of one's pleasure, is fallible and can only be confirmed by the agreement of others. In anticipation, Kemal maintains that the "disinterest" of the first moment does not exclude all concepts, but only the determinate concepts that would serve to identify objects. Kant, admittedly, reserves his discussion of the expressiveness of beautiful objects (or aesthetic ideas), but formalists and New Critics have distorted his position. Although the expressiveness of beautiful natural objects is said to parallel that of fine art, the only idea expressed there is, apparently, that of "the finality of nature." Kemars interest is primarily in art and the sort of communication made possible by it. Throughout the first three moments, his stress on the activity of judging and its putative communicability is intended to make the object peripheral. The objectjudged beautiful comes into play in the fourth moment, having to do with the necessity of judgments of taste. Here Kemal distinguishes between a postulated and fallible "subjective necessity" or universalizability and the "objective necessity" of actual judgments of ~46 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 32:1 JANUARY 199 4 taste, in which the subject goes beyond expecting the agreement of others and, knowing that he has made a judgment of taste, demands their agreement. Since judgments of taste lack logical or evidential necessity one subject can confirm that he has in fact made such ajudgment only by getting another to feel the pleasure he has experienced, and this he can do by pointing to features of the work. In order to provide a noncircular account of the demand for agreement, Kant looks to the necessity of making judgments of taste. He needs a reason, extrinsic to taste itself, for the importance of making such judgments, which he finds in their relation to...

Kant's Aesthetic Theory: An Introduction

Preface to the Second Edition - Acknowledgements - The Background - The 'Analytic of the Beautiful' - The Second Moment - The Third and Fourth Moments - Judgements of Taste and Their Deduction - The Necessity of Judgements of Taste - The Context of Kant's Aesthetic Theory - Notes - Index

Kant's aesthetic theory: an introduction

Kant's aesthetic theory: an introduction

The Kantian Sublime: From Morality to Art

In recent years Kant's aesthetic theory has been the subject of a widespread revival of interest amongst English-speaking philosophers. This revival, however, has not so far encompassed Kant's aesthetic of the sublime. This neglect is unfortunate because, amongst Continental philosophers, the Kantian sublime is currently receiving widespread discussion in debates about the nature of postmodernism. Paul Crowther thus breaks new ground by providing what is probably the first monograph in any language to be devoted exclusively to Kant's theory of the sublime.

Free Beauty, Dependent Beauty, and Art

Kant's considerable influence in aesthetics largely derives from his account of pure judgments of taste (beauty). This is not entirely inappropriate, since Kant himself gives this account a special status in his own aesthetics. For example, only pure judgments of taste receive (or are capable of receiving) a transcendental deduction of their possibility. However, to focus exclusively on Kant's general account of pure judgments of taste entails ignoring a good deal of the complexity of Kant's aesthetic theory.1 This is so even if we are exclusively concerned with Kant on taste and beauty. Kant recognizes, and gives special treatment to, four classes of beautiful objects: free dependent beauty in art, beauty in nature. Kant also recognizes two kinds of judgments of taste: pure judgments of taste (the object of which is always free beauty) and impure judgments of taste (the objects of which is always dependent beauty). In making the distinction between free and dependent beauty (two kinds of beauty, in Kant's words) in section 16 of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, Kant acknowledges that not all appreciation of beauty is captured by the notion of a pure aesthetic judgment.2 Later in the Critique (section 48), Kant suggests that most art is properly appreciated as possessing dependent thereby suggesting that a proper understanding of the appreciation of most art is not captured by the notion of a pure judgment of taste. These claims about dependent beauty have important implications for aesthetic education. The most obvious implication concerns the nature and object of aesthetic appreciation. If instances of aesthetic appreciation were identical to pure judgments of taste, they would be restricted to pleasure

Sublimity, Ugliness, and Formlessness in Kant's Aesthetic Theory

Sublimity, Ugliness, and Formlessness in Kant's Aesthetic Theory

Sublimity, Ugliness, and Formlessness in Kant's Aesthetic Theory

Sublimity, Ugliness, and Formlessness in Kant's Aesthetic Theory

Kant and the Claims of Taste.

A commentary on Kant's aesthetic theory. The book offers an account of Kant's views on judgments of taste, aesthetic pleasure, imagination and many other topics.

Comparative Aesthetic Judgments and Kant's Aesthetic Theory

Comparative Aesthetic Judgments and Kant's Aesthetic Theory

BOOK REVIEWS

Journal Article BOOK REVIEWS Get access Kant's Aesthetic Theory. By DONALD W. CRAWFORD. University of Wisconsin Press, 1974. Pp. ix³189. $13.17. DAVID POLE DAVID POLE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, KING'S COLLEGE Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume LXXXV, Issue 339, July 1976, Pages 452–454, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXXXV.339.452 Published: 01 July 1976

Kant's Aesthetic Theory.

Kant's Aesthetic Theory.

Kant's Aesthetic Theory.

Kant's Aesthetic Theory.

Kant's Aesthetic Theory, by D. W. Crawford.

(1975). Kant's Aesthetic Theory, by D. W. Crawford. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology: Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 201-202.

BOOK REVIEWS

Journal Article BOOK REVIEWS Get access Kant's Aesthetic Theory. By DONALD W. CRAWFORD. The University of Wisconsin Press. 1974. pp. 189. $13.50. SALIM KEMAL SALIM KEMAL Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 15, Issue 2, SPRING 1975, Pages 183–184, https://doi.org/10.1093/bjaesthetics/15.2.183 Published: 01 February 1975