Kantian Themes Research Articles

Kant and conceptual semantics

I believe that Kant has a view of predication and truth that straddles the present divide between reference based (broadly Fregean) semantic theories and those theories (discussed by Michael Dummett and others) which base truth on "warranted assertability" in one form or another. And I believe that Kant inherited this view from the Leibnizian "conceptual-containment" theory of truth. Truth should be assigned, says Leibniz, "to the relationship amongst the objects of the ideas, by virtue of which one idea is or is not included within the other. 1 So, for him, semantics is based on ideas; it is a relation of conceptual inclusion. 2 But that conceptual arrangement is itself a relation among objects. As I said, I believe that Kant also takes truth both in a Fregean referential way and in a conceptualist fashion. And I shall suggest in what follows that this dual theory helps explain the delicate interaction in the work of both Leibniz and Kant among semantics, ontology and logic. But I shall also claim that Kant radically changes Leibniz's account of concepts and their relations. Indeed, I shall claim that he replaces Leibniz's conceptual inclusion model of truth with a semantics that is closer to Dummett's account of assertability, and that noting this revision will explain some hitherto anomalous Kantian points. There is, I know, an apparant anachronism in speaking of Leibniz and Kant as Fregean realists and as Dummettian anti-realists. I am, however, not bothered by this for two reasons. For one thing, the link that Dummett has explored between semantic anti-realism and intuitionistic logic can be very helpful in explaining some controversial Kantian themes and arguments. There is no anachronism in saying that Kant exploited insights and connections which we have begun to make rigorous only recently. But secondly, I do believe that the differences between Leibniz and Kant on the one hand and modern writers on the other are as important as the similarities.

Kant on Self-Respect

Kant on Self-Respect STEPHEN J. MASSEY SELF-RESPECT FIGURES PROMINENTLY in recent moral and political philosophy. Philosophers have argued that it is central to an understanding both of the nature and value of rights and of why character traits such as benevolence and generosity are properly regarded as virtues.' Many of the most important writers on self-respect regard themselves as writing within the Kantian tradition or as developing Kantian themes about the nature and value of self-respect. ~ Yet there has been no adequate explication of Kant's views on self-respect. As a result of this gap, Kant's discussion of servility has been regarded as his major contribution to the theory of self-respect? This emphasis has, in turn, lent Kant's prestige to the prevailing philosophical preocMy position in this article has benefited from criticisms by Thomas Donaldson, Chin-Tai Kim, Nick Perovich, Nicholas Sturgon, Vickie Wike, and a referee for the Journal of the History of Philosophy. I would especially like to thank Terry Irwin, David Lyons, Richard W. Miller, and Allen Wood for their comments and encouragement in seeing the article through its many drafts. ' For the former, see John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), esp. secs. 67, 82; and Joel Feinberg, "The Nature and Value of Rights," Journal of Value Inquiry 4 (Winter 197o): 243-57. For the latter, see James D. Wallace, Virtues and Vices (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), esp. pp. 152-58. For the former, see Rawls, sec. 4o, "The Kantian Interpretation of Justice as Fairness." For the latter, see Thomas Hill, "Servility and Sell-Respect," Monist 57 0973): 87-1o4, esp. sec. 4. 3 See Hill's "Servility and Self-Respect," one of the most highly regarded and frequently anthologized recent works on self-respect. Hill disavows any intent "to explicate Kant directly" (p. 87). Rather, he is "interested in making sense of Kant's puzzling, hut suggestive, remarks about respect for persons and respect for the moral law" (p. 87). In explaining why the servile person (who disavows his own moral rights) is morally deficient, Hill's purpose "is not to interpret what Kant meant but to give a sense to his remark" (n. 5)- Although Hill is careful to insist that he is not explicating Kant and that he is concerned with only one of the "kinds" of self-respect, the natural inplication of his article is that Kant's main contribution to the theory of self-respect consists in his having identified a kind of failure to respect oneself, i.e., being servile, that involves a failure to properly value one's moral rights, and in having suggested why servility is a moral failing. Though at times I disagree with Hill's emphases, 1respect his article for having drawn attention to the important issues in this area. [57] 58 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY cupation with the view that it is a conceptually necessary (and perhaps sufficient ) condition of self-respect that a person believe himself to have equal basic rights? Kant has a far richer and more problematical view of self-respect than is suggested by recent Kantian accounts. He does indeed believe that servility, the tendency to act as if one did not share equal basic rights with every other person, displays a lack of self-respect. But he offers an explanation of this claim in terms of a more general theory about the worth of persons. I shall argue that the principles Kant uses to reach the conclusion that servility displays a lack of self-respect show that he holds the view that all immorality, all failure to treat others (and oneself) as ends and not simply as means, displays a lack of self-respect. If we are interested in Kant's position on self-respect, we must come to terms with this position and not with the more restricted view that respecting oneself primarily involves believing oneself to have equal basic rights. We must first consider Kant's theory of value and then determine what features of persons make them distinctively worthy of respect. His fundamental distinction in the theory of value is between beings with relative value--value...

Marx's Theory Of Ethical Justice

Historically, Marxist scholars and ideologues have shown little interest in extracting or developing a coherent system of justice, whether normative or descriptive, from Marx's writings. Sporadic attempts have been made, most notably by Bernstein, Kautsky, and Selsam. These endeavors have resulted in such diverse conclusions—each demonstrating an affinity with either utilitarian, positivist, or Kantian themes--that the searches were seen as unconvincing and perhaps selfserving. Over the past fifteen years, a renewed interesthas surfaced concerning the problem of justice and Marx. Fueled by the wide distribution of Marx's early works and the Grundrisse, the evolution of Marxist humanism, the social unrest of the sixties, and the publication of Rawls' A Theory of Justice, philosophers have looked to Marx for help xn understanding,and formulating discussion about justice. The results obtained so far have closely mirrored earlier results, although the improved quality of the work has helped to better define the prob¬ lem;-Yet the conclusions reached are still unsatisfying and discomforting at best.

ARE TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS DISTINCTIVE?

The Southern Journal of PhilosophyVolume 15, Issue 3 p. 317-326 ARE TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS DISTINCTIVE? Jack K. Horner, Jack K. Horner Fountain Valley School Mr. Horner was an Honors Lecturer at Indiana University from 1974–1977; presently he is a mathematics and physics master at Fountain Valley School, Colorado Springs. Articles elaborating his interest in Kantian themes have appeared in various journals.Search for more papers by this author Jack K. Horner, Jack K. Horner Fountain Valley School Mr. Horner was an Honors Lecturer at Indiana University from 1974–1977; presently he is a mathematics and physics master at Fountain Valley School, Colorado Springs. Articles elaborating his interest in Kantian themes have appeared in various journals.Search for more papers by this author First published: Fall 1977 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1977.tb00187.xCitations: 1 Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume15, Issue3Fall 1977Pages 317-326 RelatedInformation

Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy

This article is concerned with an examination of the rights and responsibilities of those individuals having what psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, and psychologists call psychopathic, sociopathic, or antisocial personalities. It invokes a Kantian theme, however, because in coming to terms with the concept of psycopathy, one is also forced to come to terms with the question of what it is to be a person with dignity and thereby meriting that special kind of respect which is entailed by a moral commitment to justice rather than mere utility. While the author first addressed this issue in his book Kant: The Philosophy of Right, this article expands further on this issue and constitutes a significant rejection of that book’s arguments. While, in the book, the author argued that it is a capacity to choose and not moral autonomy which confers dignity or worth upon persons, this article reverses that position and argues that it is moral autonomy and not capacity to choose which confers dignity or worthy on persons. No one had articulated a theoretical defense for this position, however, and this article attempts to fill that theoretical gap.

Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes.

Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes.

Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes.

Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes.

Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes.

Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes.