Kantian Epistemology Research Articles

Angelika Neurwirth And Qur'anic Textual Originality (Epistemological Analysis Of Emmanuel Kant's Perspective)

This paper reviews Neuwirth's thoughts regarding the originality of the Qur'anic text. According to Neuwirth, the texts of the Qur'an have been considered unoriginal because they have been influenced by Jewish and Christian traditions because the sources and methodologies used still have flaws. In reviewing Neuwirth's thoughts, this research focuses on the epistemology of Angelika Neuwirth's thoughts related to the originality of the Qur'anic text. Departing from the theory used, this paper discusses three questions. First, the sources used by Neuwirth, the methodology used, and how the validity of truth related to the originality of the Qur'anic text according to Neuwirth. This research uses a qualitative method by using library research data collection techniques. The data sources used are primary and secondary. Primary sources of the author get from Neuwirth's writings related to the Qur'an and secondary sources obtained from studies with the same object of study such as journals and books. The data that has been collected will be reduced as needed and analyzed using Emmanuel Kant's epistemology. As for the results of this study, first, Neuwirth uses text sources in the context of late antiquity. Second, Neuwirth uses an intertextuality-based pre-canonization method with a literary and historical approach. This research still has shortcomings, meaning that further research can be carried out related to the epistemology of Neuwirth's angelic thought such as the implications of Neuwirth's thinking for the study of the Qur'an in the West, especially in the scope of scholarship in Indonesia.

Понятие трансцендентального в системе трансцендентального монизма В. Д. Кудрявцева-Платонова

The aim of the article is to clarify the meaning of the concept of "transcendental" in the epistemology of the most prominent representative of Russian ecclesiastic-academic philosophy of the second half of the 19th century, Christian philosopher V. D. Kudryavtsev-Platonov, as well as the relationship of this concept in the interpretation of the Russian religious philosopher to the philosophical tradition of transcendentalism established by I. Kant. The core of Kudryavtsev's entire epistemology is the concept of transcendental monism presented in his work "Metaphysical Analysis of Empirical Cognition". In the process of reconstruction of the mentioned concept it is shown that it has two planes: ontological and epistemological. Transcendental monism as an epistemological concept is the subject of conceptual and comparative analysis in the article, by means of which similarities and differences between Kudryavtsev's and Kant's epistemology are established. On the basis of this comparison it is concluded that Kudryavtsev, denying only the subjective character of cognitive forms, overcame Kant's transcendental idealism. Then the epistemological views of V. T. Krug and F. A. Trendelenburg are analysed as basic positions for Kudryavtsev's transcendental monism in order to identify its links with the tradition of Kantian transcendentalism. According to the results of the analysis, the ideas of Krug, Trendelenburg and Kudryavtsev are compared, which shows the points of convergence between the philosophers, namely, the transcendental for them appears in connection with the a priori, that is, with that which has an inexperienced origin, but lies at the basis of possible experience. It is established that Krug, Trendelenburg and Kudryavtsev endeavoured to overcome the gap between thinking and the external world in the process of cognition, which had arisen in Kantian transcendental idealism. Hence, it is concluded that the concept of "transcendental" in Kudryavtsev's theory of cognition is linked to the tradition of Kantian transcendentalism through the concept of apriorism. Finally, it is concluded that Kudryavtsev's epistemology is an example of Christian philosophy incorporating the concept of the transcendental in its connection with Kantian transcendentalism, and may become a model for new attempts to construct a Christian epistemology.

The Way of Perceiving the World for Human: Understanding Kantian Epistemology from the Perspective of Ananda's Debate

The Way of Perceiving the World for Human: Understanding Kantian Epistemology from the Perspective of Ananda's Debate

칸트 ‘물 자체’의 해석: 교육학적 관점

In this article, I tried to explore the meanings of ‘Ding an Sich’(thing in itself) in Kant’s epistemology and attempted to interpret its epistemological meanings from educational perspective. It is true that Kant's epistemology is a philosophical discussion and does not contain any significant mentions of education. But his epistemology deals with the nature and limitations of knowledge about experience(or phenomena), and it can be said that his epistemology can make an important contributions in its own way to revealing the nature of knowledge as educational content.
 In Kant's epistemology, ‘thing in itself’ has the various status on the context of discussion, such as ‘transcendental material’, ‘transcendental object’, ‘intelligible object’, and ‘transcendental ideal’. Examining these concepts, we find that ‘thing in itself’ can be said to have the status of the ‘unknown ground’ or ‘metaphysical ground’ of knowledges.
 The ‘thing in itself’ as metaphysical ground, can be distincted from the ‘forms’ of knowledge which are belong to the subject, and it refers to the ‘world in itself’ or ‘the world as noumenon’. It can be said that Kant's epistemology shows the ‘twofold structure’ of the world divided into phenomena and ‘thing in itself’. From the perspective of Education, the ‘thing in itself’ of Kant’s epistemology shows that knowledge as educational content has a metaphysical or transcendental ground.

The Philosophy of Schopenhauer in the “Philosophical Notebooks” of B. D. Dandaron

This article presents a previously unpublished manuscript of a lecture on Schopenhauer's philosophy from archival materials of the famous Russian Buddhist scholar and Buddhist teacher B.D. Dandaron (1914–1974). It is part of a series of texts containing notes from lectures and books, his own notes as well as translations that are referred to as his “philosophical notebooks.” They date from 1953-1954, the time when B.D. Dandaron was in a Gulag camp in Taishet (Irkutsk region). This text is part of the materials of a philosophical seminar held by prisoners in their free time from work. The active participants of the seminar were B.D. Dandaron and V.E. Sesemann (1884-1963), a historian of philosophy, follower and colleague of L.P. Karsavin in the Eurasian movement. Sesemann was known for his work in Kantian philosophy and aesthetics. The manuscript argues that Schopenhauer's philosophy represents a unique attempt to combine Kant's epistemology with the ethics and metaphysics of Buddhism. The author notes that an attempt to synthesize such disparate principles should have led to significant intentional reinterpretations of these two very different systems of thought. The content of the work is to determine what new elements Schopenhauer (who considered himself a follower of Kant) introduced into Kant’s philosophy, on the one hand; and the fundamental differences between his philosophy and the teachings of Buddhism, on the other. The text will be of interest both to researchers of V.E. Sesemann (as the probable author or co-author of the work) and B.D. Dandaron. It allows us to understand the philosophical background of the religious and philosophical teaching of neo-Buddhism that they created, which had a great influence on the revival of Buddhism in Russia in the second half of the twentieth century.

How is Sociological Knowledge Possible? Influences of Kantian Epistemology in Max Weber’s ‘Verstehende Soziologie’ and the Problem of Objectivity

Kant’s ‘Copernican Revolution’ has caused a radical change in the common-sense theory of knowledge. The subject became the centre and the necessary premise for the validity of the objective world. This change in the understanding of knowledge has best manifested itself in Weber’s ‘Verstehende Soziologie’. Therefore, in order to understand the Weberian sociological method and to be able to detect the possible problems that may arise from his sociology, a better grasp of what Kantian epistemology is and in what ways it has influenced Weberian sociology is needed. Accordingly, this paper will firstly analyse Kantian epistemology with a special emphasis on transcendental idealism, and will expand and explain in detail Weber’s ‘Verstehende Soziologie’. Next, the paper will show how Weberian sociology relates to Kantian epistemology through the construction of ideal types. Before concluding, the focus moves to the objectivity claim of both Kantian epistemology and Weberian sociology and shows how objectivity arises from subjectivity through the establishment of causality. Finally, the paper will propose an objection to the objectivity claim of Weberian sociology and will argue that Kantian epistemology, when adopted as a method of sociology, becomes reflexive and threatens to deprive sociology of its objectivity claim.

Will and Morality in Schopenhauer's Philosophy

｢의지와 표상으로서의 세계｣를 중심으로 하는 쇼펜하우어의 철학은 칸트 철학에 대한 근본적인 물음으로부터 시작된다. 쇼펜하우어가 보기에, 칸트의 인식론과 윤리학은 세계와 마음의 문제를 세밀하게 밝히지 못한다는 점에서 한계를 가진다. 쇼펜하우어는 세계와 마음의 존재방식과 양자 사이의 역동적 관계를 ‘의지’라는 하나의 형이상학적 세력에 의거하여 설명한다. 그에 의하면, 세계는 ‘표상’과 ‘의지’라는 두 측면으로 구분되며, 마음은 ‘의지 그 자체’와 ‘삶에의 의지’, 그리고 ‘자비심’ 사이의 관계로 규정된다. 표상세계 속에서 살아가는 인간은 삶과 교육을 통하여 자신과 세계가 궁극적으로 구별되지 않는다는 깨달음에 이르게 된다. 진정한 도덕의 동인으로서의 자비심은 존재의 내면에서, 나의 행위가 기준에서 멀어져 있다는 후회와 반성, 책임감과 통탄의 정서로만 알려진다는 특이성을 나타내며, 바로 이 부정적으로만 알려지는 그 정서만이 진정한 도덕적 의미를 가진다. 쇼펜하우어의 철학 전체는 ‘의지의 윤리학’이라는 하나의 방향성을 가지며 그것은 존재와 행위의 관계를 파악하는 새로운 관점과 도덕교육에 관한 새로운 모형의 가능성을 시사한다.Schopenhauer's philosophy throughout his main work The World as Will and Representation begins with some fundamental questions about Kant's philosophy. In Schopenhauer's view, Kant's epistemology and ethics have critical limits in that they cannot reveal the true meaning of world and human being in detail. Schopenhauer's central doctrine of the two aspects of world and human being is to explain the dynamics in between based upon the metaphysical force called 'Will'. The world is distinguished by representation and Will, and human being can be defined by the relations between 'Will in itself', 'will to life', and 'compassion'. Throughout his life and education, man comes to reach the knowledge that his being and world are not ultimately separated each other. The true moral incentive can be known only within one's existence negatively. The regrets and responsibilities show that my actions are far from the absolute moral standard, and they are the only places where the true meaning of morality emerges. Schopenhauer's philosophy as a whole has a direction of 'ethics of Will', which suggests the possibility of a new model for moral education and a new perspective on the relation between being and action.

The Nature of Human Knowledge in Light of Empiricism After a Critique of Kantian Epistemology

This philosophical study attempts to provide a cogent solution to the debate between rationalism and empiricism by defending the empiricist standpoint. Although Kantian conception of knowledge, in a way, proposes a reconciliation of these two schools of philosophy by rendering human mind a prominent element in the formation of knowledge along with sensory data acquired from the external world on the grounds of an elucidation within the a priori-a posteriori and analytic-synthetic dichotomies, this understanding, indeed, brings about groundless ideas and contradictory results after observing the emergence of the incompatibility between the suggestions of this theory and some occurrences in the world. Yet, analyticity and the knowledge of the self, seemingly, jeopardize our conclusions that are in favor of empiricism by indicating the self-evident existence of a priori knowledge in the way they are known. Nevertheless, after ascertaining that analyticity which fundamentally resides in the realm of logic, in fact, stems from syntheticity like other principles of logic, and that the knowledge of the self arises in the presence of experience, these aspects that cause difficulty in our investigation can be resolved: after all, we can argue that analyticity and a priority are not possible, and hence, the philosophy which represents the only way to have knowledge is empiricism in the existence of syntheticity and a posteriority. In parallel, it can be concluded that the knowledge of the external world possessed through common-sense appears as self-evident in accordance with the self-evident property of the self, and all laws of nature and all logical or mathematical laws, rules, and principles, in the absence of analyticity and a priority, can be known within the synthetic a posteriori framework through the scientific method in which the principle of unfalsifiability is used in congruence with an examined structure or scale of reality.

Феноменология религии и когнитивное религиоведение

The phenomenology of religion and cognitive religious studies are perceived in scientific circles as two fundamentally different strategies for studying religion, since the reductionist basis of cognitive religious studies does not agree with the anti-reductionism of the phenomenological tradition. Despite this difference, the article substantiates the idea that these traditions have intersections, the pres­ence of which helps to take a fresh look at the study of religion in the past and present. Firstly, it is the place that both programs occupy in religious studies, their claim to be key strategies for understanding religion as a whole. Secondly, it is a common philosophical basis: both traditions ideologically go back to the basic principles of Kantian epistemology. Thirdly, it is evolutionism, the whole system of argumentation of cognitive religious studies is explicitly based on it, implic­itly it is present in all classical theories of phenomenologists of religion. Fourth, a two-process model that asserts the existence of two cognitive processes that generate two corresponding levels of religious life: intuitive and reflexive. The presence of these intersections allows to consider the logic of the study of re­ligion in a different way: the difference of research strategies on the principle of reductionism/anti-reductionism is not sufficiently heuristic. It is concluded that the commonality of ideas about the two levels of religion, shared by both tradi­tions, confirms that phenomenologists and cognitive scientists, moving in com­pletely different ways, apparently discovered a fundamental feature of the “hu­man” dimension of religious life.

У истоков неосхоластической трактовки кантиан­ства: от Ч. Бальдинотти до Й. Клейтгена

The article considers the first experience of interpretation and criticism of the Kantian doctrine of knowledge on the part of neo-scholastic thinkers in 1st half of the 19th century. It is shown that the transition from confessional polemics, which hadn’t philosophical in­terpretation, to the presentation and analysis of Kantian epistemology in Cesare Baldinotti’s treatise “Tentaminum metaphysicorum” (1817), when scholar takes an under­standing of Kantianism as radical skepticism. At the same time, he left unanswered ques­tions about what type of traditional concepts Kantianism refers, and how it can be de­scribed in the language of scholasticism. The first problem was solved by the Italian thinker Gaetano Sanseverino, who tried to correlate Kantianism with models traditionally opposed to scholasticism (like averroism). The second problem was solved by Jaime Balmes and Joseph Kleutgen, who outlined the boundaries of the compromise between scholasticism and Kantianism, trying to describe Criticism in terms of Thomism and show possible intersection points between these doctrines. As a result of these efforts, it becomes clear that the mechanical transfer of solutions developed in medieval scholas­ticism to the problems of modern European philosophy is not a successful polemic strat­egy. It was necessary to update the scholastic philosophy in a modern European context, which was subsequently carried out by Matteo Liberatore and the Neo-Thomists who fol­lowed him.

Espiritualidade e idealismo : Kant e o objeto da filosofia

In its most general sense, the concept of spirituality encompasses two basic components: on the one hand, the idea that beyond the material dimension of the world of experience, it is possible to have access to a world of transcendent meanings, in which we could find the real meaning of things and even the of the material world itself, on the other hand, the knowledge that the experience available in this form of access cannot be communicated. In his epistemological analysis of our access to the world, Kant establishes that all possible knowledge for human beings is limited to the world of objects given in experience under the conditions of the subjective faculties responsible for objective knowledge. Thus, we have not access to a world of transcendent objects, nor to the “real” meaning of things, that is, to the meaning of these things “in themselves”, but only to things as they may appear to us under the conditions of possible experience. On the other hand, the demonstration that the subjective faculties of our minds can guarantee the legitimacy of this objective knowledge is only possible through a (transcendental) proof establishing the intersubjective character of its fundamental representations (a priori and objectively valid) insofar as they constitute the necessary form of the unity of consciousness represented in the proposition “I think”. That is, insofar as the objective validity of these representations is demonstrated as necessarily shared by any consciousness that can represent itself in the proposition "I think". Thus, for Kant, the demonstration of the legitimacy of these concepts is irreversibly connected to the possibility of the intersubjective dimension of knowledge and, thus, of the communicability between the knowing subjects. This double requirement of the Kantian theory of objectivity sets Kant's epistemology in dissonance with the concept of spirituality defined in these general terms, and suggests that there is no room for a dimension of spirituality within the scope of his transcendental idealism. In this article, we examine how Kant’s transcendental project deals with such requirements of the concept of spirituality and of the transcendent.

CONSEQUENCIALISMO KANTIANO DE DAVID CUMMISKEY NA FÓRMULA DA LEI UNIVERSAL

Neste artigo, busca-se reproduzir o primeiro argumento de David Cummiskey em Kantian Consequantialism e, em seguida, realizar uma avaliação crítica dele. Tal avaliação é realizada através de duas objeções que recorrem à epistemologia kantiana: a primeira objeção demonstra que o imperativo fornecido pelo autor recorre à empiria; a segunda explicita a condição contida no pressuposto do imperativo. Esta segunda objeção bifurca-se em dois argumentos: o primeiro é contra as intuições morais, e o segundo figura como um contraexemplo hipotético. Nesse sentido, exemplos e experimentos mentais são utilizados ao longo do texto como argumentos complementares. Conclui-se que a tentativa de um consequencialismo kantiano está em fundamental oposição com sua epistemologia e, portanto, deve ser rejeitada.

Sublime and Technology: Nietzsche / Kant / Heidegger

Martin Heidegger’s “Da-sein” (Being-there) is the ideal manifestation of the Nietzschean of “overman” in relation to the “will to power.” Overman is the potential human subject thrown in the world, and is concerned with the world. Dasein manages in the world with other fellow human beings in the world. Dasein is ‘ek-sistent’ (being ahead of itself) and sustains himself by looking ahead of the potentiality of the future anterior (will have been). In this trans-temporality of the gathering together of the simultaneity of past-present-future, this Dasein is the deconstruction of the Nietzschean human subject, thus anticipating the ontology of Being in the form of Nietzschean “trans-human” (human who overcomes himself/herself) and further of post-human (machinic human after human).” In this context, the purpose of this paper is first of all to trace how Martin Heidegger articulates Nietzsche’s concepts of “world,” “overman,” and “will to power,” by deconstructing them into his own ontology of being and provokes the question concerning the ontology of technology. Heidegger’s ontological project of being and technology opens up the new poetics of the postmodern technological sublime, in tandem with the Kantian epistemology of “the analytic of the sublime.” My own aesthetics of postmodern sublime constructed in terms of the convergent dialogues among Nietzsche and Heidgger, and Kant will prepare an open and free relationship to the questioning concerning technology and the sublime.

The Epistemological Stance of Psychoanalysis: Revisiting the Kantian Legacy

Psychoanalysis, as conceived by Freud, originates from an epistemological position that is often at odds with related disciplines such as psychology and psychiatry. We argue that psychoanalysis is wedded to a Kantian epistemology that is rigorously committed to modesty. The aim of the article is to illustrate how Freud’s thinking was embedded within a Kantian epistemology. Even if he was not explicit, a prevailing Kantian philosophical discussion influenced Freud. Hence, the article shall not argue for Freud as working with Kant as a philosopher, but more narrowly address his epistemological stance as influenced by Kant. Drawing on recent philosophical work, we clarify the difference between a Kantian transcendental idealism and the more modern critical realism, and show why the former is best suited for the psychoanalytic enterprise. This leads to a discussion of how we may understand transcendental idealism as a crucial if tacit premise in modern object-relations theory. We touch upon the implicit epistemological position in Klein and Winnicott, and the more explicit one advanced by Bion. Finally, we explore the psychoanalytic attitude towards the possibility of knowledge.

HUME, KANT, AND FEUERBACH: WHY THE ANTHROPOMORPHIC CRITIQUE REVEALS A FALSE DILEMMA BETWEEN NATURALISTIC ATHEISM AND ANTI-NATURALISTIC THEISM

In current debates concerning atheism, two positions are considered possible: naturalistic atheism or anti-naturalistic theism. Anti-naturalistic theism is motivated by the failure of naturalism to explain the fundamental nature of reality. We, however, endorse anti-naturalistic atheism by reviving the ‘anthropomorphic critique’, arguing that theism misattributes human traits to the deity. Anti-naturalistic atheism is better suited to refute theists, since it undercuts their appeal to science's inadequacies. We trace the anthropomorphic critique from Hume's Dialogues, through Kant's epistemology, and conclude with its reception in Feuerbach. The anthropomorphic critique is an epistemological – not metaphysical – thesis, hence, it is agnostic about the fundamental nature of reality. Yet it convincingly shows that theism is not a tenable position. In essence, we aim to decouple atheism from naturalism, on the basis of a salient critique in the history of modern philosophy, in order to ameliorate current debates between atheists and theists.

Duas abordagens praxeológicas:

Ludwig Von Mises defendeu a polêmica tese de que a economia é regida por princípios apriorísticos, erguendo-se contra o positivismo metodológico vigente. Pretendo, neste ensaio, apresentar uma defesa datese de Mises. Para tal, começo por analisar a influência da epistemologia kantiana no projeto de Mises e osaperfeiçoamentos que este legou à mesma. Dadas as objeções à posição kantiana, posteriormente, tendo em conta a crítica wittgensteiniana do psicologismo, argumento, com base numa recente análise de RoderickT. Long, que o projeto de Mises pode ser visto, na verdade, como uma elaboração do de Wittgenstein. Os argumentos para conclusão, de que tudo o que conta como pensamento envolve princípios lógicos, podemse estender de forma a mostrar que tudo o que conta como ação envolve princípios econômicos, argumentoque sumarizaria a praxiologia de Mises.

«Поворот к онтологии» в русском неокантианстве в конце 1910-х - начале 1920-х гг. (Л. П. Салагов и Н. В. Болдырев)

The period between the late 1910s and early 1920s saw the emergence of onto-epistemological philosophical projects in Russia that was determined by criticism and attempts to overcome the domination of epistemology in philosophy which was the result of the intensive development of Neo-Kantianism and the influence of Husserl’s phenomenology. Attempts to turn towards ontology were made both by Russian religious philosophers and by Russian Neo-Kantians. I look at the little-studied philosophical projects of the Russian Neo-Kantians Lev Salagov and Nikolai Boldyrev. Their philosophical concepts share the tendency to transpose epistemological problems to ontology, and to identify and bring closer together epistemology and ontology. Russian philosophers ontologise the theory of cognition through the analysis of subjectivity, the complete elimination of psychological motives and the separation of transcendentalism from transcendentism. These principles enable Salagov to ground a three-part structure of cognition (consciousness, being, committing to consciousness) and to assert that the main task of genuine epistemology is exclusively the study of the cognitive relationship, committing to consciousness. They enable Boldyrev, proceeding from the separation of reflection and sensibility, to build a doctrine on the self-unfolding of being. Similar tendencies — a turn towards ontology — were observed in the same period in West European philosophy, including German Neo-Kantianism. However, the concepts of Russian Neo-Kantians, which imply a new orientation towards ontology, are fairly independent, and not only on account of the original interpretation of Kantian critical philosophy and Neo-Kantian epistemology, but also on account of internal discussion with the Russian philosophers belonging to other movements (for example, intuitivists). The analysis of the onto-epistemological projects of Russian Neo-Kantians makes important additions to the picture of the reception of Neo-Kantianism in Russia.

Einstein’s 1905 ‘Annus Mirabilis’: Reconciliation of the Basic Research Traditions of Classical Physics

To make out in what way Einstein’s manifold 1905 ‘annus mirabilis’ writings hang together one has to take into consideration Einstein’s strive for unity evinced in his persistent attempts to reconcile the basic research traditions of classical physics. Light quanta hypothesis and special theory of relativity turn out to be the contours of a more profound design, mere milestones of implementation of maxwellian electrodynamics, statistical mechanics and thermodynamics reconciliation programme. The conception of luminiferous ether was an insurmountable obstacle for Einstein’s statistical thermodynamics in which the leading role was played by the light quanta paper. In his critical stand against the entrenched research traditions of classical physics Einstein was apparently influenced by David Hume and Ernst Mach. However, when related to creative momenta, Einstein’s 1905 unificationist modus operandi was drawn upon Mach’s principle of economy of thought taken in the context of his ‘instinctive knowledge’ doctrine and with promising inclinations of Kantian epistemology presuming the coincidence of both constructing theory and integrating intuition of Principle.

Naturalismo y trascendentalismo en la teoría kantiana del conocimiento

This paper argues against the naturalistic interpretation of Kant's epistemology and shows the transcendental character of the critical theory, focusing on the transcendental deduction of categories. The author emphasizes the difficult balance between the transcendental and the naturalistic approach to Kantian epistemology.

The stage on which our ingenious play is performed: Kant's epistemology of Weltkenntnis

This paper focuses on Kant's account of physical geography and his theory of the Earth. In spelling out the epistemological foundations of Kant's physical geography, the paper examines 1) their connection to the mode of holding-to-be-true, mathematical construction and empirical certainty and 2) their implications for Kant's view of cosmopolitan right. Moreover, by showing the role played by the mathematical model of the Earth for the foundations of Kant's Doctrine of Right, the exact relationship between the latter and physical geography is highlighted. Finally, this paper shows how, in Kant's view, the progress of physical geography can be assured if and only if the free circulation of human beings is established and regulated by law. Therefore, examining the mutual relationship between the theory of Earth and the foundations of right opens new perspectives on the relationship between epistemology and practical philosophy within Kant's system.