Kantian Duty Research Articles

Why my doctor is a Kantian and my car mechanic is an Aristotelian: bringing marketplace ethics into the classroom

This article makes the case for bringing ethics more explicitly into the economics classroom. It outlines a theory of pluralist ethical institutions, explains how these may solve certain problems in markets and relates them to a model of human behaviour proposed by Adam Smith. Markets operate not only on the foundation of outcome incentives tied to contracts and property rights, but also on the basis of Kantian duty and Aristotelian virtue. These latter concepts explain the development of deeper trust, which reduces transaction costs and risks. Trust can be achieved through reputational effects in repeat trade and from sharing sentiments and principles. Smith’s moral sentiments model describes how individuals come to develop the self-control needed to obey social norms and laws relating to honesty and treating others with respect. The article provides examples of markets that are enhanced by non-consequentialist ethical institutions, as well as some of the constraints imposed by them. It thus provides a strong case for dealing with ethics in standard economics courses and it makes some suggestions for how this can be done simply and effectively.

Can Kant tell us what to do? Intentions, dilemmas, and the long journey towards moral perfection

The “received view” on Kantian ethics holds that perfect duties enjoy absolute priority over imperfect duties. More recently, several Kantian scholars have reassessed this situation, arguing that imperfect duties may remain binding even if they imply breaching a perfect duty. In this article, I argue that both positions rely on a misunderstanding of the bindingness of Kantian duties. Genuine Kantian duties, I claim, remain binding even when they cannot be fulfilled. We must always strive for a total completion of our duties; what it means for us to strive for it, however, will vary depending on our peculiar situation.

Human Flourishing, Normativity and Critical Theory

Aristotle has traditionally been aligned with conservative social and political philosophy. The conservative reception has been challenged by Alasdair MacIntyre and the Marx-inspired reading of Aristotle. Following MacIntyre’s arguments, this paper sketches an alternative conception of the critical theory beyond the Frankfurt School’s critique of the contemporary culture and the modern society. Critical theory is understood as an attempt to provide both historical analysis and normative critique of the contemporary society and its culture. It argues that normativity should be understood not in Kantian, but in Aristotelian terms. The articulation of Aristotelian conceptions of human flourishing and aretē, rather than that of the bürgerlich conception of Kantian duty, should be at the centre of contemporary theorising. The author claims that Aristotle’s practical philosophy allows us to conceptualise ethics beyond the dominant conceptions of ethical normativity prevalent in the capitalist modernity, while Marx is important because his analysis provides us with theoretical tools for the historically informed critique of the social and economic structures of the modern society.

Korsgaard’s Duties towards Animals: Two Difficulties

Building on her previous work (2004, 2012, 2013), Christine Korsgaard’s recent book Fellow Creatures (2018) has provided the most highly developed Kantian account of duties towards animals. I raise two issues with the results of this account. First, the duties that Korsgaard accounts for are duties “towards” animals in name only. Since Korsgaard does not reject the Kantian conception in which direct duties towards others require mutual moral constraint, what she calls duties “towards” animals are merely Kantian duties regarding animals, verbally repackaged. Hence, Korsgaard’s account is best understood as an expansion (albeit a substantial one) of Kant’s own view of an indirect duty regarding animals. Second, the expansion does not take us quite as far as Korsgaard hopes. She aims for a conception in which our duties towards animals and humans are equally important, but her argument does not support this conclusion. I point out the potential for a more radical revision of Kant’s anthropocentrism that rejects his underlying assumption that duties towards others are based on mutual constraint.

Kantian duty as unconditional hospitality

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The Glowing Screen Before Me and the Moral Law Within me: A Kantian Duty Against Screen Overexposure

This paper establishes a Kantian duty against screen overexposure. After defining screen exposure, I adopt a Kantian approach to its morality on the ground that Kant’s notion of duties to oneself easily captures wrongdoing in absence of harm or wrong to others. Then, I draw specifically on Kant’s ‘duties to oneself as an animal being’ to introduce a duty of self-government. This duty is based on the negative causal impact of the activities it regulates on a human being’s mental and physical powers, and, ultimately, on the moral employment of these powers. After doing so, I argue that the duty against screen overexposure is an instance of the duty of self-government. Finally, I consider some objections.

Persons with pre-dementia have no Kantian duty to die.

Cooley's argument that persons with pre-dementia have a Kantian duty to die has led to much debate. Cooley gives two reasons for his claim, the first being that a person with pre-dementia should end his/her life when he/she will inevitably and irreversibly lose rationality and be unable to live morally as a result. This paper argues that this reason derives from an unsubstantiated premise and general confusion regarding the condition for a Kantian duty to die. Rather, a close reading of Kant reveals that such a condition occurs when a person confronts an external handicap that does not undermine his/her rational ability but deprives him/her of the possibility of living the way a person should. People do not confront this experience with progressive dementia. The other reason Cooley proposes is that a person should not allow their continued existence to become a burden to others. This claim partly stems from a radical interpretation of a case discussed by Kant and is partly based on a misuse of Kant's formulation of humanity. Based on a prudent inference from Kantian ethics, this article argues against Cooley that persons with pre-dementia have no Kantian duty to die.

The problem of priority of principles in bioethics. Can the Kantian classification in perfect and imperfect duties help us?

Principlism has dominated contemporary Anglophone practical ethics often regarded as the most important methodological conception. Young biomedical scientists grow up learning to apply the “four principles”, an approach originally introduced in the USA by Beauchamp & Childress but soon accepted also in the UK with the support of Professor Raanan Gillon. The central idea of the method involves, first identifying the relevant among the four moral principle(s), (beneficence, non maleficence, respect for autonomy and justice) that is (are) connected with a specific moral dilemma. Then, one follows procedures of balancing, specification and deductive application, as a bridge between the moral dilemma and the four principles. Some attention is paid while balancing, to consequentialist considerations, and to other ethically significant concepts as the virtues and the emotions, but only incidentally. What is central in Beauchamp & Childress’s principlism is the adoption of normative insights of common morality, holding the position of a theoretical justification for the methodological reasoning which will determine the solution of a specific moral problem.The main ambition of the four principles approach and its main virtue is the clarity of the method and consequently the ability to become comprehensive and easily applied. There are certain problems though in applying the method. Here, we are going to investigate the problem of relative priority of principles, i.e. which principle overrides the other when two or more of them are in conflict, seeking help by the Kantian division, in perfect and imperfect duties. But we must first answer the question: Is the four principles approach, a method of moral objectivism as Beauchamp & Childress claim, or is it a method of moral relativism, as it is often argued by some of their critics? Only if our answer to the objectivity question is positive, can the main issue of priority be addressed, because an attempt at a determinate ordering wouldn’t mean anything in a relativist frame.

The Morality of Resisting Oppression

This paper reconsiders the contemporary moral reading of women’s oppression, and revises our understanding of the practical reasons for action a victim of mistreatment acquires through her unjust circumstances. The paper surveys various ways of theorising victims’ moral duties to resist their own oppression, and considers objections to prior academic work arguing for the existence of an imperfect Kantian duty of resistance to oppression grounded in self-respect. These objections suggest (1) that such a duty is victim blaming; (2) that it distorts the normative direction of self-regarding duties; and (3) that consequentialist reasons are inapt for justifying self-regarding ethical responsibilities. The paper then argues that the need for normative coherence in our very concept of a moral duty is of paramount importance, and especially so in the fight against patriarchal oppression. Accordingly, we should acknowledge the salient differences between pro tanto or defeasible moral reasons and fully fledged moral duties identifying agent-relative obligatory action. The paper concludes that we better respect and defend women’s rights when first we understand them as having, at best, defeasible moral reasons to oppose their oppression; and second, ensure that we make adequate allowance for a woman’s interpretative right to choose how to respond to her oppressive circumstances.

Kantian Harm Reduction.

The justification for harm reduction as an approach to drug use and addiction is seen by many to be consequentialist in form and it has been claimed that as a deontologist Kant would reject harm reduction. I argue this is wrong on both counts. A more nuanced understanding of harm reduction and Kant shows them compatible. Kant's own remarks about intoxication reinforce this. Moreover, there is a Kantian argument that harm reduction is not only morally permissible but more consistent with the Kantian duty of respect for autonomy than mandatory abstinence approaches.

Associative Solidarity, Relational Goods, and Autonomy for Refugees: What Does it Mean to Stand in Solidarity with Refugees?

Associative Solidarity, Relational Goods, and Autonomy for Refugees: What Does it Mean to Stand in Solidarity with Refugees?

On Virtues of Love and Wide Ethical Duties

AbstractIn this article I argue that understanding the role that the virtues of love play in Kant’s ethical theory requires understanding not only the nature of the virtues themselves, but also the unique nature of wide Kantian duties. I begin by making the case that while the Doctrine of Virtue supports attributing an affective component to the virtues of love, we are right to resist attributing anaffective success conditionto these virtues. I then distinguish wide duties from negative and narrow (positive) duties in order to make the case that prudential considerations often unavoidably and unproblematically play a role in deliberation about how we fulfil our wide duties. In the final section I combine these findings, arguing that the virtues of love play an important moral role by shaping these prudential considerations.

Is Paid Surrogacy a Form of Reproductive Prostitution? A Kantian Perspective.

This article reexamines the "prostitution objection" to paid surrogacy, and argues that rebuttals to this objection fail to focus on surrogates as embodied persons. This failure is based on the false distinction between "selling one's reproductive services" and "selling one's body." To ground the analysis of humans as embodied persons, this article uses Kant's late ethical theory, which develops the conceptual framework for understanding human beings as embodied selves. Literature on surrogacy commonly emphasizes that all Kantian duties heed to the categorical prohibition to treat persons as mere means. What this literature leaves out is that this imperative commands us more specifically to engage ourselves and others as embodied persons. This article aims to relate this point to a specific issue in assisted reproduction. It argues that a Kantian account of human beings as embodied persons prohibits paid surrogacy on exactly the same grounds as it prohibits prostitution.

Unsettling Encounters: A response to Katrin Flikschuh’s ‘Kant’s Nomads

In her thought-provoking article: “Kant’s Nomads: Encountering Strangers”, Katrin Flikschuh pursues three aims: I- to loosen the noose of the Kantian duty of state entrance against the repeated allegations of its inflexible universality; II- to rescue Kant from a certain “belligerent” liberal discourse that has overlooked his ambivalence on the question, at the expense of his potentially constructive insights; III- to articulate the possibility of an encounter with deep and permanent differences in culture or a “reflexive openness” that can help us face the “culturally unfamiliar”. Its success relies upon reading Kant’s philosophy as proceeding from a first-personal experiential standpoint, that is, a regressive strategy of justification. Though sympathetic to Flikschuh’s project, this paper wishes to examine to what extent it is compatible with the Kantian theory of the State, on the one hand, and his transcendental idealism, on the other. In the end, it may be that Kant’s openness to the other (i.e. the nomad), however sincere, remains transitory at best.

LEGAL AID IN INDIA: RETUNING PHILOSOPHICAL CHORDS

Legal aid in India has evolved over the last few decades since 42nd Amendment to the Indian Constitution. This paper attempts to provide philosophical underpinnings suggesting how legal aid model has evolved over the years and excogitate a newer trajectory for its future evolution. It delves into weighing Kant’s imperfect duty justifying a charity based regime and marks a transition to utilitarian model suggesting requirement of institutional need to address issues of basic liberty of ‘access to justice.’ It also spells out Rawls’ principles of justice and attempts to explore their applicability in the Indian context, to chart out a road map for future. While contrasting different models on legal aids, it makes a finding that, India doesn’t accord priority to liberty of access to justice. The Indian Supreme Court has emerged as a bastion of liberty but the finer details of the enactment has been messed up by the Indian lawmakers. The lower compensation to lawyers and lack of alternative incentives in attracting established litigators, testifies this. There is a convergence in Kantian duty of benevolence and Rawls’ liberty principle but in the world of moral relativism, a fair compensation must precede before imposing any obligation on lawyers to take up pro bono matters, as doing so, is likely to compromise their ‘true needs.’

De-Trivializing the Kantian Duty to Resist Oppression

De-Trivializing the Kantian Duty to Resist Oppression

Kantian Right and Poverty Relief

I have two goals in this paper. First, I want to determine whether Kant’s justification for state programs for poverty relief in The Doctrine of Right is based on 1) Kantian duties of virtue, 2) Kantian duties of right, or instead merely on 3) instrumental arguments regarding the preservation of a State as such. I claim that the last alternative is the correct one. Second, I will argue, against Kant himself, that even his merely instrumental arguments for public programs for poverty relief are ruled out by his doctrine of right. My conclusion is that, perhaps surprisingly, the only genuinely Kantian way to provide poverty relief is privately, just as Libertarians have argued.

Dependence on Wrongdoing in the Consumption of Meat: A Kantian Analysis

Kant's ethics is used by some as a defence of the exploitation of animals and is criticised by others for not recognising any moral relevance of the plight of animals. These appeals overlook the broad applicability of Kant's principles. In this article, I argue that Kant's ethics implies a duty to abstain from most meat and some other animal products derived from farming. I argue that there is a Kantian principle not to choose goods that have been derived from wrongdoing, with certain qualifications. This principle isolates the wrong of using others to commit wrongdoing on one's behalf. As has been argued by others, Kant's ethics implies that animal farming as we know it in our society almost universally involves wrongdoing and the slaughter of animals is especially tied to wrongdoing. I argue for a broad sense in which these ideas together imply that choosing farmed meat, and probably other animal products, is treating animal industry workers as mere means. Thus, we have a Kantian duty to abstain from these products.

El deber, el poder y la gestión en el sistema educativo público costarricense

This article proposes, firstly, the challenges faced by the Costa Rican Management of Education by the Information and Communications Technology (ICT); and the Society of Information and Knowledge (SIK). Subsequently, diverse and extremely important aspects are considered, such as the cost of certain devices, some types of contexts and the global network society explained by Castells; to effectively implement a significant change upon an educational organization. In light of these ideas, an articulation between Kantian duty, the power of Castells and the management proposed by Drucker is explained; in order to suppress different social inequalities, as well as to confront it with the bourdesian ideas about the reproduction; in virtue of what is offered by Castells’ global network society; which leads to an analysis based on the position of Thomas Kuhn. Afterwards, a panorama is shown according to which, the individual that is exposed to a universe of electronic pages, must be correctly oriented, starting with the Management of Education, so that this individual may utilize the information offered, in the best possible way. Finally, conclusions are drawn which are oriented towards the importance of the inquiry of postures and/or lines of thought which are exceptionally essential to humanity, such as the impact upon bourdesian ideas, considering Castells’ global network society; and the Costa Rican public educational system.

The Plight of Ethics

Since Kant, ethics has been synonymous with moral law, grounded in Reason. As Kant’s heirs, we are still grappling with a tension he sought to resolve through his appeal to a rational God, namely, between ethics and politics. “Politics says, ‘Be ye wise as serpents,’” remarks Kant: “Morality adds (as a limiting condition) ‘and guileless as doves’” (1795, 338). For Kant, both the serpent of politics and the dove of ethics are bound by the same moral duty that has its source in the freedom of our sovereign rational will. The perfection of this good will is possible not as individuals but only from the perspective of what Kant calls “Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View,” which it turns out is a view from the cosmos, more specifically, from the perspective of the “dwellers from other planets” whom Kant imagines viewing us from their own place in the universe (1784, n. 2). As we know, Kant insists that the concept of duty cannot be in conflict with doing our duty—or that ought implies can: “It is patently absurd, having granted this concept of duty its authority, to want to say that one nevertheless cannot do it. For in that case this concept would of itself drop out of morals. . . . [H]ence, there can be no conflict of politics as doctrine of right put into practice, with morals, as theoretical doctrine of right” (1795, 338). But what if the reverse were true? What if ought implies cannot? What if our obligations always outstrip our intentions? What if the sovereign will is fundamentally beholden both to other people and to the Other The Plight of Ethics