Abstract
This paper reconsiders the contemporary moral reading of women’s oppression, and revises our understanding of the practical reasons for action a victim of mistreatment acquires through her unjust circumstances. The paper surveys various ways of theorising victims’ moral duties to resist their own oppression, and considers objections to prior academic work arguing for the existence of an imperfect Kantian duty of resistance to oppression grounded in self-respect. These objections suggest (1) that such a duty is victim blaming; (2) that it distorts the normative direction of self-regarding duties; and (3) that consequentialist reasons are inapt for justifying self-regarding ethical responsibilities. The paper then argues that the need for normative coherence in our very concept of a moral duty is of paramount importance, and especially so in the fight against patriarchal oppression. Accordingly, we should acknowledge the salient differences between pro tanto or defeasible moral reasons and fully fledged moral duties identifying agent-relative obligatory action. The paper concludes that we better respect and defend women’s rights when first we understand them as having, at best, defeasible moral reasons to oppose their oppression; and second, ensure that we make adequate allowance for a woman’s interpretative right to choose how to respond to her oppressive circumstances.
Highlights
What does morality require of me, if anything, when I am oppressed? ShouldI engage in a verbal confrontation with a group of builders who wolf-whistle me as I walk past? Should I request a meeting with HR when I discover my less-qualified male colleague is paid significantly more than I am? Should I make a placard and march through Parliament Square when the prime minister proposes yet more budget cuts to vital family and domestic violence services? To most people, the answer to these questions is a resounding yes— I ought to do these things
Is the exact nature of a victim’s moral impulses in cases of oppression? What is the most accurate moral reading of the practical reasons for action a victim of oppression acquires through her unjust circumstances? This paper will survey various ways of theorising victims’ moral duties to resist their own oppression, and argue against the idea that there is an imperfect Kantian moral duty of resistance grounded in self-respect
The Morality of Resisting Oppression Throughout her work, Hay paints a picture of the spectrum of choices a victim might select from when meeting her imperfect duty to resist sexual oppression, depending on the particular situation—choices including overt verbal outrage, physical violence, appealing to higher authority, and silent protest
Summary
What does morality require of me, if anything, when I am oppressed? ShouldI engage in a verbal confrontation with a group of builders who wolf-whistle me as I walk past? Should I request a meeting with HR when I discover my less-qualified male colleague is paid significantly more than I am? Should I make a placard and march through Parliament Square when the prime minister proposes yet more budget cuts to vital family and domestic violence services? To most people, the answer to these questions is a resounding yes— I ought to do these things. Jacquette has acknowledged that in moral dilemmas, where circumstances prevent two or more justified prima facie ethical requirements from being fulfilled, “commonly received deontic logic suggests that conjoint obligation is overridden by Kant's principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can,’ and the agent has a disjunctive obligation to perform one of the otherwise obligatory actions” (Jacquette 1991, 43); while Thomas Nagel (1991, 172) suggests, along similar lines, that if good moral reasons exist in favour of either course of action, either choice may properly be considered blameless, if not necessarily morally admirable.11 For example, if a woman were to make a decision under situational pressure not to resist her oppression, Nagel’s analysis might suggest that no cause for moral blame would exist for her choice.
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