Justification For Discrimination Research Articles

Faces of Inequality: Reflections on Exceptional Developments

AbstractIn Faces of Inequality, Sophia Moreau puts forward a pluralistic theory of how discrimination wrongs people. I approach Moreau's ideas not as a legal philosopher or theorist, but as an empirical and socio-legal scholar of equality law. In this commentary, I pick up on five provocations that emerge for me from Moreau's work: on reasonable accommodations, on comparison in equality law, on the public/private divide, on the justification of discrimination, and on discrimination as a personal wrong. While Moreau's work is grounded in the common themes or shared features that emerge from equality laws across jurisdictions, I consider what these themes mean for the uncommon ground, drawing on exceptional developments in discrimination law in some Australian jurisdictions, and our experience with the “exceptional” protected characteristic of age.

Justification of Discrimination against People with Mental Illness in Republic of Korea.

This study aimed to analyze the process in which individual values and beliefs affected social distance against people with mental illness by mediating cognition, based on applying the justification-suppression model to the stigma of mental illness. An online survey was conducted with 491 adults aged 20 to 64 years. Their sociodemographic characteristics, personal values, and beliefs, justification for discrimination, and social distance were measured to assess their perceptions of, and behaviors towards, persons with mental illness. Path analysis was performed to examine the magnitude and significance of the hypothetical relationship between variables. Protestant ethic values and morality significantly affected the justification of inability and dangerousness and attribute responsibility. Excluding attribute responsibility, the justification of inability and dangerousness significantly predicted social distance. In other words, the higher the Protestant ethic values, the higher the morality of binding, and the lower the morality of individualizing, the higher the level of justification based on inability and dangerousness. Such justification has been found to increase social distance from persons with mental illness. In addition, mediating effects were the largest in the path of the morality of binding → justification of dangerousness → social distance. The study proposes various strategies to deal with individual values, beliefs, and justification logic to reduce social distance against those with mental illness. These strategies include a cognitive approach and empathy, both of which inhibit prejudice.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENCES IN UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION CASES (PART 1)

All anti-discrimination legislation that applies in the employment context contains defences to or justifications for discrimination. In South Africa, the defences available against a discrimination claim in the employment context are contained in the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. The Employment Equity Act gives only a basic structure of a prohibition on unfair discrimination. It is left to our courts to give content to and develop discrimination law. It is within this context that the Employment Equity Act expressly mentions“affirmative action consistent with the purpose” of the Employment Equity Act and “an inherent requirement of a job” as two specific exceptions to the right to equal treatment. The Employment Equity Act does not, however, state these exceptions to be a numerus clausus. It has been questioned whether there may, in addition to the statutory exceptions, be a residual “general fairness” defence to a claim of unfair discrimination.The Employment Equity Act is silent on a definition of the meaning and limits of these defences. A discussion of the development of the defences ensues, which leads to the conclusion that any possible derogations from the right to equal treatment must be strictly construed. This conclusion is mandated by the wording of the legislation itself and the influence of the Constitution. Accordingly, the notion of an implied “general fairness” defence is jettisoned. The remaining defences, it is submitted, should develop within the parameters of established principles in a disciplined manner, having due regard for the achievement of substantive equality. Part 1 of the article deals with the current legislative framework and the defence of inherent requirements of the job.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENCES IN UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION CASES (PART 2)

All anti-discrimination legislation that applies in the employment context contains defences to or justifications for discrimination. In South Africa, the defences available against a discrimination claim in the employment context are contained in the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998.The Employment Equity Act gives only a basic structure of a prohibition on unfair discrimination. It is left to our courts to give content to and develop discrimination law. It is within this context that the Employment Equity Act expressly mentions “affirmative action consistent with the purpose” of the Employment Equity Act and “an inherent requirement of a job” as two specific exceptions to the right to equal treatment. The Employment Equity Act does not, however, state these exceptions to be a numerus clausus. It has been questioned whether there may, in addition to the statutory exceptions, be a residual “general fairness” defence to a claim of unfair discrimination.The development of the defences in South Africa is discussed and it is concluded that any possible derogations from the right to equal treatment must be strictly construed. This conclusion is mandated by the wording of the legislation itself and the influence of the Constitution. Accordingly, the notion of an implied “general fairness” defence is not supported. The remaining defences, it is submitted, should develop within the parameters of established principles in a disciplined manner, having due regard for the achievement of substantive equality.

Buddhist Nationalist Sermons in Myanmar: Anti-Muslim Moral Panic, Conspiracy Theories, and Socio-Cultural Legacies

In Myanmar, Buddhist nationalist movements created a pan-Burmese anti-Muslim moral panic in response to the political and economic liberalisation starting in 2011 and to riots between Buddhists and Muslims that erupted from 2012. Based mainly on Buddhist nationalist sermons and speeches, but also on interviews and fieldwork, the aim of this article is to examine the historical and cultural roots of the anti-Muslim moral panic and its political ramifications. This article argues that Buddhist nationalist sermons contributed to moral panic in three ways. First through aspects of monastic authority by which nationalist, anti-Muslim discourse was authorised. Second, an anti-Muslim conspiracy theory going back to the 1950s and an ingrained historical narrative feeding a sense of collective victimhood and vulnerability among the Buddhist majority created fear that provides justification of discrimination and violence. Third, is a perceived existential threat to Buddhism and Myanmar’s sovereignty considered to be posed by groups of Muslims (local and international) that were interconnected in the nationalist imagination; a sense of threat that was reinforced by a globalised Islamophobia.

Queer in Translation: Sexual Politics under Neoliberal IslamLGBTI Rights in Turkey: Sexuality and the State in the Middle East

Queer in Translation: Sexual Politics under Neoliberal IslamLGBTI Rights in Turkey: Sexuality and the State in the Middle East

Biological Warfare: Constitutional Conflict over “Inherent Differences” between the Sexes

Equal protection law no longer recognizes so-called “inherent differences” among the races as a justification for discrimination. The law takes a different view of sex. It continues to recognize “inherent differences” as a legitimate ground for treating men and women differently — as long as the differential treatment does not perpetuate women’s subordination or reinforce traditional sex stereotypes. This doctrine raises a host of difficult questions, most notably, what counts as an “inherent difference”? The Court confronted that question twice in its 2016 Term. In Pavan v. Smith, the Court had to decide whether Arkansas could treat same-sex couples differently from different-sex couples with respect to their children’s birth certificates. In Sessions v. Morales-Santana, the question was whether the federal government, for purposes of assigning citizenship, could treat non-marital children born abroad to mixed-nationality couples differently depending on the sex of their U.S. citizen parent. In both cases, the Court rejected the government’s ostensibly biological justification for the differential treatment. But the new and important ways in which it reasoned about biology in these cases has not received much notice. Commentators treated Pavan as an obvious and relatively unimportant extension of the Court’s famous 2015 same-sex marriage decision. Meanwhile, so much was happening in the context of immigration when Morales-Santana came down that it did not attract much attention — and what attention it did attract tended to focus on the unusual remedy the Court adopted, not its reasoning about biology. This Article argues that Pavan and Morales-Santana, especially when read together, are surprisingly transformative and consequential decisions. In the past, the Court has declined to apply heightened scrutiny to biologically-justified sex classifications in contexts involving gay people and unmarried fathers. As a result, these contexts have become repositories of specious biological justifications for discrimination; pregnancy, in particular, has been understood to justify all manner of differential treatment in these areas. In Pavan and Morales-Santana, the Court broke with this tradition by genuinely scrutinizing the state’s pregnancy-based justifications for discriminating and finding them constitutionally inadequate. In so doing, it struck a serious blow against the most formidable barrier to equal protection where gay people, unmarried parents — and pregnant women — are concerned.

Justifying gender discrimination in the workplace: The mediating role of motherhood myths.

The issue of gender equality in employment has given rise to numerous policies in advanced industrial countries, all aimed at tackling gender discrimination regarding recruitment, salary and promotion. Yet gender inequalities in the workplace persist. The purpose of this research is to document the psychosocial process involved in the persistence of gender discrimination against working women. Drawing on the literature on the justification of discrimination, we hypothesized that the myths according to which women’s work threatens children and family life mediates the relationship between sexism and opposition to a mother’s career. We tested this hypothesis using the Family and Changing Gender Roles module of the International Social Survey Programme. The dataset contained data collected in 1994 and 2012 from 51632 respondents from 18 countries. Structural equation modellings confirmed the hypothesised mediation. Overall, the findings shed light on how motherhood myths justify the gender structure in countries promoting gender equality.

“Where mediocrity is tolerated”—Rugby Sevens and the management of diversity in South African rugby

Introduction With apartheid officially a thing of the past since the mid-1990s, race should no longer be a justification for discrimination in the “New South Africa.” Yet the country’s rugby union professional elite is still characterized by blatant racial imbalance: there are many more White—70% to 80% depending on the competition—than Black and Coloured players, and all seem to occupy specific positions on the teams according to race. This process, known as “stacking,” or “positional segreg...

Effects of legitimizing discrimination against homosexuals on gay bashing

We used a computer harassment paradigm to test the hypothesis that affirming the legitimacy of discrimination against homosexuals increases the likelihood that heterosexual men will engage inverbal gay bashing. Legitimacy of discrimination was varied among heterosexual males (N ¼167) by suggesting that denying homosexuals rights and benefits is either illegitimate or legitimate, and participants interacted online with either a gay or straight bogus discussion partner. Results show that (a) participants sent more offensive comments when the legitimacy of discrimination against homosexuals was affirmed, and (b) legitimacy affected gay bashing through its effect on collective guilt. These findings suggest that challenging the legitimacy of discrimination can be an effective strategy for reducing outgroup derogation. Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Anti-gay harassment is both widespread and damaging to the physical and psychological well being of homosexual individuals (Herek, Cogan, & Gillis, 2002). Whilegay bashing can refer to a range of behaviors from telling anti-gay jokes to violent hate crimes, we define gay bashing as verbal denigration based on an individual’s sexual orientation. Importantly, this definition does not require that derogatory remarks be directed toward a gay individual. Heterosexuals making anti-gay comments to other heterosexuals can be considered gay bashing for two reasons. First, the offensive remarks can be experienced as harassment if overheard by a gay individual. Second, derogatory language legitimizes antigay prejudice as normative and reinforces the broader culture of heterosexism (Herek, 1990). Gay bashing and anti-gay prejudice (Herek, 2002; Kite & Whitley, 1996) are more prevalent among heterosexual men than among heterosexual women. Implicit inversion theory (Kite & Deaux, 1987) offers an explanation for this sex difference, suggesting that anti-gay prejudice stems from a perceived violation of gender norms. Previous research shows those who hold more traditional gender role beliefs are more prejudiced toward homosexuals (Kite & Whitley, 1998; Nierman, Thompson, Bryan, & Mahaffey, 2007). Because the male gender role incorporates heterosexuality as an integral part of masculinity, men may engage in gay bashing to assert their own masculinity. In this way, gay bashing serves a social-expressivefunction(Herek, 1987), helping heterosexual men assert their status in a valued ingroup. Thus, there may be important identity-protective motivations for gay bashing. JUSTIFICATION OF DISCRIMINATION

Blame It on Hip-Hop: Anti-Rap Attitudes as a Proxy for Prejudice

This research investigated the stereotypes associated with rap music and hip-hop culture, and how those stereotypes may influence anti-Black attitudes and justifications for discrimination. In three studies—using a representative sample from America, as well as samples from two different countries—we found that negative stereotypes about rap are pervasive and have powerful consequences. In all three samples, negative attitudes toward rap were associated with various measures of negative stereotypes of Blacks that blamed Blacks for their economic plights (via stereotypes of laziness). Anti-rap attitudes were also associated with discrimination against Blacks, through both personal and political behaviors. In both American samples, the link between anti-rap attitudes and discrimination was partially or fully mediated by stereotypes that convey Blacks' responsibility. This legitimizing pattern was not found in the UK sample, suggesting that anti-rap attitudes are used to reinforce beliefs that Blacks do not deserve social benefits in American society, but may not be used as legitimizing beliefs in other cultures.

Disease is not a justification for discrimination

Disease is not a justification for discrimination

Reconstructing Custom

This article considers how custom is used in Vanuatu as justification for discrimination against homosexuals. It begins by considering development of custom as a political construct, before turning to discuss the history of same sex-sexual behaviours in Vanuatu. The interplay between Christianity and custom and their relationship to forces of modernisation is then explored as a possible explanation for why homosexuality is rejected as being anti-custom.

Views about food prejudice and stereotypes

Food is a social marker. Used positively, it demonstrates belonging to a group, and negatively it provides a justification for discrimination. Chauvinism and xenophobia express themselves through attitudes and stereotypes which are not necessarily grounded on facts but which may influence behaviour. Discrimination ranges from mild ridicule to harsh rejection and racism (for instance, against black people or Jews). It may apply to philosophico-religious beliefs, kinship, ethnic origins, social class and national identity. These attitudes still operate in the globalization process and possibly are not without economic consequences.

Woman's Place

In 'Because You are a Woman' (Philosophy, April I973) J. R. Lucas reaches the conclusion that some characteristics which are connected 'more integrally' and more invariably to a person's sex than others can provide a justification for certain types of sexual discrimination. Lucas distinguishes two questions basic to what he terms the feminist debate. What are the ways in which women differ from men? And could it ever be right to treat a woman differently from a man, simply because she is a woman? I shall argue that, despite Lucas's promise to discuss his topic as dispassionately as the subject allows, his account is biased in favour of the tradition of male domination. Furthermore he does not succeed in providing a justification for discrimination on the basis of sex in any of the areas he mentions. The first section of Lucas's paper contains a discussion of the facts of femininity which offers a bewildering combination of layman's science, agnosticism, and traditional wisdom about the two sexes. Men and women, Lucas reminds us, differ genetically only in that men have a Y-chromosome in one pair where women have an X-chromosome. Chromosomes control many genetic factors each, and we know that some genetically carried features of human beings are sex-linked, as, for example, are colourblindness and haemophilia. Lucas rightly points out that, in view of the genetically linked character of some human characteristics and in view of the genetic difference, albeit a small one, which does exist between men and women, it is unreasonable to reject in principle any systematic difference in intellectual capacities between the sexes. For feminists to be a priori dualists is both arbitrary and unscientific. So far, so good. As far as present scientific evidence goes, it is possible that many intellectual characteristics are inherited and even possible that some of these are inherited in a way which is sex-linked. Musical genius might appear genetically only in females, or genuine understanding of human problems only in males. These are possibilities. But there are possibilities and possibilities. The two just mentioned are my own creations and do not appear in Lucas's article. The possibilities to which he dovotes his attention are more conventional ones.

The Declining Status of Women: Popular Myths and the Failure of Functionalist Thought

Despite frequent claims of equality of status for women and men, U.S. Census data from 1940-64 suggest a gradual but persistent decline in women's occupational, economic, and educational achievements, compared to those of men. These findings suggest that women have suffered a loss in status, as measured by the variables usually used to determine social status.. In the discussion of these findings the normative nature of the functional definition of sex roles; is identified as a justification for discrimination against women. A common theme of much literature in the social sciences has developed the idea of a gradual but persistent equalization of statuses of men and women. It often has been assumed that the battle for women's rights is won, and whatever inequity still persists derives entirely from a failure of women to exercise their legal, educational, occupational, and social prerogatives.1 It is the purpose of this paper to challenge some current conceptions of the status of women, especially in contrast to their status of earlier years, and to make some assessment of the sources of the increasing inequality that has developed in the United States. Further, the institutionalization of this inequality will be used to illustrate the conservative nature of much modern social science research. THE MODERN CONTEXT OF SEX-DEFINED STATUSES While the modern industrial society has effectively destroyed the narrow definition of appropriate female roles that persisted throughout 1 An example of assumed near equality over 20 years ago is contained in the volume Victory, How Women Won It (Anonymous, 1940). In the foreword it is stated: The Century from 1840 to 1940 may appropriately be called the Woman's Century.... In 1840 for the first time women proposed to unite, organize and to remove their grievances. In 1940 this aim with slight exceptions has been eliminated. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.127 on Fri, 14 Oct 2016 04:07:37 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

The Declining Status of Women: Popular Myths and the Failure of Functionalist Thought

Despite frequent claims of equality of status for women and men, U.S. Census data from 1940–64 suggest a gradual but persistent decline in women's occupational, economic, and educational achievements, compared to those of men. These findings suggest that women have suffered a loss in status, as measured by the variables usually used to determine social status. In the discussion of these findings the normative nature of the functional definition of sex roles is identified as a justification for discrimination against women.