Justification Of Human Rights Research Articles

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

The international legal order is beginning to take human rights seriously, yet sound justifications for claims about human rights are conspicuously absent. Philosophers have begun to respond to this “justification deficit” by developing theories of human rights. Although a philosophical conception of human rights is needed, it would not be sufficient. The justification of human rights is a dynamic process in which a provisional philosophical conception of human rights both guides and is fleshed out by public processes of practical reasoning structured by legal institutions. Whether the “justification deficit” can be remedied depends not only upon the content of human rights norms as set out in the major conventions and the arguments philosophers can marshal to justify them but also upon the epistemic virtues of the institutions through which the norms are specified, contested, and revised over time.

Conscience, morality and judgment

This paper is an exploration of the role of conscience in the justification of human rights. I argue that in both the western tradition of natural rights and the non-western traditions, human rights are justified, in part, because of their appeal to conscience, and not simply because they issue from a divine source or are based on reason. In contrast, contemporary justifications of human rights primarily look for an objective foundation or simply assert the pragmatic importance of human rights as their justification. While there are distinct advantages to this way of arguing, there are also problems, which I will discuss. As an alternative, I outline Arendt's understanding of conscience as the ability to be with and think with one's self as a secular alternative to both a non-secular version of conscience, and the denial of conscience implicit in contemporary theories. Her view of political judgment helps us to understand how conscience can be understood as subjective but not arbitrary. This paper brings Arendt's insights on conscience and judgment to bear on contemporary discourses of human rights.

An Analysis of the Philosophy of Universal Human Rights

This project is, in part, motivated by my contention that one cannot adequately answer the question regarding the proper justification for human rights until one has answered the metaphysical question regarding the fundamental nature of human rights and the ontological question regarding the proper status of human rights. I offer a sustained analysis of metaphysical, ontological, and justificatory questions regarding human rights with the purpose of illustrating the point that theories that fail to engage in such analyses are inadequate. In particular, this essay argues that Michael Ignatieff's theory of human rights, as articulated in Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, is philosophically inadequate because it fails to connect his justificatory arguments for human rights with metaphysical and ontological conceptions of and arguments for human rights.

Human Rights as Moral Rebellion and Social Construction

This paper describes and defends a moral constructivist theory of human rights which characterizes them as an historically-evolved, socially-constructed ethico-legal paradigm designed to prevent and ameliorate systematic or institutionalized forms of oppression. After describing this theory and comparing it with alternative accounts of the nature, origins, and justifications of human rights, I argue that by grounding a common understanding of human rights within this framework, the global human rights community can better address the challenge of effectively protecting “all human rights for all” through the development of a more empirically grounded and cosmopolitan conception of human rights.

Liberal Islam and 'Islam and Human Rights': A Sceptic's View

AbstractLiberal Islam has become increasingly prominent in academic discourse with its argument that Islam is the necessary foundation to human rights in the Muslim world. This article argues that this theoretical premise is misguided. Instead of whether or not the rights regime makes sense given political, economic, and social context in Muslim-majority states, in a liberal Islam paradigm the question becomes whether or not there are convincing doctrinal arguments regarding the place of human rights in Islamic law. This accepts, in essence, the need for literalist religious justifications for human rights, making an argument for rights a dispute over religious doctrine: a dispute that takes place on an elite, juristic field on which reformers have little claim to institutional authority, human rights scant normative power, and that is disconnected from everyday political and normative realities. More dangerously, it risks reifying the notion that Islam monopolizes the Muslim public sphere, rather than leaving space for normative diversity. Human rights foundations must be based in the theoretical premise that political change flows out of inherently pluralistic normative environments, and that this is as true in the Muslim world as it is elsewhere.

Do We Need Unicorns When We Have Law?

. Theoretical justifications of human rights have been troubled by many criticisms and objections. It has been objected that the source of human rights is unclear as is the meaning attached to human rights. Yet today many human rights have been adopted in positive law. Law students today need to learn about this positive law of human rights and may consider that those debates in human rights theory are pointless. This article examines the extent to which the positive law of human rights answers these questions satisfactorily. It concludes that positive law offers several important answers to these criticisms, but suggests they cannot replace the need for a normative justification. The article concludes that approaches which integrate theory and positive law are fruitful avenues of inquiry.

Paradoxical bedfellows: Nihilism and human rights

This article identifies and considers the existence of a manifest, though often overlooked, paradox contained within the doctrine of human rights. The principal justifications for human rights are based upon the identification of variously conceived human characteristics, or attributes of human agency. Nevertheless, human rights have all too often been required to protect some human beings from being seriously harmed by other human beings. The justification for human rights envisages a single, universal community of human beings, whereas the actual application of human rights typically testifies to the existence of two, very distinct communities: victims and perpetrators. The single greatest impetus for the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the desire to prevent the re-occurrence of genocide. The modern human rights regime emerged out of mountains of human corpses. One would like to claim that the impetus for human rights became less urgent after the horrors of the Holocaust. Unfortunately, genocide has persisted and gross violations of human rights remain a feature of the geo-political landscape. Our need for protective human rights remains as urgent today as it did fifty years ago. This article accounts for this paradox and answers the question: Why is it that the ultimate justification and application of the doctrine of human rights is frustrated by members of the very species upon which the doctrine is based?

Philosophical Theory and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (review)

Reviewed by: Philosophical Theory and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Amy E. Eckert (bio) William Sweet, editor. Philosophical Theory and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights University of Ottawa Press. viii, 242. $24.95 More than fifty years have passed since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter 'UDHR') in 1948. Philosophical Theory and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights poses questions about the impact and legacy of the UDHR: 'What do we make of "human rights" more than half a century after the Universal Declaration - a declaration for which many, like [Jacques] Maritain, had so much hope? 'How does the [End Page 320] contemporary practice of rights fit with traditional theories of rights? What has been the effect of political and legal instruments such as the UHDR? What have events of the recent past shown us about these theories and declarations?' The UDHR, the first document to enumerate a set of globally recognized rights, marked a watershed in the internationalization of human rights, which were previously protected under national law. The essays extend beyond the scope of philosophical theory and the foundations of human rights, as the title would suggest, to questions of implementation and protection of these rights, a challenge that remains more than fifty years after the creation of the UDHR. The contributions to this volume are divided into three sections that address concepts of human rights, the UDHR's role in articulating and protecting human rights, and the challenges to the theory and application of human rights that have emerged since the UDHR. There is significant overlap among these three sections, and the questions of justification for human rights, or at least for particular conceptions of rights, never lie far beneath the surface. Additionally, three major themes cut across these three sections. One is on the question of the adequacy of consensus as a foundation for human rights. While consensus may treat certain practices as legitimate - such as slavery and colonialism - that later become discredited, we may also want to protect other rights - such as gender equality - that do not enjoy universal consensus. Howard P. Kainz's chapter rejects this consensus approach and grounds human rights in a more universalist foundation, a Thomistic conception of human nature. On the other hand, those more sympathetic to dialogic or discourse ethics see consensus itself as the basis for ethical norms. In his chapter, Bradley R. Munro describes the process of reaching consensus on the UDHR from within divergent ethical traditions. A second theme that cuts across many of the essays in this volume is the contribution of French philosopher Jacques Maritain, one of the principal architects of the UDHR, to the theory of human rights. A third focus of this volume is the impact of the UDHR on Canada's legal system. Jack Iwanicki examines the use of the UDHR and other international human rights treaties in decisions issued by the Canadian Supreme Court, while Paul Groarke and J.L.A. West address the liberal-communitarian debate in the context of the Canadian constitutional regime, arguing that a Thomistic model of the common good can provide a resolution to this divide by incorporating elements of the individual good. These common threads running through the book should not obscure the topical and philosophical diversity of the essays in this volume. Aside from the major themes mentioned above, other essays cover such topics as indigenous claims to land ownership, genocide in Rwanda, and women's rights. The approaches that the authors apply and evaluate include feminist theory, liberal models of rights, and virtue theory. The wide-ranging [End Page 321] discussion of the UDHR, and theories of rights more broadly, make Philosophical Theory and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights an excellent sampling of human rights scholarship. In addition, the book provides a clear picture of remaining philosophical and practical challenges more than fifty years after United Nations General Assembly's adoption of the Universal Declaration. Amy E. Eckert Amy E. Eckert, Department of Philosophy, Denver University Copyright © 2005 University of Toronto Press Incorporated

History, Human Rights, and Globalization

ABSTRACTAn illustrative comparison of human rights in 1948 and the contemporary period, attempting to gauge the impact of globalization on changes in the content of human rights (e.g., collective rights, women's rights, right to a healthy environment), major abusers and guarantors of human rights (e.g., state actors, transnational corporations, social movements), and alternative justifications of human rights (e.g., pragmatic agreement, moral intuitionism, overlapping consensus, cross‐cultural dialogue).

Human Dignity - Functions and Meanings

The concept of Human Dignity has become more and more prevalent in legal, moral and philosophical discourses. However, as much as linguistic functions of the concept have become widespread, its meanings have become ambiguous and blurred. This paper seeks to map and depict the main functions and meanings that the concept of human dignity encompass, and, hence, to enable both those concerned with law and its interpretation, and moral-philosophers to discern the different linguistic-spheres and the different meanings this concept encircle. The analysis will show that the meanings of human dignity are socially constructed in accordance with particular cultural and historical contexts. There is no one "true" meaning of human dignity, but rather different levels of "thickness" and "thinness" that are culturally determined in each society. The paper advances insights regarding the use of human dignity in both the legal parlance - as a justification for human rights in legal documents; and in the moral-philosophical parlance - as compared to a worldview on the one hand, and as related to humiliation on the other.

Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgment Argument for Human Rights

This essay is about the difficulties connected with grounding human rights philosophically in a multicultural context. These difficulties are argued to derive from the tension between our aspiration to universal validity and our shared belief in the constitutive role of life-forms, traditions, cultures, and vocabularies vis-à-vis our conceptions of justice. Rawls's and Habermas's approaches to the justification of human rights are then briefly reconstructed and assessed. A symmetrical distribution of strong and weak points is argued to obtain. In the light of this reconstruction, the author explores the potential of his judgment view of justice for providing a justification of the universality of human rights not vulnerable to the difficulties of the other examined approaches.

Menneskerettigheter Og Ulike Verdisyn: Vestlige Mot Asiatiske Verdier?

Few states admit that they systematically and deliberately violate international human rights. The Bangkok Declaration of 1993 ended this public consensus. In this declaration several states argued that civil and political human rights must be set aside insofar as they are incompatible with Asian values. Foreign protests against human rights were also dismissed as violating states' sovereignty.The lecture discusses and rebuts the criticism raised in the Bangkok Declaration. Several objections against international human rights are identified and assessed on the basis of theories of human rights.Claims to thorough-going differences between and Western cultures do not stand against criticisms, and few objections against human rights can be maintained. The remaining objections do not invalidate human rights, but support some justifications for human rights rather than others. Thus human rights cannot be dismissed as objectionable exercises of Western ideological imperialism.

Ernst Tugendhat über Menschenrechte- Kontroverse Bemerkungen

Abstract In this critical comment on Ernst Tugendhat's paper I dispute his view in two respects: the first refers to the concept, the second to the justification of human rights. As far as the concept of human rights is concerned, I argue that Tugendhat fails to notice that there are different kinds of human rights which are to be distinguished carefully. This conceptual failure prevents him from seeing that different human rights are justified by different reasons. While universal human rights can be justified by the principle of universalization, community rights are based on the demands of social justice.

A Discourse‐Theoretical Conception of Practical Reason*

AbstractContemporary discussions about practical reason or practical rationality invoke four competing views which can be named as follows by reference to their historical models: Aristotelian, Hobbesian, Kantian and Nietzschean. The subject‐matter of this article is a defence of the Kantian conception of practical rationality in the interpretation of discourse theory. At the heart, lies the justification and the application of the rules of discourse. An argument consisting of three parts is pre sented to justify the rules of discourse. The three parts are as follows: a transcen dental‐pragmatic argument; an argument which takes account of the maximisation of individual utility and an empirical premise about an interest in correctness. Within the framework of the problem of application, the article outlines a justification of human rights and of the basic institutions of the democratic constitutional state on the basis of discourse theory.

Human Nature and Justification of Human Rights

Human Nature and Justification of Human Rights Get access Jan Gorecki Jan Gorecki Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Journal of Jurisprudence, Volume 34, Issue 1, 1989, Pages 43–60, https://doi.org/10.1093/ajj/34.1.43 Published: 01 June 1989

Equal Respect and Human Rights

Suppose that someone is trying to justify belief in human rights not to a moral sceptic but to someone who finds ordinary moral principles unproblematic while worrying that human rights are too strong and rigid to be plausible. One familiar strategy in providing such a justification for human rights is to appeal to a general principle of equal respect for persons as rational and autonomous beings and to try to show that this principle will justify human rights, or at least provide the main normative footing for such a justification. In this article I examine attempts by S.I. Benn and Ronald Dworkin to get from a deontological principle of equal respect to human rights. By identifying some problems in the justifications provided by Benn and Dworkin I hope to illuminate some general problems in justifications of rights which start from a principle of equal respect. The human rights that I am concerned with are roughly those that were formulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.' Human rights, as they are described in the documents of the human rights movement, have a number of characteristics. First, lest we miss the obvious, they are rights, not mere goals or aspirations. Second, human rights are universal, moral rights. This means that all people have them independently of race, sex, religion, nationality, and social position; and independently of the recognition of these rights in the legal system of the country in which a person resides. These rights may not be effective rights until they are implemented in a domestic legal system, but they are alleged to exist independently as moral standards of argument and criticism. Third, these rights are alleged to be important enough to prevail in conflicts with contrary national norms and goals and to justify international action on their behalf. Finally, fourth, these rights are concerned with political, social, and economic abuses; with the most severe problems that arise in people's relationships with government

Global Justice and Human Rights: Health and Human Rights in Practice

The origin and justification of human rights, whether anchored in biological theory, natural law theory, or interests theory, as well as their cultural specificity and actual value as international legal instruments are subject to ongoing lively debates. As theoretical and rhetorical discourses challenge and enrich current understanding of the value of human rights and their relevance to democratic governance, they have found their way into public health in recent decades and play today an increasing role in the shaping of health policies, programs and practice. Human rights define the obligations of states to their people and towards each other, create grounds for governmental accountability and inspire recognition of, and action on, factors influencing people’s attainment of the highest possible standard of health. This article highlights the evolution that has brought health and human rights together in mutually reinforcing ways. It draws from the experience gained in the global response to HIV/AIDS, summarizes key dimensions of public health and of human rights and suggests a manner in which these dimensions intersect in a framework for analysis and action.