Democracy Justice Research Articles

The Equalization of Effective Communicative Freedom: Democratic Justice in the Constitutional State and Beyond

The fundamental political concern of liberalism has been to secure equal liberties for all citizens. There has, however, been no agreement among liberals on the extent to which this project depends, both normatively and practically, on the democratization of society. Socialism, on the other hand, has been fundamentally concerned with the realization of emancipated forms of life. But socialists too have disagreed with one another on the extent to which political structures of democratic self-government are central to the revolutionary task of emancipation. Social democracy, as a tradition, has involved the attempt to show how these core political projects of the modern era, liberalism and socialism, are mutually interdependent. The most appropriate emancipatory project for late modern, increasingly complex societies, from a social-democratic perspective is to create and maintain a social structure that can deliverequal and effectiveliberties for all citizens. This achievement is to be best understood in republican terms, as the realization of a democratic form of life in which free and equal citizens engage one another in the collective task of autonomous self-governance. Jürgen Habermas has been one of the most significant intellectual contributors to the development of the idea of social democracy as an emancipatory project. Over several decades from the early 1960s to the present, Habermas has set about recasting critical social theory in terms of a theory of communicative action. The main legal and political implications of this critical perspective are outlined in his discourse theory of democracy Habermas considers the realization of rights through the democratic self-organization of legal communities to be the normative core of emancipatory politics in the modern era.

The True Confessions of a White Rawlsian Liberal: An Argument for a Capacities Approach to Democratic Legitimacy

This paper takes as its point of departure the constitutional talks in South Africa in the early 1990’s. I suggest that liberal rather than democratic values held a particular attraction to South African political philosophers like me. Taking the example of Rawlsian liberalism, I show how liberalism locates the normative anchors of legitimacy outside the democratic process and is content with a weak interpretation of political equality. As an alternative I sketch a capacities approach to democratic legitimacy drawing on the work of Sen and Nussbaum. In particular I argue that the capacity to participate in democratic practices is what grounds and legitimizes principles of democratic justice agreed to by citizens. I conclude by suggesting that South Africa’s democracy would have been stronger if the state had attended to the capacities of citizens to participate in the democratic process.

In search of a democratic justice – what courts should not do: Argentina, 1983–2002

This study examines why, after so many years of economically costly judicial reforms in La1in America, the judicial system in most of the region is s1i11 working so poorly. The study assesses that part of the problem stems from a wrong theoretical analysis. Academics and leading reformers alike have placed too much emphasis on the politically dependent character of many Latin American judges, or the lack of basic resources both among judges and the people at large – such things as good salaries, administrative facilities, training, education and information. However, these serious problems are only part of the story. The case of Argentina shows that in order to reflect properly on future judicial reforms we should mainly concentrate our attention on the (questionable) constitutional ‘means and motives’ that have already been granted to the judges.

Democracy and Political Scepticism: Comment on Bufacchi

The claim that democracy requires a particular type of political scepticism for its justification has an initial plausibility. The present article argues, however, that Bufacchi does not succeed in adequately identifying the relevant type of uncertainty. Secondly, it is claimed here that Bufacchi's analysis neglects a crucial element in the justification of democracy, namely, the positive evaluation of moral autonomy. When the role of autonomy is given its proper place epistemology becomes secondary, providing a basis not for scepticism but for a theory such as Rawls's theory of reasonable disagreement.

Who Should Get in? The Ethics of Immigration Admissions

This article explores normative questions about what legal rights settled immigrants should have in liberal democratic states. It argues that liberal democratic justice, properly understood, greatly constrains the distinctions that can be made between citizens and residents. The longer people stay in a society, the stronger their moral claims become, and after a while they pass a threshold that entitles them to virtually the same legal status as citizens and eventually easy access to citizenship itself.

Rights-Based Judicial Review: A Democratic Justification

This paper investigates the accusation that judicial review is undemocratic. It argues that the alleged tension between judicial review and democracy fails to account for the fact that the content of rights and their scope depends on societal convictions and moral judgments of the public. Such dependence suggests that rights-based judicial review can be described as an alternative form of democratic participation.

The demagoguery of democratic theory

For all of its blessings, democracy in America displays weaknesses. Democratic theorists both disguise and exacerbate these weaknesses by urging us, as imperatives of democratic justice, to extend the claims of equality to all practices and throughout all spheres of life; and to discount what people actually want in favor of what democratic theorists think that reason tells us people ought to want. Such theorizing encourages the evisceration of virtue, the trivialization of truth, the subjugation of chance, the fear of freedom, and the routinization of romantic love. To combat the dogmatism and despotism to which democracy is prone, it is necessary to preserve the distinction between democracy and justice.

Advancing social justice as a part of educational leadership development

We discuss beneficial uses of imaging technologies in higher education that advance social justice. Misuse and ineffectiveness of shared decision making, specifically as related to power relationships and the redistribution of decision‐making authority, are addressed through the development of technologically delivered experiential simulations (ES). We outline ways in which ES can change higher education preparation programs to meet and adapt to the challenges of the future. ES entails using computer technology to modify a person’s appearance and thereby evoking an atypical response from an audience. The key to our proposal, however, is having the person with the modified persona learn lessons pertinent to democratic cultures and social justice from their experience of immersion in that response.

Globalization and Inequality: A Plea for Global Justice

Our age is marked by two main trajectories: globalization and democratization–which are not readily compatible. While the move toward democracy requires a certain civic equality among all participants, globalization in its present form fosters or enhances social inequality. The paper concentrates on three main types of inequality: those of power, wealth and knowledge. In each of these domains the presentation follows a prominent mentor or set of mentors: in the first domain the political scientist Samuel Huntington; in the second the economist Amartya Sen; and in the last the philosophers Heidegger and Gadamer. By way of conclusion, the paper issues a plea for cosmopolitan or global democratic justice, as a counterpoise to prevailing modes of global inequality and inequity.

Political Legitimacy and Democracy

The term ‘political legitimacy’ is unfortunately ambiguous. One serious source of confusion is the failure to distinguish clearly between political legitimacy and political authority and to conflate political authority with authoritativeness. I will distinguish between (1) political legitimacy, (2) political authority, and (3) authoritativeness. I will also articulate two importantly different variants of the notion of political authority. Having drawn these distinctions, I will argue first that political legitimacy, rather than political authority, is the more central notion for a theory of the morality of political power. My second main conclusion will be that where democratic authorization of the exercise of political power is possible, only a democratic government can be legitimate. Another ambiguity is also a source of confusion. Sometimes it is unclear whether ‘legitimacy’ is being used in a descriptive or a normative sense. In this article I am concerned exclusively with legitimacy in the normative sense, not with the conditions under which an entity is believed to be legitimate. However, a normative account of legitimacy is essential for a descriptive account. Unless one distinguishes carefully between political legitimacy, political authority, and authoritativeness, one will not be clear about what beliefs in legitimacy are beliefs about.

Teaching American Identities: A University/Secondary School Collaboration

We must not be afraid to help our students and our communities confront the contradictions of their own histories and the history of the American republic. Only through the realization of our historical and present tensions can we hope to nurture the development of individuals who will become active participants in the American narrative without the false hope of easy resolution, but with the sustained capacities to work toward a society in which democratic aspirations become democratic justice, and diversity becomes a means of forging a deeper national identity.1

Justifying Empire: Pericles, Polk, and a Dilemma of Democratic Leadership

Democratic justifications of empire reveal a tension between the demands of the national interest and those of justice that democratic leaders must always face in their conduct of foreign policy. T...

Democracy. By Albert Weale. New York: St Martin's Press, 1999. 244p. $59.95 cloth, $19.95 paper.

Like other volumes in the series Issues in Political Theory, which Weale edits with Peter Jones, this book combines an overview of the topic suitable for advanced undergraduates and above with an original argument reflecting the author's distinctive perspective that is likely to stimulate fellow specialists. The combination is an attractive one, which, when it works—as it does in this case—ensures that we do not get the sort of deadly dull textbook that merely rehashes other people's ideas. There are two novel features of Weale's argument. The first is his justification of democracy in terms of its capacity to enable members of society to advance their common interests as political equals in a situation of human fallibility. The second is his attempt to delineate the form of democracy, including the type of representation and decision rule, most likely to promote this purpose. I take each in turn.

Children and Ian Shapiro's Democratic Justice

Ian Shapiro's Democratic Justice takes up the challenge of reconciling justice and democracy. 1 It does so by articulating a conception of justice that is meant to afford a central place to democratizing social life and a conception of democracy that is meant to promote justice. The account of justice that Shapiro offers diverges from the liberal path John Rawls takes as well as from the communitarian path that Michael Walzer pursues. While Rawls attempts to define justice by calculating the unanimous rational choice of parties to an original position, Shapiro begins with the premise that no consensus on what justice requires exists. And while Walzer defines justice in terms of the discrete meanings of different social goods, Shapiro asks who decides what these meanings are. If we do not possess a consensus on what justice is and if we ought not simply accept one theorist's interpretation of it, then we should recognize the place of democracy in determining what justice requires.

Criminal Justice, Democratic Fairness, and Cultural Pluralism: The Case of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada

The place of criminal justice in democracy has been little studied in recent democratic theory. This is surprising insofar as much of the theory of democracy concerns how shared norms become binding law, and where are shared norms more forcefully expressed or enforced than in the domain of criminal law? Perhaps the reason for democratic theorists’ recent neglect of criminal justice and punishment is the fact that there is so little agreement in most democratic societies as to the purpose of punishment. Is it fundamentally retributive in purpose, and therefore appropriately measured out in proportion to the seriousness of the offense? Is its purpose deterrent, so that no greater (and no lesser) punishment should be inflicted than is necessary to dissuade individuals from violating the law? Or is its purpose rehabilitative, to “discipline” in its root meaning as synonymous with “teach”? Or, finally, we might conceive of criminal justice as restorative, with the aim of repairing victims’ injuries and reintegrating offenders into responsible membership in the community. There is clearly no settled consensus on these questions in contemporary democracies.

Liberal Theory and the "Loyal Opposition" in Democratic Justice

Liberal Theory and the "Loyal Opposition" in Democratic Justice

Democratic Justice "All the Way Down"

Collective life is not reducible to power relations, but power relations suffuse virtually every human interaction. The view that domination is the principal source of injustice, and that the experience of injustice is most often one of arbitrary domination, guides Ian Shapiro's work. A "democratic way of doing things" is the best if imperfect protection.

Ian Shapiro's Democratic Justice

Ian Shapiro's Democratic Justice

Enough Justice? Enough Democracy? A comment on Shapiro's Democratic Justice?

Ian Shapiro's Democratic Justice attempts to confront indeterminacy and fundamental value pluralism while at the same time offering some first principles for politics and public policy. In this aspiration it is, to a considerable degree, successful. It makes a credible case for a distinctive conception that deserves wide attention. The strategy it employs, to seek protection for "basic interests" as a matter of justice under government auspices and then leave the rest of policy dealing with non-basic (or "best") interests to democracy under specified conditions, is intuitively appealing and powerful. Quite naturally, it also raises important questions. I will try to raise a few of them for discussion here.

Revisiting Democratic Justice : A response to critics

I should start by thanking my critics, not least because for the most part I have been carefully and appreciatively read. In a couple of instances where my views have been misconstrued, as by Fishkin on Apartheid and inequality of opportunity and by Shiffrin on loyal opposition, this does not require much of a response since both acknowledge my actual views later in their commentaries than in the offending passages. Accordingly, I will not dwell on these issues except to reiterate that Apartheid ran afoul of several of my presumptions against hierarchy (it was avoidable, ossified, and created massive externalities and exit costs for those on whom it was imposed); that systematic inequality of opportunity of the kind invoked by Bernard Williams's warrior society violates my injunction against non-self-liquidating hierarchies at least; and that with respect to loyal opposition my argument is that unless there are opportunities for loyal opposition, disloyal opposition will be both forthcoming and legitimate. As I put it on p. 48 of Democratic Justice: "the more democratically those who win in battles over collective decisions conduct themselves in victory, the stronger is the obligation on the defeated to ensure that their opposition be loyal rather than disloyal—and vice versa."