Interest in jury research continues to proliferate (Kalven and Zeisel, 1966; Nagel, 1969; Schubert, 1963; Sigler, 1968; Simon, 1975). Part of this may be explained by the jury's historical significance. It is often viewed as one of the major props of the AngloAmerican system of justice. Part may be accounted for by its life- and liberty-imperiling powers. In this respect it is a group that may terminate human experience or modify the quality of its existence. Few groups have such awesome powers, wherever their location -- inside or outside the justice system. Yet another facet of that interest may stem from some current themes in sociolegat research that have not only pierced the veil of secrecy surrounding the legal system but have also subjected it to closer scrutiny (Becker, 1963; Lemert, 1967; Quinney, 1973; Strodtbeck, Simon, & Hawkins; 1957). In jury research, the consequence has been some discrediting of the rationalistic ideal that the jury is a legal institution designed to render verdicts based upon the evidence presented in the courtroom irrespective of the characteristics of the litigants or the jurors involved (Becker, Buckout, Cohen, & Weg, 1973; Erlander, 1970; Kaplan & Kemmerick, 1974; Reed, 1965). Studies of jury product and process, however, suggest that extraevidentiary factors have an effect. These extras include personality, demographic, content, and participatory variables, which may become operative collectively or singularly at different times during the course of the trial (Kessler, 1975; Stephan, 1975). That such influences exist makes one wonder which model of the justice system is closer to reality, the ideal model formulated and maintained by the legalists or the behavioral model of the social sciences.