Jury Discrimination Research Articles

The 'Red Menace' on Trial: Jury Discrimination in Dennis

In 1949, the leadership of the American Communist Party was put on trial for allegedly conspiring to teach the overthrow of the American government. The case, known as the Dennis trial, is a major part of American political and Cold War history. One of the rarely-discussed aspects of the case, however, is that the defendants argued that the jury was stacked against them: it would be composed almost exclusively of wealthy white men. The defendants' claim of jury discrimination was denied, but it can be seen as a vital step towards reforming New York's Blue Ribbon Panel system of jury selection, eventual Congressional legislation to end bias in jury selection, and the slow recognition by the Supreme Court that jury discrimination was more pervasive than previously thought. This Article is the first scholarly effort to explain the nature of the jury challenge in Dennis and situate the defendants' failure as part of a larger narrative of discrimination and injustice. Section II of this Article provides background on the case and establishes its importance as one of the most significant political trials of the twentieth century. Section III traces the evolution of Supreme Court jurisprudence on jury discrimination prior to the Dennis case. Section IV explains the peculiar Blue Ribbon Panel system of jury selection used in New York at the time for cases seen by the court system as especially serious or important. Section V dives into the heart of the Dennis defendants' claim that a skewed selection process would result in a jury that was almost wholly white, male, and upper-class. Last, Section VI discusses the aftermath of the Dennis trial and its importance both historically and legally.

ReviewChristopher Waldrep, Jury Discrimination: The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and a Grassroots Fight for Racial Equality in Mississippi. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2010. Pp. 325. Cloth $44.95. Paper $24.95.

Previous articleNext article No AccessBOOK REVIEWSReview Christopher Waldrep, Jury Discrimination: The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and a Grassroots Fight for Racial Equality in Mississippi. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2010. Pp. 325. Cloth $44.95. Paper $24.95.Amos JonesAmos JonesNorth Carolina Central University Search for more articles by this author North Carolina Central UniversityPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of African American History Volume 97, Number 1-2Winter-Spring 2012African Americans and Movements for Reparations: Past, Present, and Future A journal of the Association for the Study of African American Life and History Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.5323/jafriamerhist.97.1-2.0184 Views: 6Total views on this site Copyright 2012 ASALHPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

White But Not Equal: Mexican Americans, Jury Discrimination, and the Supreme Court

White But Not Equal: Mexican Americans, Jury Discrimination, and the Supreme Court

Christopher Waldrep . Jury Discrimination: The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and a Grassroots Fight for Racial Equality in Mississippi . (Studies in the Legal History of the South.) Athens: University of Georgia Press. 2010. Pp. ix, 325. $44.95.

Christopher Waldrep . Jury Discrimination: The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and a Grassroots Fight for Racial Equality in Mississippi . (Studies in the Legal History of the South.) Athens: University of Georgia Press. 2010. Pp. ix, 325. $44.95.

Jury Discrimination: The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and a Grassroots Fight for Racial Equality in Mississippi

Jury Discrimination is a book of many parts. In one, Christopher Waldrep tells how two lawyers cooperated in 1906 to achieve, if only for a brief time, the racial integration of juries in Mississippi. This story is told in accessible prose that will appeal to general readers. Other parts of the book deal with the notion that defendants have a right to be tried by a jury of their peers; the congressional debate over the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and the Supreme Court's subsequent interpretation of that clause. The discussion of these matters does justice to the complexity of the points at issue but is written in a way that will appeal only to scholars who specialize in legal history. The Fourteenth Amendment asserted, “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” What did that mean? Was this language intended to effect a sweeping change in the relative power of the state and federal governments? Did it authorize the central government to protect the rights of individuals—including the right to serve on juries—from infringement by local authorities and groups? Even among Republican members of Congress, there was no consensus, and Waldrep acknowledges that most people in many ratifying states did not understand that the privileges and immunities clause contained revolutionary possibilities. “The question of just what power the nation now had over the states” was, Waldrep writes, “uncertain, ambiguous, and subject to judicial interpretation” (p. 85).

Statistical measures and methods for assessing the representativeness of juries: a reanalysis of the data in Berghuis v. Smith

To assess the fairness of a jury system, courts compare data on the race-gender-ethnic composition of a number of jury venires (pools) to that of the jury-eligible population of the jurisdiction. The recent U.S. Supreme Court opinion in the Berghuis v. Smith case discussed the criteria a defendant's evidence must meet to establish a prima facie case that the jury pools were not representative. The decision relied on the three criteria set previously in Duren v. Missouri: name a distinct subgroup of the population, demonstrate their underrepresentation with statistics and identify the aspect of the jury system, which produced the disparity. In addition to formal statistical testing, courts have considered the absolute and comparative differences between the percentages of minorities in the age-eligible population and on the jury venires. In Berghuis, data for the period when the defendant's trial was held indicate that 6.03% of the potential jurors in the circuit (felony) courts were African American but they formed 7.28% of the age-eligible residents of the County. The 1.25% absolute difference seems small. The comparative difference or percentage shortfall is 18%, suggesting underrepresentation. The defendant argued that the disparity in the circuit courts arose because, at the time of his trial, jurors were first assigned to local courts and African Americans were concentrated in Grand Rapids. Shortly after the trial, the County changed the system, however, the comparative disparity (CD) only declined by 3%. This small change failed to convince the Court that the juror assignment system caused the underrepresentation. The available data in Berghuis v. Smith differed from most jury discrimination cases as the racial identification of the venire members were unavailable. The defendant's expert estimated the number of African Americans on the venires from their addresses and compared it to their expected number derived from their fraction of the county's age-eligible population. He did not test whether the difference was statistically significant. The two analyses available to the Court treated the estimated number of minority jurors on the venires as though it was the actual number, which is statistically incorrect. This article derives the appropriate standard deviation analysis. Applying it to the data in Berghuis, it is shown that there was a statistically significant disparity between the percentages of African Americans on the venires and in the age-eligible population. On the other hand, the difference between the CDs in the two periods was not near significance. Thus, the first two Duren criteria were satisfied but the third was not, supporting the Court's decision. Language: en

Jury discrimination: the Supreme Court, public opinion, and a grassroots fight for racial equality in Mississippi

In 1906 a white lawyer named Dabney Marshall argued a case before the Mississippi Supreme Court demanding the racial integration of juries. He carried out a plan devised by Mississippi's foremost black lawyer of the time: Willis Mollison. Against staggering odds, and with the help of a friendly newspaper editor, he won. How Marshall and his allies were able to force the court to overturn state law and precedent, if only for a brief period, at the behest of the U.S. Supreme Court is the subject of Jury Discrimination, a book that explores the impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on America's civil rights history. Christopher Waldrep traces the origins of Americans' ideas about trial by jury and provides the first detailed analysis of jury discrimination. Southerners' determination to keep their juries entirely white played a crucial role in segregation, emboldening lynchers and vigilantes like the Ku Klux Klan. As the postbellum Congress articulated ideals of national citizenship in civil rights legislation, most importantly the Fourteenth Amendment, factions within the U.S. Supreme Court battled over how to read the amendment: expansively, protecting a variety of rights against a host of enemies, or narrowly, guarding only against rare violations by state governments. The latter view prevailed, entombing the amendment in a narrow interpretation that persists to this day. Although the high court clearly denounced the overt discrimination enacted by state legislatures, it set evidentiary rules that made discrimination by state officers and agents extremely difficult to prove. Had these rules been less onerous, Waldrep argues, countless black jurors could have been seated throughout the nation at precisely the moment when white legislators and jurists were making and enforcing segregation laws. Marshall and Mollison's success in breaking through Mississippi law to get blacks admitted to juries suggests that legal reasoning plausibly founded on constitutional principle, as articulated by the Supreme Court, could trump even the most stubbornly prejudiced public opinion.

White But Not Equal: Mexican Americans, Jury Discrimination, and the Supreme Court Ignacio M. García

White But Not Equal: Mexican Americans, Jury Discrimination, and the Supreme Court Ignacio M. García

Jury Discrimination: The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and a Grassroots Fight for Racial Equality in Mississippi (review)

Reviewed by: Jury Discrimination: The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and a Grassroots Fight for Racial Equality in Mississippi James Savage (bio) Jury Discrimination: The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and a Grassroots Fight for Racial Equality in Mississippi. By Christopher Waldrep. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2010. Pp. 325. $44.95 cloth) Attorney Thomas Dabney Marshall entered a Mississippi prison in 1895 after he shot a political opponent to death for questioning the effete lawyer's masculinity. Marshall never denied the killing, and [End Page 293] the confession and plea agreement saved him from a death sentence, but the experience of prison transformed him. "When he went to prison for the murder," Christopher Waldrep writes in Jury Discrimination, "he came to identify with the slavelike status under which blacks were forced to live.… Once he realized he could no longer pursue political office or meaningfully ally himself with Mississippi's political elite, he decided to fight for the civil rights of blacks by challenging Mississippi's all-white jury system" (p. 207). Waldrep's Jury Discrimination is ostensibly the tale of how this white lawyer and his African American counterpart, Willis Mollison, challenged the Jim Crow system of exclusion that defined the jury-selection system of Mississippi—and, indeed, much of the South—during the postbellum years and into the twentieth century. However, Dabney and Mollison are largely absent from much of the book, and Waldrep uses brief introductory paragraphs at the beginning of the first five chapters of the book to connect these two men and their ally, Vicksburg newspaper publisher John Cashman, to larger debates over the evolution of the American notion of "a jury of one's peers," the Fourteenth Amendment definition of citizenship, and the internal struggle of the United States Supreme Court over the nature of federalism. It is not until the sixth chapter that Marshall and Mollison reappear at any substantial length, and by then, given Waldrep's extensive discussion of the Supreme Court's hesitancy to erase any ambiguity from states' jury-selection systems, the reader understands that their mission to seat African Americans on Mississippi juries was almost hopeless. "[R]ather than a knife at the throat of Mississippi discrimination," Waldrep explains, "the U.S. Supreme Court was an ally and a legitimizer of all-white juries" (pp. 227-28). Waldrep's examination of the southern determination to exclude African Americans from juries reveals an irony in the mindset of the region. Despite their repeated allegiance to self-determination and states' rights, southern judicial systems routinely cited rulings from their federal counterparts when it suited their own ends. As southern lawmakers and judges looked to the court as an ally, so too did the [End Page 294] court look to public opinion for guidance in reaching its rulings dealing with jury selection. Of course, as Waldrep notes, the justices used both northern and southern newspapers (presumably white-owned publications) to gauge the moods of the public, and the American public routinely allowed racial distinctions to trump fidelity to the constitutional principle of trial by jury. Competency became a thinly disguised racial watchword as northern and southern publications alike incredulously asked why states could not determine who was fit enough to serve on juries. "White people held power, and white people perceived competence as white," Waldrep writes (p. 30). Although African Americans served on southern juries during the Reconstruction period, the final two decades of the nineteenth century saw a marked erosion of political and social power for freedmen. A series of Supreme Court decisions struck down Reconstruction-era laws that sought to offer African Americans equal political opportunities, and soon southern judicial systems were once again able to exclude blacks from juries. Despite shifts in the personnel of the Supreme Court from Reconstruction to the early twentieth century, African Americans found little hope in the nation's highest court. While the court did note that blacks rarely served on southern juries, it did not force lower courts to include them in jury pools. In fact, court rulings placed the burden on black defendants to prove that all-white juries had discriminated against them and further said that black defendants had no right at...

Review: White But Not Equal: Mexican Americans, Jury Discrimination, and the Supreme Court, by Ignacio M. García

Review: <i>White But Not Equal: Mexican Americans, Jury Discrimination, and the Supreme Court</i>, by Ignacio M. García

Statistical Measures and Methods for Assessing the Representativeness of Juries: A Reanalysis of the Data in Berghuis v. Smith

This term the U.S. Supreme Court will decide Berghuis v. Smith; a case concerning the criteria a defendant claiming that the jury pools in a jurisdiction are not representative of the community must meet to establish a prima facie case. Many courts consider the arithmetic difference between the percentages of minorities in the age-eligible population and on a number of jury venires; the Sixth Circuit relied on a relative measure, the ratio of the arithmetic difference to the minority fraction of the age-eligible population. The data for the period when the defendant’s trial was held indicate that 6.03% of the potential jurors in the circuit (felony) courts were African-American but they formed 7.28% of the age-eligible residents of the County. Under the absolute difference criteria, the 1.25% figure seems small. The comparative difference or percentage shortfall is 18%, which suggests underrepresentation. The data will also be examined using the selection ratio and formal statistical testing as in Castaneda v. Partida. The available data in Berghuis v. Smith differs from most jury discrimination cases as the source of the master list did not keep racial identification nor did the county record the race of the individuals summoned. The defendant’s expert estimated the number of African-Americans on the venires from their addresses and compared it to their expected number derived from their fraction of the county’s age-eligible population. He did not conduct a formal statistical test to assess whether the difference was statistically significant. The federal appeals court found that African-Americans were underrepresented on the juries in the county’s circuit courts. At the time of the trial jurors were first assigned to local courts and as African-Americans were concentrated in Grand Rapids, this could have lead to their underrepresentation of minorities on the circuit court. Although the Sixth Circuit agreed that some hardship excusals for child care needs were legitimate, it did not accept that they would fully explain the degree of underrepresentation of African-Americans. The Census data on sole heads of poverty households, with a young child, not mentioned by either party, indicates that if most requested to be excused for child care responsibilities, a good part of the disparity might be explained. On the other hand, using the correct standard deviation analysis for the statistic used to compare the expected percentage of African American venire members to their percentage of the age-eligible population yields a statistically significant disparity meeting the two standard deviation level for the first time period, the three standard deviation level for the second time period and is nearly four standard deviations for both. Thus, the Court will be deciding a very important issue of fairness on the basis of a statistical record that has not been carefully analyzed.

White but not equal: Mexican Americans, jury discrimination, and the Supreme Court

Check out http://www.caminobluff.com/acahome.htm target=new>A Class Apart - the new PBS American Experience documentary that explores this historic case! In 1952 in Edna, Texas, Pete Hernandez, a twenty-one-year-old cotton picker, got into a fight with several men and was dragged from a tavern, robbed, and beaten. Upon reaching his home he collected his .22-caliber rifle, walked two miles back to the tavern, and shot one of the assailants. With forty eyewitnesses and a confession, the case appeared to be open and shut. Yet Hernandez v. Texas turned into one of the nation's most groundbreaking Supreme Court cases. Ignacio Garcia's White But Not Equal explores this historic but mostly forgotten case, which became the first to recognize discrimination against Mexican Americans. Led by three dedicated Mexican American lawyers, the case argued for recognition of Mexican Americans under the 14th Amendment as a ?class apart.? Despite a distinct history and culture, Mexican Americans were considered white by law during this period, yet in reality they were subjected to prejudice and discrimination. This was reflected in Hernandez's trial, in which none of the selected jurors were Mexican American. The concept of Latino identity began to shift as the demand for inclusion in the political and judicial system began. Garcia places the Hernandez v. Texas case within a historical perspective and examines the changing Anglo-Mexican relationship. More than just a legal discussion, this book looks at the whole case from start to finish and examines all the major participants, placing the story within the larger issue of the fight for Mexican American civil rights.

The effect of dependence between observations on the proper interpretation of statistical evidence

In a recent securities law case, the statistical methods used by the regulator in analysing data on daily commissions and hypothetical profits from initial public offerings (IPOs) assumed that the data on consecutive days were independent. Consecutive observations in most business and economic data, however, are positively correlated. While statistical articles demonstrate that this type of dependence affects the distribution of virtually all statistics, including non-parametric and goodness-of-fit tests, the magnitude of the effect may not be fully appreciated. For example, in one comparison of commissions one broker received on days with an IPO to the days when no IPO was issued yielded a statistically significant p-value of 0.02, under the independence assumption. Accounting for serial correlation, the test actually had a non-significant p-value close to 0.09. Other examples of the effect of dependence include jury discrimination cases in locales where grand jurors can serve two consecutive terms as well as cases concerned with environmental pollution where measurements are spatially and temporally correlated. This paper describes the noticeable effect violations of the independence assumption can have on statistical inferences. The methods for correcting some standard non-parametric tests for serial correlation are also discussed.

Judgment Days: Lyndon Baines Johnson, Martin Luther King Jr., and the Laws that Changed America (review)

Reviewed by: Judgment Days Lyndon Baines Johnson, Martin Luther King Jr., and the Laws that Changed America Jack Bass (bio) Judgment Days Lyndon Baines Johnson, Martin Luther King Jr., and the Laws that Changed America By Nick KotzHoughton Mifflin, 2006522 pp. Cloth $26.00 In contrast to the current emptiness of "compassionate conservatism," Nick Kotz has written an important book about a president from Texas and a preacher from Georgia who both understood civil rights for black Americans as a moral issue that the American people needed to confront with action. Judgment Days captures the soaring hopes and successes of the 1960s, when, in the wake of President John F. Kennedy's assassination, the vision and moral leadership of Martin Luther King Jr. and the collective Civil Rights Movement joined together with the masterful political leadership and skill of President Lyndon Baines Johnson. It forces a new look at LBJ as a man of moral courage who deeply understood and confronted the crippling effects of three centuries of racial discrimination and who suffered from the failure of his effort to succeed in his war on poverty. It also captures the heartbreaking conflicts and devastating impact of the expanding war in Vietnam, including the ultimate breach between King and Johnson over the war's morality as well as its commandeering of the resources that both recognized were needed to correct what Johnson would characterize as "the conditions that breed despair and violence" at home. He learned too late the fatal flaw in his belief that the country could afford guns and butter, a failure that fed bitter public divisiveness. Kotz has roots through his mother's family to the New Deal tradition of LBJ's Texas hill country, and he uses both the tools of journalists and historians to produce a fresh and vivid account of the combined role of Johnson and King in unlocking the legal barriers to equality. (At a time when Congress cuts back on food stamps and medical care for the poor as a means of financing tax cuts for the wealthy, this book provides clues to what another wave of reform would require.) Kotz may be viewed as a reporter interviewing sources or as an oral historian collecting revealing personal narratives; either way, his roughly 150 interviews of [End Page 110] men and women on the front lines of conflict and change add depth to our understanding of this traumatic era. The story of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's vendetta against King isn't new, but Kotz tells it with greater depth and nuance than ever before. He gained access to thousands of pages of previously closed FBI documents and interviewed contemporary top officials of the Bureau. We learn how one top Hoover aide finds out that the Ford Foundation is about to award $4 million to King's financially strapped Southern Christian Leadership Conference, calls a former FBI agent working for Ford Motor Company, and the grant is cut to $250,000. (The firewall separating the company and the foundation apparently came later.) The full story of Hoover's determination to destroy King is sordid. His top associates delivered to a receptive White House detailed reports filled with dubious counterintelligence and distorted interpretations of Communist influence over King, details of sexual exploits, and advance knowledge of his tactical moves. The approval for the initial wiretaps came from Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and Johnson devoured it all. Johnson emerges as a flawed giant, King as a brave and shrewd moral leader who becomes more radical as he's overcome by events and, finally, an assassin's bullet. Readers will learn how two lives, both well documented, intersect from the time LBJ moves into the White House until MLK is murdered in Memphis. We see in vivid detail Johnson cajoling, persuading, bribing with political favors, and using powerful moral arguments to move Congress to pass the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and then exploiting the climate of remorse after King's death to gain passage of the 1968 Civil Rights Act and outlaw housing and jury discrimination. Missing from this story is Johnson's failure, as a lame...

Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century

The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on criminal juries has overlooked an important piece of history. This is most notable in the context of its jury discrimination jurisprudence over the past twenty years. In Batson v. Kentucky, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using his peremptory strikes against a potential juror on the basis of race. Later, the Court extended Batson to a variety of related contexts. In Powers v. Ohio, the Court held that Batson applied even when the defendant and the juror were of different races, holding that a white

Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment

In Batson v. Kentucky and its progeny, the Supreme Court has done poorly at explaining how discriminatory peremptory challenges harm what has become the central value in the criminal justice system--the reliability of criminal verdicts as factually accurate pronouncements of guilt or innocence. Batson's defenders on the Court have insisted that race and gender are factually irrelevant to a juror's likely viewpoint, and have thereby foreclosed any chance that jury discrimination might have any impact at all on the reliability of verdicts. Batson's loudest critics have insisted that race and gender are factually relevant to a juror's likely viewpoint. Yet these Justices have nonetheless insisted that discriminatory peremptory challenges have negligible impact on the reliability of verdicts. This is the paradox of Batson. In this Article, Professor Muller proposes a solution to this paradox. He argues that race- and gender-based peremptory challenges do indeed make criminal verdicts unreliable. Such challenges offend the idea, central to the Sixth Amendment's jury requirement, that a criminal jury must represent distinctive groups in the community. Professor Muller argues for a richer definition of verdict reliability than the current Court has adopted, one that attempts to blend the Sixth Amendment's twin commands of jury impartiality and community representation.

Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions

In the spring of 1992, a state jury with no black members acquitted four white police officers charged with using excessive force to restrain black motorist Rodney King. Many Americans who had watched the relentlessly televised videotape of the officers delivering sixty-one baton blows in eighty-one seconds found the acquittals incredible.2 Some suggested that the defendants would have been convicted if blacks had been on the jury.3 Others considered such assumptions racist; presuming that a verdict may depend on the race of the jurors, they countered, is impermissible.4 Still others argued that no one can

Statistical Significance and the Burden of Persuasion

In most endeavors concerned with the acquisition of knowledge, quantitative information is welcomed. In law, however, it appears sometimes that scientific or numerical evidence makes cases harder, not easier. Nevertheless, there are many cases and administrative proceedings, in such areas as environmental law, food and drug regulation, and civil rights, in which statistical data obtained by observation or experiment are readily accepted as assisting in the proper resolution of disputed issues of fact.' When courts or administrators confront scientific and statistical evidence in these proceedings, they are not always certain of how to weigh the evidence or whether they should, or must, rely on the standards for proof that scientists apply in evaluating statistical hypotheses. Two decisions of the Supreme Court illustrate this uncertainty. In Castaneda zv Partida, 2 a grand jury discrimination case, the Court, acting as its own statistician, computed a statistic known as the deviation.3 The Court found this computation highly probative of discrimination in light of the general rule that if the difference between the expected value and the observed number is greater than two or three standard deviations, the hypothesis that the jury drawing was random would be suspect to a social scientist.4 One would not have thought that this reference, in a single footnote, to a standard of proof popular among social scientists would be read as commanding that the same standard be determinative when evaluating statistical evidence in court. Yet, in Hazelwood School District v. United States,5 an employment discrimination case decided the same year, the Court dropped the qualifying language about social science and noted that, under the precise methodology delineated in Castaneda, a disparity of slightly less than two standard deviations was not suspect.6 In the wake of these opinions,

Statistical Evidence in Jury Discrimination Cases

In a series of decisions beginning in 1880 with Strauder v. West Virginia,' United States Supreme Court has gradually refined definition of what constitutes jury discrimination. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in Alexander v. Louisiana, wrote that accused has a constitutional right to an impartial jury from a group of a of community. * This seems to be operant definition of due process as it applies to selection of juries today. In order to show that he has been denied due process because of jury discrimination, a petitioner must show two things: first, that his jury was not drawn from a group of a of community, and second, that the opportunity for discrimination was present. 4 In fact, definition of representative cross-section seems to depend on class of petitioner. Alexander v. Louisiana' is instructive. Claude Alexander, a Negro, appealed his conviction for rape on three grounds: (1) He was indicted by a grand jury chosen from a venire from which Negro citizens were systematically excluded. (2) He was indicted by a grand jury chosen from a venire from which women were systematically excluded. (3) A statement was introduced at his trial which he had allegedly given to police shortly after his arrest, at a time when he had neither waived his right to remain silent, nor his right to have counsel present at time he gave statement.6 In its opinion, Court ignored third ground and reversed decision of lower court on basis of first. With respect to second point, Court said:

The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases

The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases