Federal Court Jurisdiction Research Articles

The Concept of Reforming the Institute of Administrators of Federal Courts of General Jurisdiction and Federal Arbitration Courts

The article highlights the history of the creation of the institution of administrators in Russia, examines the problems of the unsettled legal status and official position of administrators of federal courts, due to the uncertainty of their dual subordination, as well as the stages that took place in the field of reforming the institution of court administrators, and conducts a comparative analysis of the functional responsibilities of administrators of courts of general jurisdiction and administrators of federal arbitration courts. The main prerequisites for the adoption of the Concept for reforming the institution of federal court administrators are highlighted, the main goal of which was to consolidate the scope of functional responsibilities of the court administrator, which were initially derived from the organizational and support functions of the Judicial Department and from the managerial powers of the chairman of the court, and the measures taken since the adoption of the Concept for its implementation are described, as well as the results achieved at this stage. It is concluded that the results achieved during the implementation of the Concept, as well as other measures to reform the institution of court administrators, are ambiguous. An opinion was expressed on the need to reduce the scope of powers of the head of the court administrator’s office, on the current duplication of the functions of the court administrator and other employees of the court apparatus, as well as on the controversial existence of his compulsory legal education.

In Defence of the Federal Court's Jurisdiction over Judicial Review of Tax Matters

In Defence of the Federal Court's Jurisdiction over Judicial Review of Tax Matters

HOW THE SUPREME COURT DISTORTED TEXT, IGNORED HISTORY, AND GASLIGHTED THE BOLD PROMISE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 A Comcast Case Study

HOW THE SUPREME COURT DISTORTED TEXT, IGNORED HISTORY, AND GASLIGHTED THE BOLD PROMISE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 A <i>Comcast</i> Case Study

Windsor Castle is Made of Mud: The Supreme Court's Approach to Federal Court Jurisdiction

Windsor Castle is Made of Mud: The Supreme Court's Approach to Federal Court Jurisdiction

The Trials and Tribulations of the Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction

This paper discusses the basis for the Canadian Federal Courts jurisdiction – and especially the role and interpretation of the Federal Courts Act. I begin with a brief overview of the constitutional basis for the Federal Courts, and then distinguish between “statutory courts” and courts of “inherent jurisdiction”. In Part II, I examine the waxing and waning of Federal Courts jurisdiction under the Federal Courts Act, focusing on the Courts’ origin in the Exchequer Court of Canada, the troublesome first iteration of Federal Court jurisdiction in the original Federal Court Act, 1970, and the impact of Supreme Court jurisprudence on that Act. Part III focuses on the “reboot” of Federal Court jurisdiction, mostly through amendments to the Federal Court Act enacted in 1990, and in force in 1992. Finally, Part IV examines the current situation, and new uncertainties (and reactions to those uncertainties) sparked by the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements on Federal Courts jurisdiction.

Kumezo Kawato and “Justice Court”

Kumezo Kawato and “Justice Court” CHARLES J. SHEEHAN The Accident Among the early acts reported in Volume 317 of the Supreme Court Reports was the December 21, 1942, memorial for the late Justice Louis D. Brandeis. Gathered that morning were leading jurists and members of the Court’s bar. The proceedings were called to order by Solicitor General Charles Fahy. His brief remarks recognized the mem­ bers absent, those “called this last year to other tasks and places that need them during the war.”1 Judge Calvert Magruder noted the occasion’s setting “[ajmid the din and distractions of war.”2 Imperial Japan’s fury loosed much of the din. Its baleful reach would deepen the struggle of a middle-aged West Coast working man in the early months of 1942—a story that quietly unfolded in Volume 317. In 1889, Kumezo Kawato was born in the southeast coast city of Ugui, Japan.3 He arrived as a teenager in the United States in 1905 and settled in the Los Angeles area.4 In April 1940, he took work as a fisherman on the “vessel Rally,” with his wages set as a share of the Rally's catch.5 On December 4, the Rally was docked and Kawato, in a small skiff alongside (he was five feet one inch),6 was repairing fish nets hanging from the larger vessel. Suddenly, the skiff was “thrown against” the Rally? Kawato sustained “severe injuries to his left foot and leg,” a fracture, and a wrenched knee.8 Immediate medical care from a physician and surgeon was required. Four months of incapacitation followed. Having paid his own medical bills, Kawato was now unable to support himself.9 In April 1941, Kawato brought suit against the Rally in federal district court. His attorney was Herbert R. Lande, of nearby San Pedro. Lande had practiced in California since 1934.10 He represented injured seamen, and his sometime opponent in these matters was attorney Lasher Gallagher.11 Kawato sought “wages due” ($387) and “mainte­ nance care while ashore” ($264—consisting of $38 in medical expenses and $2 “per day” while unable to work).12 In August, Gallagher answered for the Rally with de­ nials both of responsibility and of federal court jurisdiction.13 In a “SEPARATE AND KUMEZO KAWATO AND THE RIGHTS OF RESIDENT ALIENS 195 Kumezo Kawato was a Japanese-born fisherman who lived on Terminal Island, an enclave of 3,500 Japanese Americans near Los Angeles. Above is a photo of unidentified seamen docked at Terminal Island taken before World War II. SPECIAL DEFENSE,” he asserted that Kawato was a “citizen and subject of the Emperor ofJapan,” and that “no citizen ofthe United States shall pay any ... subject of the said Emperor of Japan.”14 A “Japanese” Seaman The case of Kawato the seaman was not the first encounter between Lande and Gal­ lagher, nor the first in which the two contes­ tants over a seaman’s claim found themselves on the docket of federal district court Judge Leon R. Yankwich. In late 1939, Clarence Robinson, an “ordinary seaman,” had fallen ill after “a voyage to the East Coast and return.”15 Robinson, represented by Lande, was unable to work for several months and sued the ship owner, represented by Gal­ lagher, for lost wages and “maintenance” during convalescence. The owner disputed the diagnosis of malaria. Judge Yankwich rendered a brisk and unhesitating decision on May 17, 1940. Declaring “immaterial” the cause of the illness and finding Robinson “unable to work,” he ruled the seaman “en­ titled to recover his wages to the end of his voyage.”16 The maintenance claim he treated with the same dispatch and awarded “actual costs.”17 Unlike Robinson, Kawato was no “or­ dinary seaman” appearing before Judge Yankwich. The times were far from ordi­ nary. Pearl Harbor still smoldered, its horror acutely raw on the Pacific coast, when the Rally sharpened its rhetoric and characterized Kawato as “a Japanese,” with the United States and Japan “at war.”18 Claiming that 196 JOURNAL OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY The first- and second-generation Japanese-Americans living at Terminal Island were forced to leave their homes in February 1942 and were given...

Shrinking the Bench: Should United States' Federal Courts Have Exclusive or Any Jurisdiction to Adjudicate ICARA Cases?

This article discusses whether the United States should follow the international trend and concentrate jurisdiction in a limited number of judges who would resolve disputes under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. At present, both federal and state courts in the United States, and thousands of judges, are authorized to adjudicate Hague Abduction Convention disputes. The article discusses why concurrent jurisdiction exists and explores the debate that occurred about the jurisdictional options at the time Congress enacted the Convention’s implementing legislation, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA). The article then examines the potential advantages of changing ICARA’s jurisdictional regime. In particular, the article delves into topics of judicial expertise, speed and efficiency, uniformity, party access to services such as interpreters and pro bono counsel, and the effectiveness of the Central Authority and liaison judges. It also explores some potential disadvantages of concentrating jurisdiction, including risking harmful amendments to ICARA, inconveniencing litigants, increasing the workload of the courts, and diluting the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction. The examination suggests that while certain advantages might result from the consolidation of jurisdiction, many of them are overstated and would be offset by the advantages litigants gain from a choice of forum. Overall, this article concludes that the United States should maintain the status quo, that is, both the federal and state jurisdictional options. It also concludes that Congress is unlikely to eliminate federal court jurisdiction; consequently, opponents of substantive amendments to ICARA should not use the possibility of jurisdictional consolidation as an excuse to oppose needed substantive reform.

Brief of Professor Aditya Bamzai as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, PDR Network et al. v. Carlton &amp;amp; Harris Chiropractic, Inc.

This amicus brief explains why a federal district court’s interpretation of a statute does not ordinarily “determine the validity” of an agency regulation that embraces a contrary interpretation under the Administrative Orders Review Act of 1950 (the “Hobbs Act”), 28 U.S.C. § 2342. The Hobbs Act splits the jurisdiction of federal courts to address certain legal questions in certain federal cases. It vests “exclusive jurisdiction” in the courts of appeals to perform a set of specified actions, with review obtainable within a 60-day time period and with regard to certain orders and regulations. But the Act leaves district courts to take any other actions — specifically, any actions not specified in the Hobbs Act’s text — in the ordinary course of the district court’s functions. As explained in the brief, by splitting federal court jurisdiction in this manner, the Hobbs Act raises questions of constitutional structure and statutory meaning. First, as to constitutional structure: The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of such a “jurisdiction-splitting” provision in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), where it held that the “exclusive jurisdiction” provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 complied with due process and Article III. Although Yakus is a controversial precedent, the brief argues that the Court can decide this case based on a faithful construction of the Hobbs Act. Second, as to statutory meaning: The precise boundary between matters reviewable only directly and those reviewable in collateral proceedings is specified by the Hobbs Act’s statutory terms. The courts of appeals have “exclusive jurisdiction” to “enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or [ ] determine the validity” of certain specified orders. When a district court merely disagrees with an interpretation expressed in an agency’s regulation, it does not take any of the four actions specified by the Hobbs Act. Congress borrowed the terms used in the Hobbs Act — “enjoin,” “set aside,” “suspend,” and “determine the validity” — from preexisting statutory schemes governing judicial review of agency action. The brief canvasses these preexisting statutory schemes, primarily the Urgent Deficiencies Act of 1913 and the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. Based on these precedents, the brief concludes that a court “determines the validity of” a regulation if, and only if, a violation of the regulation is necessarily a part of the elements of the crime or civil cause of action at issue in the case.

Modern Military Justice: Cases and Materials: Chapter One

This textbook is about the modern military justice system of the United States. It covers court-martial procedures, substantive criminal law, and nonjudicial punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, in addition to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, which gives federal courts jurisdiction over certain acts committed abroad. The Third Edition includes several recent cases and updates that address the significant changes made in the 2019 Manual for Courts-Martial, the Military Justice Act of 2016, and other recent legislation.

Disputing Denied Downward Transfer-Pricing Adjustments

This article considers the appropriate forum for disputing a denied downward transfer-pricing adjustment under subsection 247(10) of the Income Tax Act ("the ITA"). It begins by describing various scenarios in which a request for a downward transfer-pricing adjustment may arise, examines the delegation to officials at the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) of the authority to grant the adjustment, and outlines the CRA's administrative practice on when to grant such adjustments. It then explores whether the Federal Court or the Tax Court of Canada is the appropriate forum to adjudicate a denied downward transfer-pricing adjustment. For disputes under the ITA, the division of jurisdiction between the two courts is generally well defined. The Tax Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the correctness of an assessment whereas the Federal Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to review discretionary decisions of the minister of national revenue or officials at the CRA to whom the minister's powers have been delegated. This jurisdictional divide is less clear for disputes in respect of a denied downward transfer-pricing adjustment. Subsection 247(10) is the only provision in the ITA under which the correct determination of a taxpayer's income is subject to ministerial discretion. The exercise of ministerial discretion suggests that the appropriate forum to dispute a denied transfer-pricing adjustment is the Federal Court. However, subsection 247(11) specifies that the mechanisms for resolving all transfer-pricing disputes under part XVI.1 of the ITA are through the objection and appeal process in part I of the ITA. The language of subsection 247(11), coupled with its legislative history, the restrictions on the Federal Court's jurisdiction, and practical considerations regarding transfer-pricing disputes, all suggest that the Tax Court is the appropriate forum to consider a denied downward transfer-pricing adjustment. Historical case law from the Exchequer Court supports this conclusion. However, there are scenarios in which a denied downward transfer-pricing adjustment may not result in a notice of assessment being issued, and therefore no clear right of appeal to the Tax Court may exist. To ensure that the Tax Court has the jurisdiction to review all denied downward transfer-pricing adjustments, and not only those that result in an assessment, the authors recommend that part XVI.1 of the ITA be amended to include language requiring the minister to issue an assessment in all cases in which a downward transfer-pricing adjustment is denied.

'Major Questions' Moderation

The Chevron doctrine instructs federal courts to afford deference to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous authorizing statutes. Yet in select instances, courts have deviated from Chevron’s command. One of the more confounding deviations is found in cases involving “major questions.” Under this burgeoning doctrine, courts have appropriated what would appear to be typical deference cases, on the basis of the claimed political or economic exceptionality of the stakes. This “major questions exception” is at the center of ongoing debates about the future of Chevron deference and administrative governance more broadly. In this Article, I appraise the major questions doctrine by way of comparison to two other doctrines under which federal courts deviate from convention, and assume principal decision-making authority in light of political or economic concerns. The first arises from a set of cases in which an agency interpretation presents a “serious” constitutional question, leading courts to employ the constitutional avoidance canon. The second arises from cases involving state law claims implicating “substantial” federal issues, leading courts to find federal court jurisdiction where it otherwise wouldn’t exist. Both doctrines provide useful comparators, and in examining how they have been applied, we gain valuable insight into the current and future legitimacy of the major questions doctrine. After drawing the comparisons, the Article argues that the “expertise” justification for the constitutional avoidance canon does not extend to the major questions exception. But the “uniformity” justification for the federal court jurisdictional anomaly might justify the major questions exception as well, depending on how it is employed. The Article concludes by presenting a novel proposition for how the major questions doctrine could evolve to promote uniformity concerns. Until we learn more about which direction the doctrine is headed, moderation is the best approach.

Chief Justice William Howard Taft's Conception of Judicial Integrity: The Legal History of Tumey v. Ohio

On March 7, 1927, Chief Justice William Howard Taft wrote his younger brother Horace Taft, “I am going to deliver an opinion this morning in a very important alcohol prohibition act matter in Ohio.” Taft went on to explain that the Supreme Court’s decision did not address whether the so-called Volstead Act, which implemented the Eighteenth Amendment, was constitutional, but rather it addressed how Ohio’s system of prohibition enforcement violated due process. Ohio’s legislature had enacted a prohibition statute as an analog to the Volstead Act. Known as the “Crabbe Act,” Ohio’s law barred the possession of “intoxicating liquor.” After mailing his letter to his brother, Taft walked to the Supreme Court and assembled the Justices to announce the decision. Reported in newspapers across the country, the decision, captioned as Tumey v. Ohio, determined that Ohio’s downward delegation of prohibition enforcement to municipal courts failed to ensure due process. One day before writing to Horace, Taft wrote to his son Charles Phelps Taft II that the Court had unanimously determined that the Crabbe Act was “invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment” and then stressed that the Justices found the Ohio law repugnant to fundamental rights. Tumey has become a benchmark for assessing judicial impartiality, but the legal history of the decision, including how it was shaped, has hardly been written about. Professor Robert Post, in an article titled “Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era,” placed Tumey as part of the Court’s authoritative – or “national” – expansion over the United States. Yet unlike decisions upholding Prohibition, Tumey placed restraints against its enforcement. Professor Post was not in error in analyzing Tumey in the context of Prohibition or the Court’s authoritative expansion, but to exclusively do so results in an incomplete historic analysis of the judicial intent underlying the decision. For instance, Tumey arose during Taft’s efforts to limit congressional attempts to govern the judiciary. The case was also decided at a time when Taft had been attacked as being beholden to corporate interests and therefore overly partial to wealthy litigants. Most importantly, Tumey was part of a line of cases and extrajudicial actions that Taft used to shape judicial ethics. A legal history centering on Taft’s conception of the duties and independence of judges, as well as constraints on judicial power, amplifies how he led a largely conservative, yet jurisprudentially diverse, Court to unanimously intervene in a state’s municipal court construct. While it may be correct, as legal historian Melvin Urofsky has pointed out, that during the period Taft sat as Chief Justice the justices limited their dissents in an effort to fend off Congressional efforts to narrow federal court jurisdiction, the justices did dissent in several appeals, particularly decisions involving criminal prosecutions. The unanimity underlying Tumey is also, in this light, a noteworthy element in analyzing Taft’s intent.

Don't Get Thrown Out On YourDerrière: Common Mistakes In Establishing Federal Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

IN federal court, subject-matter jurisdiction is a magic bullet. Jurisdictional problems are particularly pernicious (to the verdict winner) or useful (to the verdict loser) because they can never be waived, the court must address any potential jurisdictional defect it notices, and an incurable jurisdictional defect requires the judgment to be thrown out. We review some common defects in federal subject-matter jurisdiction and potential ways to fix them. (1) I. Why Defects In Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Can Destroy Your Victory (Or Save You From Defeat) courts are courts of limited jurisdiction [,] possessing that power authorized by Constitution and statute.... (2) At every stage of litigation, a federal court is required to confirm that it has jurisdiction, and to dismiss the claim if it lacks jurisdiction. (3) court generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has subject-matter jurisdiction. (4) If it appears that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. (5) This rule holds even after final judgment has been entered and an appeal filed. federal appellate court is required to evaluate both its own jurisdiction and that of the district court. If the district court lacked jurisdiction, the appellate court must vacate the judgment: [E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review, even though the parties are prepared to concede it. And if the record discloses that the lower court was without jurisdiction this court will notice the defect, although the parties make no contention concerning it. When the lower federal court lacks jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction on appeal, not of the merits but merely for the purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in entertaining the suit. (6) A litigant generally may raise a court's lack of subject-matter jurisdiction at any time in the same civil action, even initially at the highest appellate instance. (7) Even if a jurisdictional defect is first discovered after trial or after judgment has been entered, it requires the case to be dismissed. (8) Jurisdiction cannot be created by consent or estoppel, or by 'the parties' litigation conduct.' (9) Even a party that initially brought the case to federal court can attack jurisdiction. (10) Federal district courts and courts of appeals take these requirements seriously. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(4) requires appellants to explain why the district court and court of appeals have subject-matter jurisdiction. Many district courts and courts of appeals instruct their staff to confirm the court's subject-matter jurisdiction at the inception of a case. Indeed, it is not uncommon for a district court or court of appeals to issue a sua sponte order requiring the parties to explain why there is subject-matter jurisdiction, even when no one disputes it. Meticulous attention to the jurisdictional requirements is therefore critical. We outline some common pitfalls in pleading and establishing both diversity and federal subject-matter jurisdiction, and describe some ways to fix them. II. Diversity Jurisdiction A. Background Article III of the U.S. Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United States extends to, inter alia, controversies citizens of different and a state, or citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects. (11) Pursuant to this provision, the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. [sections] 1332, grants federal courts jurisdiction over suits in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the dispute is between (a) citizens of different states, (b) citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign country (excluding lawful permanent residents domiciled in the same state), (c) citizens of different states in which citizens or subjects of foreign countries are additional parties, or (d) a foreign state as plaintiff and citizens of a state or of different states. …

Libel tourism in Australia: evaluating the jurisdiction of Australian courts

This paper aims to contribute to the discussion about the jurisdiction of Australian courts in the context of international or transnational defamation. The paper questions the appropriateness of the rules informing in personam jurisdiction of Federal, State and Territory Courts in Australia, drawing on recent case law, legislative developments and existing literature.

Naquin v. Elevating Boats, LLC: The Fifth Circuit’s Improper Expansion of Jones Act “Seaman Status” Qualification

The story began nearly a century ago, when Congress enacted the Jones Act and effectively made “seamen the most generously treated personal injury victims in American law.” But defining a Jones Act seaman has not come easy, as it took the United States Supreme Court seventy five years to arrive at the modern seaman status test. This commentary examines the “tortured history” of the Jones Act, how qualification for the statute’s protections has evolved, the modern seaman status test, and the implications of the Fifth Circuit’s recent application thereof. Section II gives a brief history and explanation of maritime law in the United States and the sources of federal court jurisdiction over maritime cases. Section III discusses pre-Jones Act maritime personal injury claims and the significance that the statute’s enactment has had on the maritime industry. Section IV discusses the evolution of the seaman status test to the modern framework. Section V discusses the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C. Section VI discusses the implications of this holding and proposes an adjustment to the seaman status test.

Brief of Interested Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent in Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl

The petitioner in this case has framed the question presented as follows: “Whether the Tax Injunction Act bars federal court jurisdiction over a suit brought by non-taxpayers to enjoin the informational notice and reporting requirements of a state law that neither imposes a tax, nor requires the collection of a tax, but serves only as a secondary aspect of state tax administration.”Amici agree with the respondent, the State of Colorado, that the Tax Injunction Act bars federal courts from enjoining the operation of the Colorado Statute at issue in this case because this lawsuit is intended to create the very kind of premature federal court interference with the operation of the Colorado use tax collection system that the TIA was designed to prevent. To assist the Court in understanding the application of the TIA to this case, amici (i) place the reporting requirements mandated by the Colorado Statute in the broader context of tax administration and (ii) explain the potential interaction between a decision on the TIA issue in this case and the underlying dispute concerning the dormant Commerce Clause.Third-party reporting of tax information is a ubiquitous and longstanding feature of modern tax systems. When tax authorities rely on taxpayers to self-report their taxable activities, compliance rates for the collection of any tax is low. Like all states with a sales tax, Colorado faced – and faces – a voluntary compliance problem with the collection of its use tax. The use tax is a complement to the sales tax; in-state vendors collect and remit the sales tax, while in-state consumers are responsible for remitting the use tax on purchases made from out-of-state vendors that do not collect the sales tax. To this compliance challenge, Colorado turned to a third-party reporting solution. In broad strokes, the Colorado Statute imposes a modest requirement on one party to a taxable transaction – specifically on relatively large retailers who do not collect the use tax - to report information on their Colorado sales both to the consumer/taxpayer and to the taxing authorities. Amici law professors contend that the centrality of third-party reporting to tax administration in general, and its aptness for this problem in particular, indicate that enjoining the operation of the Colorado Statute constitutes “restrain[ing] the assessment, levy or collection” of Colorado’s use tax. Amici also observe, however, that even a narrow ruling on the scope of the TIA in the Supreme Court could have an unexpected - and we would argue undesirable – impact on the federalism concerns that we think should decide this case. This is because any interpretation of the Colorado Statute for purposes of the TIA made by the Court might be erroneously construed as carrying over to interpreting the Statute for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause. We think it likely and reasonable for the courts below to look to the Supreme Court’s decision on the TIA for guidance as to what test to apply under the dormant Commerce Clause. However, amici fear that a decision that held that Colorado’s reporting requirement is integral to Colorado’s “tax collection” for purposes of the TIA will exert a gravitational pull on the lower courts, encouraging them to apply the physical presence test from Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) to the Colorado Statute. The Quill test is an especially strict test under the dormant Commerce Clause, and one arguably meant only for “taxes.” Thus, a victory for sensible state tax administration and federalism in this Court could be transmuted into a defeat for those principles below. Amici believe that NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), teaches that an answer on the TIA does not compel an answer concerning the dormant Commerce Clause. We call this issue to the Court’s attention so that the Court is aware of how a decision on the TIA issue might be used – or misused – when the case reaches the merits, either in the state or federal court system.

Article III: Cases &amp; Controversies - Teaching the Already v. Nike Case

Nike is the market leader selling athletic shoes worldwide. Already markets its products to a smaller segment of the athletic shoe market. These two companies battled at the intersection of the intellectual property, federal court jurisdiction and constitutional law. These slides help teach the Already v. Nike Supreme Court case. These slides cover issues such as Article III cases & controversies, intellectual property rights in trademarks and patents as well as mootness and standing doctrines.

Abuse of the Journalist's Shield: A State-by-State Survey of Blogger Liability for Trade Secret Misappropriation and Texas's Shield Statutes as a Model for Federal Preemption

This Comment addresses the tension between the maintenance of trade secrets and the potential liability issues that arise when a reporter/blogger disseminates those trade secrets. Specifically, this Comment focuses on whether third party bloggers should be subject to criminal sanctions under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996.For the proposal and solution sections, this Comment focuses on three dynamics that currently make trade secret law difficult to enforce. First, unlike all other forms of intellectual property, trade secrets are civilly enforced under state laws and do not benefit from a uniform, federal system of laws like copyrights, trademarks, and patents. With the advent of the Internet and modern commerce, business is no longer carried out only on a local scale. It is carried out in a national and international marketplace and should be afforded the standardized federal court jurisdiction that all other intellectual property rights are given. Second, courts today have placed too onerous of a burden on a corporation to establish whether that corporation has adequately guarded the secret. Only sufficiently guarded secrets are afforded trade secret status and protection. Third, The use of the Economic Espionage Act has been almost nonexistent since its enactment in 1996. Under the Economic Espionage Act, some trade secret infringement claims are actionable as a criminal offense. In certain bad faith infringement claims, use of the Economic Espionage Act may be the only deterrent to preventing misappropriation of an owner’s trade secret.The background section of this Comment begins with a historical look at trade secret protection, analyzes the depths and application of modern trade secret jurisprudence, closely uses the framework of a 2012 trade secret case as a framework for an in-depth analysis of the Economic Espionage Act. Next, the background section closely examines state reporter’s shield laws, and compares them with state trade secret laws. This Comment includes a detailed survey of all trade secret laws and reporter’s shield statutes for all fifty states and the District of Columbia and proposes Texas's journalist's shield statutes as a model for if or when federal court jurisdiction is provided for trade secret claims.

Kiobel, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and the Alien Tort Statute

The Supreme Court is currently reviewing the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, a case holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) over claims against corporations. Although the parties have focused on issues of corporate liability under the ATS, there is a logically antecedent question of subject matter jurisdiction that the Court should decide before considering corporate liability. All of the parties in Kiobel — whether corporate or individual — are aliens. Understood in its full legal and historical context, the ATS was a jurisdictional statute that did not apply to suits between aliens. The First Congress enacted the ATS as a species of foreign diversity jurisdiction to satisfy the United States’ obligation under international law to redress violence by U.S. citizens against foreign citizens. Accordingly, the ATS was originally understood to give federal courts jurisdiction only over claims by aliens against U.S. citizens for intentional torts to person or personal property. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court sought to interpret the ATS in accordance with the expectations of the First Congress. If the Court adheres to this goal in Kiobel, then it should conclude that it lacks statutory subject matter jurisdiction over the case. If the Court decides that the ATS does not apply to suits between aliens, then the Court likely will never have occasion to decide the thorny question of corporate liability under the ATS. Under the express terms of 28 U.S.C. §1332, federal courts already have jurisdiction over suits by aliens against U.S. corporations provided that the amount in controversy is greater than $75,000.00 — a condition easily met in cases against large corporations.

Equity’s New Frontier: Receiverships in Indian Country

Southern California’s Coachella Valley is one of the poorest regions in the country. Its location in Riverside County—which is within close proximity to some of the nation’s wealthiest citizens and also the U.S.-Mexico border—along with the county’s dependence on the agriculture industry has contributed to a significant demand for low-wage farm workers, who often have a mix of immigration statuses. Historical, political, and socioeconomic factors have compounded to limit affordable housing options in the Coachella Valley for these farm workers and have generated the proliferation of illegal trailer parks with egregious habitability concerns on the vast swathes of Indian country throughout the county. Tribal sovereignty renders these parks beyond the reach of prophylactic state and local laws that would otherwise protect the health, safety, and welfare of the parks’ residents. Consequently, these parks are subject only to the jurisdiction of federal courts. In United States v. Duro, a federal judge appointed a receiver to oversee urgent infrastructure improvements in Duroville, one of the largest parks. Receivership is arguably the strongest and most invasive articulation of a court’s equitable powers because it strips a party of his property rights and vests control of the property in question to a third party that is accountable only to the court. The court’s action in appointing a receiver was a key factor in the provision of a safe relocation site for