Judicial Conference Research Articles

A Century of Patent Litigation in Perspective

When comparing patent litigation rates or their “rarity” across decades, one must take into account the proportion to the actual scale of commercial activities that give rise to patent disputes. Such normalizing scales are preferably national metrics of commercial activity such as (a) the number of patents issued in the year, (b) the total number of patents in force over which disputes may arise, (c) the total number of Federal civil suits, or (d) the economic scale of the Gross National Product (GDP) in real dollars. This paper marshals for the first time information on all patent litigation in Federal district courts spanning almost a century. The patent lawsuit filing information is newly obtained from the Judicial Conference Annual Reports going back to 1937 and further collected from the weekly Official Gazette of the Patent Office going back to 1923. In addition, an estimate for the number of US patents in force in each of the years covered is derived. Using non-parametric statistical tests, it is shown that, with the exception of the AIA-caused litigation anomaly of 2011-2013 explained in the paper, for all four normalizing metrics, patent litigation intensities during this century had not exceeded those experienced during the 20th century. High patent litigation intensities in the 1920s-1930s and the 1960s have been comparable to, if not higher than, those in the 2000s. These litigation activities are thought to be consistent with major shifts in technological developments such as the development of radio and electronics and chemical advances in the 1920s-1930s, the development of semiconductor transistor electronics in the 1960s and the wireless communications and internet-based technologies at the turn of the 20th century.

Amicus Briefs of the National Association of Consumer Advocates in <i>Day v. Persels & Associates</i>, 729 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2013)

Amicus Briefs of the National Association of Consumer Advocates in <i>Day v. Persels & Associates</i>, 729 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2013)

The Chief Justice as Executive

AbstractThis article is the first comprehensive empirical study of chief justice appointments to the Judicial Conference committees of the US Courts, entities with influence over substantive public and legal policy. Using a newly created database of all judges appointed to serve on Judicial Conference committees between 1986 and 2012, the results indicate that a judge’s partisan alignment with the chief justice matters, as do personal characteristics such as race, experience on the bench, and court level. These results support claims that Judicial Conference committee selection, membership, and participation may present a vehicle for advancing the chief justice’s individual political and policy interests.

The Judges of the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation

The United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (or Panel) is one of a small number of special federal courts created pursuant to Article III by Congress and staffed by a Chief-Justice-appointed group of Article III judges for limited terms. The MDL Panel is a powerful judicial institution with substantial discretion over complex litigation in the United States. For all practical purposes, it controls where many of the most far-reaching and significant private civil actions will be resolved which can affect procedural and substantive rights of the parties. An understanding of who has served on the MDL Panel would shed light on both its structure and its decisions. In this article, we provided an analysis of the composition of the Panel, as well as comparing Panel appointments by the Chief Justice to those of the Judicial Conference Committees.

A Judicious Solution: The Criminal Law Committee Draft Redefinition of the 'Loss' Concept in Economic Crime Sentencing

This Article is one of a group of papers published in connection with the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Third Symposium On Crime and Punishment in the United States: Federal Sentencing Policy for Economic Crimes and New Technology Offenses, hosted by George Mason University School of Law in October 2000. Economic crime defendants comprise over one-fifth of all offenders convicted and sentenced in federal courts. On April 6, 2001, the U.S. Sentencing Commission approved a group of amendments to guidelines governing the sentencing of economic crimes that will go into effect absent a congressional veto on November 1, 2001. These measures, collectively known as the economic crime package, are the culmination of some six years of deliberations by both the Conaboy and Murphy Sentencing Commissions working together with interested outside groups such as the defense bar, the Justice Department, probation officers, and the Criminal Law Committee of the U.S. Judicial Conference. The package contains three basic components. First, the now-separate theft and fraud guidelines, Sections 2B1.1 and 2F1.1, will be consolidated into a single guideline. Second, the loss table in the consolidated guideline will be different from the current theft and fraud loss tables. Third, the troublesome concept of loss, the linchpin of economic crime sentencing under the Guidelines, is redefined. The Criminal Law Committee of the U.S. Judicial Conference (CLC) was a particularly influential participant in the debate over the economic crime package. In order to assist the Sentencing Commission in its deliberations, the CLC submitted to the Commission its own economic crime sentencing reform proposal. The judges recommended: (1) that the theft and fraud guidelines be consolidated; (2) that the loss table be simplified by reducing the number of its levels, and modified by decreasing sentences for some low-loss offenders while increasing sentences for some high-loss offenders; and (3) that loss be redefined. Most importantly, the CLC went beyond general recommendations and transmitted to the Sentencing Commission a specific proposal for a new loss table and draft language for a redefinition of loss. The purpose of this Article is three-fold. First, it explains the need for consolidation of the theft and fraud guidelines and for a revised definition of loss. Second, it introduces the CLC's proposed loss definition and explains, in detail, the reasoning behind the drafting choices made by the judges of the CLC when preparing this proposed new definition. Third, where appropriate, it addresses differences between the CLC proposal and other draft definitions that put forward by Commission staff and other participants in the reform process. The Article is written by the academic advisor to the CLC during the economic crime debate. It is of significance to judges and federal criminal practitioners because the majority of the substantive provisions of the CLC loss proposal were included in the language adopted by the Sentencing Commission. Thus, the CLC proposal and the thinking behind it constitute an important element of the legislative history of new sentencing rules affecting more than 11,000 federal defendants annually.

The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Bankruptcy and the Plight of the Debtor

An innocent debtor, who is either ignorant of her constitutional right to the privilege against self-incrimination or ineffectual in asserting it, may find herself wrongfully convicted and imprisoned in a criminal matter, due to unwitting complicity in the delivery of testimony or documents in her bankruptcy case. This lack of understanding poses a serious risk to debtors, and especially affects the increasing number of pro se debtors in bankruptcy. The privilege extends to debtors in bankruptcy proceedings. However, a debtor who fails to properly invoke the privilege waives her rights. This possibility is made more probable because there is no requirement that she be told about the privilege prior to filing or interrogation.Without any requirement of notice, there is no application of the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings. In short, the privilege must be invoked through an unambiguous assertion in bankruptcy, or it is lost. For this reason, the Court, under its rulemaking authority, should adopt a revised Official Form B201A for use in consumer bankruptcy cases, to ensure the just determination of every case and protect the debtor’s privilege. The revised form would provide pre-filing notice, in writing, of the privilege against self-incrimination. To accomplish this, the Judicial Conference of the United States should promulgate the proposed form pursuant to its rulemaking authority. This form would serve to make the debtor aware of the privilege prior to filing and the consequences of invocation and waiver, so that the privilege would not be lost through ignorance, inadvertence, or lack of competent counsel. This article has four parts. Part I analyzes the scope and application of the privilege and distinguishes the privilege in bankruptcy from its counterpart in the custodial setting. Part II examines the increased risk to the pro se debtor and the value of the privilege both to the truly innocent who are seemingly guilty and the presumptively innocent regardless of guilt. Part III explores the plight of the debtor under current law and explains the risk of nondisclosure of the privilege. Finally, Part IV proposes a change in the language of Official Form B201A to alleviate the problems caused by nondisclosure. In short, the author’s thesis is that only through the pre-filing delivery of notice will the debtor's right to the privilege be meaningful.

The Twelve-Person Federal Civil Jury in Exile

In the mid-1990s, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, with Fifth Circuit Judge Patrick Higginbotham as Chair and our honoree, Professor Ed Cooper, in the early years of his long service as Reporter, unanimously (coincidentally, by a 12-0 vote) proposed an amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 48 that would have required the seating of twelve-member juries in federal civil trials. The requirement of a unanimous verdict, unless waived by the parties, and the abolition of alternate jurors would have been unaffected; attrition could reduce a jury's size below twelve members, with a floor of six unless the parties consented to a verdict rendered by a smaller jury. The Standing Committee approved the final proposal by a wide margin, but the Judicial Conference rejected the change. As a member of the Advisory Committee at the time I was strongly persuaded that the amendment had merit and continue to feel that way, but must admit that the chances of a renewed proposal being adopted seem virtually nil no matter its merit. This brief account is, then, a lament rather than a call to action.

The Great and Powerful Oz Revealed: The Ethics and Wisdom of the Scotus Leaks in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebilius

On July 1, 2012, Jan Crawford of CBS News reported details of the confidential deliberations of the Supreme Court of the United States in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebilius. Specifically, she revealed that Chief Justice John G. Roberts began working with Associate Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito to draft an opinion striking the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the “PPACA”) as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power to regulate commerce. According to Crawford, he later had a change of heart and worked with Associate Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia Sotomayer, and Elena Kagan to draft the majority opinion upholding the act under Congress’s taxing power. The media seized upon this reported change of position. Conservative media outlets decried Roberts’s actions as the result of political pressure from the left. Others suggested that Chief Justice Roberts sought to promote intergovernmental harmony by upholding historic legislation that Congress had passed and the President had approved.Ms. Crawford relied on information that “two sources with specific knowledge of the deliberations” had provided to her. One important question has escaped media attention: can or should Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States discuss details of deliberations with the press, even anonymously? This essay attempts to answer that question by addressing the ethical implications of such statements from the Court, the conflict between the restrictions on judicial speech and the First Amendment rights of the Justices of the Court, and the wisdom of such extrajudicial statements. Both the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Conduct for United States Judges contain restrictions on extrajudicial speech. Specifically, those codes prohibit judges from commenting publicly on a pending or impending case. These restrictions on judicial speech would likely survive a constitutional challenge under the First Amendment because of the compelling government interest in maintaining the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary. Unfortunately, neither the Code of Conduct nor the Model Code apply to the actions of the SCOTUS informants in this instance. First, the Supreme Court is not subject to the Model Code because that code serves solely as a model on which specific jurisdictions may choose to base their own codes of conduct. The Judicial Conference of the United States did adopt a version of the Model Code, the Code of Conduct for United States Judges. That code, however, does not lust the Supreme Court among the judges to whom it is intended to apply. Moreover, the Supreme Court created the Judicial Conference and is not subject to its disciplinary authority. The second reason neither code applies to the SCOTUS leaks is because Jan Crawford’s story broke days after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in National Federation. Because the decision of the Court was not appealable, that case was no longer pending at the time the confidential information was leaked to Ms. Crawford. Thus, the actions of Ms. Crawford’s source did not violate either the Model Code or the Code of Conduct.Although the SCOTUS leaks did not violate either the Code of Conduct for United States Judges or the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, such anonymous comments to the press about the internal deliberations of the Court denigrate the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the institution. In so doing, the actions violated Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Code of Conduct and Canons 1 and 2 of the Model Code. Moreover, the Comment to Rule 3(A)(6) cautions judges to take care in making public comments concerning a case from the judge’s own court, even if otherwise permitted by the rules, because such comments may “denigrate public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality, which would violate Canon 2A.” Moving forward, the Court and its staff should aspire to achieve the overarching principles set forth in the canons of both the Code of Conduct and the Model Code. The Supreme Court must return to a minimum level of discretion and decorum if it hopes to restore its reputation for independence, integrity, and impartiality. If the Supreme Court cannot strive to achieve these goals, there is little hope lesser courts will be as successful in their quests to do so.

The Curious Dynamic of Players' Associations Bargaining Eligibility Rules on Behalf of Prospective Players

Is it appropriate that pro athletes in a players' association -- a union -- can collectively bargain away the eligibility of athletes who, because of their age or inexperience, are denied entry into a professional sports league? This question relates more specifically to eligibility restrictions in the NFL, NBA and the WNBA. These are the only three major U.S. sports leagues that prohibit players until a prescribed period after high school graduation.. While modern views of labor law suggest that players' association have the legal right to bargain on behalf of prospective players and to bargain away their eligibility, this arrangement carries conflicts of interest and highlights a need for a federal sports law.This work-in-progress consists of remarks I made to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Judicial Conference on August 9, 2012.

Of Waves and Water: A Response to Comments on the FJC Study Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim after Iqbal

This paper responds to comments regarding the Federal Judicial Center’s recent studies of the resolution of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Those studies, undertaken at the request of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, found a statistically significant increase in the rate at which defendants file motions to dismiss following the Supreme Court decisions in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal. The studies also found no statistically significant increase in the rate of grants of motions to dismiss without leave to amend, except in cases involving challenges to financial instruments such as mortgages, and no statistically significant increase in cases terminated by such motions. Several scholars have expressed reservations regarding these findings and raised a number of specific issues regarding the research. This paper responds to the following issues:• Professor Hoffman’s concerns about our use of statistical analysis in general, and the use of multinomial statistical models in particular;• Professor Moore’s concerns about the exclusion from our study of pro se cases and cases asserting affirmative defenses, and the findings of her most recent study of the outcome of motions to dismiss;• Professor Brescia’s recent study finding an increase in grant rate of motions to dismiss in employment and housing discrimination cases; and • Professor Gelbach’s incorporation of our findings into an economic model of pretrial litigation that attempts to estimate the overall effect on settlement and access to discovery.I continue to believe that our findings represent the most accurate statement of the federal district courts’ response to these Supreme Court decisions, but acknowledge that this response has continued to evolve since we conducted our study. I propose a study of all dispositive motions that will, among other things, examine the interaction between motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and motions for summary judgment.

Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim after Iqbal: Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules

This report presents the findings of a Federal Judicial Center study on the filing and resolution of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The study was requested by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. The study compared motion activity in 23 federal district courts in 2006 and 2010 and included an assessment of the outcome of motions in orders that do not appear in the computerized legal reference systems such as Westlaw. Statistical models were used to control for such factors as differences in levels of motion activity in individual federal district courts and types of cases.After excluding cases filed by prisoners and pro se parties, and after controlling for differences in motion activity across federal district courts and across types of cases and for the presence of an amended complaint, we found the following:• There was a general increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate of filing of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim (see infra section III.A).• In general, there was no increase in the rate of grants of motions to dismiss without leave to amend. There was, in particular, no increase in the rate of grants of motions to dismiss without leave to amend in civil rights cases and employment discrimination cases (see infra section III.B.1).• Only in cases challenging mortgage loans on both federal and state law grounds did we find an increase in the rate of grants of motions to dismiss without leave to amend. Many of these cases were removed from state to federal court. This category of cases tripled in number during the relevant period in response to events in the housing market (see infra section III.B.1). There is no reason to believe that the rate of dismissals without leave to amend would have been lower in 2006 had such cases existed then.• There was no increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate at which a grant of a motion to dismiss terminated the case (see infra section III.B.1).

The Hidden Costs of Habeas Delay

Because habeas petitioners seek a court order for liberty rather than compensation, judges have a duty to decide habeas petitions promptly. But increasingly, the federal courts have fallen behind on their heavy habeas dockets, and many petitions — some of which are meritorious — remain undecided for years. First, this Article makes the normative and historical argument that speed must be, and always has been, central to the function of habeas. Second, it analyzes newly compiled Administrative Office of the United States Courts data on more than 200,000 habeas petitions and demonstrates empirically for the first time that there is a widespread and growing problem of delay in the resolution of habeas petitions in the federal courts. Third, this Article offers a specific and concrete remedy for the habeas delay problem, recommending that the Judicial Conference of the United States require judges to identify publicly all habeas petitions that have been pending in their chambers for more than six months, just as the Civil Justice Reform Act requires them to do for all other civil motions.

Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim after Iqbal: Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules

Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim after Iqbal: Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules

Public Trial in the Age of Internet

The Judicial Conference of the United States has a longstanding policy prohibiting television and other electronic media coverage of federal district court proceedings. The public is losing a great deal from being deprived of easy access to the proceedings in its courts. Despite the top-down command to ban cameras, bottom-up resistance seems to be gaining momentum in the district and circuit courts. Internet access to gavel-to-gavel digital recording of public court proceedings would allow all who are interested to follow the proceedings. Those who would deny the public that access ought at least to bear the burden of rationally explaining why the public should be excluded from what purport to be public trials.

Attorney Satisfaction with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules

This report provides a brief comparison of the results of three surveys on the current operation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

David Souter: A Clerk’s View

David Souter: A Clerk’s View KERMIT ROOSEVELT Many former Supreme Court clerks describe their clerkship as the best job of their lives. David Souter’s former clerks do too, though with what I believe is a greater than normal frequency. (As a former Souter clerk I confess to partiality.) But while Souter resembles other Justices in the devoted affection he inspires, he was in many other ways a very unusual presence at the Supreme Court. There are, ofcourse, the foibles for which Souter was well known. His frugality and simplicity are colorful by the standards of Supreme Court Justices, and so the media paid attention to the fact that he ate apples and yo­ gurt for lunch, wrote with a fountain pen, and disdained overcoats. It is true that Justice Souter abhors ex­ travagance and waste. He would read by nat­ ural light rather than use electricity even if he had to stand by the window to do so, and he once wrote me a note on a napkin I had left on my desk rather than use a fresh sheet ofpaper. But these characteristics are not simple eccentricities; they are indications of deeper currents in Souter’s character. Souter is ajudge, and a man, oftrue humility. He treated clerks, Court staff, and fellow Justices with the same respect, and he had a modest vision of the judge’s role, one rooted in the commonlaw methodology he brought to the Supreme Court. Law is important, Souter believes, indi­ vidualjudges less so. Satisfaction, he once told the Third Circuit judicial conference, comes less from great moments than from being part of the great stream of law. On his resigna­ tion, some writers complained that he did not leave bold doctrines or memorable phrases. But Souter does not see the judge’s role as working dramatic changes in the law or whip­ ping up passions outside the court. A great moment for a judge is not the dramatic break with precedent or the minting of a sparkling phrase; it is the quiet resistance against excess. There are moments of crisis, and some­ times judges must confront them. Souter has also spoken ofGettysburg, and ofthe men who found themselves facing Pickett’s charge. But the role he sees for courts in such times is not to wade in gleefully on one side or the other. It is to moderate, to be a safe place in society, as free of passion and partisanship as human nature allows. At the clerk reunion after his 8 JOURNAL OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY David Souter had only served for a few months as a federal judge when President George H. W. Bush selected him to fill the Supreme Court seat vacated by Justice William Brennan. retirement was announced, he told us the story of a New England ancestor who had stopped the witch trials of Salem from spreading to his town, refusing to issue a warrant against an accused girl with the simple words “We will have none of that here.” It is not a lofty phrase or an ambitious theory, but it is a pretty good judicial philosophy, and if we look back at Souter’s notable decisions, I think we will see it has explanatory power. When the time found him, he stood against extremism and held the line. Souter was also unusual in his fondness for New Hampshire and distaste for Washing­ ton. No Justice was more eager to leave the capital at the end ofthe Term, and speaking to the Justice when he was in New Hampshire, you could almost hear over the phone line the pleasure and renewal he drew from its simple calm. This, too, was indicative of deeper cur­ rents. Who would not enjoy the social status and accolades accorded Supreme Court Jus­ tices? Someone who thought they got in the way of real personal interaction. Because of his distaste for the events and parties of Wash­ ington society, Souter was often mistaken for an awkward recluse. But his clerks know him as a warm and witty man who most afternoons would emerge from Chambers to take a cup of coffee and put us in stitches with anec­ dotes about...

Finding and Citing the 'Unimportant' Decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals

A Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure that took effect at the end of 2006 overturned past policies in several circuits that banned or severely limited citation of unpublished or nonprecedential opinions. All U.S. Court of Appeals decisions issued after January 1, 2007, published or not, may be cited. One of the objections raised by those opposed to the rule rested on concern about access to such opinions, which constitute more than 80% of the annual total. The Judicial Conference committee that drafted and pressed for adoption of the rule pointed out that federal legislation called on the circuit courts to place all their decisions, published or not, on the Web in text-searchable format. Wrote the committee, chaired by Justice Samuel Alito (then a Third Circuit judge), [T]he E-Government Act ... makes unpublished opinions widely available at little or no cost. Despite that legislative mandate, very real challenges confront anyone seeking to take advantage of the new rule who is unable or unwilling to pay the cost of Westlaw or Lexis. The paper surveys the challenges of searching for, retrieving, and citing unpublished or nonprecedential decisions of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals without using those costly services. It also sets out a few straightforward steps the federal judiciary might take that would fulfill the promise of the E-Government Act's provisions.

Online Access to Court Records - from Documents to Data, Particulars to Patterns

For over a decade public has had remote access to federal court records held in electronic format, including documents filed by litigants and judicial rulings. First available via dial-up connections, access migrated to Web in 1998. That and a succession of other improvements to federal Public Access to Court Electronic Records system or PACER prompted Administrative Office of United States Courts to proclaim in 2001 that the advancement of technology has brought citizen ever closer to courthouse. Unquestionably, what Administrative Office of U.S. Courts and Judicial Conference of United States have built offers citizens, businesses, journalists, and scholars unprecedented access to details of individual court proceedings. But to hold PACER in that frame is to miss much of its impact. Moreover, some of gains one might hope or expect to flow from enhanced judicial transparency remain largely untouched by this system. The article explores PACER's evolution, larger impact, and unrealized possibilities. It then proceeds to examine why state courts are, in general, approaching online access to court records so differently.

Which Governance for European Private Law?

The paper describes the necessity to consider the role of private rule making and the increasing importance of national regulatory agencies, in the process of European legal integration. It then focuses on the legislative design and process implementation of EPL. Its departing assumption is that EPL is and will remain a multilevel system where national implementation of European legislation generates intentional and unintentional spillover effects to be 'governed' through horizontal devices. The author underlines that the current legislative and judicial trend towards total harmonization is the wrong response to normative differentiation occurring in the process of national implementation. He analyses in particular the areas of unfair contract terms and commercial practices, providing examples of divergent implementation which can not be tackled only at legislative level, claiming that governance is a better response. He examines traditional modes of governance and then considers the applicability of new modes of governance to EPL. He makes several reform proposals; most of them do not require legislative intervention. At the legislative level, given that the competences are organised around policy areas while private law, following the national traditions, is conceptually organised around institutions, he proposes different ways to improve coordination at the Commission level, concerning legislative draft. Legislative drafting can also be improved by considering the different impacts of new legal categories in national legal systems, especially the general clauses. At the implementation level he emphasizes the role of judicial governance and the lack of coordination among national judiciaries proposing the establishment of a permanent judicial conference specialised in EPL to be coordinated with TFI and ECJ. He then proposes the institution of committees operating according to subjects (contract, property, tort) that would cut across directorates competences and would analyse the impact of European legislation on private law national systems. Finally he proposes the use of OMC, adequately redefined to evaluate the policy effects of implementation especially when it involves national regulatory agencies.

Judicial Ethics Education in the Federal Courts

Given the importance of judicial ethics to the public's confidence in the judiciary, educating judges about ethics is a high and continuing priority in the federal courts. People appointed as federal judges typically have strong records of integrity and are motivated to act ethically, but inadvertent mistakes sometimes occur, and they harm the reputation of the judge and the judiciary. The Federal Judicial Center, the education agency for the federal courts, works closely with the Judicial Conference committees responsible for administering and interpreting the sources of ethical rules: statutes and the Code of Conduct for United States Judges. Together they have developed curricula for in-person programs and resources in hard-copy and online formats, as well as television programs. Ethics is included in orientation programs for new judges and in annual continuing education programs for judges. These sessions are usually interactive discussions, often using real or hypothetical problems. By regularly covering ethics, the goal is to heighten judges' sensitivity to ethical issues.