Judgments Of Relative Frequency Research Articles

The bounded rationality of probability distortion

In decision making under risk (DMR) participants' choices are based on probability values systematically different from those that are objectively correct. Similar systematic distortions are found in tasks involving relative frequency judgments (JRF). These distortions limit performance in a wide variety of tasks and an evident question is, Why do we systematically fail in our use of probability and relative frequency information? We propose a bounded log-odds model (BLO) of probability and relative frequency distortion based on three assumptions: 1) log-odds: probability and relative frequency are mapped to an internal log-odds scale, 2) boundedness: the range of representations of probability and relative frequency are bounded and the bounds change dynamically with task, and 3) variance compensation: the mapping compensates in part for uncertainty in probability and relative frequency values. We compared human performance in both DMR and JRF tasks to the predictions of the BLO model as well as 11 alternative models, each missing one or more of the underlying BLO assumptions (factorial model comparison). The BLO model and its assumptions proved to be superior to any of the alternatives. In a separate analysis, we found that BLO accounts for individual participants' data better than any previous model in the DMR literature. We also found that, subject to the boundedness limitation, participants' choice of distortion approximately maximized the mutual information between objective task-relevant values and internal values, a form of bounded rationality.

The Value Heuristic in Judgments of Relative Frequency

The Value Heuristic in Judgments of Relative Frequency

Overconfidence in Probability and Frequency Judgments: A Critical Examination

The overconfidence observed in calibration studies has recently been questioned on both psychological and methodological grounds. In the first part of the article we discuss these issues and argue that overconfidence cannot be explained as a selection bias, and that it is not eliminated by random sampling of questions. In the second part of the article, we compare probability judgments for single events with judgments of relative frequency. Subjects received a target individual's personality profile and then predicted the target's responses to a series of binary questions. One group predicted the responses of an individual target, while a second group estimated the relative frequency of responses among all target subjects who shared a given personality profile. Judgments of confidence and estimates of relative frequency were practically indistinguishable; both exhibited substantial overconfidence and were highly correlated with independent judgments of representativeness.

Biases of Probability Assessment: A Comparison of Frequency and Single-Case Judgments

Gigerenzer (1991) has recently argued that there is a fundamental distinction between judgments of relative frequency and judgments of single-case probabilities. One of Gigerenzer′s major findings is that many representativeness effects, such as the neglect of base rates and the conjunction error, disappear when questions are reworded in terms of relative frequencies. In this paper, we claim that Gigerenzer′s distinction between frequency and single-case judgments maps onto Tversky and Kahnemans (1974) distinction between representativeness and availability. Specifically, we suggest that representativeness effects occur primarily in single-case judgments, while availability effects occur primarily in judgments of relative frequency. In Experiment 1, 170 undergraduate subjects were given four "representativeness" problems and three "availability" problems. Half of the subjects made judgments of relative frequencies, while half provided single-case probabilities. The results generally support our predictions. Representativeness effects tend to be stronger in the single-case condition, while availability effects tend to be stronger in the frequency condition. In Experiment 2 ( N = 165), we used slight modifications of the original availability problems. Again, the availability effects were more prevalent in the frequency condition than in the single-case condition. The normative and descriptive implications of these findings are discussed.

Direct and indirect measures of frequency monitoring in young and elderly adults

Abstract Memory for frequency of occurrence of novel material (Turkish words) was investigated in young and elderly adults via direct (absolute and relative frequency judgments) and indirect (reading speed) measures. Both young and elderly adults showed increased reading speed as a function of frequency of occurrence (Experiment 1). However, when asked explicitly to identify how often a word occurred (Experiment 1) or which word occurred more often (Experiment 2), elderly subjects were less accurate than young adults. These results support and extend research on age-related dissociations in memory.

Adult age comparisons in the processing of event frequency information.

The usual superiority in frequency-of-occurrence judgments of younger vs. older subjects was hypothesized to result from greater strategic encoding of the materials conveying frequency information. A subject-paced, visual search task was designed to control nontarget word encoding. Relative frequency judgments for the nontarget word pairs were equally accurate for younger and older subjects, and performance of both groups was above chance. Results suggest that strategic cover-task encoding can induce age differences in incidental frequency processing. Consistent with a nonoptimal as opposed to an optimal view, automatic processes require only minimal capacity for above-chance performance, but additional strategic resources can increase performance. When such additional resources are used more by younger than by older subjects, the former are better in frequency performance.

Effects of instructions, orienting task, and memory tests on memory for words and word frequency

Common words were presented to subjects who either rated them for pleasantness or estimated letter frequency. Words were presented with frequencies of 0, 1, 3, or 6; half of the subjects were instructed to attend to frequency, half were not. Frequency and memory tests were then given, with half of the subjects receiving each test type first. Memory was improved by semantic processing, greater presentation frequency, and additional exposure during frequency tests. Frequency judgments were accurate when tested first, but frequency discrimination declined drastically when frequency was tested second. Semantic processing produced more accurate relative frequency judgments. Data are discussed in terms of models of frequency judgment, and artifacts of different kinds of data analysis are noted.

Adult age differences in frequency judgments of categorical representations.

Adult age differences were examined for relative frequency judgments on a task in which categories had either zero, one, three, or five instances in a study list. Judgments required selecting from pairs of category names which member had the greater representation of instances in the prior list. Contrary to the results obtained in earlier studies using a task in which discrete events vary in frequency of occurrence, an age difference favoring young adults over elderly adults in accuracy of frequency judgments was found for categories. Neither instructional variation (incidental learning vs. intentional learning) nor variation in priming (cuing vs. noncuing with the list of categories prior to the study trial) yielded either main effects or interaction effects with age. The results were interpreted in terms of an age deficit in either the storage or the retrieval of memory traces of category names established by the automatic elicitation of implicit associative responses to instances of taxonomic categories.

Judgments of relative frequency in relation to shifts of event frequencies: Evidence for a limited-capacity model.

Judgments of relative frequency in relation to shifts of event frequencies: Evidence for a limited-capacity model.

Judgments of relative frequency in relation to shifts of event frequencies: Evidence for a limited-capacity model.

Judgments of relative frequency in relation to shifts of event frequencies: Evidence for a limited-capacity model.

The cognitive side of probability learning.

paradigms. In the present approach, a common theoretical framework is sought in concepts of coding and organization in memory. Following the theoretical analysis, an observation-t ransfer paradigm is developed that permits the study of predictive behavior depending on categorical, as distinguished from episodic, memory. This paradigm yields evidence that probability learning and transfer derive from frequency learning. The individual categorizes events and forms representations in memory of relative frequencies of event categories. When the different cues in a multiple-cue, probability learning situation occur equally often, this process yields predictive behavior closely reflecting the probabilities that the alternative events associated with a cue will occur when the cue is present. But when cue frequencies are unequal, the categorical memory model implies (correctly) that predictive behavior may be grossly out of line with actual probabilities. In general, depending on task requirements, predictive responses are either direct reflections of relative frequency judgments or are governed by strategies involving an additional

Relative frequency judgments and verbal discrimination learning.

Relative frequency judgments and verbal discrimination learning.