Judgments Of Learning Research Articles

A Bayesian inference model for metamemory.

The dual-basis theory of metamemory suggests that people evaluate their memory performance based on both processing experience during the memory process and their prior beliefs about overall memory ability. However, few studies have proposed a formal computational model to quantitatively characterize how processing experience and prior beliefs are integrated during metamemory monitoring. Here, we introduce a Bayesian inference model for metamemory (BIM) which provides a theoretical and computational framework for the metamemory monitoring process. BIM assumes that when people evaluate their memory performance, they integrate processing experience and prior beliefs via Bayesian inference. We show that BIM can be fitted to recall or recognition tasks with confidence ratings on either a continuous or discrete scale. Results from data simulation indicate that BIM can successfully recover a majority of generative parameter values, and demonstrate a systematic relationship between parameters in BIM and previous computational models of metacognition such as the stochastic detection and retrieval model (SDRM) and the meta-d' model. We also show examples of fitting BIM to empirical data sets from several experiments, which suggest that the predictions of BIM are consistent with previous studies on metamemory. In addition, when compared with SDRM, BIM could more parsimoniously account for the data of judgments of learning (JOLs) and memory performance from recall tasks. Finally, we discuss an extension of BIM which accounts for belief updating, and conclude with a discussion of how BIM may benefit metamemory research. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The contribution of metamemory beliefs to the font size effect on judgments of learning: Is word frequency a moderating factor?

Previous studies found that metamemory beliefs dominate the font size effect on judgments of learning (JOLs). However, few studies have investigated whether beliefs about font size contribute to the font size effect in circumstances of multiple cues. The current study aims to fill this gap. Experiment 1 adopted a 2 (font size: 70 pt vs. 9 pt) * 2 (word frequency (WF): high vs. low) within-subjects design. The results showed that beliefs about font size did not mediate the font size effect on JOLs when multiple cues (font size and WF) were simultaneously provided. Experiment 2 further explored whether WF moderates the contribution of beliefs about font size to the font size effect, in which a 2 (font size: 70 pt vs. 9 pt, as a within-subjects factor) * 2 (WF: high vs. low, as a between-subjects factor) mixed design was used. The results showed that the contribution of beliefs about font size to the font size effect was present in a pure list of low-frequency words, but absent in a pure list of high-frequency words. Lastly, a meta-analysis showed evidence supporting the proposal that the contribution of beliefs about font size to the font size effect on JOLs is moderated by WF. Even though numerous studies suggested beliefs about font size play a dominant role in the font size effect on JOLs, the current study provides new evidence suggesting that such contribution is conditional. Theoretical implications are discussed.

Solving a Mystery in Levels-of-Processing Research: The Word-First Paradigm

Abstract In the standard levels-of-processing (LOP) paradigm, subjects are presented with a question directing them to attend to surface features (case), phonetic features (rhyme), or semantic features (category) of an upcoming word. Answering the question greatly affects recall and recognition for the word, and this outcome is attributed to differing LOP of the word. Craik (1977) reasoned that if the words appeared before the questions (i.e., the word-first paradigm) under intentional learning instructions, the LOP effect would disappear. However, when he conducted experiments using the word-first paradigm, the effect remained. We conducted 2 experiments to try to explain this puzzle. In the first experiment, we replicated Craik’s findings in one condition, and in other conditions we asked subjects to make judgments of learning (JOLs) in an attempt to eliminate the LOP effect because JOLs seem to promote deep processing. However, the LOP effect still occurred, albeit in attenuated form. In Experiment 2, we tested 2 new conditions to overcome and explain the LOP effect in the word-first paradigm. In one case, subjects were instructed to use idiosyncratic study strategies to memorize the word; the second condition required subjects to perform pleasantness judgments on the words. The pleasantness rating condition eliminated the LOP effect, but the first did not. We conclude that in the word-first paradigm, subjects typically keep the word in mind without semantic processing using rote rehearsal, despite intentional learning instructions.

Dividing attention impairs metacognitive control more than monitoring.

Students consistently report multitasking (e.g., checking social media, texting, watching Netflix) when studying on their own (e.g., Junco & Cotton, Computers & Education, 59[2], 505–514, 2012). Multitasking impairs explicit learning (e.g., Carrier, Rosen, Cheever, & Lim, Developmental Review, 35, 64–78, 2015), but the impact of multitasking on metacognitive monitoring and control is less clear. Metacognition may compete with ongoing cognitive processing for mental resources (e.g., Nelson & Narens, The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 26, 125–141, 1990) and would be impaired by dividing attention; alternatively, metacognition may require little attention (e.g., Boekaerts & Niemivirta, Handbook of Self-Regulation [pp. 417–450], 2000) and would not be impacted by dividing attention. Across three experiments, we assessed the influence of divided attention on metacognition. Participants made item-by-item judgements of learning (JOLs) after studying word pairs under full or divided attention (Experiment 1) and made restudy choices (Experiments 2 & 3). Dividing attention had little impact on the resolution of learners’ metacognitive monitoring, but significantly impaired calibration of monitoring, the relationship between monitoring and control, and the efficacy of metacognitive control. The data suggest that monitoring may require few cognitive resources, but controlling one’s learning (e.g., planning what to restudy and implementing a plan) may demand significant mental resources.Supplementary InformationThe online version contains supplementary material available at 10.3758/s13423-021-01950-9.

Memory and Executive Functions Subserving Judgments of Learning: Cognitive Reorganization After Traumatic Brain Injury

ABSTRACT We investigated relationships between psychometric measures of memory, executive functions (EFs), and task-based measures of Judgments of Learning (JOLs) in individuals with and without Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), to study functional reorganization after TBI. We hypothesized that, in controls, accuracy of immediate JOLs would be associated with short-term memory and EFs (but not long-term memory, LTM), while accuracy of delayed JOLs would be associated primarily with LTM. We hypothesized that those with good recovery from TBI would demonstrate functional reorganization of the relationships between memory, EFs, and JOLs. Eighteen individuals with TBI and 18 matched controls completed eight neuropsychological tests of memory and EFs. They studied word-pairs, made immediate and delayed JOLs, and took a cued-recall test for the studied word-pairs. Stepwise regression and Lasso analyses generated a predictive model of JOL accuracy for each group. Accuracy of immediate JOLs in controls was predicted by short-term memory, inhibition, switching, and cognitive fluency, while accuracy of delayed JOLs was predicted by verbal recall. In individuals with TBI, inhibition predicted immediate JOL accuracy and switching predicted delayed JOL accuracy. Cognitive reorganization in those with good long-term recovery from TBI may account for the ability to make JOLs with accuracy similar to controls.

Hindsight bias in metamemory: outcome knowledge influences the recollection of judgments of learning

ABSTRACT Hindsight bias describes people’s tendency to overestimate how accurately they have predicted an event’s outcome after obtaining knowledge about it. Outcome knowledge has been shown to influence various forms of judgments, but it is unclear whether outcome knowledge also produces a hindsight bias on Judgments of Learning (JOLs). Three experiments tested whether people overestimated the accuracy of their memory predictions after obtaining knowledge about their actual memory performance. In all experiments, participants studied 60 cue-target word pairs, made a JOL for each word pair, and tried to recall the targets in a cued-recall test. In Experiments 1a and 1b, people recollected their original JOLs after attempting to recall each target, that is, after they obtained outcome knowledge for all items. In Experiments 2 and 3, people recollected their original JOLs in a separate phase after attempting to recall half the targets so that they had outcome knowledge for some but not all items. In all experiments, recollected JOLs were closer to actual memory performance than original JOLs for items with outcome knowledge only. Thus, outcome knowledge produced a hindsight bias on JOLs. Our results demonstrate that people overestimate the accuracy of their memory predictions in hindsight.

Judgments of learning reflect the Animacy advantage for memory, but not beliefs about the effect

People are more likely to recall animate (living) concepts than they are to recall inanimate (non- living) concepts. This finding is known as the animacy advantage in memory. Despite the frequent occurrence of this effect, we do not know if people are metacognitively aware of it, or how such knowledge relates to memory judgments such as judgments of learning (JOLs) for animate and inanimate memory materials. Across multiple experiments, participants studied and made JOLs for lists containing either animate and inanimate words for a free-recall test or for animate and inanimate word pairs for a cued-recall test. They also indicated their beliefs regarding whether they thought that animate items were more, less, or equally as memorable as inanimate items. Although we consistently obtained the animacy advantage for both free-recall and cued-recall tests, this advantage occurred regardless of participants’ stated beliefs about the effect. More important, participants mostly judged animate items to be more memorable than inanimate items, regardless of their beliefs. These results suggest that, in this context, participants do not use their beliefs as a determinant for their JOLs. Rather, some factor(s) related to the memory advantage for animate over inanimate items might have affected participants’ JOLs to produce this pattern. The results also demonstrate that researchers cannot infer people’s metacognitive beliefs directly from JOLs. Instead, we argue that in order to conclude that beliefs about a cognitive factor are a major basis of metacognitive judgments, those beliefs must moderate the effect of that factor on the judgments.

The Influence of Prior Knowledge on Memory and Metamemory for Famous Names and Faces

Abstract. Two experiments examined the effect of prior knowledge on memory and metamemory for names and faces using famous 1960s and 2000s actors as the manipulation of prior knowledge. In Experiment 1, 66 participants studied the names of famous actors, half presented with their faces, with instructions to remember only the names. In Experiment 2, 56 participants studied the faces of these actors, half presented with their names, with instructions to remember only the faces. In both experiments, participants made immediate Judgments of Learning (JOLs) for each to-be-remembered stimulus followed by a test of recognition that used a Recollect/Familiar/No-Memory judgment. We found higher JOLs, recognition memory, and JOL accuracy for 2000s actors. Adding a name to a face or a face to a name increased JOLs while paradoxically decreasing memory. Back-sorting and binning analyses converged on the conclusion that immediate JOLs predicted memories accompanied by recollection but not familiarity.

The role of metacognition and schematic support in younger and older adults' episodic memory.

Older adults experience deficits in associative memory. However, age-related differences are reduced when information is consistent with prior knowledge (i.e., schematic support), suggesting that episodic and semantic memory are interrelated. It is unclear what role metacognitive processes play in schematic support. Prior knowledge may reduce encoding demands, but older adults may allocate cognitive resources to schema-consistent information because it is more meaningful. We examined metacognitive awareness of and control over associative information that was consistent or inconsistent with prior knowledge. In Experiment 1, participants self-paced their study of grocery items paired with either market prices or unusually high prices and were tested on the exact price of each item over four study-test lists with new items on each list. In Experiment 2, participants studied items for a fixed time but made judgments of learning (JOLs) at encoding. Older adults better remembered the prices of market-value items than overpriced items. In Experiment 1, younger and older adults studied overpriced items longer than market-priced items, consistent with a discrepancy reduction model of self-regulated learning, but study time did not relate to later recall accuracy, suggesting a labor-in-vain effect. In Experiment 2, participants gave higher JOLs to market-priced items than overpriced items and were generally metacognitively aware of the benefits of schematic support. Together, these results suggest that the benefits of schematic support may not be dependent on or influenced by metacognitive control processes, supporting the hypothesis that episodic memory may be less distinct from semantic memory in younger and older adults.

Why do learners ignore expected feedback in making metacognitive decisions about retrieval practice?

We report two experiments investigating why learners, in making metacognitive judgments, often seem to ignore or otherwise fail to appreciate that feedback following retrieval practice provides a restudy opportunity. Learners practiced word pairs for a final cued-recall test by studying each pair initially, making a judgment of learning (JOL), and then deciding whether to practice the pair again after a short or long spacing interval, or not at all. For different groups in Experiment 1, additional practice involved restudying, retrieval practice without feedback, or retrieval practice with feedback (the full pair). We used procedures (long feedback duration and covert retrieval practice) designed to rule out the possibility that feedback is ignored because it is usually brief or because participants' choices are influenced by a desire to look good by performing well on overt practice tests. In the relearning condition, learners preferred a long spacing interval for items at all JOL levels. Despite the feedback duration and the covert retrieval practice, learners in both retrieval-practice conditions preferred a short spacing interval for hard, low-JOL items and a long spacing interval for easy, high-JOL items, even though this may not be an effective strategy when feedback is provided. In Experiment 2, instructions framed feedback either as a presentation of the correct answer or as a restudy opportunity preceded by retrieval practice. Framing feedback as a restudy opportunity markedly changed the choices learners made. Apparently, the restudy function of feedback does not occur to learners unless they are specifically alerted to it.

Effect of impoverished information on multisensory integration in judgments of learning.

According to the principle of inverse effectiveness (PIE), weaker responses to information in one modality (i.e., unisensory) benefit more from additional information in a second modality (i.e., multisensory; Meredith & Stein, 1986). We suggest that the PIE may also inform whether perceptual fluency affects judgments of learning (JOLs). If JOLs follow the PIE, the differences in JOLs for multisensory and unisensory items should increase as the unisensory study items become harder to perceive. That is, an influence of perceptual fluency should prompt a similar, interactive pattern across perceptual responses and JOLs. In 3 experiments, we systematically varied the signal intensity or noise in 1 modality to examine how responses might change with the inclusion of information in a second modality. In Experiment 1, written words in several font sizes were sometimes accompanied by spoken equivalents. In Experiments 2 and 3, spoken words in various background noise levels were sometimes accompanied by visual speech articulations. Consistent with the PIE, the multisensory benefits in response time and/or correct identification increased as responses to unisensory information decreased. Also, the multisensory formats received higher JOLs than the unisensory formats; however, unlike the predictions from PIE, this difference did not increase as study items became harder to perceive. Experiment 3 extended this finding to participants' explicit beliefs. In multisensory settings, JOLs may rely more on theory- than data-driven processes. We suggest that broadly defined processing fluency may always contribute to JOLs, but, regarding perceptual information, JOLs appear to track perceptual attributes rather than perceptual fluency. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The effect of delayed judgments of learning on retention.

Evidence is mixed concerning whether delayed judgments of learning (JOLs) enhance learning and if so, whether their benefit is similar to retrieval practice. One potential explanation for the mixed findings is the truncated search hypothesis, which states that not all delayed JOLs lead to a full-blown covert retrieval attempt. In three paired-associate learning experiments, we examined the effect of delayed JOLs on later recall by comparing them to conditions of restudy, overt retrieval, and various other delayed JOL conditions. In Experiment 1, after an initial study phase, subjects either restudied word pairs, practiced overt retrieval, or made cue-only or cue-target delayed JOLs. In Experiments 2a and 2b, where conditions were manipulated within-subjects, subjects either restudied word pairs, practiced overt retrieval, made cue-only delayed JOLs, made cue-only delayed JOLs followed by a yes/no retrieval question or, in another condition, by an overt retrieval prompt. The final cued recall tests were delayed by two days. In Experiment 1, recall after cue-only delayed JOLs did not reliably differ from recall after overt retrieval or restudy. In Experiments 2a and 2b, delayed JOLs consistently produced poorer recall relative to overt retrieval. Furthermore, reaction times for delayed JOLs were shorter relative to delayed JOLs paired with overt retrieval prompts. We conclude that only some delayed JOLs elicit covert retrieval attempts, a pattern supporting the truncated search hypothesis.Supplementary InformationThe online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11409-021-09260-0.

Metamemory and Memory Discrepancies in Directed Forgetting of Emotional Information.

Directed Forgetting (DF) studies show that it is possible to exert cognitive control to intentionally forget information. The aim of the present study was to investigate how aware individuals are of the control they have over what they remember and forget when the information is emotional. Participants were presented with positive, negative and neutral photographs, and each photograph was followed by either a Remember or a Forget instruction. Then, for each photograph, participants provided Judgments of Learning (JOLs) by indicating their likelihood of recognizing that item on a subsequent test. In the recognition phase, participants were asked to indicate all old items, irrespective of instruction. Remember items had higher JOLs than Forget items for all item types, indicating that participants believe they can intentionally forget even emotional information—which is not the case based on the actual recognition results. DF effect, which was calculated by subtracting recognition for Forget items from Remember ones was only significant for neutral items. Emotional information disrupted cognitive control, eliminating the DF effect. Response times for JOLs showed that evaluation of emotional information, especially negatively emotional information takes longer, and thus is more difficult. For both Remember and Forget items, JOLs reflected sensitivity to emotionality of the items, with emotional items receiving higher JOLs than the neutral ones. Actual recognition confirmed better recognition for only negative items but not for positive ones. JOLs also reflected underestimation of actual recognition performance. Discrepancies in metacognitive judgments due to emotional valence as well as the reasons for underestimation are discussed.

Evidence for Age-Equivalent and Task-Dissociative Metacognition in the Memory Domain.

Research suggests that metacognitive monitoring ability does not decline with age. For example, judgments-of-learning (JOL) accuracy is roughly equivalent between younger and older adults. But few studies have asked whether younger and older adults’ metacognitive ability varies across different types of memory processes (e.g., for items vs. pairs). The current study tested the relationship between memory and post-decision confidence ratings at the trial level on item (individual words) and associative (word pairs) memory recognition tests. As predicted, younger and older adults had similar metacognitive efficiency, when using meta-d’/d’, a measure derived from Signal Detection Theory, despite a significant age effect favoring younger adults on memory performance. This result is consistent with previous work showing age-equivalent metacognitive efficiency in the memory domain. We also found that metacognitive efficiency was higher for associative memory than for item memory across age groups, even though associative and item recognition memory (d’) were statistically equivalent. Higher accuracy on post-test decision confidence ratings for associative recognition relative to item recognition on resolution accuracy itself (meta-d’) and when corrected for performance differences (meta-d’/d’) are novel findings. Implications for associative metacognition are discussed.

How to assess the contributions of processing fluency and beliefs to the formation of judgments of learning: methods and pitfalls

Judgments of learning (JOLs) play a fundamental role in helping learners regulate their study strategies but are susceptible to various kinds of illusions and biases. These can potentially impair learning efficiency, and hence understanding the mechanisms underlying the formation of JOLs is important. Many studies have suggested that both processing fluency and metamemory beliefs can contribute substantially to the construction of JOLs. However, in recent years another body of evidence has accumulated apparently demonstrating that beliefs play a dominant role, whereas processing fluency plays little or even no role in JOL formation. In the current article, we review the experimental and analytic methods employed in this field to measure the contributions of processing fluency and beliefs to the formation of JOLs. We then illustrate several potential disadvantages and pitfalls of those research methods. Suggestions about how to solve or avoid such problems are discussed. We make several proposals for future research to shed additional light on the illusions and biases that have been documented in JOLs.

Evidence for an Age-Related Positivity Effect in Metacognitive Confidence Judgments

We examined age differences in metacognitive monitoring of emotionally-valenced stimuli. If older adults (OAs) are more focused on emotionally meaningful goals in late life (Carstensen, 2006), then they should demonstrate attentional and memory biases for positive stimuli over neutral and negative stimuli and, arguably, these cognitive biases should be reflected in their metacognitive judgments of learning. Judgments of learning (JOLs) for memory of positive, negative, and neutral words were collected. Younger adults (YAs) aged 18-23 years and OAs aged 65-90 years (N = 85) studied words in each valence category and made immediate JOLs, followed by a two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) recognition memory task. Analyses of JOLs revealed evidence for a positivity effect (Mather & Carstensen, 2005) in metacognitive confidence for OAs and an emotional salience effect in YAs (Tauber & Dunlosky, 2012; Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010). Predictably, YAs recognized more words than OAs, but valence did not affect number of words recognized and valence did not moderate age differences in recognition memory (p = .055). Memory monitoring as measured by resolution accuracy was equivalent in YAs and OAs (Hertzog & Dunlosky, 2011). Positive affect was higher and negative affect was lower in OAs relative to YAs (Gallant, Spaniol, & Yang, 2019), lending additional evidence to an orientation toward the positive in older adulthood. These results are novel in that they demonstrate an age-related positivity effect that extends beyond the domains of memory and emotion to the domain of metacognitive aging. Discussion will focus on theoretical, methodological, and applied implications.

Does word frequency influence judgments of learning (JOLs)? A meta-analytic review.

Although decades of research have identified robust effects of word frequency (WF) on memory performance, the comparatively smaller body of research examining the impact of WF on judgments of learning (JOLs) has yielded inconsistent findings. The purpose of this brief meta-analytic review is to synthesize the existing literature examining WF effects on JOLs with the aim of clarifying the extent to which such judgments are influenced by WF, and to identify some potential moderators of this effect. In analysing 17 experiments across 6 published and 1 unpublished studies, a small, but reliable effect of WF on JOLs was found (g = .23), with high frequency (HF) words afforded higher JOLs than low frequency (LF) words. There was, however, extensive heterogeneity among the effect sizes, implying that the WF effect on JOLs is subject to the influence of potentially many different moderator variables. The potential implications of this finding for understanding the sources of information that guide JOLs are discussed. In addition, speculation as to potential moderators contributing to the observed heterogeneity is offered, and emphasis is placed on the importance of considering item-level variability when items are nested within the conditions to be contrasted. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Metacognitive preserved generation strategy benefits for both younger and elderly participants with schizophrenia.

Cognitive memory and introspection disturbances are considered core features of schizophrenia. Moreover, it remains unclear whether or not participants with schizophrenia are more cognitively impaired with ageing than healthy participants. The aims of this study were to use a metacognitive approach to determine whether elderly participants with schizophrenia are able to improve their memory performance using a specific generation strategy and to evaluate the memory benefits for them using this strategy. 20 younger and 20 older participants with schizophrenia and their comparison participants matched for age, gender and education learned paired associates words with either reading or generation, rated judgment of learning (JOL) and performed cued recall. Participants with schizophrenia recalled fewer words than healthy comparison participants, but they benefited more from generation, and this difference was stable with ageing. Their JOL magnitude was lower than that of healthy comparison participants, but JOL accuracy was not affected by either age or the pathology. In spite of their memory deficit, elderly and younger participants with schizophrenia benefited remarkably from the memory generation strategy. This result gives some cause for optimism as to the possibility for participants with schizophrenia to reduce memory impairment if learning conditions lead them to encode deeply.

Examining the effect of list composition on monitoring and control processes in metamemory.

According to the widely accepted cue-utilization view, judgments of learning (JOLs) are thought to be comparative in nature, such that they are sensitive to the relative differences between stimuli. Here, we report the results of three experiments that both support and extend this tenet of the cue-utilization view by examining the impact of relative differences on metacognitive control strategies, including study-time allocation and re-study selection. By presenting word pairs of medium-difficulty intermixed with either easy or difficult word pairs we manipulated list composition to assess the impact of the relative difference between items on individuals' JOLs (Experiments 1 and 2a), study-time allocation (Experiment 1), and re-study selection (Experiments 2a and 2b). First, our manipulation of list composition demonstrated that stimuli of equal difficulty are judged to be more or less memorable depending on the context in which they are presented, thereby confirming previous findings that JOLs are sensitive to the relative differences among items. Second, with regard to metacognitive control strategies, our results indicated that list composition may not impact all control strategies in the same fashion. Specifically, the relative differences between items did not appear to influence the amount of study time allocated to a given item, but did affect which items were selected for re-study. These findings have important applied implications, and may assist in the development of more effective guidance on how to best engage in self-regulated learning.

Perceptual Fluency Affects Judgments of Learning Non-analytically and Analytically Through Beliefs About How Perceptual Fluency Affects Memory.

Perceptual fluency is generally thought to affect judgments of learning (JOLs) non-analytically. However, some studies suggested that perceptual fluency may also affect JOLs analytically based on beliefs about the relationship between perceptual fluency and memory performance. The present study aimed to investigate how perceptual fluency affects JOLs. In Experiment 1, participants performed a continuous identification task and a JOLs task to determine whether perceptual fluency affects JOLs. In Experiment 2, we manipulated participants’ beliefs about how perceptual fluency affects memory to explore whether perceptual fluency affects JOLs through belief-based analysis. In Experiment 3, we explored whether participants who believed neither perceptual fluency nor font size affected memory performance still offered higher JOLs to large words than to small words, to explore whether perceptual fluency affects JOLs non-analytically. In Experiment 4, participants performed a continuous identification-JOLs task, and then they performed an observation task to measure their beliefs about fluency and memory. The results of the four experiments suggested that perceptual fluency affects JOLs both non-analytically and analytically based on beliefs about the relationship between perceptual fluency and memory performance.