Children's Judgments Research Articles

Children's judgments on the acceptability of prejudice.

By middle childhood, children become aware that discriminatory behavior is unacceptable; however, the development of their anti-prejudice sentiments is largely unknown. Across two studies, 333 Australian 5- to 10-year-olds (51% female, majority White) were asked how acceptable they thought it was to have prejudicial sentiments toward 25 different targets. Children responded privately through a novel digital paradigm designed to minimize social-desirability biases. With age, children were more likely to display anti-prejudice sentiments toward targets who are prosocial, vulnerable, and of minority race and linguistic backgrounds. In contrast, they judged prejudice as "okay" for targets who are antisocial and negatively regarded in society. These findings suggest that children's perceptions of prejudice become increasingly nuanced and adult-like across the primary school years.

Multidimensional profiles of Head Start children's social behaviors predict their interpretations of physical aggression.

Preschool children's reasoning regarding moral events differs according to adversity and relates to aggression. Understanding morality in young children is paramount for understanding their aggressive behaviors. The study aims to identify patterns of aggression and prosocial behavior using Latent Class Analysis (LCA) and investigate how patterns of aggression and prosocial behavior relate to reasoning about prototypic moral events. One hundred six children (Mage = 4.40 years old, SD = 0.55 years old, Range: 3.08-5.33 years old, 51% boys) enrolled in Head Start programs and their caregivers participated. In the fall caregivers completed surveys on forms (i.e., the manifestation of behavior) and functions of aggression (i.e., motivation of behavior), and prosocial behavior. The following spring children completed two moral reasoning tasks that measured children's judgment and reasoning of harm, and their attributions of transgressors'reasoning. The LCA revealed a 3-class solution: (1) high levels of relational aggression and moderate levels of prosocial behavior (bistrategic controllers), (2) low levels of both aggression and average prosocial behavior (uninvolved), (3) high levels of all types of aggression and low levels of prosocial behavior (high aggression). Subsequent analyses suggest that uninvolved children prioritize adhering to authority over other concerns, and bistrategic controllers focused on goal-oriented reasoning. Overall, our findings support that recognizing patterns of behavior may be useful in understanding children's moral reasoning.

The minds of machines: Children's beliefs about the experiences, thoughts, and morals of familiar interactive technologies.

Children are developing alongside interactive technologies that can move, talk, and act like agents, but it is unclear if children's beliefs about the agency of these household technologies are similar to their beliefs about advanced, humanoid robots used in lab research. This study investigated 4-11-year-old children's (N = 127, Mage = 7.50, SDage = 2.27, 53% females, 75% White; from the Northeastern United States) beliefs about the mental, physical, emotional, and moral features of two familiar technologies (Amazon Alexa and Roomba) in comparison to their beliefs about a humanoid robot (Nao). Children's beliefs about the agency of these technologies were organized into three distinct clusters-having experiences, having minds, and deserving moral treatment. Children endorsed some agent-like features for each technology type, but the extent to which they did so declined with age. Furthermore, children's judgment of the technologies' freedom to "act otherwise" in moral scenarios changed with age, suggesting a development shift in children's understanding of technologies' limitations. Importantly, there were systematic differences between Alexa, Roomba, and Nao, that correspond to the unique characteristics of each. Together these findings suggest that children's intuitive theories of agency are informed by an increasingly technological world. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Counterfactual choices and moral judgments in children.

When making moral judgments of past actions, adults often think counterfactually about what could have been done differently. Considerable evidence suggests that counterfactual thinking emerges around age 6, but it remains unknown how this development influences children's moral judgments. Across two studies, Australian children aged 4-9 (N = 236, 142 Females) were told stories about two characters who had a choice that led to a good or bad outcome, and two characters who had no choice over a good or bad outcome. Results showed that 4- and 5-year-olds' moral judgments were influenced only by the actual outcome. From age 6, children's moral judgments were also influenced by the counterfactual choices that had been available to the characters.

Development and relationship between the judgment of the speed of passage of time and the judgment of duration in children.

This study examined the relationships between the awareness of the speed of the passage of time, the judgment of durations and experiential factors in children aged 4-9 years. They were asked to judge the duration and the speed of the passage of time for different intervals (second and minutes), and to rate their feelings (arousal, happiness, sadness, and task difficulty) during each interval. The results indicated that 8-9-year-olds' judgment of the passage of time is extremely flexible and context-dependent, representing the duration and/or the individual changes in subjective experience (emotion). In contrast, young children's judgment of the passage of time was not related to duration. However, their judgments were not given randomly. They judged that time passed more quickly when they felt happier and more alert. The passage-of-time judgment was therefore initially grounded in emotional and sensory-motor experience, i.e., in their perception of changes (acceleration and deceleration) in self-movement (successions of states and their extension). Therefore, duration judgment and passage-of-time judgment initially develop separately and are later combined when children understand the logical link between speed and duration.

Is helping always morally good? Study with toddlers and preschool children.

Young children from a very early age not only prefer those who help others but also those who engage in altruistic helping. This study aims to test how children assess helping when the goal of the helping behavior is immoral. We argue that younger children consider only the helping versus hindering behavior, but older children distinguish their judgments depending on the goal to which the helping leads. In the study involving 727 European children aged 2-7 years (354 girls, M = 53.82 months, SD = 18.76), we found that children aged 2-4 years assessed helping as always morally good and hindering as morally bad, no matter the recipient's intention. Only children aged 4.5-7 years assessed helping in an immoral act as immoral and hindering in an immoral act as moral. We also found that younger children liked the helper regardless of the goal that their helping behavior led to, but from the age of 5, children preferred characters who hindered in an immoral act rather than those who helped. Our study extends the previous research, showing how children's moral judgments of helping behavior develop and become more complex as children get older. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Grammaticality Judgments of Tense and Agreement by Child Speakers of African American English: Effects of Clinical Status, Surface Form, and Grammatical Structure.

We examined the grammaticality judgments of tense and agreement (T/A) structures by children with and without developmental language disorder (DLD) within African American English (AAE). The children's judgments of T/A forms were also compared to their judgments of two control forms and, for some analyses, examined by surface form (i.e., overt, zero) and type of structure (i.e., BE, past tense, verbal -s). The judgments were from 91 AAE-speaking kindergartners (DLD = 34; typically developing = 57), elicited using items from the Rice/Wexler Test of Early Grammatical Impairment. The data were analyzed twice, once using General American English as the reference and A' scores and once using AAE as the reference and percentages of acceptability. Although the groups differed using both metrics, the percentages of acceptability tied the DLD T/A deficit to judgments of the overt forms, while also revealing a general DLD weakness judging sentences that are ungrammatical in AAE. Judgments of the overt T/A forms by both groups correlated with their productions of these forms and their language test scores, and both groups showed structure-specific form preferences ("is": overt > zero vs. verbal -s: overt = zero). The findings demonstrate the utility of grammaticality judgment tasks for revealing weaknesses in T/A within AAE-speaking children with DLD, while also calling for more studies using AAE as the dialect reference when designing stimuli and coding systems. https://doi.org/10.23641/asha.22534588.

From outcome to process: A developmental shift in judgments of good reasoning

What does it mean to reason well? One might argue that good reasoning means that the outcome of the reasoning process is correct: reaching the right belief. Alternatively, good reasoning might refer to the reasoning process itself: following the right epistemic procedures. In a preregistered study, we investigated children's (4–9-year-olds) and adults' judgments of reasoning in China and the US (N = 256). Participants of all age groups evaluated the outcome when the process was kept constant - they favored agents who reached correct over incorrect beliefs, and they evaluated the process when the outcome was kept constant – they preferred agents who formed their beliefs using valid over invalid procedures. Developmental changes emerged when we pitted outcome against process: young children weighed outcome more heavily than process; older children and adults showed the reverse preference. This pattern was constant across the two cultural contexts, with the switch from outcome to process happening earlier in development in China. These results suggest that children initially value what someone believes, but, with development, come to increasingly value how beliefs are formed.

Supplemental Material for Parents’ Judgments of Children’s Gender-Typed Play Indicate Qualities of the Early-Life Caregiving Environment

Supplemental Material for Parents’ Judgments of Children’s Gender-Typed Play Indicate Qualities of the Early-Life Caregiving Environment

Dissertationsprojekt: Unterschiedliche Dimensionen der kindlichen Beurteilung von Musik und deren Beeinflussung durch Kontextualisierung

This dissertation project in the music pedagogical field asks how children's judgement of music at the critical age of 9 years old is influenced by contextualization and to what extent open ear studies can be applied to this age group to gain insight into the processes of musical judgment building.

Do You Use Love to Make it Lovely? The Role of Meaning Overlap across Morphological Relatives in the Development of Morphological Representations.

We examined whether and how the degree of meaning overlap between morphologically related words influences sentence plausibility judgment in children. In two separate studies with kindergarten and second-graders, English-speaking and French-speaking children judged the plausibility of sentences that included two paired target words. Some of these word pairs were morphologically related, across three conditions with differing levels of meaning overlap: low (wait-waiter), moderate (fold-folder) and high (farm-farmer). In another two conditions, word pairs were related only by phonology (rock-rocket) or semantics (car-automobile). Children in both ages and languages demonstrated higher plausibility scores as meaning overlap increased between morphologically related words. Further, kindergarten children rated sentences that included word pairs with phonological overlap as more plausible than second-grade children, while second-grade children rated those with high meaning overlap as more plausible than kindergarten children. We interpret these findings in light of current models of morphological development.

Quantifier spreading and the question under discussion

Children often display non-adult-like behaviors when reasoning with quantifiers and logical connectives in natural language. A classic example of this is the symmetrical interpretation of universally quantified statements like “Every girl is riding an elephant”, which children often reject as false when they are used to describe a scene with, e.g., three girls each riding an elephant and a fourth elephant without a rider. We present evidence that children's understanding of these sentences is not attributable to syntactic, semantic, or general processing limitations. Instead, in two experiments, we argue that children's behavior stems primarily from difficulty in correctly identifying the speaker's intended “question under discussion”, and that when this question is made contextually unambiguous, children's judgments are almost completely adultlike.

Children's and adolescents’ conversations with mothers about offenders’ and victims’ responsibility for harm in their experiences of being hurt by a peer

AbstractThis study investigated mothers’ and children's constructions of meaning about responsibility for harm in conversations about two experiences when children were hurt by a peer and felt they had either contributed or not contributed to the situation. The sample included 105 Canadian mothers (75% White) and their children (53 girls, 52 boys) across three age groups (M ages = 6.92, 11.14, 15.89 years). Overall, mothers and children emphasized different aspects of responsibility; mothers made more evaluations of acts and discussed the avoidability of harm whereas children referred more to hurtful acts, consequences, reasons, and subsequent responses. Discussions of the child's and peer's responsibility were responsive to the child's perspective on events. The child's responsibility for self‐protection was particularly emphasized by mothers and when the child felt they had not contributed to the situation. Children more often mitigated their responsibility as compared to their mothers, and older children referred more to their own and their peer's responsibility for harm. Findings illuminate how conversations with mothers may inform children's judgments of their own and others’ roles in peer conflict.

Poor Toddlers Feel Less Pain? Application of Class-Based Pain Stereotypes in Judgments of Children

Across four studies, we investigated whether perceptions of children’s pain are influenced by their socioeconomic status (SES). We found evidence that children with low SES were believed to feel less pain than children with high SES (Study 1), and this effect was not moderated by child’s age (Study 2). Next, we examined life hardship as a mediator of this effect among children, finding that children with low SES were rated as having lived a harder life and thus as feeling less pain (Study 3). Finally, we examined downstream consequences for hypothetical treatment recommendations. We found that participants perceived children with low SES as less sensitive to pain and therefore as requiring less pain treatment than children with high SES (Study 4). Thus, we consistently observe that stereotypes of low-SES individuals as insensitive to pain may manifest in judgments of children and their recommended pain care. Implications of this work for theory and medical practice are discussed.

The accuracy and annual rank-order stability of elementary school children's self-monitoring judgments

The present study investigated age-related development in children's metacognitive self-monitoring skills; eight-year-olds (N = 140) and ten-year-olds (N = 164) were compared. Children learned paired associates and completed a recognition test. Two types of monitoring judgments were compared: predictions and postdictions of performance. To investigate the rank-order stability of monitoring judgments, the task was repeated one year later. Prediction accuracy was low for both age groups and did not improve over time. Postdictions were more accurate than predictions; this indicates that self-test experiences support children to take actual performance into account when monitoring learning. For the second graders, postdiction accuracy improved over one year. Annual rank-order stability was found for predictions and postdictions, suggesting that habitual judgment tendencies affect children's monitoring judgments and judgment accuracy.

Wearing your knowledge on your sleeve: Young children’s reasoning about clothing as a marker of group-specific knowledge

In four experiments, we explored children’s use of shared clothing style to infer grouplevel knowledge. In Experiment 1, 3-and 4-year-olds and 6-and-7-year-olds inferred that those wearing identical clothing (i.e., same style, color, and pattern) were likely to share the same knowledge, while those who wore different clothing were not. In Experiment 2, we introduce variation into the clothing to make it more difficult for children to use a similarity heuristic. In this case, 6-and-7-year-olds but not 3- and 4-year-olds, used clothing style to make inferences about shared knowledge. Using the same varied clothing styles, Experiment 3 demonstrates that 3-and 4-year-olds use clothing style to make other social inferences (i.e., about friendship choices), demonstrating that younger children are capable of making some social inferences based on shared clothing style. Finally, Experiment 4 tested the mechanism underlying older children's judgments. Namely, we manipulated the ownership status of the garment and found that when the same clothing style was worn by an owner, but not a borrower, older children inferred shared knowledge.

Children's Navigation of Contextual Cues in Peer Transgressions: The Role of Aggression Form, Transgressor Gender, and Transgressor Intention.

When faced with transgressions in their peer groups, children must navigate a series of situational cues (e.g., type of transgression, transgressor gender, transgressor intentionality) to evaluate the moral status of transgressions and to inform their subsequent behavior toward the transgressors. There is little research on which cues children prioritize when presented together, how reliance on these cues may be affected by certain biases (e.g., gender norms), or how the prioritization of these cues may change with age. To explore these questions, 138 5- to 7-year-olds (younger children) and 8- to 10-year-olds (older children) evaluated a series of boy and girl characters who partook in physical or relational aggression with ambiguous or purposeful intent. Children were asked to provide sociomoral evaluations (i.e., acceptability, punishment, and intention attribution judgments) and social preferences. Transgressor gender only impacted children’s social preferences. Conversely, aggression form and transgressor intent shifted children’s sociomoral judgments: they were harsher toward physical transgressors with purposeful intent over those with ambiguous intent but made similar evaluations for relational transgressors regardless of intentionality. The present results suggest that gender is perhaps not uniformly relevant to children across all contexts, as other cues were prioritized for children’s sociomoral judgments. Since children likely have less familiarity with relational aggression compared to physical aggression, it follows that intent would only shift judgments about physical transgressors. This research provides insight about how children simultaneously navigate multiple cues in aggression contexts, which is likely reflective of their real-world experiences.

Focusing on different informant characteristics by situation: The dimensions of benevolence and competence in children's trust judgment

AbstractChildren use informant characteristics, such as competence or benevolence, in trust judgment. Previous studies have examined the characteristics that children prioritize in trust judgment, but findings have been conflicting. Since people possess and tap into each characteristic in their daily lives as the situation demands, children may adjust the characteristics that they choose to rely on depending on the specific situation rather than always prioritizing either of the characteristics. Thus, the present study investigated children's trust judgment in different situations requiring either competence or benevolence. Additionally, children's preference for competence or benevolence was examined to explore its effect on trust judgment. Results showed that children were more likely to select a competent rather than a benevolent person in situations requiring competence and vice versa in situations requiring benevolence. Children preferred the benevolent person rather than the competent person; such preference did not appear to affect their selection of informants across various situations. In summary, children might focus on the different characteristics of the informant in accordance with the situation. Their preference for benevolence might relate to a preference for prosociality. This, in turn, could relate to enhanced sensitivity to benevolence in early childhood.

Miraculous, magical, or mundane? The development of beliefs about stories with divine, magical, or realistic causation.

Children's naïve theories about causal regularities enable them to differentiate factual narratives describing real events and characters from fictional narratives describing made-up events and characters (Corriveau, Kim, Schwalen, & Harris, Cognition 113 (2): 213-225, 2009). But what happens when children are consistently presented with accounts of miraculous and causally impossible events as real occurrences? Previous research has shown that preschoolers with consistent exposure to religious teaching tend to systematically judge characters involved in fantastical or religious events as real (Corriveau et al., Cognitive Science, 39 (2), 353-382, 2015; Davoodi et al., Developmental Psychology, 52 (2), 221, 2016). In the current study, we extended this line of work by asking about the scope of the impact of religious exposure on children's reality judgments. Specifically, we asked whether this effect is domain-general or domain-specific. We tested children in Iran, where regular exposure to uniform religious beliefs might influence children's reasoning about possibility in non-religious domains, in addition to the domain of religion. Children with no or minimal schooling (5- to 6-year-olds) and older elementary school students (9- to 10-year-olds) judged the reality status of different kinds of stories, notably realistic, unusual (but nonetheless realistic), religious, and magical stories. We found that while younger children were not systematic in their judgments, older children often judged religious stories as real but rarely judged magical stories as real. This developmental pattern suggests that the impact of religious exposure on children's reality judgments does not extend beyond their reasoning about divine intervention. Children's justifications for their reality judgments provided further support for this domain-specific influence of religious teaching.

Do children estimate area using an "Additive-Area Heuristic"?

A large and growing body of work has documented robust illusions of area perception in adults. To date, however, there has been surprisingly little in-depth investigation into children's area perception, despite the importance of this topic to the study of quantity perception more broadly (and to the many studies that have been devoted to studying children's number perception). Here, in order to understand the interactions of number and area on quantity perception, we study both dimensions in tandem. This work is inspired by recent studies showing that human adults estimate area via an "Additive Area Heuristic," whereby the horizontal and vertical dimensions are summed rather than multiplied. First, we test whether children may rely on this same kind of heuristic. Indeed, "additive area" explains children's area judgments better than true, mathematical area. Second, we show that children's use of "additive area" biases number judgments. Finally, to isolate "additive area" from number, we test children's area perception in a task where number is held constant across all trials. We find something surprising: even when there is no overall effect of "additive area" or "mathematical area," individual children adopt and stick to specific strategies throughout the task. In other words, some children appear to rely on "additive area," while others appear to rely on true, mathematical area - a pattern of results that may be best explained by a misunderstanding about the concept of cumulative area. We discuss how these findings raise both theoretical and practical challenges of studying quantity perception in young children.