The Scandal of Particularity Randi Rashkover Knowledge is always about power in one way or another. Politicians, theologians, philosophers, and social theorists have realized this for a long time. We must, Spinoza told us, be wary of ecclesiastical efforts to control belief. Kant distinguished between an ethics rooted in an object we want and a practical knowledge driven by a law “free” from interest. Weber taught us about instrumental knowledge that worked to achieve sought‐for ends. Habermas enlightened us to a different sort of knowledge that placed “understanding” over acquisition as its goal but even so, sustained a vision of what constituted “right” knowledge and designated the line drawn to siphon off falsehood. Of course we cannot mention a connection between knowledge and power and not invoke Marx, who taught us that knowledge is not only about acquiring power but about sustaining it as well. The exposure of power as a factor in knowledge about religion has become a frequently noted phenomenon. The study of religion is not an innocent affair. According to Robert Orsi “[t]he discipline of Religious Studies has always been organized around a distinct and identifiable set of moral values and judgments. The usually unacknowledged centrality of the values in the working life of the discipline has limited the range of human practices, needs and responses that count as religion.”1 Along the same lines, Talal Asad’s challenge to Clifford Geertz’s definitional approach to religion reminds us that to define is to control. It is to delimit or assert a power over and against the phenomenon one claims to be able to name. No doubt, Geertz saw much of his work as an effort to protect religion from the encroachment of the secular but Geertz’s implicit heroism registered as an exercise in intellectual coercion and order‐making, here again excising out what remained unruly, contingent, mysterious, and unknowable. Orsi and Asad’s insights in‐hand, scholars of religion now work to expose what were hidden and sometimes repressed impulses toward containment. This work further illuminated how the effort to contain and control knowledge undermines the very desire for power driving this approach since control is a response to fear or loss—a testimony to powerlessness and the very opposite of authentic power and freedom. If one applies these considerations to the question of how Jews may know about Christianity and how Christians may know about Judaism, we meet with an extraordinary situation because historically speaking, Jewish–Christian relations did not arise from an effort by either party to retain a status quo. Rather, these relations arose from a dramatically different context of chaos and confusion. The Holocaust left Jews and Christians bereft of power, bereft of the ability to contain and control knowledge not only of the other but of themselves as well. Jewish–Christian Studies emerged within and not outside of the Fackenheimian shadow that demanded a full coming to terms with the suffering of the victims in the Holocaust prior to a retrieval of any piece of Christianity or Judaism. Incapable of naming the event and its players, post‐Holocaust Jewish and Christian thought did not lapse into a kenotic undoing. Denuded of power, both traditions sat amidst the confusion of variables, the confusion of positions, the confusion of questions and lost answers. A bombed‐out city of broken ideas and shattered foundations, the Sitz im Leben of post‐Holocaust Jewish–Christian reflection meant a mandated survey of the rubble. Much of what was found was distorted. We may recall the now famous “Mauriac Foreward”2 to Eli Wiesel’s Night with its “What did I say to him? Did I speak of that other Jew, his brother, who may have resembled him—the Crucified, whose Cross has conquered the world?”3 and the shadow of confusion it cast upon our understanding of that book. We may also recall Richard Rubenstein’s interview with Dr. Heinrich Gruber during which Gruber, a man Rubenstein described as “devoted to the work of healing and reconciliation,”4 nonetheless proclaimed to Rubenstein during the interview that “the problem in Germany is that the Jews have not learned anything from what happened to them…I...
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