Causal Judgments Research Articles

Recursive retrospective revaluation of causal judgments.

Recursive causal evaluation is an iterative process in which the evaluation of a target cause, T, is based on the outcome of the evaluation of another cause, C, the evaluation of which itself depends on the evaluation of a 3rd cause, D. Retrospective revaluation consists of backward processing of information as indicated by the fact that the evaluation of T is influenced by subsequent information that is not concerned with T directly. Two experiments demonstrate recursive retrospective revaluation with contingency information presented in list format as well as with trial-by-trial acquisition. Existing associative models are unable to predict the results. The model of recursive causal disambiguation that conceptualizes the revaluation as a recursive process of disambiguation predicts the pattern of results correctly.

Reinstatement of acquisition performance by the presentation of the outcome after extinction in causality judgments

Two experiments were conducted with the aim of exploring reinstatement after extinction using a causality judgment task in human beings. In Experiment 1, participants learned first that a fictitious medicine produced a side-effect. The medicine was then presented in extinction. Re-exposure to the side-effect by itself before the test reinstated acquisition performance. Reinstatement was greater when exposure took place in the test context than when it took place in a different context. Experiment 2 replicated reinstatement in a situation that ensured equivalent extinction for the different groups before the test.

Is a Cause Conceptualized as a Generative Force?: Evidence from a Recognition Memory Paradigm

How do naive observers conceptualize the causes of behavior? We report evidence that people frequently view an antecedent event, feeling, or motivation as a cause to the extent that it is judged to be a relatively powerful force. Participants in three studies read about situations in which two mental antecedents (e.g., two different attitudes, motivations, or feelings) were consistently associated with the target behavior. One of these antecedents was always described as more typical of the target figure. In one version, for example, Jean's mistakes on the job were said to be consistently accompanied by job-related stress (relatively typical of Jean) and irritation with her coworkers (relatively atypical of her). Study 1 suggested that an explicit statement about the relative power or intensity of these antecedents influenced causal attributions more than did an explicit statement about their relative covariation with the target behavior. Although the vignettes in studies 2 and 3 contained no information about the power of the antecedents, recognition memory performance indicated that participants inferred that the more typical antecedent was a more powerful force than the atypical antecedent. Analyses also suggest that the tendency to attribute more power to a typical antecedent mediates covariation-inconsistent judgments of causality. In addition, studies 2 and 3 demonstrate the utility of a recognition memory task for identifying implicit inferences.

Human Response Rates and Causality Judgments on Schedules of Reinforcement

Experiments examined the effect of various relationships between a response (an investment made in the context of a game) and an outcome (a return on the investment) on judgments of the causal effectiveness of the response. In Experiment 1, the time between successive outcomes obtained on a variable ratio (VR) schedule became the successive interval criterion for a yoked variable interval (VI) schedule. Response rates were higher on the VR than the VI schedule. In Experiment 2, the number of responses required per outcome on a VR schedule was matched to that on a master VI 20-s schedule. The ratings of causal effectiveness of the response, and the response rate, were higher in the VR schedule. In Experiment 3, a VI schedule with a reinforcement requirement for a short IRT produced higher response rates and higher causality judgments than a simple VI schedule. These results are taken to corroborate the view that schedules are a determinant of both response rates and causal judgments in humans.

Causal Learning: Association Versus Computation

Causal learning enables humans and other animals not only to predict important events or outcomes, but also to control their occurrence in the service of needs and desires. Computational theories assume that causal judgments are based on an estimate of the contingency between a causal cue and an outcome. However, human causal learning exhibits many of the characteristics of the associative learning processes thought to underlie animal conditioning. One problem for associative theory arises from the finding that judgments of the causal power of a cue can be revalued retrospectively after learning episodes when that cue is not present. However, if retrieved representations of cues can support learning, retrospective revaluation is anticipated by modified versions of standard associative theories.

How two causes are different from one: the use of (un)conditional information in Simpson's paradox.

In a causally complex world, two (or more) factors may simultaneously be potential causes of an effect. To evaluate the causal efficacy of a factor, the alternative factors must be controlled for (or conditionalized on). Subjects judged the causal strength of two potential causes of an effect that covaried with each other, thereby setting up a Simpson's paradox--a situation in which causal judgments should vary widely depending on whether or not they are conditionalized on the alternative potential cause. In Experiments 1 (table format) and 2 (trial-by-trial format), the subjects did conditionalize their judgments for one causal factor on a known alternative cause. The subjects also demonstrated that they knew what information was needed to properly make causal judgments when two potential causes are available. In Experiment 3 (trial-by-trial), those subjects who were not told about the causal mechanism by which the alternative cause operated were less likely to conditionalize on it. However, the more a subject recognized the covariation between the alternative cause and the effect, the more the subject conditionalized on it. Such behavior may arise from the interaction between bottom-up and top-down processing.

Belief-based and covariation-based cues affect causal discounting.

Causal discounting occurs when the perceived efficacy of a putative cause is reduced by the presence of a stronger causal candidate. Previous studies of causal discounting have defined the strength of causal candidates in terms of the degree to which the cause and the effect covary (e.g., Baker, Mercier, Vallee-Tourangeau, Frank, & Pan, 1993). In contrast, in the present study, causal strength was defined in terms of both covariation- and belief-based cues. Seventy-two participants made causality judgments for a fictional causal candidate both in isolation and when paired with either a stronger or a weaker cause. The results demonstrated that the degree to which a causal candidate is discounted depends not only on the degree to which an alternative cause covaries with the effect, but also on whether the alternative is a believable or unbelievable candidate. Indeed, it was observed that a highly believable alternative will produce the discounting effect, even if it is a weaker covariate than the original candidate. These findings suggest the need to incorporate both belief-based and covariation-based cues into models of causal attribution.

Re-examination of the role of within-compound associations in the retrospective revaluation of causal judgements.

We investigated blocking and retrospective revaluation of causal judgements using a scenario in which food cues acted as potential causes of an allergic reaction as the outcome. In the blocking contingency, the treatment cues were either paired or unpaired with the outcome prior to a second stage in which sequential compounds of treatment and target cues were paired with the outcome. The order of this compound and treatment training was reversed in retrospective revaluation contingencies. When the interstimulus interval between the treatment and target cues was unfilled on compound trials (Experiments 1 and 3), both blocking and retrospective revaluation were observed in that the target cue trained in compound with the paired treatment cue attracted lower causal ratings than the target cue trained in compound with the unpaired treatment cue. By contrast, performing a mental arithmetic task using numerals presented during the interstimulus interval had no effect on the magnitude of blocking but rendered re...

Re-examination of the role of within-compound associations in the retrospective revaluation of causal judgements.

We investigated blocking and retrospective revaluation of causal judgements using a scenario in which food cues acted as potential causes of an allergic reaction as the outcome. In the blocking contingency, the treatment cues were either paired or unpaired with the outcome prior to a second stage in which sequential compounds of treatment and target cues were paired with the outcome. The order of this compound and treatment training was reversed in retrospective revaluation contingencies. When the interstimulus interval between the treatment and target cues was unfilled on compound trials (Experiments 1 and 3), both blocking and retrospective revaluation were observed in that the target cue trained in compound with the paired treatment cue attracted lower causal ratings than the target cue trained in compound with the unpaired treatment cue. By contrast, performing a mental arithmetic task using numerals presented during the interstimulus interval had no effect on the magnitude of blocking but rendered retrospective revaluation unreliable (Experiments 2 and 3). These results provide further support for accounts of revaluation based upon within-compound associations.

Theories of Associative Learning in Animals

Theories of associative learning are concerned with the factors that govern association formation when two stimuli are presented together. In this article we review the relative merits of the currently influential theories of associative learning. Some theories focus on the role of attention in association formation, but differ in the rules they propose for determining whether or not attention is paid to a stimulus. Other theories focus on the nature of the association that is formed, but differ as to whether this association is regarded as elemental, configural, or hierarchical. Recent developments involve modifications to existing theories in order to account for associative learning between two stimuli, A and B, when A is accompanied, not by B, but by a stimulus that has been paired with B. The implications of the theories for understanding how humans derive causal judgments and solve categorization problems is considered.

Causation, Contribution, and Legal Liability: An Empirical Study

LAWRENCE M. SOLAN [*] JOHN M. DARLEY [**] I INTRODUCTION This article presents empirical evidence of the ways people compare judgments of liability with judgments of causation and contribution. Specifically, the article reports the results of experiments designed to show whether people regard causation and enablement as necessary elements of liability. As suggested by past psychological research, the experiments also test what roles other factors, such as the defendant's state of mind and the severity of the victim's injury, play in people's judgments of both causation and liability. The experiments ask people their judgments concerning types of cases that the law does not treat uniformly. In one type of case, the defendant has left his keys in the ignition of his car. Someone steals the car and gets into an accident. In the other type, a social host sends an intoxicated guest out in a car to drive another guest home and the guest gets into an accident. Both of these scenarios illustrate what Robert Rabin has called [1] The defendant does not directly cause the harm sets the stage the individual who does. As discussed below, courts disagree not only as to whether such cases should generate liability the enabler, also as to how these cases should be conceptualized in causal terms. The results of the experiment show no more uniformity of judgment than the case law. Some respondents thought that there should be liability the enabler, while others disagreed. Nonetheless, the study casts light on some important contemporary debates in the law of torts. First, the results begin to offer an explanation the disagreement in the case law. Courts do not use the expression enabling torts; rather, they decide these cases using traditional tort concepts, such as duty, foreseeability, and proximate causation. [2] For example, some courts deny recovery lack of proximate causation. Others allow recovery on the basis of proximate causation. Still others talk, instead, of duty. Professor Rabin's approach suggests an additional possibility: To the extent that people distinguish between causation and enablement, there may be no cause in fact in these cases. However, because enablement, like actual causation, is a but for relationship, legal thinkers who draw the distinction will find it di fficult to articulate the problem in that way within the taxonomy of conventional tort theory. This article explores the possibility of such alternative conceptualizations. The results of the study show people to be divided as to how they conceptualize these cases. Many respondents appear content to group causation and enablement together and to regard them essentially as components of a general concept of contribution. Those who do distinguish between the two disagree as to whether enablement is an adequate basis to establish liability. Some who see the actor as an enabler not a cause do not assign liability to the actor, while others who see him only as enabling do assign liability. Thus, the uncertainty expressed by the courts perhaps mirrors the difficulty that ordinary language users have with these problems. Second, the experiments strongly suggest that people believe that the amount of harm which a defendant should be held liable depends on the extent of the defendant's contribution to bringing about the harm. In other words, people's naive sense of justice comports with theories of proportional liability. Third, the actor's state of mind predicts liability to some extent, even when the law does not make such distinctions. For example, a willful enabler is typically assigned more liability than is a reckless one. Part II of this article presents a brief outline of the current state of the law concerning cases that can be characterized as enabling torts. The discussion is not intended to be exhaustive. …

Causal judgments about relations between multilevel variables.

Three experiments presented stimulus information about cause and effect variables taking 3 quantitative values. Judgments tended to vary in accordance with considerations of conditions affecting the validity of causal inference from correlational data: whether causal candidates were presented simultaneously or in a temporal order such that one could affect the other and whether candidates were confounded with each other. The results supported a general hypothesis that causal judgments are moderated in accordance with acquired methodological intuitions. The fourth experiment showed that tendencies in correlation judgment were different from those in causal judgment, further supporting the hypothesis that causal judgment from multilevel variable information is, to some extent, determined by processes or conceptual frameworks specific to the domain of causal cognition.

Schedules of reinforcement as determinants of human causality judgments and response rates.

Experiments examined the effect of relationships between a response and an outcome on human judgments of causal effectiveness. In Experiment 1, the time between outcomes obtained on a variable ratio (VR) schedule became the intervals for a yoked variable interval (VI) schedule. Response rates were higher on the VR than on the VI schedule. In Experiment 2, the number of responses required per outcome on a VR schedule were matched to that on a master VI 20-s schedule. Both ratings of causal effectiveness and response rates were higher in the VR schedule. In Experiment 3, tandem VI fixed-ratio (FR) schedules produced higher rates and judgments than equivalent conjunctive VI FR schedule. In Experiment 4, a VI schedule with a reinforcement requirement for a short interresponse time (IRT) produced higher rates and judgments than a simple VI schedule. These results corroborate the view that schedules are a determinant of both response rates and causal judgments. Few current theories of causal judgment predict this pattern of results.

Causal learning mechanisms in very young children: Two-, three-, and four-year-olds infer causal relations from patterns of variation and covariation.

Three studies investigated whether young children make accurate causal inferences on the basis of patterns of variation and covariation. Children were presented with a new causal relation by means of a machine called the "blicket detector." Some objects, but not others, made the machine light up and play music. In the first 2 experiments, children were told that "blickets make the machine go" and were then asked to identify which objects were "blickets." Two-, 3-, and 4-year-old children were shown various patterns of variation and covariation between two different objects and the activation of the machine. All 3 age groups took this information into account in their causal judgments about which objects were blickets. In a 3rd experiment, 3- and 4-year-old children used the information when they were asked to make the machine stop. These results are related to Bayes-net causal graphical models of causal learning.

Combined effect of context change and retention interval on interference in causality judgments.

Four experiments studied the effects of context change and retention interval on retroactive interference in human causal learning. Experiment 1 found evidence of retroactive interference. Experiment 2 found that either a 48-hr retention interval or a change in the context after the interference treatment decreased retroactive interference. An interaction between context change and retention interval effects was also found, eclipsing the context change effect after the 48-hr retention interval. Experiments 3 and 4 found additivity between context change and retention interval effects when participants were remained of the difference between physical contexts before the test, independently of whether the context change involved a return to the original acquisition context. These results add to the evidence suggesting that spontaneous forgetting is caused by a change in either the physical or the temporal contexts where information is acquired.

Conditioned inhibition produced by extinction-mediated recovery from the relative stimulus validity effect: A test of acquisition and performance models of empirical retrospective revaluation.

Empirical retrospective revaluation is a phenomenon of Pavlovian conditioning and human causal judgment in which posttraining changes in the conditioned response (Pavlovian task) or causal rating (causal judgment task) of a cue occurs in the absence of further training with that cue. Two experiments tested the contrasting predictions made by 2 families of models concerning retrospective revaluation effects. In a conditioned lick-suppression task, rats were given relative stimulus validity training, consisting of reinforcing a compound of conditioned stimuli (CSs) A and X and nonreinforcement of a compound of CSs B and X, which resulted in low conditioned responding to CS X. Massive posttraining extinction of CS A not only enhanced excitatory responding to CS X, but caused CS B to pass both summation (Experiment 1) and retardation (Experiment 2) tests for conditioned inhibition. The inhibitory status of CS B is predicted by the performance-focused extended comparator hypothesis (J. C. Denniston, H. I. Savastano, & R. R. Miller, 2001), but not by acquisition-focused models of empirical retrospective revaluation (e.g., A. Dickinson & J. Burke, 1996; L. J. Van Hamme & E. A. Wasserman, 1994).

Causal judgments about relations between multilevel variables.

Causal judgments about relations between multilevel variables.

Causal learning mechanisms in very young children: Two-, three-, and four-year-olds infer causal relations from patterns of variation and covariation.

Three studies investigated whether young children make accurate causal inferences on the basis of patterns of variation and covariation. Children were presented with a new causal relation by means of a machine called the "blicket detector." Some objects, but not others, made the machine light up and play music. In the first 2 experiments, children were told that "blickets make the machine go" and were then asked to identify which objects were "blickets." Two-, 3-, and 4-year-old children were shown various patterns of variation and covariation between two different objects and the activation of the machine. All 3 age groups took this information into account in their causal judgments about which objects were blickets. In a 3rd experiment, 3- and 4-year-old children used the information when they were asked to make the machine stop. These results are related to Bayes-net causal graphical models of causal learning.

Combined effect of context change and retention interval on interference in causality judgments.

Four experiments studied the effects of context change and retention interval on retroactive interference in human causal learning. Experiment 1 found evidence of retroactive interference. Experiment 2 found that either a 48-hr retention interval or a change in the context after the interference treatment decreased retroactive interference. An interaction between context change and retention interval effects was also found, eclipsing the context change effect after the 48-hr retention interval. Experiments 3 and 4 found additivity between context change and retention interval effects when participants were remained of the difference between physical contexts before the test, independently of whether the context change involved a return to the original acquisition context. These results add to the evidence suggesting that spontaneous forgetting is caused by a change in either the physical or the temporal contexts where information is acquired.

Primacy in causal strength judgments: the effect of initial evidence for generative versus inhibitory relationships.

The order in which people receive information has a substantial effect on subsequent judgment and inference. Our focus is on the order of covariation evidence in causal learning. The first experiment shows that the initial presentation of evidence suggesting a generative causal relationship (the joint presence or joint absence of cause and effect) leads to higher judged causal strength than does the initial presentation of evidence suggesting an inhibitory relationship (the presence of cause or effect in the absence of the other). Additional studies show that this primacy effect is unlikely to be due to fatigue or to an insufficient number of learning trials. These results are not readily explained by current contingency-based or associative theories of causal induction.