Journal Of Political Philosophy Research Articles

Editorial

In introducing the inspiration behind and aims of the new Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Politica (Italian Journal of Political Philosophy), launched by the Italian Society for Political Philosophy, this editorial explores the relationship between politics and philosophy. As does all philosophy, political philosophy arises from the desire to understand what is new and to question existing reality. Political philosophy is thus political in a twofold sense: on the one hand, it is an act of freedom vis-à-vis existing power or knowledge, and, on the other, it is an attempt to establish social relations based on discursive reasoning, and on open participatory mechanisms for decision-making. This dual political attitude is ever more vital in the face of challenges to contemporary societies, such as climate change, migratory movements, dramatic inequalities, and the apparatus of surveillance. Eschewing a philosophy of distraction and non-engagement, political philosophy (and this Journal) endorses the idea of another, “more civic”, philosophy, one which is committed to the opening of new spaces of personal and collective freedom. This Journal intends to nurture the dialogue between Italian and international philosophical-political communities, showing the richness of Italian discussion, and highlighting some of the most authoritative international scholars.

Editorial

In introducing the project of the Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Politica (Italian Journal of Political Philosophy), launched by the Italian Society for Political Philosophy, this editorial explores the relationship between politics and philosophy. As with philosophy itself, political philosophy arises from the desire to understand what is new and to question existing reality. Political philosophy is thus political in a twofold sense: on the one hand, it is an act of freedom vis-à-vis existing power or knowledge, and, on the other, it is an attempt to establish social relations based on discursive rationality, and on open participatory mechanisms for decision-making. This dual political attitude is even more essential in the face of challenges to contemporary societies, such as climate change, migratory movements, dramatic inequalities, and the apparatus of surveillance. Avoiding the risk of a “philosophy of distraction or non-engagement”, political philosophy (and this Journal) endorses the idea of another, “more civic”, philosophy, one which is committed to the opening of new spaces of personal and collective freedom. This Journal intends to nurture the dialogue between Italian and international philosophical-political communities, showing the richness of Italian discussion, and highlighting some of the most authoritative international scholars.

Legal Transitions without Legitimate Expectations*

Legal Transitions without Legitimate Expectations*

Survey Article: Pluralist Neutrality

Journal of Political PhilosophyVolume 26, Issue 4 p. 508-532 Survey Article Survey Article: Pluralist Neutrality† Collis Tahzib, Collis Tahzib Philosophy, University of OxfordSearch for more papers by this author Collis Tahzib, Collis Tahzib Philosophy, University of OxfordSearch for more papers by this author First published: 10 October 2018 https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12169Citations: 1 †For very helpful discussions and comments, I owe thanks to Raven Adams, Paul Billingham, Matthias Brinkmann, Henrik Dahlquist, Yuuki Ohta, Fergus Peace, Tom Sinclair, Anthony Taylor, and participants in John Hyman’s Thursday reading group. I am especially grateful to Jeff McMahan and David Miller, who gave highly perceptive feedback on multiple drafts of the article, as well as to three anonymous reviewers from the Journal of Political Philosophy, who provided extensive and insightful written comments. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume26, Issue4December 2018Pages 508-532 RelatedInformation

On Representing

Journal of Political PhilosophyVolume 26, Issue 2 p. 216-239 Original Article On Representing† Andrew Rehfeld, Andrew Rehfeld Political Science, Washington University, St. LouisSearch for more papers by this author Andrew Rehfeld, Andrew Rehfeld Political Science, Washington University, St. LouisSearch for more papers by this author First published: 21 September 2017 https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12137Citations: 16 † For comments on earlier versions of this argument I am grateful to Jenni Rinne, and to Monica Brito Vieira, Keith Sutherland and other participants in the workshop “Enacting the People: Political Representation and Democratic Legitimacy” at the Department of Politics, University of York, 29 September 2015. I also thank two anonymous reviewers from the Journal of Political Philosophy who helped clarify and shape the current article. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume26, Issue2June 2018Pages 216-239 RelatedInformation

Catching capital: the ethics of tax competition

Acknowledgements Introduction 1. The political philosophy of international taxation 2. A primer on taxation 3. What is at stake 4. competition and the financial crisis 5. A short outline of the book PART I Chapter 1: Fiscal autonomy and tax competition 1. Framing the question as one of autonomy 2. Understanding tax competitionEL* 3. EL and its corrosive impact* 4. State incentives under tax competition 5. Conclusion Chapter 2: Regulating tax competition 1. Existing reform proposals and where they fall short 1.1. Capital controls 1.2. Unilateral measures to protect one's tax base 1.3. Redefining the corporate tax base 2. Two principles of global tax justice 2.1. The first principle: membership* 2.2. Transparency as a corollary of membership 2.3. The second principle: A constraint on the design of fiscal policy* 3. Implementation* 3.1. Institutionalizing the membership principle* 3.2. Institutionalizing the fiscal policy constraint* 3.3. Enforcement* 3.4. Comparison to the OECD and EU tax agendas and the question of feasibility* 4. Principles for global background justice* 5. Conclusion PART II Chapter 3: Efficiency of what? - Assessing efficiency arguments in the context of tax competition 1. The deadweight loss and its interpretation 2. Two concepts of efficiency 3. Efficiency as a placeholder 3.1. Efficiency as productive Pareto optimality 3.2. Efficiency as general Pareto optimality 3.3. Making sense of the models 3.4. Efficiency as economic growth 3.5. Taking stock 4. Efficiency as an optimal trade-off 5. Conclusion Chapter 4: Rethinking sovereignty in international fiscal policy 1. The many facets of sovereignty 2. Sovereignty with strings attached 3. Back to fiscal policy 4. The twofold conditional nature of sovereignty 5. What about non-democratic regimes? 6. Conclusion Chapter 5: Life with (or after) tax competition 1. Should the winners of tax competition compensate the losers? 1.1. What's the point of compensatory duties? 1.2. Calculating compensatory duties 2. Should low-income countries be allowed to compete on taxes? 3. Unwinding the system of tax havens 3.1. Additional duties towards low-income countries? 3.2. Corporate lobbies - the elephant in the room 4. Conclusion Conclusion Bibliography Index * These sections are largely based on Peter Dietsch & Thomas Rixen, Tax Competition and Global Background Justice, The Journal of Political Philosophy 22/2 (2014), 150-77. I thank my co-author Thomas Rixen for his permission to use this material here.

Exile Political Representation

Journal of Political PhilosophyVolume 24, Issue 3 p. 277-296 Original Article Exile Political Representation† Ashwini Vasanthakumar, Ashwini Vasanthakumar Politics, University of YorkSearch for more papers by this author Ashwini Vasanthakumar, Ashwini Vasanthakumar Politics, University of YorkSearch for more papers by this author First published: 06 October 2015 https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12083Citations: 3 †The author is grateful to the three anonymous reviewers at The Journal of Political Philosophy, and especially to Bob Goodin and David Miller, who generously commented on multiple versions of this article. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Citing Literature Volume24, Issue3September 2016Pages 277-296 RelatedInformation

“Cripping” Resilience: Contributions from Disability Studies to Resilience Theory

“Cripping” Resilience: Contributions from Disability Studies to Resilience Theory

Creating Capabilities, Lists and Thresholds: Whose Voices, Intuitions and Value Judgements Count?

Creating Capabilities, Lists and Thresholds: Whose Voices, Intuitions and Value Judgements Count?

AGAINST DEMOCRATIC CONTRACTUALISM

Democratic Rights is a rich, provocative and ambitious book. In it, Corey Brettschneider invites readers to embrace a new conception of democracy—a conception that helps dispel the tension between ...

The Saint, the Criminal and the Terrorist: Towards a Hypothesis on Terrorism

Journal of Political PhilosophyVolume 18, Issue 1 p. 1-15 The Saint, the Criminal and the Terrorist: Towards a Hypothesis on Terrorism S.N. Balagangadhara, S.N. Balagangadhara Vergelijkende Cultuurwetenschap, Ghent University, BelgiumSearch for more papers by this authorJakob De Roover, Jakob De Roover Vergelijkende Cultuurwetenschap, Ghent University, BelgiumSearch for more papers by this author S.N. Balagangadhara, S.N. Balagangadhara Vergelijkende Cultuurwetenschap, Ghent University, BelgiumSearch for more papers by this authorJakob De Roover, Jakob De Roover Vergelijkende Cultuurwetenschap, Ghent University, BelgiumSearch for more papers by this author First published: 08 January 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2009.00336.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume18, Issue1March 2010Pages 1-15 RelatedInformation

Self‐Defence and the Right to Resist

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 4th edn (New York: Basic Books, 2006); Alex J. Bellamy, Just Wars, Cicero to Iraq (Cambridge: Polity, 2006). 2 Tony Honoré, ‘The Right to Rebel’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 8(1) (1988), pp. 34–54. For a more recent affirmation of the right of revolution in principle, see C. A. J. Coady, ‘Terrorism and Innocence’, Journal of Ethics, 8 (2004), pp. 37–58, p. 40. 3 Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2004), pp. 52, 91. 4 See, for instance, Alan Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 4–9. 5 Ignatieff, p. 52. 6 Ibid., pp. 91–2. 7 Ibid., p. 92. 8 Honoré, p. 41. 9 See also David Miller, ‘The Use and Abuse of Political Violence’, Political Studies, 32 (1984), pp. 401–19, p. 406. 10 Honoré, p. 36. 11 Ibid., pp. 34–5. 12 Ibid., pp. 34–5. 13 Ibid., pp. 34–5. 14 Ibid., pp. 53–4. 15 Ibid., pp. 42–4; Ignatieff, p. 92. 16 Honoré, p. 37. 17 Ignatieff, pp. 95, 110–11. 18 On the derivation of other ethical possibilities and critical discussion of these, see Christopher J. Finlay, ‘Violence and Revolutionary Subjectivity, Marx to Žižek’, European Journal of Political Theory, 5(4) (2006), pp. 373–97. 19 David Rodin, War and Self‐Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), chapters 1 and 2. 20 Rodin, pp. 43–8; Richard Norman, Ethics, Killing and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 128–31. 21 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), Second Treatise, Ch. III, especially paragraphs 17–19; and Ch. XIX, ‘Of the Dissolution of Government’. 22 Rodin, pp. 135–7. 23 Ibid., in the context of his discussion of imminent and conditional threats, pp. 132–8. 24 Ibid., pp. 132–8. 25 Jeff McMahan, ‘Innocence, Self‐Defence, and Killing in War’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 2(3) (1994), pp. 193–221. 26 Ibid., p. 196. 27 The two principles are distinguished as ‘stability of possession’ and its ‘transference by consent’ in David Hume’s theory of justice. 28 McMahan, p. 196. 29 Rodin, p. 134.

Survey Article: The Legitimacy Deficits of the European Union

THE legitimacy of the European Union has become a popular academic and political issue, stimulating debate about alleged symptoms, diagnosis and prescriptions. This review presents some of the central approaches and research issues, as well as an account of legitimacy that accommodates several but not all contributions. The ‘normative turn in EU studies’ has tended to address how the European level institutions should be governed. This subject gained political salience largely in response to the contentious Maastricht Treaty ratification process, sketched in Section I. Popular and legal conflicts strengthened the claims of politicians and scholars that the European Union suffered from a ‘legitimacy deficit’ that has yet to be resolved. Section II dissolves this apparent consensus by exploring experts’ different choices of symptoms, diagnosis and prescriptions regarding this deficit. Section III provides a taxonomy of concepts of legitimacy, institutional mechanisms of legitimation and objects of legitimacy. Section IV perhaps over-ambitiously seeks to combine several of these disjointed insights into a somewhat unified perspective. It incorporates empirical concepts of legitimacy as compliance in an account of citizens’ political obligation to obey normatively legitimate political orders. On this account, a normative duty to obey political commands requires firstly, that the commands, rulers and regime are normatively legitimate, and secondly, that citizens also have reason to trust in the future compliance of other citizens and authorities with such commands and regimes. To merit obedience, institutions must thus address the assurance problems faced by ‘conditional compliers’ under complex structures of interdependence. I suggest that this perspective helps address some – though not all – of the central tensions between empirical and normative concepts of legitimacy, and the conflicts between problem solving efficiency and democratic accountability. The Journal of Political Philosophy: Volume 14, Number 4, 2006, pp. 441–468

Political Philosophy: The View from Cambridge

This article reports on a conversation convened by Quentin Skinner at the invitation of the Editors of The Journal of Political Philosophy and held in Cambridge on 13 February 2001.

Inequality and Indignation

Philosophy & Public AffairsVolume 30, Issue 4 p. 337-362 Inequality and Indignation EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT is professor of philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a member of its Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory. She recently edited Reasoning Practically (Oxford University Press, 2000). She and Cass R. Sunstein have previously co-authored “Second-Order Decisions,”Ethics, (1999) and “Solidarity Goods,”The Journal of Political Philosophy (2001). This is her first contribution to Philosophy & Public Affairs.Search for more papers by this authorCASS R. SUNSTEIN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN CASS R. SUNSTEIN is Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor in the law school and department of political science at the University of Chicago. His recent books include Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (2002) and Risk and Reason: Safety, Law, and the Enuironment (2002). He is a previous contributor to Philosophy & Public Affairs.Search for more papers by this author EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT is professor of philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a member of its Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory. She recently edited Reasoning Practically (Oxford University Press, 2000). She and Cass R. Sunstein have previously co-authored “Second-Order Decisions,”Ethics, (1999) and “Solidarity Goods,”The Journal of Political Philosophy (2001). This is her first contribution to Philosophy & Public Affairs.Search for more papers by this authorCASS R. SUNSTEIN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN CASS R. SUNSTEIN is Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor in the law school and department of political science at the University of Chicago. His recent books include Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (2002) and Risk and Reason: Safety, Law, and the Enuironment (2002). He is a previous contributor to Philosophy & Public Affairs.Search for more papers by this author First published: 13 January 2005 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2001.00337.xCitations: 6 We are grateful to Avishai Margalit, Eric Posner, Richard Posner, Adrian Vermeule, and two anonymous reviewers for Philosophy & Public Affairs for very valuable comments on previous drafts. The first author also wishes to thank Russell Hardin, Stephen Holmes, Sanford Levinson, Mario Rizzo, and the participants in The Program in Ethics in Society at Stanford University, the Austrian Economics Colloquium at New York University, the Law School Faculty Colloquium at the University of Austin, Texas, and the Philosophy Department's Brown-Bag Colloquium at Columbia University. Their questions and comments helped to shape the present article. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume30, Issue4October 2001Pages 337-362 RelatedInformation

Degrees of Freedom in the Social World: Towards a Systems Analysis of Decision

THOMAS SCHELLING taught us that in ordinary human affairs, con ict and common interest are ubiquitously intertwined.1 For when it comes to variety, the occasion of pure con ict (known to some of its friends as the zerosum game) is as under-represented in human affairs as the occasion of undiluted common interest (known as the pure coordination game). The undiluted extremes are the exceptions, when it comes to counting kinds, while the mixed-motive kind of occasion is the rule. Things look a bit different, however, when one looks at sheer numbers of true-life occasions, as I will explain. Schelling also taught us that in the diverse space of mixed-motive affairs, intermediate between pure con ict and pure coordination, there is more true-life collaborative behaviorÐmore trustings and promise-keepingsÐthan our prescriptive decision theories can accommodate, never mind explain. This collaborative behavior, as long ago another ThomasÐThomas HobbesÐwas painfully aware, requires some explaining precisely because of the presence of ineliminable con ict of interest. The problem confronting those who aspire to explain such collaboration is to identify weighty motivations in its favor, in the face of the weighty, but countervailing motivations. What shall concern me here is not the collaboration that transpires in the face of con ict of interest, but the success which meets us more than halfway in those limiting cases of pure coordination, so as (for example) not to collide in roadways and corridors. For in sheer quantity, the occasions for pure coordination outnumber the occasions for anything else perhaps a hundredfold. We The Journal of Political Philosophy: Volume 7, Number 4, 1999, pp. 453±477

Creating Supra‐National Institutions Democratically: Reflections on the European Union's “Democratic Deficit”

There are two distinct democratic de®cits in the emerging European Union. On the one hand, ordinary citizens of the EU have very little meaningful in uence on the political decisions made in their name by the centralized organs and agencies, such as the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament. Having produced some public expressions of discontent and alienation (Euro-fatigue), this problem has been discussed quite extensively, and various proposals have been made by politicians, Eurocrats and academics for how EU institutions can be made more user-friendly. This elite debate highlights the second problem: Ordinary citizens of the EU have had very little meaningful in uence on the designing of the emerging European institutions, which have been shaped and modi®ed by a small politico-bureaucratic elite. And this elite is now likely to decide, quite undemocratically, what sorts of democratizing modi®cations they are going to implement in order to reduce public hostility to their intransparent and undemocratic rule. The present essay addresses only this second democratic de®cit in institutional designing.1 Some terminology may help clarify the issue. By a political decision, I mean any legislative, executive, judicial, or administrative decision that is authoritative for (or within) some comprehensive social system (such as a city, province, state, The Journal of Political Philosophy: Volume 5, Number 2, 1997, pp. 163±182

Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender

In 1977, Jane English pointed out that "by making the parties in the original position heads of families rather than individuals, Rawls makes the family opaque to claims of justice." Since then, a number of feminists have written on issues having to do with gender and the family in Rawls's A Theory ofJustice. 1 I argued in two earlier articles, and then in Justice, Gender, and the Family, that the absence of a discussion of justice in families and justice and gender was a significant problem, for reasons both internal and external to the theory.' I also argued, however, that Rawls's theory of justice had very great potential to address these issues. And I have tried to make some suggestions as to what a feminist extension of Rawls's ideas might include. I shall turn to these later in this article. In the introduction to Political Liberalism, Rawls mentions, as one of a number of "major matters" omitted from Theory, "the justice of and in the family." He reminds us that he did, however, "assume that in some form the family is just."3 It is not at all clear that, in Political Liberalism, he still holds to this assumption, or even to the requirement that families ought to be thought of in terms ofjustice. In publications

Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating the Community

A predominant theme in much recent feminist thought has been the critique of the abstract individualism which underlies some important versions of liberal political theory.' Abstract individualism considers individual human beings as social atoms, abstracted from their social contexts, and disregards the role of social relationships and human community in constituting the very identity and nature of individual human beings. Sometimes the individuals of abstract individualism are posited as rationally self-interested utility maximizers.2 Sometimes, also, they are theorized to form communities based fundamentally on competition and conflict among persons vying for scarce resources, communities which represent no deeper social bond than that of instrumental relations based on calculated self-interest.3 Against this abstractive individualist view of the self and of human community, many feminists have asserted a conception of what might

Propositions on Citizenship

Much has recently been said about "new citizenship," although often in an unclear way. The turn of phrase may be only a gimmick, as was, recently, the "new philosophy" or that kind of auberge espagnole where you have to bring your own food, also known as "la nouvelle cusine." Most of all, it risks soon passing out of fashion with the ups and downs of French socialism. Yet whatever the future redistribution of political power may be, several of the problems raised by discussions of the "new citizenship" will still have to be faced. These include racism and the status of immigration (or rather of "the communities that have issued from immigration") in France. Nevertheless, the form in which these problems will be faced and the chances of finding a solution to them may be singularly transformed depending on whether dominant parties confront or fail to confront certain fundamental alternatives. "Citizenship" (in Greek politeia) is a concept as old as politics itself and which has always marked two distinctions: it is bound to the existence of a state and therefore to a principle of public sovereignty, and it is bound to the acknowledged exercise of an individual "capacity" to participate in political decisions. This is why the dimension of equality-with all the problems of definition which it poses and the mystifications which it may conceal-is always present in the constitution of a concept of citizenship, even when the latter is paradoxically combined with a hierarchical principle and with caste distinctions (as seen in the difference between "active citizens" and "passive citizens" in the nineteenth century). Beyond the conflict between citizenship and allegiance to an actual or transcendentally legitimate state, history still shows that this concept has no definition that is fixed for all time. It has always been at stake in struggles and the object of transformations. Not only because, as Aristotle has already shown, each political regime builds the distribution of powers into a specific defintion of citizenship but also because, in juridically (or quasijuridically) delimiting a certain type of "human being" and a certain model of rights and duties, this definition crystalizes the constitutive social relations of a society at the level of the individual.