Self‐Defence and the Right to Resist

Abstract

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 4th edn (New York: Basic Books, 2006); Alex J. Bellamy, Just Wars, Cicero to Iraq (Cambridge: Polity, 2006). 2 Tony Honoré, ‘The Right to Rebel’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 8(1) (1988), pp. 34–54. For a more recent affirmation of the right of revolution in principle, see C. A. J. Coady, ‘Terrorism and Innocence’, Journal of Ethics, 8 (2004), pp. 37–58, p. 40. 3 Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2004), pp. 52, 91. 4 See, for instance, Alan Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 4–9. 5 Ignatieff, p. 52. 6 Ibid., pp. 91–2. 7 Ibid., p. 92. 8 Honoré, p. 41. 9 See also David Miller, ‘The Use and Abuse of Political Violence’, Political Studies, 32 (1984), pp. 401–19, p. 406. 10 Honoré, p. 36. 11 Ibid., pp. 34–5. 12 Ibid., pp. 34–5. 13 Ibid., pp. 34–5. 14 Ibid., pp. 53–4. 15 Ibid., pp. 42–4; Ignatieff, p. 92. 16 Honoré, p. 37. 17 Ignatieff, pp. 95, 110–11. 18 On the derivation of other ethical possibilities and critical discussion of these, see Christopher J. Finlay, ‘Violence and Revolutionary Subjectivity, Marx to Žižek’, European Journal of Political Theory, 5(4) (2006), pp. 373–97. 19 David Rodin, War and Self‐Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), chapters 1 and 2. 20 Rodin, pp. 43–8; Richard Norman, Ethics, Killing and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 128–31. 21 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), Second Treatise, Ch. III, especially paragraphs 17–19; and Ch. XIX, ‘Of the Dissolution of Government’. 22 Rodin, pp. 135–7. 23 Ibid., in the context of his discussion of imminent and conditional threats, pp. 132–8. 24 Ibid., pp. 132–8. 25 Jeff McMahan, ‘Innocence, Self‐Defence, and Killing in War’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 2(3) (1994), pp. 193–221. 26 Ibid., p. 196. 27 The two principles are distinguished as ‘stability of possession’ and its ‘transference by consent’ in David Hume’s theory of justice. 28 McMahan, p. 196. 29 Rodin, p. 134.