Joseon Government Research Articles

招商局 차관 상환 어음부도사건과 조선·청의 대응

Joseon government repaid 46,800 nyang of Chinese Chosang-gug loan at the end of 1889. Among them, 46,000 nyang were Chinese merchant Yujeungsangho’s promissory notes that was received as red ginseng trade money last year. However, Yujeungsangho dishonored the promissory notes on the promised date. China government received 13,000 nyang from Yujeungsangho’s property, but was unable to receive 33,000 nyang. On April 2, 1890, China officially requested Joseon government to accept Yujeungsangho’s debt of 230,000 nyang of silver based on his claim. However, the Joseon government was passive in collecting his debt, and did not collect the debt until 1892. In May 1892, Chinese government returned the 33,000nyang promissory notes to the Joseon government and demanded that the Chosang-gug loan be paid in cash. Joseon government accepted this, demanded that Yujeungsangho’s promissory notes be exchanged for cash and paid to the Joseon government. This case proceeded very complicatedly, because interlinked the repayment of Chosang-gug loans and the red ginseng trade which had both public and private characteristics, and was linked Yujeungsangho’s promissory notes and Joseon people’s debt. In the end, this case was left unsolved.

Політика США щодо франко-корейського конфлікту 1866 р.

In the article comprehensively examines the process of formulating the Korean policy of the USA in the 1860-s, aimed at the «opening» of the Joseon state to foreign commerce. It is noted that this course was a direct continuation of the strategy, which passed the initial public test in the middle of the ХІХ-th century, during the violent «opening» of Japan. Examining the process of formulation of Washington's policy towards the Korean state of Joseon, the author proves that the reason for interference in Seoul's internal affairs was oppression and persecution by the «isolationist» government of the East Asian state. This problem became particularly acute in 1866, when the Joseon government massively persecuted the country's Christian community, which was developing under the patronage of the French Catholic mission. As a result of the conducted research, the author came to the following conclusions. The Korean policy of the USA became significantly more active in the 1860-s. Under the pretext of protecting French Catholic missionaries from repression by the Korean authorities, the White House advocated, along with other states (in particular, France) for the «opening» of Joseon to foreign trade. The latter was considered as a universal recipe for the spread of «civilized» rules of coexistence to the previously «isolated» countries of East Asia. The actions taken by Washington during this period can be interpreted as a «test of strength» in order to determine the further strategy of «opening up» Korea.

조선 개항기 서양음악을 전래한 오페르트의 ‘한국음악 평론가’로서의 선구적 면모와 통찰

German merchant Ernst Jacob Oppert(1832~1903), the mastermind of the “Opert Incident” (It refers to his theft of the royal family’s tomb) has been a rash aggressor and traitorous figure in Korean history. It has also been almost entirely negatively evaluated as a very ambitious merchant who tried to monopolize business by pushing through trade pressure and provided the Joseon government with the pretext of severe Catholic persecution. Unlike this previous evaluation, as a result of this study that analyzed Opert’s wrritten records of Korean music in his travelogue, the need for his re-evaluation as a music critic increased. His music writing was highly complete in both form and content levels, making it reasonable to define it as a “music review”. In particular, he praised Koreans’ own musical ear and music fondness, which seems to have demonstrated insight into their outstanding musicality and love for music, which is considered the driving force of the “Myth of K-pop success” among experts these days. The study illuminated his music historical value as the first Westerner to leave an unprecedented record of “Korean Music Criticism” just before the port opening era, which is expected that a new evaluation will be made only in the history of cultural exchange.

환난상휼의 실천, 16·17세기 향촌 사족들의 지방 의국(醫局) 운영

From the very foundation of the dynasty, the Joseon government continued to open medical offices throughout the country in order to spread medical service. However, the establishment of such offices could also be attributed to the local Sajok(士族) figures’ willingness to actively participate in the operation of these offices, as the joining of Confucian scholars with medical knowledge(Yu’eui, 儒醫) went a long way to ensure their success. In short, both the government’s determination to install such medical offices in the local regions, and the voluntary participation of the local Sajok figures who were willing to engage in public service were altogether crucial to the cause.BR Since the 16th century, the Joseon Sajok figures in local regions actively engaged in local governance through several local bodies including the Yu’hyang-so(留鄕所), Seo’weon(書院) and Hyang’gyo(鄕校) schools, and of course the Euiguk medical facilities, in order to provide suggestions or offer resolutions for the local communities’ problems. There have been many prior studies that examined such efforts, but many of them chose a rather dichotomous approach in their analysis of such local actions, as they mostly categorized the local Sajok figures’ efforts as a fight against the central government’s attempt to assimilate the local regions, and as an ultimate effort to achieve autonomous local rule for themselves. This article employs a different angle, as stressed in this article is the fact that local Sajok figures who were generally deeply involved in character-building studies[爲己之學] were also committed to running local medical facilities and serving as Confucian doctors(or Doctor Confucians, Yu’eui), and that many of them were interested in not only Neo-Confucianism but practical knowledge.BR For the local medical Euiguk offices to continue to function, cooperation between the state and local figures was imperative. Conflicts could only endanger that. Cases examined here include (1) Confucian Medical practitioner Yi Seok-gan of the Yeongju area’s Euiguk office “Jemin-ru,” and the effort of Park Jong-mu who was involved in the management of this facility, (2) Yi Deug-yun and other local Sajok figures of the Chungju region who all contributed to the reinstallation of the region’s Euiguk facility, and (3) the efforts and academic traits of Song Je-min who opened an Euiguk facility in the Mu’an area. These examples would hopefully help us properly evaluate the nature and meaning of public services provided by the Neo-Confucian scholars of the 16th and 17th centuries in the local regions.

숙종 대 왕비의 수고명의와 조·청관계

Joseon and the Qing dynasty had conflicts from the very beginning, and one of the issues over which they clashed with each other was the issue of Qing’s bestowal of a title to Joseon Queen Jang’ryeol. Qing, ever distrustful of Joseon, demanded that Joseon personally greet the Go’myeong(誥命) order, but Joseon, which was more than bitter by past events outright refused to do so. Eventually Joseon found a compromise by having the King receive the order from a Qing emissary and then relay it to the Queen. This practice became the “Gimyo-year protocol.”BR Then, during King Sukjong’s reign several queens were appointed, deposed, and then reinstated, and in the wake of total of four instances of Joseon having to receive Qing’s order for such occasions, a modified protocol concerning the Appointment-receiving ritual was established. According to this new practice, referred to as the “Imsul-year protocol,” the Qing emissary would arrive at the Inner chamber’s gate, and hand the Go’myeong order over to an eunuch. Later, however, whenever a similar occasion would occur the Joseon government would argue that the Gimyo-year precedence should be honored, while the Qing government would demand the Imsul-year protocol be observed. In the end, two protocols were merged, as a result of another compromise agreed on by both parties.BR All these fights were because of Qing’s intention to reinforce the Imperial family’s authority, and punish Joseon for its rebellious attitude on a political and diplomatic level, while trying to integrate the Korean peninsula into the Qing- centered ritual order. To such an offensive initiative on Qing’s part, Joseon responded with the argument emphasizing the prudence of the Gimyo-year precedence, out of repulsion against Qing, which was in itself caused by racial, cultural and historical antagonism that naturally led Joseon to refuse to greet and accept Qing’s Go’myeong order.BR However, both sides could not afford to endanger their relationship and let it be damaged beyond repair, so they chose to honor both precedences(前例) and ritual protocols(典禮) at the same time, which allowed the Su-Go’myeong-eui practice to retain its dual nature and an indirect delivery system, resulting in a third, modified option(變禮) as a follow-up to the Gimyo and Imsul practices.

17~18세기 추국청의 혹형(압슬형(壓膝刑), 낙형(烙刑)) 시행 추이

This study deals with the implementation procedure and temporal progress of Apseul-hyung(壓膝刑) and Nak-hyung(烙刑), severe punishments carried out by the Joseon government in the 17th and 18th centuries Apseul-hyung and Nak-hyung were unique punishments that were enforced without legal stipulations in Joseon.BR The severe punishment was a compromise of Joseon’s Confucian ideology and practical necessity. Joseon adopted a confession-centered principle that a sentence should be executed after obtaining a confession from the accused. Severe penalties were used as a means to eliciting confession (in criminal cases). The government reorganized its punishment system to a certain limited extent to prevent side effects.BR The abolition of King Yeongjo’s severe punishment does not signify “the king’s compassionate decision to resolve evil practices at once,” but rather “formalization of the abolition of progressively disappearing practices.” Already in the 17th century, the infliction of Apseul-hyung and Nakhyung had been decreasing. Nevertheless, King Yeongjo was aware of their functional advantages and intended to make use of them in the execution of punishment. King Yeongjosought to establish the image of a Confucian monarch by means of the abolition of severe tortures during his reign, but at the same time utilized them to eliminate opponents that threatened his power.

조선시대 왕후의 이름, 휘호(徽號)의 정립 과정과 의의

Among all the titles the Joseon dynasty queens were awarded, the title ‘Hwiho(徽號)’ is the one that is examined in this article. How such title was institutionalized, and what was the meaning of this particular title, would be the main focus of this work.BR The Joseon royal family considered awarding a special title to someone as a holy event, and for such task the Joseon government arranged special ceremonies, during which Chaek(冊) and Bo(寶) pieces with special titles inscribed upon them would be awarded to the recipient. Among those awarded titles, Hwiho was a four-lettered honorific title(尊號) provided to the deceased queens, apart from the regular posthumous title that would automatically entail their death.BR This title was given to the late queens throughout the entire Joseon period, but at least in the beginning the practice was yet to be institutionalized. In the middle period of the Joseon dynasty, from the reign of king Jungjong through the reign of king Injo, discussions for the institution gathered momentum, resulting in the establishment of certain details such as the proper time point to award titles to the deceased queens, as well as the nature, format and procedure concerning the entire practice, which continued to be observed in the later periods of the dynasty as well.BR The succeeding king(嗣王, Sawang) would provide this Hwiho when the deceased queen was to be enshrined at the Dynastic Shrine for the first time. The ritual itself effectively displayed the king’s filial piety for the dead queen mother, and it was meant to be that way, as in the Joseon society which considered piety as a paramount virtue, any benevolent king should have embodied that in action.BR Ceremonies for presenting the dead queens a Hwiho title continued, and was even held for the last queen of the Daehan Empire, Queen Sunjeonghyo. It was a constant factor in every royal funeral that was ever arranged for a queen in Joseon, yet it never received adequate attention in Queen funeral studies. The ritual can never be observed in prior dynasties on the Korean peninsula, so this Joseon-specific ritual should be studied more in the future.

조선초 왜구의 퇴조와 조선 조정의 ‘회유책’에 대한 비판적 검토 - 1396년(태조 5년) 나가온 왜구 집단의 투항과 김사형의 이키·대마도 정벌군 출진 간의 인과관계를 중심으로 -

본 연구의 목적은, 조선초 왜구 투항에 관한 최초･최대 규모 사례인 1396년(태조5) 12월 9일 나가온 왜구 집단 투항의 배경 및 양상을 고찰하면서, 이에 관한 기존의 통설적 견해를 재검토하는 것이다.BR 기존의 통설적 견해는 왜구 투항의 주된 배경을 ‘조선 조정의 회유책’에서 구하고 있다. 그러나 이 견해에는, 사료상 근거가 없고 오히려 기존 사료의 문언과 모순된다는 문제가 있다. 따라서 본 연구에서는, 1396년 12월 김사형 정벌군 출진이 나가온 왜구 집단 투항의 배경이었다는 견해를 다음 4가지 측면에서 검토하였다.BR 첫째, 나가온 왜구는 1396년 11월 하순부터 12월 초까지의 기간 중에 있었던 조선군과의 전투 과정에서 김사형 정벌군에 관한 첩보를 입수하게 되었다고 생각한다. 나가온 왜구 집단은 조선 조정의 적극적 군사 조치에 위협을 느껴 급히 투항했던 것이다.BR 둘째, 김사형 정벌군은 이키·대마도 정벌 및 한반도 내에서의 왜구 토벌이라는 두 가지 과업을 갖고 결성되었다. 즉 조선 조정은 당시 왜구 근절 목적을 위하여 조선의 국방력을 김사형 정벌군의 명령 체계 하에 통합시켰다고 보인다.BR 셋째, 나가온 왜구 집단이 투항함으로써 김사형 정벌군은 실제 이키·대마도 정벌 없이도 출진 목적을 달성할 수 있었다. 이에 따라 이키·대마도에서의 실제 전투가 없었음에도 조선 조정은 김사형 정벌군의 귀경을 크게 환영하였다.BR 넷째, 나가온 왜구 집단의 투항은, 자신들의 병선 및 병력을 거의 그대로 유지하면서 조선에 대한 적대행위만을 중지하는 정도의 제한적인 투항이었다. 조선 조정은 항왜들을 경계했으므로, 항왜 집단 중 구륙, 나가온 등 지도자들을 서로 분리한 후 10명 정도의 소수 인원만 붙여서 순차적으로 한양으로 상경시켰다. 또한 조선 측은 경상도에 남은 나머지 항왜 세력을 섬멸하고자 하는 시도를 최소 2차례 이상 계획 또는 실행하였다.BR 조선초 왜구 투항에 관하여 확인된 위와 같은 사실들은 ‘조선 조정의 회유책’을 위주로 하는 기존의 통설적 견해로는 설명될 수 없다. 기존의 통설적 견해 및 이에 근거한 조선초 향화왜인에 대한 연구는 근본적으로 재검토될 필요가 있을 것이다.

개경과 한경의 행정체제와 영역 편제의 특징

Goryeo had a multi-centered perception of the world, with Buddhism at its primary core. Its Capital city, Gae’gyeong(開京), can be described as a Buddhist city. Joseon was a dynasty that aspired to become a Confucian state, so Han’gyeong(漢京) can be regarded as a Confucian city. Then again, both cities featured basically similar geographic traits, and positions of major structures and buildings were not that different from each other. This is because Joseon’s Han’gyeong was originally the Nam’gyeong(南京, Southern capital) city of the Goryeo dynasty.BR So, in both these cities the Goryeo order still remained. We can see that from Goryeo’s Gae’gyeong capital and its ‘Gaeseong-bu’ authorities, and Joseon’s Han’gyeong capital and its ‘Hanseong-bu’ authorities, as well as the “Five-Bu” system including the Bang and Ri counties that existed in both Goryeo and Joseon periods. Below are some characteristics.BR First, while Goryeo had sometimes two Capital cities(Yang’gyeong-je, 兩京制), and sometimes even three, in most cases Gae’gyeong and Seo’gyeong were the two primary pillars of such system. The Joseon government also -in its early days- operated both the new capital Han’gyeong and the old capital Gaeseong as official Capitals at the same time, as a convention inherited from the Goryeo period.BR Second, the Gae’gyeong Capital of Goryeo, and the Gyeong’gi region in the Goryeo period, were under stronger supervision of the Central government, than the Han’gyeong capital and the Joseon Gyeong’gi region ever were. This was due to Goryeo’s own needs to suppress and control powerful local regions and the factions living there.BR Third, the relationship between Hanseong-bu and Gaeseong-bu authorities (in the early Joseon period) resembled the relationship that existed between Gaeseong-bu and Seo’gyeong Yusu-gwan during the Goryeo period. But of course there were differences. In the Joseon period, both Hanseong-bu and Gaeseong-bu offices were manned by central governmental officials, and enjoyed virtually the same rank, but Hanseong-bu’s authority was clearly superior to that of Gaeseong-bu.BR Fourth, both Gae’gyeong and Han’gyeong cities had five Bu sectors, and several Bang(坊) counties, 35 in Gae’gyeong, and 52 in Han’gyeong. Han’gyeong was much smaller than Gae’gyeong, but had more Bang counties. Meanwhile, the Ri counties’ role as an administrative unit significantly diminished in Joseon.BR Fifth, there seems to have been a historical relationship between the Four Gyo areas[Sagyo, 四郊] of the Gae’gyeong capital, and the space that existed inside a 10-ri radius of the Han’gyeong capital walls(Seongjeo Shibri, 城底十里). The boundaries formed by the 4 Gyo areas of Goryeo were established initially 10 ri-units away from the Naseong(羅城) Wall, but that line later further regressed to 20 ri-units from the Wall. Buk’gyo(北郊) was at the farthest. This feature seems to have at least partially inspired the formation of Joseon dynasty’s Seongjeo Shibri.BR As we can see, the Goryeo dynasty, which enjoyed plurality in the people’s religious lives, with Buddhism firmly at its center, and the Joseon dynasty, which observed a unitary order based on Neo-Confucianism, tried to instill their own aspirations into the running of their own respective capital spaces. Their aspirations were different from each other, and as a result Gae’gyeong and Han’gyeong capitals came to feature ideological differences.

18세기 전반 탕춘대 지역의 도성 외곽 기지화와 총융청 관할 방어체제의 성립

Tangchun-dae was a hill area located between the Han’yang capital and the Bukhan-san mountain. It was the final line of defense to protect the Capital city. Earlier, around the 17SUPth/SUP century the Joseon capital had already fallen to enemy attacks several times, so in an effort to remedy the problem, the Joseon government in the 18SUPth/SUP century tried to reinforce the capital defense system, utilizing the Tangchun-dae area.BR First, during the reign of King Sukjong, fortresses were constructed around the Capital city, as well as Mt. Bukhan in the city’s rear. Military chain of command was also revised, while a weapon & food supply depot (alongside a fortress) was installed at Tangchun-dae, between the capital city and Mt. Bukhan. Defense strategies were updated accordingly as well.BR Despite Sukjong’s efforts, however, there was a fundamental flaw in this Tangchun-dae-centered strategy. Constructed fortresses were far from serving as efficient defense barriers. More importantly, there were not enough soldiers to man them, and the situation got only worse due to shortage of weapons and food supply. These problems became even more evident in the stage of subduing the Mushin-year rebellion in 1728, 4SUPth/SUP year of King Yeongjo’s reign. So in the early half of the Yeongjo reign, the task of reinforcing overall food supply for the soldiers was put in motion, utilizing incoming revenue from the Daedong tax(大同稅).BR Meanwhile, as an extension of these former efforts The Chong’yung-cheong office was moved to the Tangchun-dae area in 1747, 23SUPrd/SUP year of King Yeongjo’s reign. And entering the latter half of the Yeongjo reign, local areal defense continued to be strengthened with the Chong’yung-cheong office at the center of such plan. The number of resident troops were increased, while fortresses were reinforced. Management of weapons also got enhanced, with in-house supply of weapons using gunpowder–including the Jochong rifles-secured. All these endeavors vastly contributed to the upgrade of capital defense.

조선후기 함경도 사노비의 존재양태와 국가 정책

The social stratification system of the Joseon dynasty was closely related to the dynasty’s institution of drafting individuals for dynastic services. The state regularly surveyed households throughout the country, enlisted male individuals above the age of 16 and under 60, and then mobilized them for dynastic labor services required by the government, in the form of providing them with adequate status and duties. But not all individuals were economically suited for obligations laid out by the government, so individuals in those situations were legally exempted from such duties. These private citizens(私民) instead delivered their labors and properties to their masters(主家), and by aiding their masters’ performance of their duties they indirectly contributed to the government in their own ways.BR Then, coming into the 17SUPth/SUP century, the government decided to transform those private citizens into public citizens(公民), and have them perform duties assigned to them directly from the government. The first case of this policy was the government’s recruit of Gyeong-Nobi(京奴婢) figures who had been private Nobi figures in the Hamgyeong-do(咸鏡道) provincial region. The Hamgyeong-do province was a border region that was located in the far north of the entire peninsula, so securing enough workforce that could be put to military duties at all time was more than crucial. Furthering such needs at the time was a regime change in China from the Ming dynasty to the Qing. Such transfer of power on the international stage was a big pressure for the Joseon government, and desperate nature of the time called for the mobilization of Nobi figures to deploy as military assets too. In fulfilling such goal, the Gyeong-Nobi figures in this region, who had been private Nobi figures and enjoyed very loose ties with their masters to the extent of having their own separated livelihood, were the first ones to be recruited by the central government. The Joseon authorities would “purchase them and turn them into Gong-Nobi (Public Nobi) figures who would serve governmental offices”[買作公賤, ‘Maejak Gongcheon’], or encourage them to “buy their ways into becoming commoners ”[贖良, ‘Sok’ ryang’] and then enlist them as military personnel.BR This policy of the Joseon government, utilizing methods of either ‘Maejak Gongcheon’ or ‘Sok’ryang, ‘later spread to the entire country, effectively nullifying the previous Joseon convention of having all the Nobi slaves’ offspring inherit the same status with their parents. Now the authorities were instead having them either become a commoner, or having them (remain as slaves but) assume military posts, which had only been manned by commoners in the past. As these former(or current) Nobi slaves became figures under the government’s public control their status continued to elevate, and that brought significant changes to not only the Nobi institution of the country but the entire dynasty’s stratification system as well, during the Joseon period’s latter half.

독립문 편액 서자(書者) 연구

There are two theories about the lyricist of A framed picture written on the south and north sides of Independence Gate. It was written by Lee Wan-yong(1858-1926), who was patriotic but degenerated into a traitor, and by Dongnong Kim Ga-jin(1846-1922), who devoted himself to modernization of Joseon and campaigned for independence until he turned his back on the world. Independence Gate is a national monument modeled after the Arc de Triomphe in Paris in the form of a 14.2m high and 11.48m wide stone gate that greeted the envoys of Cheong since the Independence Association advocated the construction of Independence Gate in 1896. The south side of Independence Gate is engraved in Korean, and The north side is engraved with three letters of Independence Gate in Chinese characters. As both Lee Wan-yong and Kim Ga-jin were known as the best handwritings of the time, it is highly likely that they wrote the compilation of the Independence Gate. In addition, Lee Wan-yong was the chairman of the Independent Association and the foreign minister of the Joseon government at the time of the establishment of the Independent Gate, and Kim Ga-jin was also a member of the Independent Association and a high-ranking official of Joseon. Therefore, it is considered reasonable to interpret the answer to who wrote the compilation of the independent text in a calligraphy manner through the genuine enemies left by Lee Wan-yong and Kim Ga-jin. Therefore, this paper analyzes the calligraphy context of Lee Wan-yong and Kim Ga-jin and the font characteristics of similar handwriting left by them based on two different theories about independent writers.

시헌력 시행에 대한 조선 조정의 논의 전개 과정, 1645년-1653년

In the tenth month of 1644, when the Qing (淸) Dynasty adopted the Siheon calendar (時憲曆, Shixianli) and pronounced the calendar of the following year, it affected the situation of the calendar in Joseon. Given the tributary relation with the Qing, Joseon had no choice other than to adopt it, and thus the main effort of the Joseon government had to be exerted in learning the calculation method of the Siheon calendar. Yet, in reality the situation was extremely complicated. The discussions about the calendar at the Joseon court did not proceed smoothly and in one direction. There were various differences in the details of the specific positions, understanding, perception, and intentions of the king, the officials, and various offices including the Astronomical Bureau. As a result, the discussion proceeded in a very complicated way, running through twists and turns, repeating misunderstanding, distortions, reversions, and regressions. In this article, while tracing the discussions on the calendar at the Joseon court based on such chronological records as Silrok (實錄) and Seungjeongwon il-gi (承政院日記), I will show differences and changes in the thoughts and attitudes of various individuals towards the Siheon calendar, and will point out some notable and questionable points regarding the situation surrounding the adoption of it.

18세기 조선의 ‘황조인(皇朝人)’ 정책과 창원(昌原) 공씨(孔氏)에서 곡부(曲阜) 공씨로의 정체성 변화

Examined in this article is a state-wide policy of the Joseon government regarding the “Hwangjo-in figures” (‘People from the Empire who naturalized as Joseon citizens’) that was actively promoted in 18th century Korea. The specific issue examined here is how the Joseon society perceived the Gong house members(孔氏) in each period, how it treated them, how the Gong figures came to regard themselves in response to the Joseon society’s such treatment of them, and how their identity changed accordingly.BR Till the mid-17th century, it was not the Joseon society’s general perception to view figures with the last name Gong(孔) living on the Korean peninsula as descendants of the ancient Chinese sage Confucius himself. Even the Gong community never showed a consensus in either way, supporting or denying such perception to begin with. Later on, however, such perception began to be reflected in certain genealogy records and then further spread throughout the Joseon society. Even the Joseon government began to accept this newborn social belief during the reign of Sukjong, and provided benefits (for example, to be exempted from state duties) to the Gong figures, under the name of respecting their status as ‘Descendants of the Grand Sage(大聖後裔).’ BR But the Gong figures were yet to receive full recognition as Confucius’ descendants, until the reign of King Jeongjo. Regarding several efforts of certain ‘Chinese-in-Joseon’ figures to secure proofs -such as genealogical records or pictures- from Qing, the Joseon government actively supported them if they were made by original Ming citizens who had earlier come to Joseon and got naturalized (who could also be called as Hwangjo-in a narrower sense). On the other hand, regarding similar efforts made by the Gong figures, the Joseon government sometimes acted in a completely opposite manner. Then in 1792, 16th year of King Jeongjo’s reign, the Gong figures in Joseon were officially designated as ‘Descendants of Confucius’ (and as Hwangjo-in in literally a broader sense), and their official home region(‘Gwan-hyang, 貫鄕’) was changed from Chang’weon to Gokbu. Commemoration projects were initiated while the government changed its previous stance of being uncooperative to totally supporting the import of relevant materials from Qing. This sort of turnaround also heavily affected the Gong figures in Joseon, who finally came to perceive themselves as members of the Gokbu Gong House. Such new perceptions were also reflected in the Gong House genealogy records published in this period.

15세기 초 율문 교육과 형률적 교화 모색

This paper analyses how the Joseon government dealt with two conflicting concepts in the ruling: an ideal of realizing moral persuasion and a realistic measure of using legal punishment. As a compromise between these options, the government implemented double policies: to instruct common people about the codes and to allow reductions of sentences of some criminals. Such a measure can be called ‘Moral persuasion by legalist approaches.’<BR> By introducing the double policy, the government expected specific outcomes: to deter crime by instructing the codes, and the criminals to be regretful for their wrongdoing by commuting the sentences. The double policy was carried out based on specific intentions. On the one hand, instructing the code was intended to direct commoners not to offend the law. In instructing ordinances, the government was benefited from local intellectuals’ cooperation during the reigns of King Taejong and King Sejong. On the other hand, allowing commutation to some criminals is intended to avoid severe punishment. The government hoped the criminals to be remorseful for their wrongdoing in the process of commutation. Previously, this kind of approach was applied only to elites. However, from the early Joseon period, the target of the approach was widened beyond the upper class.<BR> In conclusion, the double policy reveals the Joseon government’s initiatives for harmonizing two conflicting political ideas.

여말선초 화약 및 관련기술의 ‘국산화’에 대한 체계적 재구성

Gunpowder technology on the Korean peninsula developed in the wake of cultural exchanges with China, at the end of the Goryeo dynasty period. The Goryeo government, as part of its ongoing effort to address the Waegu(Japanese pirates) crisis and appropriately respond, attempted to import techniques to produce gunpowder through official channels from the Chinese Ming dynasty, but eventually failed as Ming refused to help. Then a Goryeo figure named Choi Mu-seon managed to develop necessary technical skills, through his own research and civilian exchanges.BR The gunpowder technology secured by Choi Mu-seon not only covered the area of production but the entire range of its applications as well. During his stay in Yuan(元) he acquired general knowledge of how to manufacture weapons using gunpowder, how to use those weapons in battle situations, and how to operate them in battles on the sea. Later he also conversed with Chinese technicians and obtained methods to refine niter as it was a crucial part in gunpowder production.BR Choi Mu-seon also proposed to the Goryeo government the establishment of Hwatong Dogam(火㷁都監), as an office to oversee gunpowder production and supervise related technical issues. His intention was to have all the technical expertise he earlier acquired put to good use in the government’s response to the Waegu problem of the time. Considering how the gunpowder manufacturing technique of Goryeo was developed, a group of technicians led by Choi Mu-seon were virtually in almost private (and exclusive) control of the technology, but the government was able to tap into that through a Dogam office, which was part of Goryeo’s unique governmental system.BR Later leaders of the Joseon government, who aspired to establish a centralized government system, dismantled all the Dogam offices including Hwatong Dogam. But the Joseon government also tried to absorb the technology by enlisting Choi Mu-seon’s son Choi Hae-san for governmental service. What ensued was the acquirement of new technology and the establishment of Joseon’s own technical manual for gunpowder production & usage during the reign of King Sejong. A new standard for state technology involving gunpowder was secured, and that meant the complete internalization of the technology as well as its new status as state asset and governmental property.

세종대(世宗代) ‘수차(水車)’ 도입 논의를 통해 본 15세기 중화 문물의 수용 문제

Examined in this article is the discussion that took place in the Joseon government during the reign of King Sejong, over the issue of importing waterwheels(水車) into Korea to assist agricultural production in the 15th century Joseon society. The goal of such examination is to observe the Joseon people’s perception of - and attitude toward - Chinese culture and technology in this very period.BR Previous studies’ general belief was that the 15th century Joseon people, in their efforts to reinvent their own culture and institutions, preferred ancient Chinese institutions (and even the institutions of its contemporary Chinese counterpart Ming, which they called “Institutions of the Time” [Shiwangjije, 時王之制]) to the institutions of Joseon’s own predecessor Goryeo. However, if we observe various cases of potential cultural embracing or adoption in the 15th century, we can see that not every Chinese cultural influences were welcomed or even favorably perceived. The discussion and debate that took place during King Sejong’s reign over the issue of whether or not Joseon should adopt the Chinese waterwheels is one of those examples.BR Waterwheels were used in agricultural production, as it hugely contributed to adequate irrigation. Even before Sejong’s reign, their adoption was seriously considered several times. A Goryeo official named Baek Mun-bo who served King Gongmin in the late Goryeo days had earlier suggested that waterwheels in usage across the Jiāng Huái(江淮) region of China should be introduced to the Korean peninsula. And later, after the Joseon dynasty was founded an official named Wu Hi-yeol created waterwheels to be employed throughout the country during King Taejong’s reign, but his efforts unfortunately failed as well. BR Various failures to adopt these waterwheels in Joseon could be attributed to the fact that the weather on the Korean peninsula was different from that of either China or Japan. Before the time of King Sejong, mostly Chinese waterwheels were considered for adoption, while since the Sejong days the idea of importing ‘Japanese’ waterwheels(‘Wae-Sucha, 倭水車’) were newly pursued by people like Park Seo-saeng. Park had earlier visited Japan as a Tongshin-sa emissary, and came to realize that the waterwheels used in Japan were not only superior to but also more efficient than Chinese waterwheels, so he proposed to Sejong their installations in Joseon. As he was already deeply interested in the issue, Sejong agreed that Japanese waterwheels could be the answer to the problems the Chinese waterwheels had been posing. This example shows us that not all Chinese culture and technology was positively pursued by the Joseon people. Any country’s culture, if it was deemed to be fitting the Joseon situation or as practical enough to be employed, were favorably pursued.

Anatomical and Histological Analyses on Cattle and Horse Bones of Joseon Period Discovered at Archaeological Site in Old Seoul City Area

Anatomical examination of animal bones found at archaeological sites can provide information that historical studies alone cannot. As related in this report, we performed morphological analyses on cattle and horse bones retrieved from Joseon-period ruins found at the Gongpyeongdong site (Seoul, South Korea). By anatomical and histological comparisons, we confirmed that the slaughter of Gongpyeongdong cattle and horses was done at a later age than is the case today. This was likely due to the fact that cattle and horses in Joseon society were raised primarily as beasts of burden and only secondarily for food; and so, the Joseon government strictly prohibited what it considered to be premature slaughter.

한국사 시대구분론의 전개와 과제 - 근세와 근대를 중심으로 -

In addition to raising the problem of solving the challenges of periodical division theory of Korean History, first of all I would like to present the early-modern social theory. The theory of early-modern society is raised by paying attention to the social characteristics, the ruling class, and especially the discrimination of the ruling system shown between the Joseon Dynasty society and the Goryeo Dynasty society. It can be seen that a early-modern society is finally established in the late 15th century.BR During the reign of King Seongjong in the late 15th century, the Neo-Confucian ideological groups grown in local society began to work as bureaucrats in the central politics. In addition, the market, which emerged as a regular rural market at the end of the 15th century, was due to the development of an economic foundation. Against this economic background, the governance system of early-modern society was formed around aristocrats and they exercised control within the framework of the status system and bureaucracy.BR Secondly the modern transition theory was presented as the challenge of the periodical division theory of the Korean history. To explain the nature of a social composition in terms of production style, productivity, and production relations, agricultural production is a basic form of social production. The content of the modern transition theory can be found in that it is a transition to the agricultural system.BR After the opening of the port in 1876, in the 1880s, the change to a modern agricultural system and a major change were appearing in the process of forming a modern agricultural system. In order to directly introduce Western agricultural technology, a farming and livestock test site was established as an agricultural test site directly under the royal family. After 1895, the Joseon government established a modern governance system and implemented agricultural policies to establish a modern agricultural system. It can be summarized as the establishment of an organization in charge of agricultural policies accompanied by the change from the modern agricultural system to the modern agricultural system.

개항 후 조선의 포삼정책과 홍삼의 어용화(1876~1894)

Joseon changed red ginseng policy in response to changes in the trade environment after opening the port in 1876. At that time, red ginseng was the best trade goods that could be exchanged in silver, and red ginseng tax accounted for an important part of national finance.<BR> In 1881, the Joseon government promulgated Posamijeongjeolmok(포삼이정절목) and greatly increased the tax of red ginseng. As a result, ginseng tax had more than doubled. The increased tax was concentrated on muweiso(무위소) that was the king