Joint Warfare Research Articles

Measuring operational cognitive readiness of military personnel using Joint Theater Level Simulation System (JTLS)

Cognitive Readiness refers to military personnel who are cognitively ready to perform effective and efficient roles in military operations with the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs). These KSAs are essential for critical thinking, problem-solving and decision-making. Military personnel at each level in the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) must be cognitively ready for military deployment. To enhance the cognitive readiness of military personnel at the operational level, a training design—scenario-based training (SBT) has been developed by the Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College (MAFSC) to develop cognitive readiness for course participants (CPs) who attended staff courses. Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS) has been used to analyze the Line of Operation (LOO) that has been produced by the course participant. The results show that SBT affected the development of cognitive readiness to prepare military personnel at the operational level through Joint Warfare environment exercises and tested by Modeling and Simulation (M&S).

DESIGNING, DEVELOPING, AND DELIVERING WARGAMES

On November 16, 2023, Mr. David Redpath, Senior Wargames Designer and member of the Canadian Joint Warfare Centre and Department of National Defence, presented Designing, Developing, and Delivering Wargames for this year’s West Coast Security Conference. The key points discussed were the definition, scope, and usefulness of Wargames; who should partake in Wargaming; and how Wargames are utilised effectively.
 
 Received: 01-20-2024
 Revised: 01-28-2024

СУТНІСТЬ ПОНЯТТЯ КОЛАБОРАЦІОНІЗМ ТА ЙОГО ОСНОВНІ ОЗНАКИ

The article examines the concept of collaborationism, its main features and types. The issues of collaboration in modern Ukraine are especially relevant referring to the ongoing occupation of part of the sovereign territory, which is connected with the beginning of the Russian war against the Ukraine. Collaborationism is defined in modern science as a complex and ambiguous socio-political phenomenon that arises as a result of interaction between subjects of the communication process and enemies, or occupiers. The work identifies international legal acts that reveal the phenomenon of collaborationism; it is shown that some of them were developed even before World War I. Today, there is an agreed position of the EU countries on collaborationism, which is presented in many modern documents. Collaborationism is shown as a complex and ambiguous psychosocial and ethical phenomenon arising from the interaction between subjects of the communication process (individuals, certain political organizations and participants). The paper specifies that collaboration should be interpreted as voluntary or forced cooperation with the enemy in all spheres of life, in particular political, military, economic, socio-cultural, household, etc. It is concluded that the modern concept of collaborationism includes certain forms of treasonous cooperation of the population with the occupying power, its representatives, and the aggressor state through various actions in the military, economic, political and other spheres of life. The common goal of collaborative activities is to cause great damage to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of own state. Modern researchers specify collaborationism, which involves the presence of a political agreement with the occupier, "cooperation" with the occupiers in civilian territories, as well as "joint warfare" on the side of the invader. Key words: collaborationism, collaborator, types of collaborationism, criteria for the classification of collaborationism.

Multi-objective optimization of operation loop recommendation for kill web

In order to improve our military's level of intelligent accusation decision-making in future intelligent joint warfare, this paper studies operation loop recommendation methods for kill web based on the fundamental combat form of the future, i.e., “web-based kill,” and the operation loop theory. Firstly, we pioneer the operation loop recommendation problem with operation ring quality as the objective and closed-loop time as the constraint, and construct the corresponding planning model. Secondly, considering the case where there are multiple decision objectives for the combat ring recommendation problem, we propose for the first time a multi-objective optimization algorithm, the multi-objective ant colony evolutionary algorithm based on decomposition (MOACEA/D), which integrates the multi-objective evolutionary algorithm based on decomposition (MOEA/D) with the ant colony algorithm. The MOACEA/D can converge the optimal solutions of multiple single objectives non-dominated solution set for the multi-objective problem. Finally, compared with other classical multi-objective optimization algorithms, the MOACEA/D is superior to other algorithms superior in terms of the hyper volume (HV), which verifies the effectiveness of the method and greatly improves the quality and efficiency of commanders' decision-making.

The Means and Methods of War

The Joint Doctrine and Concepts Center (JDCC) is in charge of distributed Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs) and keeping up a chain of importance of such productions. At the start of any thought of the law of furnished clash, it must be underlined that the privilege of the gatherings to the contention to pick techniques on the other hand method for fighting is not boundless .

Sajber prostor kao područje sukobljavanja - slučaj SAD - Iran i Severna Koreja

Modern society is critically dependent on information as a strategic resource and information and communications technology, which carries out its transmission, processing and exchange. Information and communications technology has created a new environment, cyberspace, in which tensions, disagreements and incidents are becoming more frequent. In recent years, the mentioned area has increasingly appeared as a domain of conflict between the leading world and regional powers. The paper gives a brief description of the concept of operations in several domains and elements of the new concept of joint warfare of the US Armed Forces. The importance of cyberspace for the US has been pointed out with a review of organizational changes and the adoption of certain strategic and doctrinal documents. The paper presents certain events and activities in cyberspace, in recent years, between the United States on the one hand, and Iran and North Korea on the other. The United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was created in 2009. USCYBERCOM was elevated to the status of a full and independent unified command in May 2018. It indicates the importance of cyberspace for the Pentagon. In many ways, the separation of USCYBERCOM from Strategic Commands, which oversees strategic rejection, is a symbol of the change in the US attitude in cyberspace from "defensive" to "persistent engagement." The United States is still the strongest force in cyberspace and shows ambition to carry out cyber operations at all levels of command. It is unlikely that Iran will provoke the United States into a large-scale military conflict and wage a direct war in cyberspace. Iran has rapidly improved its ability to operate in cyberspace, and it is estimated that this trend will continue. The imbalance can prevent Iran from a direct military conflict with the United States and its allies. Greater action is expected with an asymmetric arsenal such as e.g. cyber attacks. Iranian and North Korean operations are similar in target selection, planning and exploitation of attacks. Both countries undertake different variants of phishing attacks in an attempt to deceive their victims into downloading malicious software by presenting it as a legitimate link or file. Whereas Iran usually had a motive only to cause disruption to the functioning of financial institutions, North Korean motive was both financial and political retaliation. Certain discovered incidents indicate that North Korea devotes much more time to conducting invasive surveillance before carrying out attacks. Numerous examples show that some activities have been prepared over the years and with the support of certain state bodies. Regardless of the fact that an investigation has been launched against certain groups, most often sponsored by states, it is unlikely that this will deter countries such as North Korea and Iran from giving up further activities and will pose an increasing threat to the US security.

한국형 전술데이터링크 시스템 구현을 위한 무선모뎀 시스템 설계

Next Generation Weapon system from the center of the platform to share information in real-time Network Centric Warfare(NCW: Network Centric Warfare) has been changed. Data link system is defined as a network. That is, all in real-time battlefield information is to enable sharing. Data link system is classified as a precision strike, Monitoring/control, control of a Patriot missile battery systems. These systems are most effective in a Joint warfare and precision strike. Data Link Systems(Data Communications) implementation is accomplished by using the KDLM(Korean Data Link Modem) and Radio Transceiver. KDLM is operated in conjunction with the legacy Radios(re-using fielded HF/VHF/UHF radio systems). In this paper, we describe in terms of KDLM system design. In this paper, the proposed design structure is how to effectively interact with legacy various radio. First, The results provide an analysis of that Dynamic TDMA system and apply modem structure. Radio characteristics data are necessary for an effective TDMA system design. This article analyzes the test results and describes the structure to improve the receive performance.

White Paper on “China's National Defence in 2008”: An Analysis

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. The term informationisation refers to the integration of all communication, radar, nuclear, C4ISR, space and satellite systems with strategic and tactical command platforms to achieve net-centric joint warfare capability.

Use of Control Variates in a Large-Scale Aggregated Combat Model

In early fall 2004, the Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency (AFSAA) forwarded a proposed research topic, endorsed by the Air Force Chief of Staff, to the Department of Operational Sciences at the Air Force Institute of Technology. This topic requested an examination of potential variance reduction techniques (VRTs) for use with the THUNDER combat model. THUNDER is a large-scale, highly aggregated, discrete-event simulation of campaign-level military operations used to examine issues involving the utility and effectiveness of air and space power in a theater-level, joint warfare context. A new, state of the art combined multiple recursive generator was incorporated into THUNDER to synchronize the random inputs for common random numbers (CRN) and antithetic variates (AV). This work discusses the application of CRN, AV, and control variates (CV), within THUNDER, and the resulting variance reductions obtained for an example scenario.

The British Army, the Royal Navy, and the ‘big work’ of Sir George Aston, 1904–1914

This article re-examines the British record of inter-service cooperation in the decade before the outbreak of World War I. A fresh perspective is offered through the ideas, writings and experiences of Sir George Aston, a Royal Marines officer and contemporary analyst of what would today be called joint warfare. The article observes that, despite Aston's best efforts, the Army and Navy did not advance beyond a degree of mutual sympathy for each others operational needs, and did not address the underlying problems of integrated planning and unified command.

JWARS: A Case Study

This paper is a management-oriented review of a large-scale government software development project. The product is the Joint Warfare System (JWARS), a theater-level warfare simulation intended to support U.S. Department of Defense decision-making. This paper discusses all aspects of the JWARS development project from 1995 until 2002. Unique features included object-oriented development, an integrated government-contractor environment, and involvement of users and subject matter experts in development and testing.

Jointness, Defense Transformation, and the Need for a New JointWarfare Profession

Skilled officers, like all other professional men, are products of continuous and laborious study, training, and experience. There is no shortcut the peculiar type of knowledge and ability they must possess. Trained officers constitute the most vitally essential element in modern war, and the only one that under no circumstance can be improvised or extemporized. --Douglas MacArthur, May 1932 How can I be a professional, if there is no profession? --A field grade officer, 2001 This article reviews the evolution toward jointness since the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, (1) relates that progress the newer initiative of defense transformation, and derives a need for a new joint warfare profession. What has been meant by jointness, however, is not agreed; it is not a term in the Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. In this analysis the term is used mean the integration of the combat capabilities of the services, America's warfighting professions. The evolution of this effective integration, as well as the mindset among military officers who facilitate it, has progressed unevenly since 1986. There have been clear evolutionary successes in some areas and a consistent lack of progress in others. Evolutionary success in attaining jointness has been manifested perhaps most clearly in the execution of joint warfare--America now fights wars almost solely under joint commands. Most recently and vividly this was seen by the integration of combat effects in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, there have been other, less visible successes in the global war on terrorism. There also have been less pronounced but consistent successes toward jointness made in peacetime--the steady evolution in joint doctrine and exercises, for one example. But it is also the case that jointness has failed evolve in other areas in which it was anticipated and intended by the framers of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. There are still few standing joint forces ready for joint deployment and employment. (2) Rather, forces are, by and large, still assembled only at the time of deployment. Further, there has been only glacial movement toward joint force training and experimentation and the determination of force requirements based on combatant commanders' warplans. (3) In other words, while recent decades have shown remarkable improvements in developing warfighting concepts and in planning for and executing joint warfare, they have not shown the same progression, if any at all, in creating truly ready joint forces in peacetime nor in rationalizing the services' future capabilities related joint warfighting needs. Why is this the case? Why successful evolution in some areas and evolutionary failure in others? It is certainly not because those personnel assigned command and staff positions within the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, and defense agencies are not solid military professionals deeply steeped in the doctrines and warfighting expertise of their respective services. Nor are those who have cycled through the joint assignments people of bad intent. Quite the contrary, there are today a few officers who are truly joint in mindset and practice, particularly those who have cycled into the joint arena and then stayed or returned for repetitive joint assignments, notwithstanding the bureaucratic pressures serve elsewhere. And in them we see a glimpse of the real need for the future. In this article I will suggest that the uneven evolution toward jointness is symptomatic of a deeper problem, one that is systemic--simply stated, there has been no evolution toward a joint warfare profession. Instead, such evolution has been constrained by the intent and language of the original Goldwater-Nichols Act: to establish policies, procedures and practices for the management of officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps on active duty who are particularly educated, trained in, and oriented toward joint matters. …

Shoestring strategy: the British campaign in the Aegean, 1943

The British campaign in the Aegean in 1943 is a case study in audacity, in joint warfare and in failure. The fall of Mussolini and Italy's consequent departure from the Axis brought a fleeting opportunity of securing wide strategic gains in the eastern Mediterranean, and the possibility of drawing Turkey into the war on the Allied side. The Dodecanese islands in the Aegean were the key, but provision of the forces necessary for their capture was contrary to the priorities agreed by the British and American Allies. Urged by Churchill, the British command in the Middle East attempted to secure the islands with the limited forces at their disposal, and ran headlong into Hitler's determination to demonstrate German strength in the Aegean. The following article examines the British campaign in the Aegean, largely from the perspective of a joint operation.

Shield and sword: the United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War

Essential reading as part of the Chief of Naval Operation's Professional Reading Program!Though not so well known as the land and air campaigns, the campaign at sea in the 1991 Gulf War was vital in subduing Saddam Hussein's invasion forces and driving them out of Kuwait. U.S. Navy surface ships and submarines launched hundreds of cruise missile attacks against Iraqi targets throughout the war, and carriers sent air strikes deep into enemy territory. The battleships Missouri and Wisconsin bombarded hostile targets while U.S. sailors joined U.S. Army and Royal Navy helicopter crews in additional actions. SEAL missions, global sealift actions, mine countermeasures, and operations in support of the economic embargo were still more contributing factors to the complex joint warfare effort.Details of these naval operations are thoroughly documented and analyzed in this authoritative study, conducted by the Naval Historical Center and published in limited numbers in 1999. It is based on previously classified action and lessons-learned reports, interviews with participants, and studies conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses and the Department of Defense. The book includes candid evaluations of leadership effectiveness, interservice relations, and methods of command and control. It also analyses the effectiveness of various weapons and sensors, including the Tomahawk land-attack missile, the EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft, the Aegis battle management system, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Winner of the Navy League's Theodore and Franklin D. Roosevelt Naval History Prize and favorably reviewed by military scholars and foreign affairs journals, this credible historical account captures the drama as well as the detail of a modern victory at sea.

A case study in early joint warfare: An analysis of the Wehrmacht's Crimean campaign of 1942

Military theorists and commentators believe that joint operations prove more effective in most circumstances of modern warfare than operations involving only one service or involving two or more services but without systematic integration or unified command. Many see Nazi Germany's armed forces, the Wehrmacht, as early pioneers of ‘jointness’. This essay demonstrates that the Wehrmacht did indeed understand the value of synchronising its land, sea and air forces and placing them under operational commanders who had at least a rudimentary understanding of the tactics, techniques, needs, capabilities and limitations of each of the services functioning in their combat zones. It also shows that the Wehrmacht's efforts in this direction produced the desired result of improved combat effectiveness. Yet it argues that the Wehrmacht lacked elements considered by today's theorists to be essential to the attainment of truly productive jointness ‐ a single tri‐service commander, a proper joint staff and an absence of inter‐service rivalry ‐ and that, as a result, it often suffered needless difficulties in combat.

The sources and nature of future conflicts in the Asia‐Pacific region

More than ever, a sense of vision is required to recognize the potency of new forces at work in the international system which will influence the course of future history and alter the face of war. This article looks at key trends in global politics, and the sources and nature of future conflicts in the Asia‐Pacific with respect to the next 50 years. It argues that just as the nineteenth century was Jominian and the twentieth century Clausewitzian, the twenty‐first century may well be influenced by the strategic paradigm of Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart, the strategists of “limited war.” “Limited wars fought for limited purposes with varying degrees of intensity” will be the wave of the future. In Asia, the probability of a medium‐intensity conflict in the foreseeable future is higher than that of a high‐intensity or low‐intensity conflict. Future war will be a war about time, not about ground. Conditions of nuclear deterrence will apply, but info‐war and space capabilities will assume greater significance. Integrated joint warfare— Air, Land, Sea, Space interface—will be a key feature of future war. Information warfare and the ongoing revolution in military affairs (e.g., nonlethal weaponry) may have led some to believe that this is a new age in which war will be bloodless, but technology will make no conceivable war casualty free.

Canadian joint operations

The current emphasis on Joint Operations should not obscure the continuing importance as well of Combined Operations. An appreciation of how our closest allies operate is vital to ensure that we can work with sister services not just from Britain, but also from abroad. The Canadian approach is described by Lieutenant Commander Stocker who designed and ran the first Canadian Forces Joint Warfare Course last year.

The falklands: Joint warfare justified

(1982). The falklands: Joint warfare justified. The RUSI Journal: Vol. 127, No. 3, pp. 46-52.