After Mexico and Cuba, probably no Latin American country has been more central to United States interests since the 1840s than Panama. Blessed with unique geographical assets, the isthmus attracted the Panama Railroad, the abortive Ferdinand de Lesseps project, and repeated American “police” interventions under Colombian sovereignty authorized by the Mallarino-Bidlack Treaty of 1846. But Isthmians were never sure of their identity as Colombians, and the Americans were increasingly anxious to secure their own control for commercial and strategic reasons. These two drives meshed in November 1903, leading to “incomplete” Panamanian independence, the inequitable and immediately controversial Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, the monumental canal construction, and an influx of Anglophone white North Americans and black antillanos.After a relatively clear discussion of what constitutes international hegemony and a summary of those conditions that either promote or militate against political democracy in the short and long term, Sánchez focuses on Panama to illustrate how those two factors can interact, especially how a hegemon — in this case the United States — can facilitate or frustrate the subordinate state’s prospects of becoming a viable democracy. His objective is to do this “with an eye toward social science theories that focus on power distribution in order to explain international interactions and the advent and consolidation of democracy” (p. 198).Few scholars deny that from even before 1903 till at least 1964 there was an almost endless pattern of U.S. domination and exploitation of Panama’s economy; of denial of Panamanian nationalism, democratization, and popular aspirations; and of humiliating arrogance, condescension, and racist treatment on the part of U.S. diplomats, military personnel, businessmen, and Zonians. Sánchez reaches the same conclusions and states them with unabashed firmness and emotion: “The result of U.S. . . . dominance and control was that the economic bonanza that Panama’s elite expected after independence and from the canal was not materializing” (p. 67). “Soon after the canal’s completion, Panamanian leaders had lost control of their territory, economic policy, foreign policy, and security apparatus” (p. 81).In the first five decades of the twentieth century, changes occurred inside Panama that challenged the assumptions upon which the Isthmian elites and the Americans had based their loose working alliance. The middle class, labor unions, students, and teachers continued to press for challenges to U.S. power, some even espousing fascism and communism. Finally, amid tensions raised by mounting Panamanian frustrations and U.S. Cold War fixations, intensified by Castroism, the 1964 riots ended the “special relationship” and forced both sides to consider at least some modifications in their behavior.Despite some restructuring anticipated in the failed 1967 treaties negotiated by the Johnson administration, and in the Torrijos-Carter Treaties a decade later, little really changed till the 1990s. That was because both the Panamanian oligarchy and Washington felt that their interests would be better served if Panama was run by the Guardia Nacional (later renamed the Panamanian Defense Forces) under the somewhat progressive Omar Torrijos and later the more unprincipled Manuel Noriega. Only when Washington concluded that Noriega was really anti-American and threatening proper implementation of the 1977 treaties did the Bush administration choose to invade and allow the implementation of a civilian-run liberal democracy.Based on this analysis, Sánchez is cautiously optimistic about the future of that democracy in Panama. He finds the country “poised as never before for democratic consolidation” (p. 210). It lacks a strong traditional landed oligarchy, enjoys a moderate level of development, apparently has said goodbye to antidemocratic militarism, and displays “increasingly institutionalized and vibrant” political institutions (p. 206). Sánchez feels that paradise might be at least approachable if the Panamanians can expand their educational system to overcome ethnic and racial divisions and build a greater sense of national identity, and can use the potential economic rewards of controlling the Canal and the former Zone lands to reduce economic inequalities. Furthermore, he urges the Americans to more consistently use “soft” as opposed to “hard” power tactics and thereby hopefully convince the majority of Panama’s and the hemisphere’s peoples that the hegemon’s leadership, based on democratic political values and neoliberal economic policies, works to their benefit.In some ways this book is not exceptionally original; its presentation of U.S.-Panama relations covers old ground with oft-made criticisms of American bullying and insensitivity. And, while the bibliography is extensive, it draws mainly on secondary sources. Citations of government documents, newspapers, and interviews are limited. But it does provide a compact and very readable summary of this arduous bilateral relationship in the context of domestic Isthmian conditions, of hemispheric, at times global, power struggles, and of some provocative theoretical formulations. It will serve the broadest of audiences.