Japan's Military Research Articles

Women judges in transitional justice and their impact on trials on cases of sexual and gender-based violence committed as war crimes

Unfortunately, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) against women and men who are identified as enemies very often appears as a tool of war. For a long time, SGBV-related atrocities were not perceived as an element of combat, thus they were not investigated as war crimes. None of the war criminals prosecuted in the Nurnberg and Tokyo trials was ever charged with crimes that specifically targeted women, despite overwhelming evidence of mass-scale rapes committed during World War II by their subordinates. Only in 2000, the Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery was established to hear cases of women forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese Imperial Army more than 50 years earlier.The perception of the SGBV crimes in armed conflicts has considerably changed because of the mass atrocities committed in Bosnia and Hercegovina and in Rwanda. Women who as victims of the sexual violence dared to talk about their suffering, played the crucial role in changing the general attitude towards SGBV crime committed during the war. Simultaneously, the composition of international prosecution and judiciary included numerous female prosecutors and judges.It may be argued if judge's characteristic, personal experience, or gender indeed or to what extent influence judicial decisions. Some fundamental questions related to the judge's gender remain without an answer: Would the gender of judges impact the quality of fact-finding in SGBV as a war crime? Would a female judge assess the evidence more thoroughly than a male judge? Would a SGBV victim's well-being be better protected by a judge of the same gender? Would the risk of a victim's re-traumatisation be lower if the trial was handled by a judge of the same gender as the victim? And finally: would the risk of a victim's re-traumatisation be lower if a judge of the same gender as the victim handled the trial? All these questions seem particularly relevant in the context of the new wave of war crimes SGBV cases resulting from the war in Ukraine.

Investigation Characteristics and Influence of Manchurian Railway on Forest Resources in Northeast China

Northeast China is rich in forest resources, and it is also a resource that Japanese invaders covet and demand. At the beginning of the 20th century, Japan began to investigate China's forest resources, and Japan carried out nearly half a century's investigation and plunder of forest resources in Northeast China, among which Manchuria was the main economic institution for Japan to investigate and plunder forest resources, and fully met Japan's military needs. Therefore, through the main statement of Manchuria Railway's investigation of forest resources in Northeast China from 1906 to 1936, and the main characteristics of Manchuria Railway's investigation of forest resources, the historical influence of Japan's plundering of forest resources in Northeast China is finally explained.

Who Takes the Japanese Threat Seriously? A Survey‐Based Analysis of South Koreans’ Perceptions*

This study explores the factors underlying South Koreans' negative perceptions of Japan beyond nationalism or simple partisan conflict. This paper employed the 2020 Korea Institute for National Unification survey, and statistical models revealed that the following factors are related to fundamental threat perception. First, the utility of Korean unification is associated with perceptions of the military threat posed by Japan. Second, after controlling for other predictors, this study found that younger generations were less likely to see Japan as a future military threat. Third, micro‐level variables affected perception. Conservative partisans tended to perceive Japan's military threat as stronger. However, individuals with stronger right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA) were less likely to perceive Japan as a military threat. Fourth, the association between RWA and perceptions of Japan as a military threat was moderated by generation. Fifth, those who strongly disliked China were less likely to perceive a Japanese military threat, which implied that some Koreans perceive China as a legitimate challenge to Japanese military expansion. These empirical findings attest to the importance of fully considering personality traits and political orientations on a micro level, and macro changes such as the emergence of a new generation that perceives Japan differently.

Defenders of Japan: The Post-Imperial Armed Forces, 1946–2016; A History by Garren Mulloy

Reviewed by: Defenders of Japan: The Post-Imperial Armed Forces, 1946–2016; A History by Garren Mulloy Giulio Pugliese Defenders of Japan: The Post-Imperial Armed Forces, 1946–2016; A History. By Garren Mulloy. London: Hurst, 2021. 440 pages. ISBN: 9781849048934 (hardcover; also available as e-book). The English-language academic literature on the postwar Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) is sparse, and studies typically focus on just one branch of the country's armed services. A handful of recent works, including one each on the Maritime and Ground branches, stand out for their fine-grained analyses centered on security issues, politics, and history. Garren Mulloy's encyclopedic tour de force on the evolution of Japan's military, Defenders of Japan,constitutes instead a commendable attempt at disentangling the international and domestic politics behind the entirety of contemporary Japan's "defenders": its navy, army, and air force. The author takes an eclectic, interdisciplinary approach, combining findings by scholars in area studies, history, foreign policy analysis, and international relations to trace the arc of postwar Japan's force structure, military doctrine, and identity (or self-representation) vis-àvis civilian leaders and the population at large. Mulloy's extensive use of primary sources—including archival material, official documentation, and interviews with elite military officers and security officials—provides an incredibly detailed account of the book's subject matter, one that sheds light on lesser-known events and connections. In short, the author's work constitutes an important addition to the literature to which contemporary Japan specialists will want to turn frequently. The book is divided into four thick chapters following a typical periodization. In the first chapter, which is quite fast paced, the author debates the merits of viewing Japan's military in the aftermath of World War II through the prism of the country's imperial legacy. The chapter opens with a spotlight on the continuation of hostilities after the summer of 1945 by thousands of Japanese soldiers scattered throughout Asia—some acting out of choice, some under duress, and some based on their indoctrination. This is followed by an extensive analysis of the little-known engagement by Japanese fighters in the Korean and Vietnam wars, involvement that runs counter to the official narrative of a clean break with militarism after the end of World War II: while both of those subsequent conflicts resulted in Japanese casualties, Tokyo consciously chose to conceal such events under a cloak of silence. The chapter then delves into the genesis of the National Police Reserve (NPR), which was effectively the beginning of Japan's postwar military; it was reborn in 1952 as the National Safety Forces and later as the JSDF. Offering a detailed analysis, Mulloy disputes facile takes that understand the National Police Reserve and National Safety Forces—as well as ancillary forces—as a covert military setup arranged by the US occupiers. He argues that Japanese decision-makers tended to see the merits of these [End Page 175] precursors to the nation's defenders as agents capable of policing—and potentially repressing—the populace. The second chapter is the book's largest. Here the author traces the genealogy of each branch of the JSDF, from the establishment of the unified forces in 1954 to their evolution during the Cold War. The chapter initially deals with issues concerning the constitutional and legal framing of the JSDF and then goes on to elucidate the early emphasis on tight civilian control, as well as the relationship between the JSDF and the public at large. These themes run through the analyses of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense branches and add to our understanding of Japan's quantitative and qualitative military buildup (or lack thereof). Other important motifs that run through the chapter concern stovepiping and scant coordination among the three branches, problems that were accompanied by a relative paucity of interest and sense of direction by civilian leaders—especially those sitting in the prime minister's office, which had responsibility over the Japanese Defense Agency. Reliance on the unequal US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was partly to blame for this state of affairs, but I was surprised to learn of the extent...

Rhetoric and Realism: The First Diet Debates on Japan's Military Power

Rhetoric and Realism: The First Diet Debates on Japan's Military Power

Japan's Military Policy Today: Motivation, Problems, and Prospects

Japan's Military Policy Today: Motivation, Problems, and Prospects

Can South Korea Embrace Japan's Expanding Security Role? Sources and the Manifestation of the Conflicting Identities

Amid the soured bilateral relations with South Korea, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has taken swift steps toward transforming Japan into a more active player in East Asian power politics. This is in response to North Korea's military threat and China's maritime expansionism. These intensifying security challenges prompted Tokyo to promote military readiness and introduce a force development plan in 2013. On 1 July 2014, Japan's Cabinet passed the decision on exercising collective self‐defense, signaling a shift from the old self‐imposed restriction on the use of force as a means of dispute settlement. The reinterpretation of Article 9 heralded a more proactive engagement of Japan's military in the regional power balance. Accordingly, Japan revised the US–Japan Defense Guidelines in April 2015, strengthening ties with the United States. South Koreans expressed sharply divided attitudes toward Japan's military empowerment. Marked differences ranged between the watchful eyes of the public on the one hand, and conditional acceptance by the government and security specialists on the other. Referring to regional geopolitics and historical bilateral relations, this paper presents conditions and rationales reconciling these conflicting positions.

Japan's postwar military and civil society: contesting a better life

Japan's postwar military and civil society: contesting a better life

Japan, the Ministry of Defense and Cyber-Security

Following a series of shocks that rocked Japan's confidence in its cyber-security provisions, in April 2014 the Japanese Ministry of Defense will finally set up a unified command to deal with cyber-security threats. However, many issues, including the role of Japan's military in the protection of critical national infrastructure and the nation's cyber-warfare doctrine, have yet to be finalised. Paul Kallender examines recent policy and posture changes by the Ministry of Defense as it tries to get to grips with new and changing cyber-security challenges.

Japan's Security Policy and Military Activity

Japan's Security Policy and Military Activity

Rethinking the Utility of Nuclear Weapons

The parameters of the discussion about nuclear weapons are well known and appear to be relatively fixed. It seems as if there has been little on that front in forty years. Most civilian scholars have lost interest in nuclear weapons and moved on to other topics. But it is the habit of the military mind to learn from the past; even today there are lessons to be learned from Cannae, Waterloo, and Vicksburg. It will not surprise thoughtful military officers to find that the past has something important and interesting to tell us about nuclear weapons. The conventional wisdom is that nuclear weapons are horrible, probably immoral, but necessary. We keep them because they have a unique ability to coerce and deter. There are psychological characteristics to the weapons--as Secretary of War Henry Stimson pointed out in the first semiofficial discussion of them in 1947--that make them unlike other weapons. (1) Now evidence is throwing doubt on these decades-old conclusions. Actually not new evidence, but additional evidence culled from a careful study of the past. Hiroshimas The first and most important revision to history has to do with the efficacy of bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki. (2) This evidence, however, has nothing to do with the school of Hiroshima history. The revisionist school ascended in 1964 with the publication by Gar Alperovitz of a book arguing that bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki was unnecessary--the Japanese would have surrendered anyway. (3) This debate has caused controversy and aroused passions for almost fifty years. But it is not really about nuclear weapons. The revisionists argue that the bombings were horrible and, since they weren't necessary to win the war, they were immoral. The counterrevisionists argue that the bombings were required and were, therefore, moral. But this is a debate about whether the United States acted morally, not about whether nuclear weapons work. New evidence seems to suggest that while the bombs destroyed the cities, they didn't play much of a role (or perhaps any) in convincing Japan's leaders to surrender. Over the last twenty years, increasing access to records in Japan, Russia, and the United States has revealed that in the three days following the bombing of Hiroshima Japan's leaders had little idea that they had to surrender as a result of the bombings. (4) Meeting notes, diary entries, and the actions that various actors took during this period show that while Japan's leaders knew Hiroshima had been destroyed by a nuclear weapon, they saw this as another problem in an already difficult war, not a war-ending crisis. The Foreign Minister, Togo Shigenori, actually suggested convening the Supreme Council two days after the bombing of Hiroshima to discuss it and found he could not generate enough interest on the subject to get it on the agenda. When the Soviet Union, which had signed a five-year neutrality pact with Japan in 1941, broke that agreement and joined the war at midnight on 8-9 August, however, it touched off a crisis. Within hours of the news reaching Tokyo, the Supreme Council met to discuss unconditional surrender. It is clear from all the evidence now available that Japan's leaders surrendered because of the Soviet entry into the war and not because of the nuclear bombings. There are reasons to doubt the traditional story that the Emperor was horrified by the bombing of Hiroshima. The documentary evidence is thin, (5) and if the Emperor was so moved, it begs the question: why was he moved by secondhand reports of a city destroyed in August when he was not moved by driving through Tokyo and personally witnessing the devastation of that city in March? Would it not be sensible to expect that firsthand experience would have a stronger emotional impact than a secondhand report? (6) In some ways, this conclusion about Hiroshima makes sense. In order to believe that Hiroshima was the cause of Japan's surrender, it was necessary to believe that Japan's military men didn't know their business. …

II. History and current approaches to violence towards women in Japan

This article considers, the history, changes, and current state of the problem of violence toward women in Japan. The civic code established in 1889 aimed to establish a similar relationship between the emperor and its citizens as the patriarchal family system of the warrior caste with its ideology of faith and duty to the clan and the family. Although Japan has gone through substantial changes in the past 20 years, the situation for women is not much improved. The Gender Equality Bureau of the Cabinet Office conducts domestic violence surveys periodically. Needless to say, individual support is important; however, also needed, are the strategic methods to address the structural problems. Researchers have conducted thorough investigations and concluded that accountability lay with the Japanese government and Japan's military. Sex slavery during the war, prostitute-buying tours, 'japayukisan', and human trafficking are essentially the same problem. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved) Language: en

St John's Ambulance Brigade and the Gendering of ‘Passive Defence’ in British Malaya, 1937-42

The St John's Ambulance Brigade established itself in British Malaya in the 1930s, as part of efforts to mobilise and train the colony's subjects for civil defence as the geo-strategic climate in the Pacific deteriorated. This article demonstrates how the provision of emergency medical care was a gendered and racialised undertaking in the colonial context. Unlike the military, comprising mainly European and ‘trusted’ ethnic Indian soldiers, the realm of ‘passive defence’ was identified as a feminised undertaking for women and ethnic Chinese men who were considered to be either too vulnerable or too disloyal to bear arms. The rapid advance of Japan's military in south-east Asia violently shattered such social boundaries, as many women and non-European volunteers found themselves exposed by retreating Allied forces to the Japanese offensive and took up duties at posts from which their European supervisors had been forced to desert. Mainstream military historiography has often been highly gendered towards what is considered as the male-dominated public domain of the battlefield. In this respect, the involvement of the St John's Ambulance Brigade reveals the process in which colonial ethno-gender identities and hierarchies were being established, appropriated and subsequently subverted by the exigencies of the war in British Malaya.

Imperial-Way Zen: Ichikawa Hakugen's Critique and Lingering Questions for Buddhist Ethics (review)

Reviewed by: Imperial-Way Zen: Ichikawa Hakugen's Critique and Lingering Questions for Buddhist Ethics Nam-lin Hur (bio) Imperial-Way Zen: Ichikawa Hakugen's Critique and Lingering Questions for Buddhist Ethics. By Christopher Ives . University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, 2009. x, 274 pages. $52.00. Ōtani Kōzui (1876-1948), the twenty-second abbot of Nishi Honganji, felt strongly about the importance of Japan's military preparedness. In 1929, he lamented that his country was "addicted to peace and vitiated by cultural pursuits" (p. 29). Two years later, at the time of the Manchurian Incident, [End Page 425] he further "condemned diplomacy and advocated fighting" (p. 29), urging Japan to use military force to protect its interests throughout China. Similarly, in 1937, two Sōtō Zen leaders, Hayashiya Tomojirō and Shimakage Chikai, indicated how eternal peace could be established in East Asia: "We are sometimes accepting and sometimes forceful. We now have no choice but to exercise the benevolent forcefulness of 'killing one so that many may live' (issatsu tashō)" (p. 35). For them, killing was nothing other than Buddhist compassion serving the glory of Imperial Japan. The Buddhist leaders who jumped on the bandwagon of Japanese militarism did not know how or where to stop. Hosokawa Kei'itsu, secretary general of the Myōshinji branch of Rinzai Zen, clarified what his sect's support of Japan's Sacred War meant in doctrinal terms: "If Shakyamuni Buddha had been born in Japan . . . he would have proclaimed, as the First Principle, the Imperial Way" (p. 53). Following Hosokawa's lead, in 1939 Zen Master Harada Sōgaku (1870-1961) explained how Zen and war could be united: "In accord with each situation one should forget all things and the self, and become one with the way (the work at hand) in that situation. March: tramp, tramp, tramp. Shoot: bang, bang, bang" (p. 68). Buddhism is known as a religion that forbids killing, and its peace-loving missions are always blessed with a rich reservoir of doctrinal backup. Nevertheless, many Japanese Buddhist leaders did not shy away from exhorting their followers to kill as many enemies as possible and to sacrifice themselves for the glory of Imperial Japan. How do we make sense of Buddhist leaders who become obsessed with killing and destruction? What causes them to run counter to the peace-loving teachings they are supposed to deliver? Through the lens of Imperial-Way Zen, Ives tries to answer these questions. Was there any serious effort to prevent a repetition of Buddhist-backed destruction in post-1945 Japan? Scholars have attempted to determine why and how Japanese Buddhism supported the war efforts of Imperial Japan and, in doing so, have revealed a dismaying amount of Buddhist hypocrisy in the blood-drenched march of Japanese militarism. Yet Ives is not fully satisfied with their explanations, which, he thinks, do not deal with the core of the problem. In an effort to evaluate Buddhist collusion with the Japanese state during World War II, Ives turns to the work of Ichikawa Hakugen (1902-86). Throughout his life, Ichikawa dedicated himself to chronicling and critiquing Imperial-Way Zen. And Ives's strategy of turning to the work of this foremost scholar of Imperial-Way Zen proves to be effective. Based on a plethora of information available in Ichikawa's works, Ives offers his own reflections on wartime Buddhism, ideology, the emperor system, and Buddhist responsibility for the war. Unlike Brian Victoria, who suggests that, as Ives recapitulates, "Imperial-Way Zen was caused by the Zen connection to the samurai, swordsmanship, and the warrior ethos [End Page 426] (bushidō)" (p. 3), Ives explores how, as Ichikawa suggests, certain aspects of the doctrine of Zen Buddhism helped entangle Zen leaders with the political ambitions inherent within Imperial Japan. These include "peace of mind" (anjin), "becoming one with things" (narikiru), "accepting and according with circumstances" (nin'nun), the "logic of sokuhi," karma, the idea that "differences are none other than equality" (shabetsu-soku-byōdō), indebtedness (on), and harmony (wa). By and large, Ives agrees with Ichikawa, who argues that the conservative social stance incubated by Zen Buddhism rendered Buddhists subservient to the goals of Imperial...

An “Eventful” History ofHind Swaraj: Gandhi between the Battle of Tsushima and the Union of South Africa

This article argues that Gandhi's book Hind Swaraj was centrally concerned with undermining the influence of the violent “terrorist” wing of nationalism on Indian political militants. In particular he sought to question the inspiration that Japan's military defeat of Russia in 1905 had given to the terrorists. For Gandhi, the Japanese example led in a militaristic and Westernizing direction. To this he counterposed his own model of peaceful resistance and idealized village life. Gandhi's critique of modernity needs to be understood within the context of this project, which explains some of the inconsistencies of his relation to ideas of the modern. In the long run, the doctrine of Hind Swaraj successfully positioned Gandhi as the most radical and national of Indian political leaders, while at the same time almost surreptitiously leaving the door open to pragmatic engagement with the colonial power. This article also emphasizes the South African location of Gandhi's book; his campaign in the Transvaal and its unique conditions were crucial to the formation of the ideas put forward in it, and the unification of South Africa in 1910 was a key reference point for his constitutional notions. Winning the battle for the minds of the Indian political elite, a campaign that he launched through Hind Swaraj, was the necessary preliminary to Gandhi's later, broader achievement.

POLITICIZING JUSTICE

How are we to understand the global proliferation of truth and reconciliation commissions (TRC) and the seemingly heightened desires for historical justice at the new century's turn? Is the rush toward redress and reconciliation but a symptom of the retreat from the political? Can transitional justice, whether in tribunals, reparations, apologies, or TRCs, suggest more than the liberal management of postviolence societies? This essay explores these and other questions by examining insights derived from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea (TRCK). The TRCK's idea of redress was unique in that it understood the Korean War to be an outcome of the multifaceted histories of Japanese colonialism, post-liberation dictatorial regimes, the World War II military strategy of civilian annihilation, anticommunism, and the expansion of American empire. Moreover, the TRCK was a part of the broader post-1990s interrogation of cold war institutional and epistemic structures that had undermined earlier attempts to achieve thoroughgoing transitional justice in the aftermath of Japan's military and colonial aggression. The Korean War occurred at a critical juncture when cold war concerns contained both redress demands against Japan and anticolonial aspirations for a radically transformed global order. Engaging the works of Allen Feldman, Jacque Rancière, Slavoj i ek,and others, this essay argues that, by questioning the longue durée of modern-colonial violence, the TRCK's and other post–cold war efforts for historical justice have the potential to effectively politicize the terms and distribution of justice.

IMPASSE AT MCAS FUTENMA

In 1960, a Japanese prime minister was forced to resign after he committed Japan to an unpopular security relationship with the United States. In 2010, exactly fifty years later, the security relationship with the United States, centered on the stationing of a vast U.S. base complex in Japan, has unseated a prime minister who came to office just last year with an over 70 percent approval rating. In the small southern prefecture of Okinawa, where 75 percent of the U.S. military in Japan is stationed, the continued presence of the unpopular Futenma air base has become a lodestone for Okinawan frustration. High-level talks to remove Futenma from the crowded city of Ginowan have been ongoing since 1996, yet nothing has been accomplished. On 25 April 2010, an estimated 90,000 people rallied in Okinawa and demanded the base be removed from the prefecture completely, and not simply relocated to a location near the city of Nago. This essay attempts to explain Washington's central role in creating the problem and argues that Futenma is an unnecessary burden on the people of Okinawa and on cash-strapped Japanese and American taxpayers.

Japan's Power Shift and Its DPRK Policy

Many serious issues exist between Japan and North Korea (DPRK), such as nuclear, missile, abduction, and colonial issues. Progress on their resolution has been limited. Consequently, the two countries have remained unfriendly neighbors. Their relations recently deteriorated as a result of the DPRK's satellite launch and its second nuclear test in the first half of 2009, and Japan's strong response to them. In the middle of this period of significant tension, in August 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won a landslide victory in the lower house elections, ending the dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) over the last half a century. This political sea change in Japan has not resulted in major improvements in the Japan–DPRK relations. Yet, the DPJ's stance toward the DPRK's military threat and the Japan–US alliance is different from that of the LDP. So far, the DPJ has opted to avoid following in the LDP's footsteps of strengthening the alliance and expanding Japan's military operations in response to the DPRK's military threat. Instead, it intends to increase Japan's independence from the USA, and reduce US military presence in Japan. Given such intentions, the DPJ seems willing to improve Japan's relations with the DPRK. The question is whether its willingness will be translated into real actions to bring about major improvements.

Annexe 2 - Charter of The Women's International War Crimes Tribunal On Japan's Military Sexual Slavery

Annexe 2 - Charter of The Women's International War Crimes Tribunal On Japan's Military Sexual Slavery

Japan's Military Modernisation: A Quiet Japan–China Arms Race and Global Power Projection

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes Christopher W. Hughes, Japan's Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press/IISS, 2004); Daniel M. Kliman, Japan's Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing a New Realpolitik (Westport, CT: Praeger/CSIS, 2006); Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (New York: Public Affairs Books, 2007); Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007). H. Richard Friman, Peter J. Katzenstein, David Leheny and Nobuo Okawara, “Immovable Object? Japan's Security Policy in East Asia,” in Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, Beyond Japan: The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 85–107; Paul Midford, “Japanese Mass Opinion Toward the War on Terrorism,” in Robert D. Eldridge and Paul Midford (eds.), Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 11–42; and Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008). For a full analysis of these long-term changes in Japan's military stance, see Christopher W. Hughes, Japan's Remilitarisation (London: Routledge/IISS, 2009). Bōeishōhen, Bōei Hakusho 2008 (Tokyo: Zaimushō Insatsukyoku, 2008), pp. 50–51; Bōeishō Bōeikenkyūshō, Higashi Ajia Senryku Gaikan 2008 (Tokyo: The Japan Times, 2008), pp. 16–33. Bōeishōhen, Bōei Hakusho 2008 (Tokyo: Zaimushō Insatsukyoku, 2008), p. 66. Japan Defence Agency, National Defense Program Guideline FY 2005, http://www.jda.go.jp, pp. 2–3. Bōeishōhen, Bōei Hakusho 2008 (Tokyo: Zaimusho Insatsukyoku, 2008), p. 333. 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Sunohara Tsuyoshi, Tanjō Kokusan Supai Eisei: Dokuji Jōhō to Nichibei Dōmei (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 2005). Suzuki Kazuto, “Space: Japan's New Security Agenda,” RIPS Policy Perspectives, 5 October 2007, http://www.rips.or.jp/English/publications/rips_pp_5.html. “Govt May Propose Missile Defense Satellite,” Yomiuri Shimbun, 5 November 2008, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20081105TDY020307.htm. Bōeishōō Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō Iinkai, Uchu Kaihatsu Riyo ni Kansuru Kihon Hoshin ni Tsuite, 15 January 2009, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/uchuukaihatsu/pdf/kihonhoushin.pdf, pp. 4, 6. Richard J. Samuels, “‘New Fighting Power!’ Japan's Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security,” International Security, vol. 32, no. 3, Winter 2007–2008, p. 99. Christopher W. Hughes, Japan's Security Agenda: Military, Economic and Environmental Dimensions (Boulder: CO, Lynne Rienner, 2004), pp. 222–226. “Bōei Taikō Kaitei Honkaku Giron e: Chūchō Kokusai Kōken ni Jūten,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 9 January 2009, p. 2; Kaneko Masafumi, “Bōei Taikō o Dō Minaosu ka,” PHP Policy Review, vol. 2, no. 11, 10 December 2008, p. 7. Christopher W. Hughes, Japan's Remilitarisation (London: Routledge/IISS, 2009), pp. 139–147.